GREATHOUSE v. STATE THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES III (2025)

Defendants, the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Workforce Commission, Louisiana Rehabilitative Services (“the State”), and George Wilbur Rogers, III, appeal a partial summary judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff, Aaron Greathouse. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2023, Rogers was driving an International Harvester truck, owned by the State, in a northerly direction on Interstate 49 in Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana. Rogers was driving directly behind Greathouse, who was also driving an International Harvester truck, when Rogers’ truck impacted the rear-end of Greathouse's truck. At the time of the accident, Rogers was driving to Shreveport on a mission for his employer, the State. On August 15, 2023, Greathouse filed a petition for damages against Rogers and the State (collectively, “defendants”) alleging Rogers was at fault in causing the accident and the State ¹ was vicariously liable for his negligence. On November 27, 2023, defendants filed an answer to Greathouse's petition denying Rogers’ negligence and alleging Greathouse's fault or negligence as an affirmative defense.

On June 12, 2024, Greathouse filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the liability of the parties. Greathouse argued he was entitled to partial summary judgment that Rogers was the sole legal cause of the July 5, 2023 accident, Greathouse was free from fault, and the State was vicariously liable for Rogers’ negligence. Greathouse sought dismissal of defendants’ affirmative defense alleging Greathouse's fault in causing the accident. Greathouse attached to his motion defendants’ responses to requests for admissions, wherein they admitted Rogers was driving behind Greathouse and rear-ended Greathouse's truck. Greathouse also attached Rogers’ deposition, wherein he stated that he rear-ended Greathouse's truck after Greathouse slowed down and Rogers was unable to stop in time to avoid a collision. Greathouse attached defendants’ responses to interrogatories, wherein when asked to provide a list of “specific acts of conduct” by Greathouse that contributed to or caused the accident, defendants failed to list any such acts. As to the State's vicarious liability, Greathouse referenced Rogers’ attached deposition testimony that on the day of the accident he was working for the State and driving the State's vehicle.

Defendants opposed Greathouse's motion for partial summary judgment, arguing the motion was premature because defendants had not yet begun discovery and therefore, were unable to present sufficient summary judgment evidence in opposition to Greathouse's motion. Defendants also argued Greathouse's motion should be denied because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Greathouse was driving below the posted speed.

On August 5, 2024, a hearing was held on Greathouse's motion for partial summary judgment. Following argument, the trial court granted the motion, finding defendants had an adequate opportunity to obtain evidence to oppose the motion and no genuine issue of material fact existed precluding partial summary judgment.

On August 28, 2024, the trial court signed a written judgment granting Greathouse's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Rogers was the sole legal cause of the July 5, 2023 accident and that the State was vicariously liable for his negligence, and striking defendant's affirmative defense alleging fault on the part of Greathouse.

Defendants appeal the trial court's August 28, 2024 judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in granting Greathouse's motion for partial summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Greathouse's comparative fault and his motion was premature because defendants did not have adequate time to conduct discovery.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

At the outset, we note that an appellate court has the duty to examine its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Co., Inc., 2017-1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So.3d 1044, 1046 (en banc). This court's appellate jurisdiction extends only to “final judgments.” See La. C.C.P. art. 2083(A).

A partial summary judgment rendered dispositive of a particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense, may be granted in favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the summary judgment does not dispose of the entire case as to that party or parties pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(E). A judgment granted pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(E) may be immediately appealed during ongoing litigation only if it has been designated as a final judgment by the district court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. See La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(3) & (B); Pontchartrain Natural Gas System v. Texas Brine Company, LLC, 2022-1001 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/1/23), 362 So.3d 952, 956.

After the record was lodged with this Court, this Court issued a rule to show cause, noting that it appeared that the judgment at issue was a partial judgment, and was not certified as final by the trial court pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). This Court invited the trial court, on or before January 26, 2025, to designate the judgment as final under La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) if warranted and to provide reasons for the designation, or to advise this Court that no certification was necessary. The record of this matter was later supplemented with the trial court's March 10, 2025 written judgment declining to designate the August 28, 2024 judgment as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Therefore, the judgment is not a final judgment for purposes of immediate appeal. See La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(2). Consequently, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider the present appeal. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1841, 1911, 2083.

This Court has the discretionary authority to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs and review the merits when the appeal would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ application. See Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005-0074 (La. 6/29/05), 914 So.2d 34, 39; Myers v. Diaz, 2022-0445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 354 So.3d 78. Here, notice of the trial court's August 28, 2024 judgment was mailed to the parties on September 9, 2024, and defendants filed their notice of appeal on October 8, 2024. Therefore, defendants’ appeal would have been timely had it been filed as an application for supervisory writs. See Rule 4-3 of the Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal. Nevertheless, we decline to convert defendants’ appeal to an application for supervisory writs as this case does not meet the criteria set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Herlitz Construction Company, Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La. 1981) (per curiam). See Matter of Succession of Smith, 2020-1139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/2/21), 326 So.3d 1252, 1254.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we dismiss the appeal of the August 28, 2024 partial summary judgment. All costs of this appeal in the amount of $1834.50 are assessed to the appellants, the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Workforce Commission, Louisiana Rehabilitative Services, and George Wilbur Rogers, III.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Greathouse initially named the State of Louisiana through the Department of Children and Family Services as a party defendant, but subsequently amended his petition to name the correct State entity.

BALFOUR, J.