ASANTE CHIOKE v. HODGES (2025)

In this mandamus action seeking documents under the Louisiana Public Records Act, defendant, Louisiana State Police Superintendent Colonel Robert P. Hodges, in his official capacity as the Records Custodian for the Louisiana State Police and the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Public Safety Services, appeals an adverse judgment of the trial court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 21, 2024, Malikah Asante-Chioke filed a petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to the Louisiana Public Records Law, codified as La. R.S. 44:1, et seq., seeking an order directing Colonel Robert P. Hodges, in his official capacity as the Superintendent for the Louisiana State Police and the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Public Safety Services (“LSP”) to produce public records relating to the shooting death of her father, Jabari Asante-Chioke. Malikah alleged therein that on November 21, 2021, LSP Officers, including Nicholas Dowdle, “shot 36 rounds” at Jabari, killing him. Following his death, Malikah filed suit against the LSP officers and supervisors responsible for their training in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting claims of excessive force, unlawful seizure, wrongful death, and negligent training. Malikah alleged that a third-party subpoena was served on the LSP in the federal court litigation, but the LSP refused to produce any responsive documents. Malikah contended that on May 31, 2024, she submitted a public records request to the LSP seeking records relating to the shooting of Jabari, the training and supervision of Officer Dowdle, and certain records related to Lamar Davis's tenure as superintendent of the LSP. Malikah contended that the LSP withheld all responsive records on the basis that the matter was pending review by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office. Malikah sought damages, attorney's fees, costs, and other sanctions for the LSP's alleged arbitrary and capricious withholding of all records requested where criminal charges were unlikely.

In support of her petition, Malikah attached the May 31, 2024 Public Records Request, responses thereto from the LSP Records Management Division, email correspondence between Malikah's attorney and the LSP, and a provisional findings letter from Sgt. Gustavae Bethea to Lt. Chad Lacoste reporting that the use of force by Officers Dowdle, Duplessis, and Dowing was “objectively reasonable and within the confines of State law.”

The LSP opposed the petition for mandamus contending that that the Public Records Request relating to the shooting, which occurred in Jefferson Parish, involved Officer Dowdle and other officers from the East Jefferson Levee District who, while in the line of duty, were responding to Jabari raising a gun in the direction of the officers. The LSP further contended that it was voluntarily dismissed from Malikah's federal court suit pursuant to its defense of sovereign immunity.

According to the LSP, Officer Dowdle, Lamar Davis, former Superintendent of the LSP, and members of the East Jefferson Levee District in their individual capacities remain as defendants in the federal suit and that discovery in that case has been limited to facts related to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claim. The LSP noted that the video, audio, and “entire case jacket” of the LSP investigation related to the incident were submitted through discovery. The LSP further asserted an exemption pursuant to La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1) because criminal litigation is “reasonably anticipated.” According to its response to the Public Records Request, the LSP interprets the La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1) exemption to extend to “the time while under DA review, even where charges may be unlikely, since DA has [the] final word on prosecution.” The LSP also maintained that any documents dealing with the disciplinary history of Officers Dowdle and Davis and any requests for training records are considered security procedures, investigative training information, and proprietary information, which is not subject to public disclosure and is exempt pursuant to La. R.S. 44:3(A)(3).

In support of its opposition, the LSP attached its written objections filed in the federal court litigation wherein it asserted its defense of sovereign immunity, contending that the LSP is not subject to the subpoena power of the federal court, the affidavit of LSP Trooper First Class Carlos Pineda stating that the investigation and documents were submitted to the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office for consideration and review for any potential criminal charges, a letter dated September 1, 2024, from the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office stating that the “matter is still under review[,]” a Public Records Request propounded on the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office by Malikah and the responses thereto, and the LSP Initial Complaint Report completed by Officer Pineda.

The matter was heard by the trial court on September 23, 2024. The parties introduced the exhibits attached to their respective petition and opposition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the writ of mandamus and ordered the LSP to “turn over” the documents requested. The trial court further determined that Malikah was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. On October 16, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment: (1) granting the writ of mandamus; (2) ordering the LSP to produce all documents responsive to Malikah's Public Records Request; and (3) awarding Malikah attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $29,422.00.

The LSP appeals, urging the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering the LSP to produce records in response to request numbers seven, eight, and nine, which should be exempt from public disclosure as pertaining to any criminal litigation that can be reasonably anticipated under La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1);

2. The trial court erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering the LSP to produce records in response to numbers one, four, and five requesting “training records” of Office Dowdle and Lamar Davis, which should be exempt from public disclosure under La. R.S. 44:3(A)(3), as records containing “security procedures,” “investigative training information or aids,” “physical security information,” “proprietary information,” and/or “operational plans.” Alternatively, there should have been an in-camera inspection conducted by the court to determine if the training records requested fell under this exemption.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the LSP to pay $29,422.00 in attorney's fees and costs without any evidentiary submission or contradictory or evidentiary hearing and over the LSP's objections as to the amounts and inclusions of fees and costs, which are unreasonable.

DISCUSSION

Writ of Mandamus ~ Public Records Request Assignments of Error Numbers One and Two

The narrow issue before us in these assignments of error is whether exemptions to the public records law apply to certain documents requested. In our view, this issue does not implicate the discovery articles codified in La. C.C.P. arts. 1420, et seq. Instead, Malikah's request is a matter of constitutional right.

The public's right of access to public records is a fundamental right guaranteed by both the Louisiana Constitution and the Public Records Act, codified as La. R.S. 44:1, et seq. Carolina Biological Supply Company v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2015-1080 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/31/16), 202 So. 3d 1121, 1125. Article 12, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution mandates that “[n]o person shall be denied the right to ․ examine public documents, except in cases established by law.”

The custodian of the record shall present any public record to any person of the age of majority who so requests. La. R.S. 44:32(A). While the record generally must be made available immediately, the Public Records Act recognizes that some reasonable delay may be necessary to compile, review, and, when necessary, redact or withhold certain records that are not subject to production. See La. R.S. 44:33; Stevens v. St. Tammany Parish Government, 2017-0959 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/18/18), 264 So. 3d 456, 462, writ denied, 2018-2062 (La. 2/18/19), 265 So. 3d 773. In such a case, within five business days of the request, the custodian must provide a written “estimate of the time reasonably necessary for collection, segregation, redaction, examination, or review of a records request[.]” La. R.S. 44:3 5(A); Stevens, 264 So. 3d at 462. The enforcement provisions of the Public Records Act are set forth in La. R.S. 44:35.

A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law. La. C.C.P. art. 3863. In a mandamus proceeding against a public officer involving the performance of an official duty, nothing can be inquired into but the question of duty on the face of the statute and the ministerial character of the duty he is charged to perform. Salinger Group, Inc. v. City-Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2019-0295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/24/20), 309 So. 3d 373, 382.

A writ of mandamus is not an appropriate procedure where there is an element of discretion left to the public officer. Odoms v. Cammon, 2021-0828 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/3/22), 2022 WL 620773, at *3 (unpublished), writ denied, 2022-00560 (La. 5/24/22), 338 So. 3d 1186. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be applied where the law provides no relief by ordinary means or where the delay involved in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice. Zillow, Inc. v. Gardner, 2021-1172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 341 So. 3d 765, 768. The remedy must be used sparingly to compel action that is clearly provided by law. Odoms, 2022 WL 620773 at *3. Mandamus will not lie in matters in which evaluation of evidence must be exercised. Salinger Group, Inc., 309 So. 3d at 382. However, La. R.S. 44:35 authorizes the court to grant mandamus relief in all cases where a public record is improperly withheld from a person seeking disclosure. Odoms, 2022 WL 620773 at *3.

In order to invoke mandamus as a remedy under the Public Records Act, the following six requirements must be met: (1) a request must be made; (2) the requester must be a “person;” (3) the request must be made to a “custodian;” (4) the document requested must be a “public record;” (5) the document requested must “exist;” and (6) there must be a failure by the custodian to respond to the request. Odoms, 2022 WL 620773 at *4.

Appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's judgment on a writ of mandamus. Gulfsouth Credit, Inc. v. Wiley, 2019-0526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/9/20), 294 So. 3d 1096, 1097. A trial court's findings of fact in a mandamus proceeding are subject to the manifest error standard of review. Zillow, Inc., 341 So. 3d at 769. However, questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of a statute, are reviewed by appellate courts de novo, with no deference to the lower court's interpretation. Salinger Group, Inc., 309 So. 3d at 382.

In its first assignment of error, the LSP contends that the trial court erred in ordering it to produce records in response to request numbers seven, eight, and nine of the May 31, 2024 Public Records Request, which requested:

(7) All documents related to the Officer Involved Shooting of Jabari Asante-Chioke at which Nicholas Dowdle was present on November 21, 2021. This includes but is not limited to official or unofficial reports, interview notes, interview recordings or transcripts, completed standard form documents, written correspondence, transcripts or recordings of all verbal communications, or statements to the public, to East Jefferson Levee District Police Department employees or personnel, or to LSP employees or personnel, including drafts thereof.

(8) All video footage relating to the Officer Involved Shooting of Jabari Asante-Chioke at which Nicholas Dowdle was present on November 21, 2021, including, but not limited to, video footage from body-worn cameras, squad car cameras, mobile devices, pole cameras, security cameras, or other surveillance footage.

(9) All documents and communications relating to any investigation conducted by the LSP following the Officer Involved Shooting that Nicholas Dowdle was present at on November 21, 2021, including, but not limited to investigative reports, notes, or memoranda regarding interviews with LSP or East Jefferson Levee District police officers, witnesses, evidence collected from the scene, and/or any other internal affairs documentation.

In response to the Public Records Request, the LSP determined that the records requested were exempt from disclosure because “La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1) exempts investigative materials pending actual prosecution or ‘anticipated’ prosecution” and the “LSP has interpreted this to extend to the time while under DA review, even where charges may be unlikely, since [the] DA has [the] final word on prosecution.” According to the LSP, the matter “was still pending review at the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office.”

Louisiana Revised Statute 44:3(A)(1) provides that:

A. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to require disclosures of records, or the information contained therein, held by the offices of the attorney general, district attorneys, sheriffs, police departments, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, marshals, investigators, public health investigators, correctional agencies, communications districts, intelligence agencies, Council on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, or publicly owned water districts of the state, which records are:

(1) Records pertaining to pending criminal litigation or any criminal litigation which can be reasonably anticipated, until such litigation has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled, except as otherwise provided in Subsection F of this Section[.1]

(Emphasis added.)

The LSP contends on appeal that these items are exempt from public disclosure because they pertain to criminal litigation that can be “reasonably anticipated” pursuant to La. R.S.44:3(A)(1). “Reasonably anticipated” has been defined as reasonably foreseen or contemplated. Does v. Foti, 2011-0014 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/8/11), 81 So. 3d 101, 107, writ denied, 2012-0057 (La. 3/2/12), 84 So. 3d 537, citing In re Matter Under Investigation, 2007-1853 (La. 7/1/09), 15 So. 3d 972, 991. The custodian need not prove that criminal litigation will be pursued or will almost certainly be pursued. In re Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 991. Rather, the exemption applies if it can be reasonably anticipated that “criminal litigation will be brought against some potential criminal defendant who was part of the investigation.” In re Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 991.

The determination of whether a particular record falls within the exemption provided by La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1) must be made on a case-by-case basis. Does, 81 So. 3d at 107. This determination requires more than judicial acceptance of a prosecutor's assertion of privilege. In re Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 991. Rather, the determination must be made following a contradictory hearing where there is an opportunity for the presentation of evidence and cross-examination of witnesses because “[t]he determination must rest on more than an assertion by the prosecutorial authority that criminal litigation is or is not reasonably anticipated.” Louisiana Capital Assistance Center v. Riley, 2010-0733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/15/10), 54 So. 3d 177, 179, writ denied, 2011-0115 (La. 2/25/11), 58 So. 3d 459, quoting In re Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 992; Does, 81 So. 3d at 107.

The Supreme Court set forth objective factors to determine whether criminal litigation is reasonably anticipated pursuant to La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1), which serve the dual purpose of protecting the public's right to know and safeguarding a prosecutorial authority's ability to preserve the integrity of an investigatory file when criminal prosecution is reasonably anticipated. In re Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 992. Those factors are: (1) whether criminal litigation may still be initiated given the prescriptive period of the offense to be charged; (2) the temporal and procedural posture of each case; (3) whether criminal litigation has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled; (4) the assertion of the prosecutorial authority as to its intent or lack thereof to initiate criminal litigation; (5) whether the prosecutorial authority has taken objective, positive and verifiable steps to preserve its ability to initiate criminal litigation, including, but not limited to, preserving evidence, maintaining contact with witnesses, and continuing an investigation; (6) the time it would take to appropriately investigate and try an offense; (7) the prosecutor's inherent authority to determine whom, when, and how he will prosecute; (8) the severity of the crime; (9) the availability of witnesses, victims and defendants; (10) the spoliation of evidence; (11) the reasonable likelihood that a missing witness or an absconded defendant might be found; and (12) the reasonable likelihood that additional witnesses might be willing to come forward with the passage of time. In re Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 992.

The custodian of the record bears the burden of proving that the record is not subject to inspection, copying, or reproduction by a member of the public. See La. R.S. 44:31(3). However, whenever there is any doubt as to whether the public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the public's right to access. Landis v. Moreau, 2000-1157 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So. 2d 691, 694.

In Louisiana Capital Assistance Center, 54 So. 3d at 180, the appellate court observed that the only evidence offered by the district attorney at the contradictory hearing was testimony that it was the policy of the Orleans Parish District Attorney that criminal litigation could be “reasonably anticipated” in any case where the litigation period has not legally prescribed. Relying on the directive by the Louisiana Supreme Court in In re Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 972, that “[w]ere the determination based solely on the testimony of the prosecutor, inconsistencies and caprice could enter the determination of whether the Public Records Act requires disclosure of the records at issue[,]” the court found this testimony alone insufficient to establish the criminal litigation was “reasonably anticipated.”

In the instant case, the evidence offered by the LSP failed to establish that criminal litigation is reasonably anticipated in order to meet its burden, as the custodian, of proving that the public record is not subject to production. In fact, the only evidence offered by the LSP responsive to the factors used to evaluate whether criminal litigation was “reasonably anticipated,” was a letter from the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office that the matter was “under review.” The LSP failed to offer any evidence to address the remaining factors set forth in In re Matter Under Investigation. Under the prevailing jurisprudence, we find this assertion by the prosecutorial authority insufficient to establish that criminal litigation is reasonably foreseen or contemplated. See Does, 81 So. 3d at 107; In re Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 991; Louisiana Capital Assistance Center, 54 So. 3d at 180. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's determination that the LSP failed to meet its burden of establishing that the documents requested are subject to the La. R.S. 44:3(A)(1) exemption.

In its second assignment of error, the LSP contends that the trial court erred in ordering it to produce training records requested in numbers one, four, and five, as follows:

(1) All employment and/or personnel files of LSP officer Nicholas Dowdle. This includes but is not limited to, any resumes, employment applications, letters of reference, training records, letters of reprimand, disciplinary records, performance evaluations, and any performance awards or recognition. For the avoidance of doubt, we do not seek any confidential personal information, including financial or medical information, and request that, if the requested files contain any such materials, that they be produced with appropriate redactions.

(4) All training materials received by and all records of trainings administered to Nicholas Dowdle regarding de-escalation tactics or encounters with individuals suffering from mental health issues from the start of his employment with the LSP through November 21, 2021.

(5) Former LSP Superintendent Lamar Davis's employment and/or personnel files during his tenure as an LSP employee. This includes but is not limited to, resumes, employment applications, letters of reference, training records, letters of reprimand, disciplinary records, performance evaluations and/or awards, and records related to his retirement from the LSP.

(Emphasis added.)

The LSP contends that the “training records” of Office Dowdle and Lamar Davis requested by Malikah contain “security procedures,” “investigative training information or aids,” “physical security information,” “proprietary information,” and/or “operational plans[,]” which are exempt from public disclosure pursuant to La. R.S. 44:3(A)(3). According to the LSP, at a minimum, there should have been an in-camera inspection conducted by the court to determine if the training records requested fell under this exemption.

Louisiana Revised Statute 44:3(A)(3) provides that:

A. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to require disclosures of records, or the information contained therein, held by the offices of the attorney general, district attorneys, sheriffs, police departments, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, marshals, investigators, public health investigators, correctional agencies, communications districts, intelligence agencies, Council on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, or publicly owned water districts of the state, which records are:

* * *

(3) Records containing security procedures, investigative training information or aids, investigative techniques, investigative technical equipment or instructions on the use thereof, criminal intelligence information pertaining to terrorist-related activity, or threat or vulnerability assessments collected or obtained in the prevention of terrorist-related activity, including but not limited to physical security information, proprietary information, operational plans, and the analysis of such information, or internal security information[.]

The LSP contends that the tactical training officers receive must be covered by these exemptions for the safety and security of the officers. According to the LSP, the statutory exemptions in place recognize that providing the tactical training of law enforcement as it relates to de-escalation and the mentally ill presents a significant risk to law enforcement.

In the absence of controlling jurisprudence, the LSP relies on an Attorney General Opinion, which determined that La. R.S. 44:3(A)(3) protects records containing security measures, investigative training information or aids, investigative techniques and/or internal security information and that producing a list of all training received by officers who conduct training could reveal protected information. The attorney general thus concluded that “the training received by officers is protected from disclosure” by La. R.S. 44:3(A)(3). See La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 12-0005 (2012), 2012 WL 2090505, *2 (unpublished).

On review, we note that while an Attorney General opinion is merely advisory and not binding authority, we recognize its persuasive authority, particularly where there is no jurisprudence on point. Dipaola v. Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System, 2014-0037 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/14), 155 So. 3d 49, 53 n. 4, writ denied, 2014-2575 (La. 2/27/15), 159 So. 3d 1071; Purpera v. Robinson, 2020-0815 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/21), 320 So. 3d 425, 429 n. 5, writ denied, 2021-00406 (La. 5/11/21), 315 So. 3d 868. Nonetheless, we instead elect to employ an application of the plain language of the statute at hand.

Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will. Roper v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2016-1025 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/15/18), 244 So. 3d 450, 465, writ denied, 2018-0854 (La. 9/28/18), 252 So. 3d 926. Thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for legislative intent. In re Succession of Boyter, 99-0761 (La. 1/7/00), 756 So. 2d 1122, 1128. The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself, as the text of the law is the best evidence of legislative intent. See La. R.S. 1:4 and 24:177(B)(1). A statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed fair purpose and intent of the legislature in enacting it. Roper, 244 So. 3d at 465.

Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. La. R.S. 1:3. When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. La. C.C. art. 10. When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole. La. C.C. art. 12.

A plain reading La. R.S. 44:3(A)(3) reveals that the training records and training materials requested by Malikah are clearly exempted from disclosure. See also Major v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2010 WL 1979431, at *3 (M.D. La. 2010) (unpublished). However, it appears unlikely that the whole of the material requested in numbers one, four, and five fall within this exempt category of records. Thus, on review, we find the trial court erred in ordering their wholesale production. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to conduct a contradictory hearing for a judicial determination and in camera inspection, if necessary, as to whether the training records sought can be produced, in whole or in part, in compliance with La. R.S. 44:3(A)(3). See La. R.S. 44:3(C).

Attorney's Fees and Costs Assignment of Error Number Three

In its final assignment of error, the LSP contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Malikah $29,422.00 in attorney's fees and costs without conducting a contradictory or evidentiary hearing and over the LSP's objections as to the amounts and inclusions of fees and costs, which it contends are unreasonable.

Louisiana Revised Statute 44:35(D)(1) governs the award of attorney's fees and costs in suits under the public records act, as follows:

If a person seeking the right to inspect, copy, or reproduce a record or to receive or obtain a copy or reproduction of a public record prevails in such suit, he shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and other costs of litigation. If such person prevails in part, the court may in its discretion award him reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate portion thereof.

This provision requires a mandatory award of reasonable attorney fees in favor of a plaintiff who prevails in an action under the Public Records Act. If the plaintiff prevails in part, an award of attorney fees is discretionary. See La. R.S. 44:35(D); Roper, 244 So. 3d at 469; Williams Law Firm v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 2003-0079 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So. 2d 557, 564.

After granting Malikah “reasonable attorney's fees” at the hearing, the trial court indicated that it would conduct a hearing if there was any dispute as to the reasonableness of the fees. The LSP objected to the judgment awarding $29,422.00 for attorney's fees and costs as unreasonable and included the basis for its objection upon the judgment's circulation. However, the trial court did not conduct a contradictory hearing on the award of attorney's fees and costs.

In any event, because we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court herein, Malikah has now prevailed in part. See La. R.S. 44:35(D) (If such a person prevails in part, the court may in its discretion award reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate portion thereof.). Accordingly, we vacate the award of attorney's fees and costs and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to determine whether Malikah is entitled to a reasonable award of attorney's fees pursuant to La. R.S. 44:35(D), and if so, to conduct a contradictory hearing to determine the amount of such fees.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the October 16, 2024 judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions.

Costs of this appeal in the amount of $980.00 are assessed one-half to Louisiana State Police Superintendent Colonel Robert P. Hodges, in his official capacity as the Records Custodian for the Louisiana State Police and the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Public Safety Services, and one-half to Malikah Asante-Chioke.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Revised Statute 44:3(F) provides that:Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, after a period of ten years has lapsed from the date of death of a person by other than natural causes, and upon approval by the district court having jurisdiction over any criminal prosecution which may result due to the death of such person, any prosecutive, investigative, and other law enforcement agency, or any other governmental agency in possession of investigative files or evidence or potential evidence, or any other record, document, or item relating to said death shall, upon request, provide copies of all such files, records, and documents to immediate family members of the victim and shall provide unlimited access for any and all purposes to all such evidence, potential evidence, and other items to any member of the immediate family and to any person or persons whom any member of the immediate family has designated for such purposes. The access granted shall include but not be limited to the examination, inspection, photographing, copying, testing, making impressions, and the use in any court proceeding of and conducting forensic studies on such evidence, potential evidence, and other items. For the purposes of this Subsection, the term “immediate family” shall mean the surviving spouse, children, grandchildren, and siblings of the victim.

MILLER, J.