GALMON v. ST HELENA PARISH POLICE JURY (2025)

Plaintiff, Edward Galmon, appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant, St. Helena Parish Police Jury (“the Police Jury”), dismissing Mr. Galmon's suit with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following undisputed facts were established by the evidence submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment.

In October of 2008, the Police Jury hired Mr. Galmon as a full-time building inspector for St. Helena Parish. As a building inspector for the parish, Mr. Galmon was assigned planning review and conducted assessments on buildings to determine whether the structure was sound or whether a structure needed to be condemned. (130-32, 203). His supervisor was Tressa Byrd, the Building Official. Mr. Galmon's work hours were 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. At some point in 2019, Mr. Galmon began to notice that Ms. Byrd and Michael Martin, Director of Homeland Security for the parish, were leaving work before 4:00 p.m. some days, but Mr. Galmon “did not hear the time clock get punched.” Mr. Galmon also observed Ms. Byrd and Mr. Martin, who were both employed by the St. Helena Parish School District, driving school buses during hours when he believed they should have been working for the Police Jury. After observing Ms. Byrd and Mr. Martin, Mr. Galmon reviewed Mr. Martin's timecard, which showed that Mr. Martin was clocking out after 4:00 p.m.

On November 12, 2019, during a Police Jury meeting, Mr. Galmon reported his observations to the Police Jury. Mr. Galmon provided each member of the Police Jury with a packet, which included a few pictures ¹ and a complaint letter detailing his observations of Ms. Byrd and Mr. Martin driving buses for the school district while remaining on the clock for the Police Jury.

A few days after the November 2019 Police Jury meeting, Mr. Galmon walked into the office and saw Ms. Byrd speaking with Toni Melton, Deputy Director of Homeland Security for the Police Jury. According to Mr. Galmon, he overheard Ms. Byrd tell Ms. Melton that “Frank[² ] is going to handle this” and then Ms. Byrd told Mr. Galmon “I'm going to get rid of you.” In December of 2019, the locks on the Police Jury's office building were changed, and Ms. Byrd did not give Mr. Galmon a new key to the office.³

On January 30, 2020, Mr. Galmon met with employees of the Louisiana Legislative Auditor (“LLA”). During the meeting, Mr. Galmon expressed his concerns regarding Ms. Byrd's payroll issue and his belief that he was about to be terminated. Mr. Galmon also furnished the LLA with a copy of the complaint letter he submitted to the Police Jury at the November 12, 2019 meeting. Thereafter, in February of 2020, the LLA provided the independent auditors with details of an allegation regarding payroll fraud by two employees. Mr. Galmon was subsequently terminated from his full-time position as a building inspector and reduced to part-time.

On June 3, 2020, Mr. Galmon filed this lawsuit alleging that the Police Jury engaged in reprisal against him in violation of La. R.S. 23:967, the Louisiana Whistleblower Act (“LWA”). Mr. Galmon asserted that the actions/inactions of the Police Jury, through Ms. Byrd and Mr. Martin, constituted malfeasance in office, a violation of La. R.S. 14:134, and public payroll fraud, a violation of La. R.S. 14:138. Mr. Galmon alleged that as a result of the Police Jury's actions, he sustained damages, which include, but are not limited to, severe and extreme emotional distress, lost wages and/or benefits, mental anguish, humiliation and embarrassment, loss of earning capacity, and medical expenses.

On May 13, 2024, the Police Jury filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting there exist no genuine issue of material fact and mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Police Jury asserted that Mr. Galmon had not produced any evidence that it was an “actor who violated the law” for which Mr. Galmon blew the whistle. The Police Jury further asserted that even if the court found to the contrary, it did not take reprisal action against Mr. Galmon. In support of the motion for summary judgment, the Police Jury submitted the following evidence: (1) Mr. Galmon's petition (Exh A); (2) Mr. Galmon's deposition excerpts (Exh B); (3) Bruce Harrell's (the independent auditor) deposition excerpts (Exh C); (4) the Police Jury's February 10, 2020 meeting minutes (Exh D); (5) Notice of Employment Claim from the Louisiana Workforce Commission (Exh E); (6) the Police Jury's June 9, 2020 meeting agenda (Exh F); (7) the Police Jury's June 9, 2020 meeting minutes (Exh G); and (8) Ms. Byrd's deposition excerpt (Exh H).

Mr. Galmon opposed the motion for summary judgment and objected to exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G” because the documents were not certified. Attached to the opposition to the motion for summary judgment were the following: (1) Mr. Galmon's deposition excerpts; (2) Mr. Harrell's deposition excerpts; (3) Mr. Martin's deposition excerpts; (4) Police Juror Major Coleman's affidavit; (5) Ms. Byrd's deposition excerpts; and (6) local ordinances.

Before the hearing, the Police Jury filed a reply memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment and an expedited motion to substitute exhibits in connection with the July 22, 2024 hearing on the motion for summary judgment. In the motion to substitute, the Police Jury requested to substitute the attached verified true and correct copies of its exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G” in place of the originally submitted uncertified copies of the same. The Police Jury also sought to admit affidavits from Ms. Brown authenticating the exhibits.

Following a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On July 31, 2024, the trial court signed its “reasons for judgment,” granting the Police Jury's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Galmon's suit with prejudice, deeming the judgment a final judgment.⁴ This judgment is the subject of the instant appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Galmon assigned the following as error:

1. The trial court erred by failing to rule on plaintiff's objections to defendant's exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G” filed in support of the motion for summary judgment.

2. The trial court incorrectly imposed a heightened burden on plaintiff to defeat the motion for summary judgment; specifically requiring plaintiff to present “corroborating evidence” of defendant's payments to Ms. Byrd for work she did not perform.

3. The trial court erred by concluding there were no genuine issues of material facts [as to whether] the defendant violated the law, which plaintiff opposed and reported.

4. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment as there are genuine issues of material fact precluding judgment as a matter of law.

FAILURE TO RULE ON EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Galmon argues the trial court erred by not ruling on his objection to exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G.” He argues the exhibits should have been rejected and not considered in connection with the motion for summary judgment because the exhibits are not competent summary judgment evidence pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(4)(a).

Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(2), “[a]ny objection to a document shall be raised in a timely filed opposition or reply memorandum. The court shall consider all objections prior to rendering judgment. The court shall specifically state on the record or in writing whether the court sustains or overrules the objections raised.”

Louisiana Code Civil Procedure article 966(A)(4)(a) pertinently provides:

The only documents that may be filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, certified copies of public documents or public records, certified copies of insurance policies, authentic acts, private acts duly acknowledged, promissory notes and assignments thereof, written stipulations, and admissions.

In Mr. Galmon's memorandum in opposition to the Police Jury's motion for summary judgment, he objected to exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G.” The challenged exhibits are the February 10, 2020 and June 9, 2020 minutes from the St. Helena Parish Police Jury Special and Regular Sessions (exhibits “D” and “G”), the Louisiana Workforce Commission Notice of Unemployment Claim application (exhibit “E”), and the St. Helena Parish Police Jury Regular Session Agenda for June 9, 2020 (exhibit “F”).

The Police Jury subsequently filed an expedited motion to substitute exhibits in connection with the upcoming July 22, 2024, hearing on the motion for summary judgment. In the motion to substitute, the Police Jury requested to substitute the attached verified true and correct copies of its exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G” in place of the originally submitted uncertified copies of the same. The Police Jury also sought to admit affidavits authenticating these documents. During the July 22, 2024, summary judgment proceeding, counsel for Mr. Galmon apprised the court that Mr. Galmon objected to the aforementioned exhibits, and argument ensued between counsel for the parties relative to the Police Jury motion to substitute exhibits. The trial court in turn stated, “I will look at them. I'm not ruling on that now.”

Generally, when the trial court fails to rule on objections to evidence submitted with the motion for summary judgment, this court remands the matter to the trial court for compliance with La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(2). See Jones v. State, 2023-1236 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/24), 2024 WL 4661803, n.3, writ denied, 2024-01490 (La. 4/1/25), 404 So.3d 650. It is evident from the record that the trial court did not consider or rely on exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G” in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Police Jury violated state law and in reaching its decision to grant the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, in our independent review of the record, we do not rely on exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G” to reach our conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Police Jury violated state law and that summary judgment is appropriate in this case. Accordingly, we see no practical reason to remand this matter to the trial court to rule on the objection to exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, and “G.”

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendant may move for summary judgment at any time for all or part of the relief for which he has prayed. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(1). “After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(3). Bonano v. Docar Sales, Inc., 2024-0194 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/20/25), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 866993 *2. Appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

The mover has the burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1). However, “if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.” Instead, the mover must “point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.” If the mover is successful, “[t]he burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1).

LOUISIANA WHISTLEBLOWER ACT

Mr. Galmon's second, third, and fourth assignments of error challenge the trial court's dismissal of his claims under the LWA. Mr. Galmon argues his deposition testimony should have been sufficient to establish disputed issues of fact that the Police Jury violated the law. Mr. Galmon further argues that the trial court erred by finding there was insufficient evidence of the Police Jury violating the law and therefore granting summary judgment.

The LWA, La. R.S. 23:967, governs employee protection from reprisal. It provides in pertinent part:

A. An employer shall not take reprisal against an employee who in good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation of law:

(1) Discloses or threatens to disclose a workplace act or practice that is in violation of state law.

(2) Provides information to or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into any violation of law.

* * *

B. An employee may commence a civil action in a district court where the violation occurred against any employer who engages in a practice prohibited by Subsection A of this Section. If the court finds the provisions of Subsection A of this Section have been violated, the plaintiff may recover from the employer damages, reasonable attorney fees, and court costs.

The LWA protects employees against reprisal from employers for reporting or refusing to participate in illegal work practices. The statute targets serious employer conduct that violates the law. Gautreau v. EnLink Midstream Operating GP, LLC, 2021-0796 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/25/22), 342 So.3d 939, 947, writ denied, 2022-01010 (La. 10/12/22), 348 So.3d 68. The statute requires an employee to prove an actual violation of state law by the employer in order to prevail on the merits under the LWA. Porto v. TBC Grand Bayou, LLC, 2019-1376 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/11/20), 303 So.3d 1060, 1064.

Furthermore, the plaintiff is required to establish that the employer, not simply its employees, violated state law. See Gautreau, 342 So.3d at 947, citing Dillon v. Lakeview Regional Medical Center Auxiliary, Inc., 2011-1878 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/13/12), 2012 WL 2154346, at *5 & n. 8 (unpublished), writ denied, 2012-1618 (La. 10/26/12), 99 So.3d 651 (observing that “it could be concluded that the employer must be the actor who violated the law, in order for there to be a cause of action under” La. R.S. 23:967, and that “there is no indication in the provisions of [La.] R.S. 23:967, in referencing an ‘act or practice’ of the employer, that such would encompass unauthorized acts of its employees”).

Therefore, to defeat the Police Jury's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Galmon must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists that: (1) the Police Jury violated Louisiana law through a prohibited workplace practice; (2) he advised the Police Jury of the violation; (3) he then disclosed or threatened to disclose the prohibited practice or objected to or refused to participate in the prohibited practice; and (4) a reprisal action was taken against him as a result of the threat to disclose or because of the disclosure of the prohibited practice or his objection to or refusal to participate in the prohibited practice. See Gautreau, 342 So.3d at 947-8.

Mr. Galmon asserts that he presented evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, including his deposition testimony, the photograph of Ms. Byrd driving a school bus, and Mr. Coleman's sworn statement that he observed Ms. Byrd “punch the time clock” after returning to the office from driving the school bus. Mr. Galmon further argues the Police Jury violated La. R.S. 14:138 ⁵ , La. R.S. 14:134(A)⁶ , and St. Helena Parish Ordinance 2-157(A)⁷ by paying Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd for hours they did not work for the Police Jury, but instead they were driving a school bus for St. Helena Parish School District. Mr. Galmon further argues that the Police Jury's violation of law was shown by his testimony, by former Police Juror Coleman's affidavit, and the internal auditor findings. He asserts that after he reported Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd to the Police Jury in November of 2019, the Police Jury paid Mr. Martin for work he did not perform on December 4, 2019, December 17, 2019, and December 19, 2019. Mr. Galmon asserts that the trial court correctly found that Mr. Martin was paid by the Police Jury for hours he did not work, but erroneously found the Police Jury did not violate the law.

In his deposition, Mr. Galmon testified that he personally saw Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd, who were also employed as bus drivers with the St. Helena Parish School District, operating the school bus “at times when they were on the clock for the [P]olice [J]ury.” Mr. Galmon indicated that he saw Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd “on the bus at times that would prohibit them from getting 40 hours at the [P]olice [J]ury.” According to Mr. Galmon, every day during the school year, Ms. Byrd left the office at 3:00 p.m., but Mr. Galmon could not recall how many days he personally saw her leave the building because he did not look at the clock when she left the building. When Mr. Galmon was specifically asked if he personally knew for certain whether or not Ms. Byrd clocked out from her job at the “parish” before she left on days she drove the school bus, he stated, “No.” Mr. Galmon admitted that when he heard the clock, he did not know whether Ms. Byrd was clocking in or out.

Mr. Galmon further testified that his office was located near the time clock and when his door was open, he could see people clocking in and out, and when his door was closed, he could still hear the clock machine. Mr. Galmon also testified that Mr. Martin confided in him that he was getting forty hours a week. According to Mr. Galmon, he looked at Mr. Martin's timecard and saw that Mr. Martin clocked out after 4:00 p.m.

Mr. Galmon explained that because he saw some things happening that he believed were wrong, he notified the Police Jury. According to Mr. Galmon, in November of 2019, during a Police Jury meeting, he reported Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd to the Police Jury by providing the individual members of the Police Jury with a “letter packet,” which included pictures and a complaint letter. In the complaint letter ⁸ , Mr. Galmon set forth:

The CBO signs my time sheet and [has] scrutinized every hour of my time for the last eleven years, [meanwhile], the CBO is on the clock at times when she is employed by another local governing agency (St. Helena Parish School [District]). She has even been observed driving up on a bus after hours, clocking in and driving off on the bus, later returning and clocking out. The President recently appointed another bus driver to the St. Helena Office [of] Homeland Security, and the CBO supports the same clocking practices by this appointee. It is my understanding that appointed officials shouldn't work for anybody, company, or agency in their jurisdiction. An audit of these clock rings will prove my concerns.

* * * *

The CBO on a daily [basis] [chose] to abandon her job to work for SHPSB, yet clocks more hours [than] myself whom is here 8-4 daily. The CBO now carries more than 1000 hours of comp-time. These hours needs [sic] to be audited to declare whether they are justified.

Mr. Galmon testified that in November of 2019, when he spoke with Major Coleman, a Police Juror, regarding these allegations, Mr. Coleman's position was that the Police Jury would investigate by calling in the auditor to determine if “these things were founded or not.” Mr. Galmon further testified that when he spoke with Jeremy Williams, another Police Juror, Mr. Williams assured him that he would do everything in his power to make sure the matter was investigated. Mr. Galmon also spoke with Doug Watson, another member of the Police Jury, about the matter. All of these conversations occurred after Mr. Galmon gave the Police Jury the packet on November 12th.

When Mr. Galmon was asked what specific information he had that Ms. Byrd and Mr. Martin were still clocked in while driving the school bus, Mr. Galmon described a specific incident that occurred on September 19, 2019. According to Mr. Galmon, on September 19, 2019, he and Mr. Coleman were sitting in Mr. Galmon's office shortly after 4:00 p.m. when they saw a bus pull up. Mr. Galmon saw Ms. Byrd get off the bus and enter the Police Jury building. Mr. Galmon exited the Police Jury building through the back door, went around front, got into his personal vehicle, and took a picture of the bus located in front of the building. According to Mr. Galmon, Ms. Byrd came out of the Police Jury building, and Mr. Galmon drove to the Dollar General Store. As he was exiting his vehicle at the Dollar General Store, he saw Ms. Byrd pass on the bus. Meanwhile, Mr. Galmon and Mr. Coleman were on the telephone, and Mr. Coleman said to Mr. Galmon that “they punched the clock.”

In a sworn affidavit, Mr. Coleman attested that he was a police juror on the St. Helena Parish Police Jury from 2008 through December 31, 2019. He recalled that Mr. Galmon reported to him that Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd operated the school bus while remaining clocked in with the Police Jury, after which he advised Mr. Galmon to report the matter to the Police Jury “during a meeting so it could be investigated․.” Mr. Coleman also attested that he often went to the parish building where Mr. Galmon, Ms. Byrd, and Mr. Martin worked to perform his work as a police juror, and on these occasions, he observed Ms. Byrd drive a school bus to the same parish building and/or her school bus parked in the parking lot.

According to Mr. Coleman on September 19, 2019, he and Mr. Galmon were in Mr. Galmon's office when they observed a school bus drive into the parish building parking lot. Mr. Coleman indicated that Mr. Galmon subsequently exited the building to see who was driving the bus and Mr. Galmon reported to him that he saw Ms. Byrd driving the bus and that he took a photograph of her driving the bus. Mr. Coleman also confirmed that Mr. Galmon reported Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd's conduct to the Police Jury on November 12, 2019, during the Police Jury meeting.

Bruce Harrell, Jessica Jones, and Louie Johnson, independent auditors for the Police Jury Association, employed by Bruce Harrell and Company, investigated Mr. Galmon's complaint to the Police Jury regarding the payroll issue. In his deposition, Mr. Harrell ⁹ explained, “as part of the audit, the allegations came up.” He testified that the letter that Mr. Galmon had written to the Police Jury was submitted to his firm. Mr. Harrell indicated that he could not testify as to when his firm was tasked with performing the audit of the payroll issue. However, he explained that his company's engagement had to be approved by the Police Jury, and “[t]hen it goes to the [LLA], and they have to approve it.”

Attached to Mr. Harrell's deposition is a fraud report, which reflects that on December 13, 2019, Sharonda Brown, the secretary for the Police Jury, submitted a fraud report to the LLA. In the report, it is alleged that it was brought to the Police Jury's attention that the Police Jury Building Official, Ms. Byrd, was allegedly also employed by the St. Helena Parish School District. Also attached to Mr. Harrell's deposition is an email, dated November 13, 2019, prepared by Police Juror Williams. In the email, Mr. Williams advised Mr. Speed of Speed Law Office ¹⁰ that he and the other Police Jurors received a letter from Mr. Galmon, which included allegations against another employee. Mr. Williams indicated that he was advised by Ms. Brown that Mr. Speed received a copy and inquired on how to proceed.

According to Mr. Harrell, during the audit procedure his firm received the bus logs of the times ¹¹ Ms. Byrd and Mr. Martin drove the bus route and information on when “they clocked in, clocked out, and what times they reported on their time sheets to be paid․” With regard to Mr. Martin, it was determined that out of one hundred and fifty-seven school days, there were forty-five instances of overlap in times clocked in at the Police Jury. Mr. Harrell testified that it was concluded that “there was significant deficiency in payroll.” Mr. Harrell further testified that the Police Jury acknowledged the audit was good and indicated its willingness to resolve the problem. He confirmed that there was no information that the Police Jury disputed the audit finding. The audit report reflects the independent auditors findings and that the Police Jury agreed to adopt a detailed written dual employment policy, as well as amend the supervisor signoff of assignment for each department.  ¹²

Herein, the record reflects that in November 2019, Mr. Galmon reported to the Police Jury that Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd were being paid for hours they did not work for the Police Jury. The next day, Police Juror Williams emailed Speed Law Firm, advising Mr. Speed of Mr. Galmon's allegations, and inquired on how to proceed. Thereafter, in December of 2019, Ms. Brown, the secretary for the Police Jury, submitted a fraud complaint with the LLA, reporting Mr. Galmon's allegations relative to Ms. Byrd's dual employment. In February of 2020, during audit procedure, the LLA provided to the independent auditors details of the allegations regarding payroll fraud on two employees. The audit conducted by the independent auditors was approved by the Police Jury.

Therefore, the record reflects that upon receiving Mr. Galmon's allegations — Mr. Martin and Ms. Byrd were operating the school bus during hours when they should have been working for the Police Jury — the Police Jury took steps to initiate an investigation into the matter. The investigation conducted by the independent auditors revealed that only Mr. Martin had overlapping time with the Police Jury and the school district. There is no evidence in the record that any member of the Police Jury authorized Mr. Martin to remain clocked in with the Police Jury while driving the bus for the school board. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record that after the audit, the Police Jury continued to pay Mr. Martin for hours he did not work. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the Police Jury knowingly paid Ms. Byrd or Mr. Martin for work they did not perform.

Notably, after the Police Jury received the audit, it agreed to adopt a detailed written dual employment policy, and amend the supervisor signoff of assignment for each department, demonstrating the Police Jury agreed to take action to resolve the payroll issue once the matter was completely investigated. Therefore, we find that Mr. Galmon has not produced evidence that the Police Jury violated La. R.S. 14:138 (public payroll fraud), La. R.S. 14:134(A) (malfeasance in office), and Parish Ordinance 2:157(A). As such, he has not shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists that the Police Jury violated Louisiana law through a prohibited workplace practice. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the Police Jury's motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's July 31, 2024 judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the St. Helena Parish Police Jury, dismissing Edward Galmon's suit with prejudice. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff, Edward Galmon.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record only contains one picture of what appears to be a school bus, but the image is grainy.

2.   At that time, Frank Johnson was president of the Police Jury.

3.   Ms. Byrd testified that either the administration or “some other department” had the locks changed to address a problem with too many people having keys to the building. The decision was made to only give keys to the new locks to the department heads.

4.   “When written reasons for the judgment are assigned, they shall be set out in an opinion separate from the judgment.” La. Code Civ. P. art. 1918(B). The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has held that the language contained in the second sentence of La. C.C.P. art. 1918 is precatory and, as such, does not render an otherwise complete and valid judgment invalid merely because it contains surplus language. A judgment should not be nullified if it is otherwise complete and valid except for the inclusion of reasons. John M. Floyd & Assocs., Inc. v. Ascension Credit Union, 2019-0574 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/19), 292 So.3d 922, 924. Although the trial court included the written reasons with the judgment, we decline to remand this matter to the trial court to issue a separate judgment because the judgment is otherwise complete and valid.

5.   Louisiana Revised Statute 14:138 provides in pertinent part:A. Public payroll fraud is committed when:* * *(2) Any public officer or public employee shall carry, cause to be carried, or permit to be carried, directly or indirectly, upon the employment list or payroll of his office, the name of any person as employee, or shall pay any employee, with knowledge that such employee is receiving payment or compensation for services not actually rendered by said employee or for services grossly inadequate for such payment or compensation.

6.   At the time Mr. Galmon made these allegations, La. R.S. 14:134(A), malfeasance in office, provided in pertinent part:A. Malfeasance in office is committed when any public officer or public employee shall:* * *(3) Knowingly permit any other public officer or public employee, under his authority, to intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him, or to perform any such duty in an unlawful manner.

7.   St. Helena Parish Ordinance 2:157(A) provides, “The St. Helena Parish Police Jury's department heads, being its secretary-treasurer and its parish road superintendent, shall be responsible for maintaining and policing employee time records. No employee shall be paid for time that he or she does not work, except for validly accrued leave time, compensatory time, personal leave time, funeral leave, vacation time and/or sick time.”

8.   In Mr. Galmon's complaint letter, dated November 7, 2019, he complained about other actions taken by Ms. Byrd, but those actions are not before this court.

9.   Attached to Mr. Harrell's deposition were spreadsheets produced by his firm that were formulated from Mr. Martin's time sheets from the Police Jury and the St. Helena Parish School District and the “Independent Auditor's Report,” issued January 11, 2021. Also attached to Mr. Harrell's deposition excerpts was an email dated January 31, 2020, with the LLA's emblem sent from Ryan Stamper to Tanya Phillips. In the email, Mr. Stamper advised Ms. Phillips about Mr. Galmon's complaint regarding Ms. Byrd and Mr. Martin's time.

10.   Mr. Speed's full name is not included in the record.

11.   The spreadsheets reflect that between January 30, 2019 and December 20, 2019, there were forty-five instances of overlap in times clocked in at the Police Jury and at the school board.

12.   In the auditor's report, it is noted that “[i]n February 2020 (during audit procedure), the LLA provided details of an allegation regarding payroll fraud on two employees. It was alleged that the employees did not clock out when leaving early to drive their school bus routes.”

FIELDS, J.

Penzato, J. concurs