STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RAYMOND LEE AKA RAY (2025)

The defendant in this criminal matter appeals his convictions and sentences on three counts. We affirm for the following reasons.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 21, 2022, a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned a true bill of indictment charging the defendant, Raymond Lee, with one count of second-degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one), one count of a felon possessing a firearm violating La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count two), and one count of obstruction of justice in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (count three). The defendant pled not guilty to all charges at his arraignment on April 22, 2022. A jury trial began on January 30, 2024, and concluded on February 2, 2024, with the defendant being found guilty on all three counts. The court denied the defense motions for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a new trial. On March 7, 2024, the defendant was sentenced concurrently to life at hard labor for count one, 20 years for count two, and 40 years for count three. The court ordered that the sentences for counts one and two be without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.¹ The defendant filed a motion for appeal on time, which the trial court granted.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for second-degree murder as the state's circumstantial case failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

2. The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for obstruction of justice.

3. The trial court erred in denying the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial or a mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the state proved all of the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under the Jackson standard, a review of the record for sufficiency of the evidence does not require the court to ask whether it believes the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 08-20 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/15/08), 985 So.2d 234, 240. Instead, the reviewing court must consider the whole record and determine whether any rational trier of fact would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Sufficiency of evidence for the Second Degree Murder conviction

The defendant first claims that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for second-degree murder.

As this Court observed in State v. Jacobs, 07-887 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 67 So.3d 535, 551, writ denied, 11-1753 (La. 2/10/12), 80 So.3d 468, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 838, 133 S.Ct. 139, 184 L.Ed.2d 67 (2012):

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. Williams, 05-59, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 830, 833.

La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second-degree murder as the “killing of a human being․when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La. R.S. 14:10(1) defines specific criminal intent as “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or his failure to act.” “Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.” State v. Bishop, 01-2548 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437.

The jury in this case received testimony and evidence that on December 5, 2021, the defendant was staying with his girlfriend,² Sierra Guidry, in a room at the Travelodge Motel in Harvey, within Jefferson Parish. The victim, Alonzo Wiley, was also staying in a rented room at the Travelodge on that date. In the early morning hours of December 5, the defendant and the victim exchanged text messages that appeared to show the victim soliciting prostitution from the defendant.³ The defendant sent the victim messages indicating he would meet in the victim's room. In the minutes leading up to the victim's murder, the defendant's text messages to the victim stated that he was outside the victim's hotel room and wanted him to open the door. The last text message from the defendant to the victim was at 4:28 a.m.

At 4:35 a.m., an anonymous 9-1-1 caller from the Travelodge reported hearing multiple gunshots.⁴ Police arrived and discovered the deceased victim with multiple gunshots. Dr. Dana Trosclair, a forensic pathologist with the Jefferson Parish Coroner's Office, concluded that the victim's cause of death was five gunshot wounds, and the manner of death was homicide. The two brands of spent 9 mm shell casings at the scene,⁵ Winchester 9 mm and Blazer 9 mm ammunition, were later found in a plastic bag in the defendant's possession after the execution of a search warrant at another hotel in Jefferson Parish where the defendant was staying with Sierra Guidry.⁶ They did not find the murder weapon.

Police learned from the victim's niece, Azona Wiley, that he had recently purchased a silver BMW SUV. The vehicle was not in the Travelodge parking lot after the victim's death. Surveillance video from the Motel showed the victim's car leaving the Travelodge's parking lot minutes after the murder. While the video did not identify the driver, a black Jeep owned by the defendant's girlfriend, Sierra Guidry, closely followed the BMW. When giving her statement to detectives, Guidry admitted that she had followed the defendant to New Orleans East that night; she could not recall the make and model of the car she followed. She had never seen the defendant drive the vehicle before that night and did not see the car again after he left it at his mother's home in New Orleans East.⁷ Cell phone data established that the defendant and Guidry drove near the parking lot of the Travelodge to a location in New Orleans.⁸

The investigation also revealed that the victim typically carried a Ruger handgun on his person, which his niece, Azona Wiley, purchased and gave to him. Law enforcement did not find the Ruger at the scene of the murder. A forensic analysis of the defendant's phone revealed that over a week after the murder, the defendant had taken a picture of the victim's Ruger with his phone, as established by its verified serial number visible in the photo.⁹ Texts from the defendant's phone also showed that the defendant had contacted someone about trading the victim's Ruger for a Glock handgun.

Jewelry and sunglasses recovered from the defendant's hotel room were very similar to those the victim was known to wear, as shown in video evidence taken the night of his murder.

Detectives who were investigating observed several discrepancies in the defendant's interview that differed from the evidence.¹⁰ The defendant denied ever staying at the Travelodge, where the murder occurred. He also claimed to know the victim through the music business; however, the victim was not a musician, and the music studio owner ¹¹ where the defendant and victim had allegedly met did not verify the defendant's story.

On appeal, the defendant acknowledges the evidence presented at trial that showed he was at the Travelodge at the time of the shooting and that he exchanged text messages with the victim immediately before being shot. He also recognizes the evidence showing he possessed a firearm “that was possibly stolen” from the victim. Despite the foregoing, the defendant argues that “there is no physical, scientific, or testimonial evidence that places Mr. Lee in Mr. Wylie's room on the night of the shooting.”

The defendant is correct that there was no direct evidence presented that conclusively placed him in the victim's room at the time of the murder. However, the evidence presented at trial established that the defendant texted the victim to gain entry into his hotel room. The last message said that the defendant was outside of the victim's hotel door minutes before the victim was shot and killed. Law enforcement seized ammunition, according to a search warrant, from the defendant of the type used in the victim's murder. Within minutes of the murder, the victim's gun was removed from the hotel room. The defendant had a photo of the victim's gun on his phone over a week after the murder. The keys to the victim's vehicle were missing from his hotel room. Minutes after the murder, someone drove away in the victim's vehicle to New Orleans, followed closely by the defendant's girlfriend.

Based upon our review of the record, we find no error in the jury's conclusion that the State proved all elements of second-degree murder. We can reasonably infer from the evidence presented that the defendant gained access to the victim's hotel room under pretenses while armed, murdered the victim, and removed certain items from the room.

Sufficiency of evidence for obstruction of justice

On finding that the jury's verdict for second-degree murder is supported, we now address the defendant's assignment that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for obstruction of justice.

In the true bill of indictment, the State alleged that the defendant obstructed justice “by intentionally removing the 9 mm semiautomatic handgun he used to shoot the victim from the crime scene when he knew or had good reason to know the weapon may prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding by state, local or United States law enforcement officers with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present, past or future criminal proceeding[.]” La. R.S. 14:130.1 provides the elements for obstruction of justice in the relevant part:

A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding as described in this Section:

(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding. Tampering with evidence shall include the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance either:

(a) At the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any investigation by state, local, or United States law enforcement officers; or

(b) At the location of storage, transfer, or place of review of any such evidence.

On appeal, the defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that he intended to commit obstruction of justice.

In State v. Lopez, 23-335 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/21/24), 398 So.3d 167, 181-82, writ denied, 24-01187 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 650, we explained:

Under La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1), obstruction of justice is a specific intent crime. “Specific intent” is the state of mind that exists when circumstances indicate “the offender actively desired prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). To support a conviction, the State must prove that removal of evidence from a crime scene was carried out with “the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding.” La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1); State v. Scott, 23-22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 54, writs denied, 23-1317 and 23-1318 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707. Specific intent need not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. State v. Everett, 11-714 (La. 6/13/12), 96 So.3d 605, 619.

The knowledge requirement of the obstruction of justice charge is met if the perpetrator merely knows that an act “reasonably may” affect a criminal proceeding. The statute does not require the criminal proceeding to actually be affected; the perpetrator must merely know and understand that the act reasonably may affect the proceeding. State v. Nicholas, 10-866 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 67 So.3d 610, 615. Regarding the statute's requirement that the tampering be either by the intentional “alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance,” the Supreme Court has stated that “nothing beyond ‘movement’ is required by the statute if accompanied by the requisite intent and knowledge.” State v. Tatum, 09-1004 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1082, 1090 (citing State v. Jones, 07-1052 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So.2d 95, 101).

More recently, in State v. Ford, 24-197 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 2025 WL 618008, this Court upheld a defendant's convictions for second-degree murder and obstruction of justice:

We find the evidence was sufficient under the Jackson standard to support Ford's conviction of two counts of obstruction of justice. First, as discussed heretofore, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Ford shot both victims and then left the crime scenes with the firearm—a revolver—which law enforcement believed was the murder weapon.

The defendant argues that we should follow the holding of State v. Ramirez-Delgado, 24-119 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), 2024 WL 5153070, in that the defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder and obstruction of justice. On appeal, he challenged his conviction for obstruction of justice, arguing that the State failed to prove his intent to commit the crime. The panel, relying on the Fourth Circuit case of State v. Scott, 23-22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 54, writs denied, 23-1317, 23-1318 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707, reversed the defendant's conviction for obstruction, finding:

As in Scott, defendant here did not collect the shell casings from the crime scene, destroy any surveillance footage of him, or harm the person who witnessed the shooting. In this case, there was no testimony or evidence that defendant discussed hiding or destroying the gun from the scene with anyone after the shooting. The evidence presented does not show that, in taking the gun with him, defendant gave any thought to interfering with the results of a criminal investigation or proceeding.

The instant case is distinguishable from Lopez, Scott, and Ramirez-Delgado in one crucial aspect: in this case, there were no witnesses to the murder itself and no direct evidence to tie the defendant to a murder weapon. The circumstantial evidence introduced at trial established that the defendant murdered the victim with a firearm that law enforcement did not locate at the crime scene. While law enforcement never found the gun used in the commission of the murder, spent casings found in the hotel room matched the same brand and caliber as a bag of ammunition found in the defendant's possession. Further, as discussed above, forensic analysis of defendant's cell seized phone conducted during the murder investigation produced a photograph of the victim's Ruger, as identified through its verified serial number seen in the photograph, taken over a week after the murder as well as texts in which defendant contacted another individual, seeking to trade the Ruger for a Glock handgun. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience. Jacobs, 67 So.3d at 551. In this instance, we can infer that the defendant murdered the victim and removed the murder weapon from the scene of the crime. We can also infer that, when removing the gun from the crime scene and making it impossible to locate, the defendant intended to thwart the police investigation that followed. Finally, we can also infer that defendant sought to conceal or dispose of the murder weapon by trading it for another “clean” weapon. Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the jury's conclusion that the defendant is guilty of obstruction of justice beyond a reasonable doubt.

Denial of motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal.

In his final assignment, the defendant asserts that because the evidence of obstruction was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed obstruction of justice, the trial court should have granted the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Because the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed obstruction of justice, we find that the district court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal.

Error patent discussion

We reviewed the record for patent errors following La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

The transcript does not reflect the court advising the defendant of the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; however, the minute entry reflects the court advised the defendant of these provisions. The transcript prevails when there is a discrepancy between the transcript and the minute entry. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). When a trial court fails to advise or provides an incomplete advisal, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, the appellate court may correct this error by informing the defendant of the applicable prescriptive period for post-conviction relief through its opinion. State v. Becnel, 18-549 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d 1017, 1022. Accordingly, we advise the defendant by way of this opinion that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications seeking an out-of-time appeal, shall be time-barred when filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

SENTENCES AND CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

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FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also imposed fines, court costs, and fees in connection with the three sentences.

2.   At trial, Ms. Guidry testified that she and the defendant were engaged to be married.

3.   JPSO Detective Dustin Ducote, an expert in the field of mobile device forensics, testified that copies of the text messages were found on the defendant's and the victim's cell phones.

4.   Custodian of 9-1-1 Records in Jefferson Parish, Nancy Clary, authenticated an emergency phone call from December 5, 2021 at 4:35 a.m. that originated from a Travelodge Hotel at 2200 Westbank Expressway in Harvey, within Jefferson Parish.

5.   Kortnie Layrisson testified that she worked for the JPSO Crime Laboratory on December 5, 2021, and processed the crime scene at the Travelodge on that date.

6.   JPSO Detective Steven Quintance testified about the items found pursuant to the search warrant at the hotel where the defendant and Ms. Guidry were found to be staying in Metairie.

7.   The victim's car was ultimately located in the possession of Troy Scott, and it was determined that he had no involvement in the murder and had never communicated with the defendant. Scott claimed that he bought the victim's car at a gas station in New Orleans.

8.   At trial, Special Agent William Charles Williams, part of the Cellular Analysis Survey Team (“CAST”) in New Orleans, testified about the historical record analysis for cell phone towers used to determine the defendant's movements the night of the murder.

9.   JPSO Detective Dustin Ducote authenticated the image of the victim's gun found on the defendant's cell phone.

10.   JPSO Homicide Detective Anthony Buttone testified at trial about his interview of the defendant.

11.   Derrick Thomas, owner of 504 Records studio and a DJ, testified that he had never seen the victim before at his studio. He recognized the defendant as someone he may have seen around the studio but was never introduced to.

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. JUDGE