STATE v. BARNES (2025)

In this criminal appeal, defendant, Rodrick Barnes aka Rodrick Devin Barnes, Jr. aka Rodrick D. Barnes aka Roderick Barnes, challenges his convictions and sentences for felon in possession of a firearm and attempted obstruction of justice. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences for felon in possession of a firearm and attempted obstruction of justice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 12, 2021, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office filed a bill of information charging Rodrick Barnes a/k/a Rodrick Devin Barnes Jr. a/k/a Rodrick D. Barnes a/k/a Roderick Barnes, with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count one) and obstruction of justice in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (count two).¹ At his arraignment, defendant pled not guilty.

After a two-day trial, a twelve-person jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count one) and guilty of the lesser responsive verdict of attempted obstruction of justice (count two). Subsequently, defendant filed motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and for mistrial, which the trial court denied.

The trial court sentenced defendant to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as to count one, and ten years imprisonment at hard labor for count two. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.

On April 3, 2024, the State filed a multiple offender bill of information alleging that defendant pled guilty on May 26, 2015, to seven counts of simple burglary and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in case number “548-677,” Division “G” in the 22nd Judicial District Court in St. Tammany Parish. The trial court found defendant to be a second-felony habitual offender. The court vacated defendant's sentence on count one and resentenced defendant to twenty-two years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. That sentence was ordered to run concurrently with any other sentence he may be serving, including his parole sentence in St. Tammany Parish.

EVIDENCE

At trial, Deputy Gerald Favaloro, who responded to the incident, and Detective Ryan Vaught, who investigated the incident, testified regarding the police investigation surrounding defendant's charges.

On May 25, 2021, Deputy Favaloro responded to a 9-1-1 call that shots had been fired at an apartment complex on 1645 Carol Sue Avenue. When he arrived at the scene, Deputy Favaloro found a man with multiple gunshot wounds in the parking lot and multiple spent casings in the area.

During the investigation, the police located surveillance video. In the video, Detective Vaught identified the decedent, Nathaniel Stevenson, and defendant, and observed defendant following Mr. Stevenson. Detective Vaught testified that the video showed defendant holding a handgun in his right hand. In a separate video, Detective Vaught identified Mr. Stevenson showing two men, Derrick Everfield and Rodrick Bovia, that he was not armed by raising his shirt. Detective Vaught testified that two men were the perpetrators of Mr. Stevenson's murder, and explained that once the shooting started, defendant ran through the apartment complex holding the firearm as shown in the surveillance video.

Detective Vaught testified that the dispute initiated when Mr. Everfield and Mr. Bovia threatened Mr. Stevenson on Instagram. Detective Vaught learned that their dispute involved the murder of Mr. Stevenson's relative. No threats were made towards defendant. At trial, Detective Vaught acknowledged that Mr. Stevenson was unarmed, but Mr. Everfield and Mr. Bovia each had a gun, and Mr. Bovia opened fire at Mr. Stevenson. He testified he did not think defendant was a victim of an attempted murder, but agreed that defendant was in the general area of Mr. Stevenson's murder.

During his investigation, Detective Vaught interviewed defendant regarding the incident. Defendant informed him that before leaving to go to find Mr. Everfield and Mr. Bovia, Mr. Stevenson, who was his cousin, was angry because of an exchange with Mr. Everfield and Mr. Bovia. Mr. Stevenson told defendant these individuals were connected to a two-year-old murder.

At the scene, defendant said he saw two black men, each of whom had a gun. Defendant tried to call Mr. Stevenson to come back and to not go talk to the men, but Mr. Stevenson proceeded towards them. Defendant explained to Detective Vaught that once he heard gunshots, he ran around the building. When he heard more gunshots, he returned to the car and drove down the street. Defendant indicated his car was not hit, and that he could not see who was shooting at him. He said that he drove past the two men, whom he thought were getting in a car. Defendant returned to the apartment complex to check on Mr. Stevenson, but did not see him and could not reach him by phone. When he could not find Mr. Stevenson, he called “Brian” and went to pick Brian up. They returned to the scene, and found Mr. Stevenson's body on the ground.

During the interview, Detective Vaught showed defendant photographs from the surveillance video and a Google Maps printout of the crime scene. When he asked defendant what he was holding in a certain photograph at the crime scene, defendant replied that it might be his phone. Defendant initially denied that he had a gun, but eventually admitted that Mr. Stevenson had a gun in the car. Defendant explained that when Mr. Stevenson got out of the car, he left the gun on the seat. Defendant claimed he grabbed the gun for Mr. Stevenson's protection. He later said he knew the gun could not be around him so his first instinct was to get it away from him. Defendant denied firing the gun at the crime scene but Detective Vaught testified that the casings recovered from the crime scene suggested otherwise.

Detective Vaught obtained an arrest warrant for defendant and a search warrant for defendant's hotel room in Baton Rouge. In searching defendant's hotel room, the police brought a canine trained to sniff out “ballistics or firearms.” But, the police did not find a firearm or any ammunition in the room.

The State presented testimony from Jene Rauch, accepted as an expert in firearm and tool mark examination, and Detective Vaught that evidence from the crime scene was consistent with two distinct areas of gunfire from two different guns. There were twelve .40 caliber casings fired from a .40 caliber pistol most consistent with a Glock firearm in the area where defendant parked upon arriving. Detective Vaught determined that defendant was using a .40 caliber firearm. There was also a group of ten 9 mm casings fired from a different weapon where the homicide occurred.

Ms. Rauch and Detective Vaught testified that a month after the crime, the police in Plaquemines Parish recovered a Glock model 22 .40 caliber gun during a traffic stop. After testing, the police believed that the .40 caliber Glock model 22 firearm was the firearm from which the .40 caliber casings were fired at the crime scene. Detective Vaught acknowledged that identifying it as the weapon fired at the scene did not identify the shooter or the target.

When police asked defendant where the gun was, defendant said he threw it somewhere in the apartment complex, and that he did not remember having it when he got back in his car. The police did not find it at the apartment complex.

Detective Vaught also testified regarding defendant's recorded jailhouse calls that were played for the jury. During these calls, defendant spoke about the State's lack of a gun to prove the possession of a firearm charge against him. He believed the State could not prove he possessed a gun at the crime scene if they did not have the gun.

Amanda Moore, an expert in ten-print fingerprint examination, testified that fingerprints she took of defendant and defendant's fingerprints from a November 17, 2010 booking in Orleans Parish and a December 13, 2011 “Louisiana Department of Corrections Parole and Probation, Orleans West, fingerprint booking” belonged to the same person. The State introduced a certified copy of Mr. Barnes’ prior conviction for simple robbery.

LAW and ANALYSIS

On appeal, defendant asserts the State's evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and attempted obstruction of justice. In this regard, defendant also claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and his motion for new trial. In a pro se brief, defendant claims the State improperly used his prior convictions twice: first to establish his status as a convicted felon to convict him of felon in possession of a firearm, and second to increase his sentence as an habitual offender.

 Sufficiency of the Evidence

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine if the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under the Jackson standard, the appellate court does not consider whether the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but instead, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Garrison, 19-62 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/23/20), 297 So.3d 190, 203, writ denied, 20-547 (La. 9/23/20), 301 So.3d 1190.

It is not the function of the appellate court to assess credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v. Havies, 22-133 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/22/22), 355 So.3d 677, 687, writ denied, 23-76 (La. 9/19/23), 370 So.3d 463. The trier of fact shall evaluate credibility, and when faced with a conflict in testimony, is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Id., citing State v. Garrison, 297 So.3d at 204.

 Count One — Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon

In order to convict a defendant of illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had: (1) possession of a firearm; (2) a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; (3) an absence of the ten-year statutory period of limitation; and (4) the general intent to commit the offense. La. R.S. 14:95.1; State v. Kelly, 19-425 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/31/20), 299 So.3d 1284, 1288. General criminal intent is “when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(2). Intent is a question of fact and may be inferred from the circumstances of a transaction. State v. Bell, 21-599 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/22/22), 343 So.3d 914, 922, writ denied, 22-1179 (La. 9/27/22), 347 So.3d 155.

Defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to convict him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the evidence does not connect him to the weapon seized in Plaquemines Parish or show he possessed that firearm. Defendant, alternatively, argues that even if he possessed the firearm, the possession was legally justified in that he possessed the gun only for a duration sufficient to defend Mr. Stevenson's life.

The State contends defendant's conviction for felon in possession of a firearm was established by the surveillance footage showing defendant with a gun in his hand, and defendant's admission that Mr. Stevenson had a gun in the vehicle and that he possessed the gun when he exited the car. The State disputes that defendant was justified in possessing a firearm because there was no imminent threat.

The evidence at trial clearly established that defendant had possession of the firearm. First, photographs taken from surveillance video of the incident clearly show defendant with a gun in his hand. Second, in his statement to the police, defendant initially denied possessing a gun, but eventually admitted that Mr. Stevenson brought a gun in his car and left it on the seat. Third, defendant also admitted he took the gun with him when he exited the vehicle, claiming he needed it to protect Mr. Stevenson. In defendant's statement to the police and jailhouse calls, he acknowledged that he was not supposed to possess a gun due to his previous conviction and sentence.

After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction.

Defendant asserts his possession of the firearm was legally justified to protect Mr. Stevenson. Justification is a viable defense to illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. State v. Blache, 480 So.2d 304, 308 (La. 1985). The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that when a felon is in imminent peril of great bodily harm, or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, he may take possession of a weapon for a period no longer than is necessary or apparently necessary to use it in self-defense, or in defense of others. Id. at 308; State v. Lewis, 98-447 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/98), 720 So.2d 1230, 1232. Defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that he was in imminent peril or great bodily harm or reasonably believed himself or others to be in such danger. State v. McKinney, 19-380 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/19), 289 So.3d 153, 164. Even so, the defendant could only have taken possession of the weapon for a period no longer than was necessary or apparently necessary to use it in self-defense or in defense of others. State v. Blache, 480 So.2d at 308. “ ‘Necessity,’ when raised as a defense to the illegal possession of a firearm, entails proof that the threat or force by another is imminent and apparent, and that the person threatened has no reasonable alternative but to possess the firearm.” State v. Lee, 00-1253 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/30/01), 782 So.2d 1063, 1067, writ denied, 01-831 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 338.

Defendant did not prove the lack of a reasonable alternative to his possession of the gun. Defendant admitted he went with Mr. Stevenson to meet the men knowing Mr. Stevenson was angry, had a gun in the vehicle, and there would likely be an altercation. In addition, defendant could have chosen to not go with Mr. Stevenson or alerted the police of a potential incident involving a gun. Considering these facts, we find the evidence shows defendant had a reasonable alternative to possessing the gun.

Moreover, the evidence does not show that imminent and apparent danger existed when defendant left to go to the apartment complex or when he exited the vehicle with the gun. No threat existed at the time defendant and Mr. Stevenson left to go to the apartment complex already in possession of a gun. In addition, when defendant exited the vehicle, he took the gun with him even though Mr. Stevenson, who intended to fight the men they were meeting, left it in the car. The evidence does not show there was an imminent threat of harm when defendant exited the car. Thus, considering the evidence presented, we find no error in the jury's conclusion that defendant failed to prove he was justified in possessing the gun for a period no longer than was necessary or apparently necessary to use it in defense of Mr. Stevenson. The credibility of a witness is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of a witness. State v. Le, 22-468 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So.3d 162, 170, writ denied, 23-1230 (La. 2/6/24), 378 So.3d 752. The resolution of conflicting testimony rests solely with the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Dominguez, 14-1 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/28/14), 148 So.3d 648, 654, writ denied, 14-2033 (La. 5/22/15), 170 So.3d 982.

Considering the foregoing, we cannot say the record shows defendant established he was in imminent harm when he exited the vehicle with the gun or did not have a reasonable alternative. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

 Count Two — Attempted Obstruction of Justice

Defendant asserts the conviction for attempted obstruction of justice is unsupported because there was no evidence showing that defendant possessed or attempted to dispose of the firearm. In response, the State contends that the firearm defendant possessed had to go somewhere and was later found in Plaquemines Parish. It argues that the logical conclusion is that defendant disposed of the firearm, constituting obstruction of justice.

The State charged defendant with obstructing justice relative to a murder investigation. The jury convicted defendant of the lesser charge of attempted obstruction of justice. The trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the reliance on circumstantial evidence in determining whether defendant was guilty.

When circumstantial evidence forms the basis of a conviction, such evidence must consist of “collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.” State v. Manuel, 21-0273 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/6/22), 337 So.3d 967, 973. Where there is no direct evidence presented proving one or more of the elements of the offense, La. R.S. 15:438 provides “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” State v. Woods, 23-41 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/23), 376 So.3d 1144, 1155, writ denied, 23-1615 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 700. The statutory test for La. R.S. 15:438 “works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency test to evaluate whether all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury.” State v. Scott, 23-0022 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 50-51, writ denied, 23-1317 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707, and writ denied, 23-1318 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707 (citing State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 968 (La. 1986)).

On appellate review, the court can affirm the conviction only if the reasonable hypothesis is the one favorable to the state and there is no reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La. 1983). This circumstantial evidence rule is not a separate test from the Jackson standard; instead, La. R.S. 15:438 merely “provides an evidentiary guideline for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence and facilitates appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 889, on reh'g (June 21, 2002); State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198, 1201 (La.1984). “Although the circumstantial evidence rule may not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general reasonable juror's reasonable doubt formula, it emphasizes the need for careful observance of the usual standard, and provides a helpful methodology for its implementation in cases which hinge on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence.” Bridgewater, 823 So.2d at 889.

The crime of obstruction of justice is committed, when with the knowledge that an act may affect a criminal proceeding, the defendant tampers with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation.² La. R.S. 14:130.1 A. Evidence tampering includes the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance at the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any law enforcement investigation. La. R.S. 14:130.1 A(1). To support a conviction, the State must prove more than the mere removal of evidence from a crime scene; the State must also prove that such removal was done with “the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding.” Id.

Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act and may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Holliday, 17-1921 (La. 1/29/20), 340 So.3d 648, 666, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 141 S.Ct. 1271, 209 L.Ed.2d 10 (2021); State v. Tatum, 09-1004 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/25/10), 40 So.3d 1082, 1089.

La. R.S. 14:27 defines an attempt as follows:

A. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

In the bill of information, the State specified that defendant obstructed justice in a murder investigation by intentionally removing a semi-automatic handgun from the scene. We first point out that there were at least two guns used at the crime scene: the gun used to shoot and kill Mr. Stevenson, which the police never found, and the handgun defendant possessed at the crime scene, which was later found in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The handgun removed to and found in Plaquemines Parish is the basis of defendant's attempted obstruction of justice conviction.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could have concluded defendant fled from the scene with a gun in his hand. The evidence shows that after the murder, defendant got back into his vehicle and drove around the parking lot for a few minutes looking for his cousin, before leaving to pick up “Brian” from a different location. Defendant then returned to the crime scene with “Brian” to again look for his cousin. Defendant eventually dropped “Brian” off and drove to Port Allen instead of staying at the scene or calling 911. While defendant eventually returned to Jefferson Parish for an interview later that evening, it is significant that defendant initially lied about possessing a gun. Defendant eventually admitted to possessing a gun, but only after arguing with the detectives for approximately ten minutes after being confronted with photographic evidence. He also provided other statements which were inconsistent with the physical evidence located at the scene. Additionally, the firearm was not found at the scene of the crime, even after a canine-assisted search, despite defendant's first statement that he “probably dropped it” and his second statement that he threw it down before leaving.

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant fled the scene with the firearm, and either gave it to Brian or tossed it somewhere between the time he left the scene and the time he turned himself in to the police many hours later.

We further find that it can be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew or had good reason to believe the handgun he possessed would be relevant to the Stevenson murder investigation. Under La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1), obstruction of justice is a specific intent crime. Specific intent need not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. State v. Lopez, 23-335 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/21/24), 398 So.3d 167, 181, writ denied, 24-1187 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 650.

This Court has previously upheld convictions for obstruction of justice when specific intent can be inferred from the circumstances. For example, in Lopez, supra, the defendant fired shots from a vehicle. A witness testified at trial that the defendant kept the gun when he exited the vehicle. While the defendant fled to Florida, he was later apprehended, but the gun was never found.

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant intentionally removed the .40 caliber Glock from the crime scene, which he knew may reasonably become the subject of a law enforcement investigation. He was clearly aware that his cousin was shot and killed there, so any gun that had been at the scene would be part of the investigation. He also clearly knew that the Glock was evidence that he, a convicted felon, was in illegal possession of a firearm. Both support a jury's conclusion that defendant had the requisite specific intent to remove the gun to prevent its discovery by police.

Considering the foregoing, we find the evidence supported a finding that any reasonable hypothesis of innocence did not exist. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted obstruction of justice.

 Sentencing

In his pro se brief, defendant claims that his enhanced sentence results from an improper double enhancement. He claims the same convictions (seven counts of simple burglary) were improperly used to adjudicate him as a felon in possession of a firearm and an habitual offender. We find this incorrect.

Although the original bill for felon in possession of firearm listed multiple predicate convictions, the bill was amended twice, ultimately striking all of the 2015 convictions. As a result, defendant proceeded to his felon in possession of a firearm trial with the 2011 predicate conviction of simple robbery as the predicate conviction for the crime. At trial, the State, through Ms. Moore, only established defendant's 2011 simple robbery conviction.

In the habitual offender bill, the State used 2015 convictions for seven counts of simple burglary and a 2015 felon in possession of a firearm conviction as the predicate convictions. The State established these predicate convictions with expert testimony at the habitual offender hearing. The court used them to adjudicate defendant as a second-felony offender adjudication.

Consequently, the record establishes that the 2011 simple robbery was used as an element of the felon in possession of a firearm offense, and the seven counts of simple burglary and the 2015 conviction of felon in possession of a firearm were used as the predicate convictions for the habitual offender adjudication. Therefore, the conviction used as an element for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, the 2011 simple robbery conviction, was not used as a predicate felony conviction in the habitual offender proceedings, as alleged by defendant.

Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ERROR PATENT DISCUSSION

We have reviewed the record for errors patent and found the following, which requires corrective action. La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

At defendant's habitual offender sentencing, the trial court ordered defendant's enhanced sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence defendant may be serving, including his parole sentence in St. Tammany Parish. The minute entry and habitual offender uniform commitment order (UCO) identify the St. Tammany case number as 584-677. The transcript of the hearing, however, indicates the correct number is 548-677. Specifically, defendant's counsel informed the trial court that the correct case number was “548-677.”

We therefore remand this case for correction of the enhanced sentence minute entry and the habitual offender UCO to reflect the correct case number and direct the Clerk of Court for the 24th Judicial District Court to transmit the original of the corrected multiple offender UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 892 B(2) and the Department of Corrections’ legal department. State v. Gilbert, 23-121 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/8/23), 377 So.3d 378, 388, writ denied, 23-1640 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 704.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences for felon in possession of a firearm and attempted obstruction of justice. We also remand for correction of the enhanced sentence minute entry and the habitual offender UCO in accordance with this opinion.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED; REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   In April and June 2023, the bill was amended to remove some of the prior convictions for count one.

2.   The elements of obstruction of justice include: (1) the obstruction must be committed with the knowledge that the act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential criminal proceeding; (2) the defendant must tamper with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation; (3) the tampering must involve the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance; and (4) the tampering must be done at a location which the perpetrator has good reason to believe will be the subject of any police investigation. State v. Jones, 07-1052 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So.2d 95, 101-02.

WINDHORST, J.