JEFFERSON PARISH FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION OF LOUISIANA LOCAL 1374 v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON (2025)

The appellants, Jefferson Parish Firefighters Association, Louisiana Local 1374, seek a review of the October 22, 2024, judgment that sustained the appellees’ exception of no cause of action. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs/appellants filed suit against the Parish of Jefferson (“Jefferson Parish”), Jefferson Parish Council (“Council”), Parish President Cynthia Lee Sheng (“President Sheng”), and the East Bank Consolidated Special Services Fire Protection District (“Fire Department”) alleging improper compensation. The appellants appear to claim miscalculations or nonpayment of specific categories of compensation, such as sick leave, holiday pay, and emergency pay.

The Council and President Sheng filed an exception of no cause of action,¹ claiming that the appellants did not assert any specific allegation against them in the original petition. The Council's exception stated that the supplemental petition does not allege any particular actions or inactions by the Council concerning their causes of action. Instead, the supplemental petition describes the Council as the legislative and policy-making body for Jefferson Parish and the governing authority for the parish and its special districts. It explained that the Council adopted the personnel rules of the Fire Department (also known as the “Red Book”) via ordinance. In President Sheng's exception, she asserted that the supplemental petition contained vague allegations that she denied emergency pay to the appellants and “violated the equal protection provision” of the Louisiana constitution. In opposition, the appellants argued that they did assert causes that the Council passed ordinances contrary to state law and that President Sheng violated equal protection by refusing emergency pay to the firefighters but paid it to other “essential workers.” At the hearing on the exception, the Council argued that no specific allegations of action or inaction were made against it and suggested that a suit is proper against the Fire Department, not the Council. President Sheng argued that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against her, maintaining that the plaintiffs are seeking the payment of wages from their “employer,” and she is not the plaintiffs’ employer. The appellants argued that the rules regarding firefighters passed by the Council conflict with state law and that President Sheng is incorrectly administering firefighters’ wages.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial judge sustained the exception and dismissed the appellants’ claims against the Council and President Sheng with prejudice. This timely appeal followed.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, the appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ exceptions of no cause of action because these were dilatory exceptions of lack of procedural capacity. The appellants did not raise this issue in their opposition to the exception; instead, they argued that the petitions filed against the Council and President Sheng stated causes of action against each of them. The appellants repeated these arguments at the hearing on the exception. The appellants did not argue that the exception of no cause of action was improper because the substance of the exceptions was a lack of procedural capacity.

An appellant cannot raise an argument for the first time on appeal. We do not consider issues not raised in the trial court but raised for the first time on appeal. Uniform Rules Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3; Ruel v. Dalesandro, 18-243 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/19), 276 So.3d 626, 632. Thus, we will not address the appellants’ argument that the appellees essentially raised an exception of lack of procedural capacity.

The purpose of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy for the facts alleged in the petition. 5301 Jefferson Hwy, L.L.C. v. A. Maloney Moving & Storage, Inc., 23-211 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/24), 392 So.3d 337, 348. The exception raises a question of law, and the appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's ruling based solely on the sufficiency of the petition. Id. This exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, and we must accept the well-pleaded facts in the petition as true to resolve issues raised by the exception. Par. of Jefferson v. Bankers Ins. Co., 11-590 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/12), 88 So.3d 1082, 1085, writ denied, 12-691 (La. 5/4/12), 88 So.3d 466. Parties cannot introduce evidence to support or controvert an exception of no cause of action. Id. A plaintiff is not required to plead the theory of recovery in his petition; however, mere conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by facts will not set forth a cause of action. Id.

A court can consider only the petition, any amendments to the petition, and any documents attached to the petition in deciding an exception of no cause of action. Welch v. United Med. Healthwest-New Orleans, L.L.C., 21-684 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/24/22), 348 So.3d 216, 221. The question is whether, on the face of the petition, accepting all allegations as true, the petition states a valid cause of action for relief. Am. Rebel Arms, L.L.C. v. New Orleans Hamburger & Seafood Co., 15-599 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/24/16), 186 So.3d 1220, 1222. We do not consider the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail at trial or that the defendant has a valid defense. 5301 Jefferson Hwy, L.L.C., 392 So.3d at 349. The trial of the exception is solely on the face of the pleadings, and the court may not go beyond the petition to the case's merits. Wood v. Omni Bancshares, Inc., 10-216 c/w 10-567 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/26/11), 69 So.3d 475, 480.

The Council

In the original and supplemental petition, the appellants state that the Council is the legislative and policy-making body for Jefferson Parish and serves as the governing authority for the parish and its special districts, including the Fire Department.² The appellants appear to attempt to impose liability on the Council based on the allegation that it adopted personnel policies for the Fire Department.

A “cause of action” is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Terrebonne Par. Consol. Gov't v. Duval, Funderburk, Sundbery, Richard & Watkins, APLC, 21-0578 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/18/22), 340 So.3d 1099, 1104, writ denied, 22-470 (La. 5/10/22), 337 So.3d 910. Only well-pled allegations of fact are accepted as true when reviewing a petition to rule on an exception of no cause of action. “Well-pled” refers to properly pled allegations conforming to the system of fact pleading embodied in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Scott v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 22-0728 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/18/23), 360 So.3d 607, 618. “Well-pled” does not include allegations deficient in material detail, conclusory factual allegations, or allegations of law. Id. Conclusions of law asserted as facts are not well-pled allegations of fact, and we do not concede them as correct for purposes of the exception. Tate v. Johnson, 19-1541 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/2/20), 316 So.3d 502, 506.

The appellants did not specify the detailed acts that establish their cause of action against the Council in the original and supplemental petitions. The appellants do not point to any ordinance, action, or refusal to act by the Council that violated any legal duty owed to them. The petitions do not allege any operative facts, identify wrongdoing, or indicate involvement by the Council in the events giving rise to their claims. Thus, the appellants have not asserted a cause of action against the Council, and the trial court correctly granted the exception of no cause of action as to the Council.

The court may allow a petitioner to amend the petition when it sustains a peremptory exception. La. C.C.P. art. 934. The petitioner should be allowed to amend its pleading if the allegations in the petition are merely conclusory and fail to specify the acts that establish a cause of action. Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1219. For this reason, we remand this matter so that the appellants can amend the petitions.

President Sheng

The appellants do not make any allegations against President Sheng in their original petition; they only state that President Sheng is the Chief Administrative Officer and Appointing Authority of the East Bank Consolidated Special Service Fire Protection District. The appellants made numerous allegations against President Sheng in the supplemental petition though, as quoted in part below:

(1) “suppression firefighters who are designated ‘essential workers’ by the Parish President were not paid as these similarly situated employees in other fire divisions were paid;”

(2) the “Parish President, who without lawful authority to effectively change the Parish Council's policy, who specifically had the intention to retaliate against suppression firemen and their association by not compensating them as they had been under existing ordinance;”

(3) the “Parish President repeatedly has avoided public responsibility in her role as Chief Administrative Officer of the state authorized Fire Protection District ․ when both the classified Fire Chief and the Civil Service Board recommended that the Parish President issue the emergency pay through a letter written by the Civil Service Board and the classified Fire Chief, the Parish President ignored the recommendation and did not respond to their letter;”

(4) “fire employees have historically been compensated as have other employees designated by Parish President as ‘essential workforce’ in the event of an emergency until the Parish President arbitrarily, capriciously and with malice did not pay fire employees defeating longstanding practice;”

(5) the “Parish President has abused her position to directly retaliate against similarly situated firefighters.;”

(6) the “Parish President has usurped Charter authority of the Parish Council by not paying firefighters and in the process has also violated the equal protection provision of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana;”

(7) the “Parish President has directly retaliated to exclude payment from fire employee who are designated ‘essential workforce,’ even though the Parish pays its other employees who have been designated essential workers emergency pay on similar if not the same terms as have the firefighters been paid prior to the Parish President's unilateral decision in violation of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana;”

(8) the “Parish President has ordered fire employees through her subordinates to fill out federal disaster forms for reimbursement from the federal government relative to ‘Declared Emergency Pay’ but nevertheless has decided to withhold emergency payments received from the federal government from the fire millage which compensate the fire millage and the taxpayers in the Fire Protection District for fire employees’ hours in an emergency event.”

In the exception of no cause of action, President Sheng argued the plaintiffs base their claims against her on an alleged denial of emergency pay to the appellants. She maintained these allegations fall under La. R.S. 23:631, et seq, the “wage law” statutes, which require an “employer” to pay the employee under the terms and conditions of their employment. President Sheng avows that she cannot be liable for the claims asserted in the supplemental petition because the appellants have not alleged that she is their employer; she repeats these arguments on appeal.

The ruling of the exception of no cause of action is based solely on the facts of the pleadings, and the court may not go beyond the petition to the case's merits. Wood v. Omni Bancshares, Inc., 69 So.3d at 480. Whether these claims fall under the “wage law” and whether President Sheng is the employer go to the merits of the claim. For this reason, we find the argument that appellants did not sufficiently allege in its supplemental petition that President Sheng is their employer to be unpersuasive.

In ruling on an exception of no cause of action, the pertinent inquiry is whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Terrebonne Par. Consol. Gov't v. Duval, Funderburk, Sundbery, Richard & Watkins, APLC, 340 So.3d at 1105. We must give every reasonable interpretation to the language in the petition to maintain its sufficiency and allow the plaintiff to present evidence at trial. Id.

The supplemental petition alleges: (1) President Sheng required the appellants to work in an emergency and changed the policy so that they were not compensated for this work, (2) President Sheng refused to take any action to compensate them after the Fire Chief and Civil Service Board recommended the appellants be paid, (3) other essential employees were paid for work during an emergency, and (4) the appellants were instructed to fill out forms to seek compensation for work performed during an emergency from the federal government, funds were received from the federal government, and President Sheng did not take action to have these funds paid to the appellants. The assertions are sufficient to state a cause of action against President Sheng when accepting the alleged facts as true.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the October 23, 2024 judgment in part and uphold the grant of the exception of no cause of action in favor of the Jefferson Parish Council. We amend the judgment, dismiss the appellants’ claims against the Council without prejudice, and give appellants 30 days to amend their petition. We reverse the grant of the exception of no cause of action in favor of Parish President Cynthia Lee Sheng and the dismissal of the suit against President Sheng. We remand this matter for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED

I agree that this court should affirm the trial court's ruling granting the exception of no cause of action as to the Jefferson Parish Council, with leave to amend, and reverse the ruling granting the exception as to Parish President Cynthia Lee Sheng. I write separately to emphasize certain aspects of the case that I believe are important in resolving the issues presented by the exception of no cause of action.

Plaintiffs filed their original Petition for Damages and Other Relief on June 8, 2023, and their First Supplement and Amendment to the Original Petition on August 28, 2023. As discussed in the majority opinion, plaintiffs named four defendants in the original petition: the Parish of Jefferson, Parish President Cynthia Sheng, the Jefferson Parish Council, and the East Bank Consolidated Special Services Fire Protection District (“Fire Protection District”).

In more than 50 numbered paragraphs in the original petition and an additional 19 paragraphs in the amended petition, plaintiffs alleged various specific actions taken by one or more of the defendants in connection with the adoption, implementation and administration of certain parish ordinances and personnel rules, specifically identified in the petition, relating to sick leave, annual leave and emergency/holiday pay for firefighters. Plaintiffs alleged that some of those actions were contrary to specific state statutes and court decisions and that the conduct alleged in the petition amounted to an unlawful deprivation and misappropriation of wages earned by firefighters. They sought monetary damages and declaratory relief to remedy the alleged improprieties in their pay and the allocation of their leave time and pension contributions.

Many of the allegations in the original petition refer to actions taken by the “Parish of Jefferson,” which was one of the four named defendants, or by the “Parish,” without any indication as to which of the defendants those allegations referenced.

There are no factual allegations referencing specific actions taken by the Parish Council or by the Parish President in the original petition. The paragraph in which the four defendants are named includes the following statement:

References to the “Parish of Jefferson” hereafter should be construed as references to “defendants,” and/or to the official acts or omissions of Parish officials complained of herein.

This blanket statement does little to aid in determining which of the actions alleged in the petition are attributable to which defendant(s).

In a few places in the original and amended petitions, plaintiffs alleged that the “defendants,” collectively, had “effectively misappropriated earned wages from the plaintiffs” (¶ 25), “illegally prevented its firemen from access and use of [statutory sick leave] when sick or injured,” (¶ 27), and did not have “an adequate rule or protocol to even administer the illegal terms to [sic] Accrued Sick Leave and further have not been administering a protocol in any consistent manner to make any factual distinction between on duty or off duty injury.” (¶ 28).

In the amended petition, plaintiffs added a number of specific allegations with respect to President Sheng, as listed in the majority opinion.³ They also added allegations concerning the Parish Council, including the following:

• The Council is the legislative and policy making body for the Parish of Jefferson, pursuant to the parish charter, and is the governing authority for the Parish, as well as for the Fire Protection District, pursuant to Section 2-19 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances.

• The Council must operate under state law relative to special districts in its role as governing body for the Fire Protection District.

• The Council has adopted personnel rules for firefighters, including those named as plaintiffs in this lawsuit, in an ordinance known as the “Red Book ordinance,” through its legislative authority and through its role as the governing body of the Fire Protection District.

On October 20, 2023, the four defendants filed an exception of no cause of action to the original and amended petitions “on the basis that Plaintiffs cannot state their claims against Parish President Cynthia Sheng and Jefferson Parish Council.” Defendants do not dispute that the plaintiffs adequately stated a cause of action against the Parish of Jefferson and the Fire Protection District.

In their memorandum in support of the exception, defendants asserted, among other things, that the Parish Council, as a matter of law, is not a “separate government unit with the capacity to sue and be sued.” Plaintiffs disputed that assertion in their memorandum opposing the exception, and defendants repeated their position on that issue in a reply memorandum and at the hearing on the exception. Although plaintiffs did not assert in the trial court that the substance of the exception was a lack of procedural capacity, it is clear from the supporting and opposing memoranda and the hearing transcript that both litigants considered the issue of the Parish Council's capacity to sue or be sued to be a significant aspect of the exception of no cause of action.

Article 855 of the Code of Civil Procedure states:

Except as otherwise provided by law, it is not necessary to allege the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of a legal entity or an organized association of persons made a party. Such procedural capacity shall be presumed, unless challenged by the dilatory exception. (Emphasis added.)

Lack of procedural capacity is a dilatory exception, as provided in Article 926(6) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. In this case, the only exception filed by the defendants was the peremptory exception of no cause of action pursuant to Article 927(5). They did not file a dilatory exception of lack of procedural capacity. Without such an exception, and for purposes of the no cause of action exception before us, the capacity of the Parish Council to be sued must be presumed, as directed by Article 855. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that we need not address that issue, but for different reasons.

Defendants have asserted, here and below, that plaintiffs seek to impose liability on the Parish Council based solely on the allegation that it adopted personnel policies for the Fire Department. This characterization of the plaintiffs’ position is incomplete, in my view, because the plaintiffs have also alleged that those policies were adopted in contravention of law. The allegations in the amended petition concerning the Parish Council should be read together with the allegations in the original petition, and not in isolation, in order to give a reasonable interpretation to the petition as a whole to maintain its sufficiency and allow the plaintiff to present evidence at trial. Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-612, 05-719 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1217; Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Govt. v. Duval, Funderburk, Sundbery, Richard & Watkins, 21-578 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/18/22), 340 So.3d 1099, 1105.

Even so, however, because the petition also names the Parish of Jefferson, the Fire Protection District and the Parish President as defendants, I agree that more specificity is needed with respect to the allegations against the Parish Council in order to clarify which actions described in the petition form the basis for plaintiffs’ claims against the Council as distinguished from the other defendants.

With respect to the allegations concerning President Sheng, I agree that the petition, as amended, while not a model of clarity, contains enough specificity to overcome the exception of no cause of action. However, plaintiffs are not precluded from further amending those allegations as well to more specifically articulate the basis for their claims against her.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the Exception of No Cause of Action lists all defendants named in the petition, the appellants’ counsel clarified at the hearing on the exception that it only pertained to the Council and President Sheng.

2.   The appellants argue that the Council and President Sheng are legal entities that have the legal capacity to sue and be sued. It is not necessary to address that issue in order to determine whether the exception of no cause of action was properly granted in this case.

3.   The parish president serves as the chief administrative officer for the parish and for special districts such as the Fire Protection District pursuant to Section 2-86.1 of the Jefferson Parish Code of Ordinances.

MOLAISON, J.

CONCURS WITH REASONS FHW