STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WILLIE RAY MOSES (2025)

Appellant/Defendant, Willie Ray Moses, appeals his convictions and sentences for multiple sexual offenses involving juveniles adjudicated in the 24th Judicial District Court, Division “D”. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's convictions, vacate the sentences, and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing. We further grant appellate counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 21, 2020, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging Defendant with pornography involving juveniles under thirteen, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.1(E)(5)(A) (counts one and two); computer aided solicitation of a minor, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.3 (count three); pornography involving juveniles, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.1 (count four); sexual battery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1 (count five); and oral sexual battery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.3 (count six). On October 23, 2020, Defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

On March 27, 2023, Defendant withdrew the not guilty plea and pleaded guilty as charged to each count. Because Defendant's convictions were the result of guilty pleas, the facts underlying the crimes of conviction are not fully developed. At the guilty plea proceeding, the State provided the following factual basis:

As it relates to Case Number 20-3741, the State if we were to proceed to trial would have found that Mr. Willie Ray Moses beyond a reasonable doubt committed two counts of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:81.1 subsection E5a, in that he did commit pornography involving juveniles by intentionally possessing, distributing, or possession with the intent to distribute any photographs, films, videotapes or other visual reproductions of sexual performances involving children under the age of 13 on/or between February 3, 2019, and July 30 in the year of 2019.

Additionally, Your Honor, the State would have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Willie Ray Moses violated Louisiana Revised Statute 14:81.3 to-wit computer-aided solicitation of a minor that -- in that the said Willie Ray Moses, a person 17 years of age or older did communicate through the use of electronic textual communication with a person who had not yet reached the age of 17 where there is an age difference of greater than two years or a person reasonably believed to have not yet attain the age of 17 and reasonably believed to be at least two years younger for the person of or with the intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the person to engage or participate in sexual conduct or a crime of violence and this happened in the Parish of Jefferson on/or between January 1st, 2016, and July 14th, 2020.

Your Honor, the State would have also proven beyond a reasonable doubt that on or between January 1st, 2016, and July 14th, 2020, Willie Ray Moses violated Louisiana Revised Statute 14:81.1 in that he did commit pornography involving juveniles by intentional possession, sale, distribution, or possession with the intent to sell or distribute any photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual reproductions of any sexual performance involving a child under the age of 17.

As well, the District Attorney would have also proven beyond a reasonable doubt that on/or between January 1st, 2016, and July 14th, 2020, Willie Ray Moses violated Louisiana Revised Statute 14:43.1 in that he did commit sexual battery upon known juvenile with the date of birth of 12/18/2004.

As well Your Honor, the State would have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Moses violated Louisiana Revised Statute of 14:43.3, in that he did commit oral sex sexual battery upon a known juvenile with the date of birth of 12/18/2004 on/or between January 1st, 2016, and July 14th, 2020, all happening within the Parish of Jefferson, Your Honor.

Defendant answered affirmatively when asked if he wished to plead guilty because he was in fact guilty of the crimes as recited by the State

After informing Defendant of his rights and accepting the guilty pleas, the judge told Defendant, “As a result, this Court hereby sentences you as agreed upon to 30 years at hard labor on Counts 1 and 2. Ten years at hard labor on Count 3, 20 years at hard labor on Count 4.” He specified that those counts are to “run concurrent with one another and concurrent with any and all other sentences.” The judge continued, “Counts 5 and 6, the Court hereby sentences you to serve ten years at hard labor. Those counts will run consecutive to one another but concurrent with any and all other sentences. That is 30 years total at hard labor.” The sentences on each count were to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant was ordered to register as a sex offender for life. The judge waived any and all costs, fines, and fees pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1.

On April 18, 2023, Defendant filed a “Motion for 881. Reconsideration OS [sic] Sentence.” The court denied the motion on April 20, 2023. That same day, Defendant filed a Motion for Appeal, which was granted on April 21, 2023. Defendant's appointed counsel has now filed an appellate brief pursuant to Anders v. California ¹ and has further filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Defendant seeks review of his convictions and sentences in conformity with the procedures outlined in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241 (per curiam).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Anders Brief

Under the procedure adopted by this Court in State v. Bradford, 95-929 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 1108, 1110-11,² appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that he has thoroughly reviewed the trial court record and cannot find any non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Anders v. California, supra, and State v. Jyles, supra, appointed counsel requests permission to withdraw as counsel of record.

In Anders, 386 U.S. 738, the United States Supreme Court stated that appointed appellate counsel may request permission to withdraw if he finds his case to be wholly frivolous after a conscientious examination of it.³ The request must be accompanied by “ ‘a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal’ ” so as to provide the reviewing court “with a basis for determining whether appointed counsel have fully performed their duty to support their clients’ appeals to the best of their ability” and to assist the reviewing court “in making the critical determination whether the appeal is indeed so frivolous that counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 439, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988) (quotation omitted).

In Jyles, 704 So.2d at 241, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that an Anders brief need not tediously catalog every meritless pretrial motion or objection made at trial with a detailed explanation of why the motions or objections lack merit. The supreme court explained that an Anders brief must demonstrate by full discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast an advocate's eye over the trial record and considered whether any ruling made by the trial court, subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant, adverse impact on shaping the evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.” Id.

When conducting a review for compliance with Anders, an appellate court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Bradford, 676 So.2d at 1110. If, after an independent review, the reviewing court determines there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence. However, if the court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, it may either deny the motion and order the court-appointed attorney to file a brief arguing the legal point(s) identified by the court, or grant the motion and appoint substitute appellate counsel. Id.

In this matter, Defendant's appellate counsel asserts that after a detailed review of the record, he could find no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. He states that according to the Boykin colloquy, there are no errors committed that would reverse the court's acceptance of Defendant's guilty pleas. Counsel determines that his review of the entire appellate record reveals no appealable issues to support a direct appeal of the convictions and sentences. Counsel requests an errors patent review.

Appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of record, which states he made a conscientious and thorough review of the trial court record and can find no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal and no rulings of the trial court which would arguably support the appeal. He further indicates that Defendant was notified of his filing and advised of his right to file a pro se brief. Additionally, this Court sent Defendant a letter by certified mail informing him that an Anders brief had been filed and that he had until December 12, 2024, to file a pro se supplemental brief. On December 17, 2024, this Court granted Defendant an extension and stated that Defendant had until January 16, 2025, to file his supplemental brief. On January 10, 2025, this Court granted Defendant another extension and stated that Defendant had until February 18, 2025, to file his supplemental brief. Defendant has not filed a brief in this matter.

This Court has performed an independent and thorough review of the record, which included an errors patent review in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).

Defendant pleaded guilty as charged to the bill of information; therefore, he waived all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea, and review of any such defects, either by appeal or post-conviction relief, is precluded. See, State v. Turner, 09-1079 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/10), 47 So.3d 455, 459. Moreover, no pre-trial rulings were preserved for appeal under the holding in State v. Crosby (338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976).

Additionally, the record reveals no constitutional infirmities or irregularities in Defendant's guilty plea proceeding, and the acknowledgement and waiver of rights forms collectively show that Defendant was aware of the nature of the charges against him; that he was properly advised of his Boykin rights—including the right to a jury trial, the right to confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination—and that he understood he was waiving these rights by pleading guilty.

The record further reflects that Defendant was informed by the trial court of the sentencing range for the each of the counts and the sentences that would be imposed upon acceptance of his guilty pleas. Each of Defendant's sentences fell within the statutory sentencing range and benefits were restricted on each count as called for by the statutes. Additionally, the plea agreement is beneficial to Defendant in that the trial judge waived the mandatory fines on counts one, two, three, and four, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1.

However, as previously recounted, in sentencing Defendant, the trial judge said, “As a result, this Court hereby sentences you as agreed upon to 30 years at hard labor on Counts 1 and 2. Ten years at hard labor on Count 3, 20 years at hard labor on Count 4.” He specified that those counts are to “run concurrent with one another and concurrent with any and all other sentences.” The judge continued, “Counts 5 and 6, the Court hereby sentences you to serve ten years at hard labor. Those counts will run consecutive to one another but concurrent with any and all other sentences.” (Emphasis added).

La. C.Cr.P. art. 879 provides that “[i]f a defendant who has been convicted of an offense is sentenced to imprisonment, the court shall impose a determinate sentence.” We find that Defendant's sentences are indeterminate because the trial court did not specify whether the sentences were ordered to run concurrently with specific sentences imposed or simultaneously with any other sentences imposed that defendant may have been serving at the time of his sentencing. “This Court has recognized this distinction in sentencing, finding the ‘open-ended’ statement that a sentence be served with ‘any other sentence’ is distinguishable from a sentence ordered to be served concurrently with ‘any sentence [the defendant] may be serving,’ requiring correction.” State v. Lavigne, 22-282 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/23), 365 So.3d 919, 962; See State v. Nellon, 18-385 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/19/18), 262 So.3d 441, 445. Accordingly, we vacate Defendant's sentences on counts one through six and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing.

Because appellate counsel's brief adequately demonstrates by full discussion and analysis that he has reviewed the trial court proceedings and cannot identify any basis for a non-frivolous appeal and an independent review of the record supports counsel's assertion, we grant appellate counsel's motion to withdraw as attorney of record.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant's convictions for counts one through six. However, we vacate Defendant's sentences on those counts and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing. Additionally, appellate counsel's motion to withdraw as attorney of record is granted.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

(504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY MAY 28, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

24-KA-483

E-NOTIFIED

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL (DISTRICT JUDGE)

HONORABLE JACQUELINE F. MALONEY (DISTRICT JUDGE)

PRENTICE L. WHITE (APPELLANT)

ANDREA F. LONG (APPELLEE)

THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)

MAILED

HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.

(APPELLEE)

DISTRICT ATTORNEY

ALYSSA ALEMAN (APPELLEE)

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

200 DERBIGNY STREET

GRETNA, LA 70053

FOOTNOTES

1.   Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

2.   In Bradford, 676 So.2d 1108, this Court adopted the procedures outlined in State v. Benjamin, 573 So.2d 528, 530 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990), which were sanctioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Mouton, 95-981 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1176, 1177 (per curiam).

3.   The United States Supreme Court reiterated Anders in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).

MARC E. JOHNSON JUDGE