STATE OF LOUISIANA v. GUADALUPE FIGUEROA (2025)

The Grand Jurors of the Twenty-First Judicial District for the Parish of Tangipahoa charged the defendant, Guadalupe C. Figueroa, by grand jury bill of indictment with first degree rape of a victim under the age of thirteen, a violation of La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4). The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Following a jury trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged by unanimous verdict. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, alleging the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in allowing a lay witness to provide opinion testimony over his objection. We affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On November 29, 2022, ten-year-old V.C.¹ disclosed at school that her mother's boyfriend—the defendant—had sexually abused her. Detective Lisa Reilly, a juvenile investigator with the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriffs Office (“TPSO”), responded to the school and began an investigation. V.C. was brought to the Children's Advocacy Center (“CAC”) for a forensic interview. After the CAC interview, V.C. went to the Audrey Hepburn CARE Center for a medical examination. Thereafter, TPSO deputies arrested the defendant.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, the defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of first degree rape of a victim under the age of thirteen beyond a reasonable doubt.

Law

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2; State v. Stephens, 2024-0399 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/21/25), _____ So.3d _____, _____, 2025 WL 573318, *1. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460. See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B). When the issues on appeal relate to both the sufficiency of the evidence and one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992). When addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, consideration must be given to the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734.

When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 15:438 mandates “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test for evaluating the evidence; rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cabellero, 2022-0441 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 356 So.3d 389, 394, writ denied, 2022-01777 (La. 4/25/23), 3 59 So.3d 982. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984); State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 17, 22, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 802.

Rape is the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse committed without lawful consent. See La. R.S. 14:41(A). Emission is not necessary, and any sexual penetration, when the rape involves vaginal or anal intercourse, however slight, is sufficient. See La. R.S. 14:41(B). First degree rape is a rape committed where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because the victim is under the age of thirteen years old. Lack of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense. See La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4).

It is well-settled that, if found to be credible, the testimony of the victim of a sex offense alone is sufficient to establish the elements of the offense, even where the State does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. State v. Lilly, 2012-0008 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/12), 111 So.3d 45, 62, writ denied, 2012-2277 (La. 5/31/13), 118 So.3d 386. Likewise, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. Lilly, 111 So.3d at 61.

Pertinent Evidence and Testimony Presented at Trial

CAC Interviewer, Jasmine Gardner

The trial court accepted Jasmine Gardner, a former forensic interviewer at the CAC, as an expert in the field of child forensic interviews. Ms. Gardner interviewed V.C. immediately after her disclosure. At the beginning of the interview, V.C. introduced herself and stated that she was ten years old and in the fourth grade. V.C. told Ms. Gardner she had a “big imagination.” When asked why she disclosed, V.C. said her teacher asked her what was making her sad at home. Later in the interview, V.C. stated she disclosed because kids at school were bullying her. According to V.C., the defendant put his “balls” in her “basement” and her “river,” which V.C. clarified were the words she used to describe her buttocks and vagina, respectively. V.C. claimed the sexual abuse started when she was seven years old and had occurred in the last week. V.C. said the defendant showed her inappropriate adult videos and put his “balls” in her mouth. Ms. Gardner asked V.C. to draw “balls.” The trial court admitted the drawing into evidence and published it to the jury.

The Victim, V.C.

V.C. testified her birthday was August 14, 2012, and she was eleven years old at the time of trial. V.C. recalled the police coming to her school, meeting with Detective Reilly, being interviewed by Ms. Gardner at the CAC, and meeting the medical examiner, Anne Troy, at the hospital. V.C. agreed she did not feel comfortable talking about what the defendant did to her. However, V.C. testified that she knew the difference between the truth and a lie. V.C. testified that she was telling the truth during her CAC interview and medical examination. V.C. agreed she had made “similar” allegations previously against her babysitter's husband and her babysitter's teenaged grandson. V.C. testified the defendant put his penis in her mouth, her vagina, and her buttocks.

Medical Examiner, Anne Troy

The trial court accepted Anne Troy, a forensic nurse practitioner and professor of nursing, as an expert in child maltreatment, sexual abuse, and delayed disclosure. Dr. Troy testified V.C. visited the CARE Center on December 15, 2022, and was diagnosed with chronic sexual abuse. Prior to the medical examination, Dr. Troy received a verbal history from V.C., which was audio recorded. V.C. disclosed “Guadalupe” raped her multiple times. Regarding her expert assessment, Dr. Troy testified:

[S]he had given a clear and detailed spontaneous sensory driven history. That it was more than one time. That it was the boyfriend, G[ua]dalupe, and that it involved [penile-]vaginal, [penile-]anal, [penile-]oral contact[,] and․that he sucked her boobies.

***

He told her to drink his ejaculate, which she referred to as milk, and he had said to her, it will make your boobies grow. He licked her front private. He had showed her pornography, which is consistent with grooming. He took pictures of his balls in her butt․ Her body hurts afterwards․ And it tastes like raw milk. He cleans up, and these are quotes. And first it comes out clear, which is consistent with the pre-ejaculate, like when you pop a mosquito bite. So she is giving me an example of her understanding of what it looked like.

Dr. Troy testified the history provided by V.C. “was consistent with sexual abuse[.]”

On cross-examination, Dr. Troy agreed V.C. disclosed she had been sexually abused by multiple individuals, including the defendant. Dr. Troy testified she was not a licensed medical doctor. Dr. Troy indicated that there were no physical findings on V.C.’s body to confirm she had been raped, and no forensic evidence was collected.

Discussion and Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain a first degree rape conviction, because there was no medical, physical, or forensic evidence nor was there corroborative testimony to support V.C.’s allegations. He notes a search of his cell phone revealed no pornographic videos or inappropriate photographs as alleged by V.C. The defendant contends V.C.’s allegations were fabricated, motivated by her dislike for him, and too similar to allegations made against other individuals to be credible. Therefore, the defendant argues no rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of first degree rape of a victim under the age of thirteen beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

The defendant calls V.C.’s credibility into question insomuch as he contends his conviction was based solely on her testimony, which was not corroborated by physical, forensic, or eyewitness testimony. However, as noted above, the victim's testimony alone is sufficient to establish the elements of a sexual offense, if found to be credible. Lilly, 111 So.3d at 62. The jury heard the testimony of all the witnesses, including V.C.’s trial testimony, and her statements during the CAC interview with Ms. Gardner and CARE Center interview with Dr. Troy. Her statements were wholly consistent with her trial testimony. V.C. consistently stated the defendant vaginally and anally raped her, forced her to perform oral sex on him, and touched her breasts. The defendant is correct that a search of his cell phone was conducted by the TPSO and that the search failed to recover anything of relevance to the investigation. However, V.C. made independent, consistent, and detailed statements regarding the defendant's acts of sexual misconduct and abuse, which the jury found credible. In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662.

Based on the record before us, the jury could have rationally concluded the defendant raped V.C., a person under the age of thirteen. See La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4). An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of first degree rape of a victim under the age of thirteen. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY

In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing Detective Reilly, a lay witness, to provide opinion testimony over his objection. Specifically, he contends Detective Reilly's testimony was based purely on speculation and her subjective opinions, which rendered her testimony unreliable and prejudicial.

Law

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 701 limits a lay witness's testimony in the form of opinions or inferences to those opinions or inferences which are rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. A law enforcement officer may testify as to matters within his personal knowledge acquired through experience without first being qualified as an expert; however, only experts are allowed to give opinion testimony in areas of specialized knowledge. State v. Morgan, 2012-2060 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13), 119 So.3d 817, 826-27. Pursuant to La. C.E. art. 702(A)(1), “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if․[t]he expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand or to determine a fact in issue[.]”²

A reviewing court must ask two pertinent questions to determine whether the trial court properly allowed lay opinion testimony: (1) was the testimony speculative opinion evidence or simply a recitation of or inferences from fact based upon the witness's observations; and (2) if erroneously admitted, was the testimony so prejudicial to the defense as to constitute reversible error. Morgan, 119 So.3d at 827. The trial court is vested with much discretion in determining which opinion testimony shall be received into evidence as lay or expert testimony. Morgan, 119 So.3d at 827.

Discussion and Analysis

The testimony at issue occurred during the State's redirect examination of Detective Reilly, wherein the following colloquy ensued:

[The State:] Detective, also you were asked about abuse that [V.C.] was a victim of from other people. In your experience, is it uncommon for a child, especially in this community, in the Hispanic community, to be victimized by multiple people?

[Detective Reilly:] Yes, sir, it is.

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, again, I object. He is asking for --

[The State]: -- He opened the door to this line of questioning.

[Defense counsel]: He is asking for an opinion, Your Honor. This is a fact witness.

[The State]: I am asking in her experience and he opened the line, Judge.

[The Court]: Overruled.

[The State]: He is the one that brought up other abuse.

[The Court]: Overruled.

[The State]: Thank you, Judge.

By [The State]:

[The State:] You can answer that.

[Detective Reilly:] Yes. In my experience with this culture in the Hispanic community that that has happened with several cases that I have worked.

[The State:] And then one other question, based on -- You were asked about [V.C.] being bullied when she was at [school], correct?

[Detective Reilly:] Yes.

[The State:] Is it common, in your experience again, for children who have been victimized, ․ especially of sexual abuse, to be bullied at school?

[Detective Reilly:] Yes, it is.

[Defense counsel]: Same objection.[3]

On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in overruling his objections, because Detective Reilly's testimony was speculative, rendering it unreliable and prejudicial. He posits the testimony was elicited to bolster V.C.’s credibility as it suggested her allegations were truthful due to the purported frequency of repeated sexual abuse in the Hispanic community. In addition to the “racist undertones” of Detective Reilly's testimony, the defendant argues her testimony encroached on the province of the factfinder.

The State, on the other hand, focuses on Detective Reilly's extensive experience as a law enforcement officer to argue her testimony was properly admitted. Even if her testimony was improperly admitted, the State contends the error was harmless, because Detective Reilly's testimony was cumulative of Dr. Troy's testimony and was not overly prejudicial. Finally, the State asserts its line of questioning was not an attempt to appeal to racial prejudices and was “not explicitly racially biased.”

We find the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the lay opinion testimony from Detective Reilly absent an adequate foundation. Detective Reilly testified she was a juvenile detective, and she had approximately twenty years of law enforcement experience in various divisions, including as a patrol deputy, school resource officer, and detective. However, before eliciting the testimony at issue, the State did not ask Detective Reilly approximately how many sexual assaults she had investigated involving children from the Hispanic community. The State failed to ascertain whether Detective Reilly had investigated ten, fifty, a hundred, or a thousand cases involving children from the Hispanic community. Simply put, had Detective Reilly only investigated three cases during her twenty years as a law enforcement officer, her testimony was pure speculation and based on her subjective opinions. However, had the State elicited that Detective Reilly investigated countless cases involving Hispanic juvenile victims, then her testimony was appropriate opinion testimony based on her experience as a law enforcement officer. The State failed to establish that Detective Reilly's testimony was based on her personal knowledge, training, and experience, which would enable her to give an opinion about the re-victimization of children in the Hispanic community. As such, we find Detective Reilly's testimony was speculative opinion evidence and was improperly admitted. Such error is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Morgan, 119 So.3d at 827.

If the reviewing court determines that lay opinion testimony was improperly admitted, it must then proceed to the next question: whether that testimony was so prejudicial to the defense as to constitute reversible error. State v. LeBlanc, 2005-0885 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/10/06), 928 So.2d 599, 603. Erroneous admission of evidence requires reversal only where there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Under Chapman, the relevant inquiry is whether the reviewing court may conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., whether the guilty verdict actually rendered was unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); State v. Stockstill, 2019-01235 (La. 10/20/20), 341 So.3d 502, 507 (per curiam).

Given the substantial evidence properly admitted against the defendant, we find any error in the admission of the testimony harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed above, V.C. disclosed the rapes to Detective Reilly, Ms. Gardner, and Dr. Troy. V.C. was consistent in her disclosures throughout the investigation and at trial. Ten-year-old V.C. described the defendant telling her to drink his ejaculate, which she referred to as milk. During the CAC interview, she drew a picture of a penis and stated the defendant put his penis in her vagina and buttocks.

V.C.’s testimony alone was sufficient to establish the elements of the offense. See Lilly, 111 So.3d at 62. We therefore conclude there is no reasonable possibility the erroneously admitted evidence may have contributed to the jury's decision to return a guilty verdict. The admission of such testimony was harmless error and, as such, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 3 85 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

The transcript reflects after the trial court imposed the defendant's sentence, the trial court incorrectly advised the defendant that he had “[t]wo years for post-conviction relief.” Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to correctly advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-43, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

I join with the majority in affirming the defendant's conviction and sentence. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that Detective Reilly's testimony was improperly admitted.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We use the victim's initials to protect her identity. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

2.   The version of La. C.E. art. 702 prior to its amendment by 2024 La. Acts No. 88, § 1 (2024 Reg. Sess.) (eff. Aug. 1, 2024) is applicable to the instant matter. See State v. Parker, 2003-0924 (La. 4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 322 (“[I]t is generally settled that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty which is to be imposed upon the convicted accused.”).

3.   Following defense counsel's objection, the State indicated it had no further questions of Detective Reilly. The trial court did not rule on the objection.

EDWARDS, J.

Hester, J. concurring with reasons