WILBERT BRADLEY v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS (2025)

Petitioner, Wilbert Bradley, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”), challenges the district court's May 15, 2024 judgment, dismissing his petition for judicial review with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we reverse, render judgment, and remand to DPSC with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bradley was arrested on March 27, 1989, and charged with attempted second-degree murder. The offense occurred on March 26, 1989, in East Baton Rouge Parish. Bradley was found guilty as charged and, on November 16, 1989, was sentenced to 50 years at hard labor with credit for time served. On August 17, 1995, Bradley signed a “Good Time Rate Option and Approval Form” opting to receive double good time, in lieu of incentive wages, effective January 1, 1992.

In May 2023, Bradley filed a request for administrative remedy procedure (“ARP”), LSP-2023-0729 “seeking [restoration] of unlawfully forfeited good time ․ and immediate release from custody.” Bradley alleged that DPSC improperly computed his good time credits by allowing him only 15 days of good time credit for every 30 days served. He further alleged he was entitled to earn good time at a rate of 30 days for every 30 days served (“double good time”) retroactive to the date of his sentencing.

In the First Step Response Form, Bradley received the following explanation from DPSC:

Your request for Administrative Remedy has been reviewed by a qualified member of the Offender Records Staff for accuracy. After a thorough review of your time computation and good time credits it has been determined that your time computation had to be updated to reflect the addition of the Good Time Option date of 01/01/1992.

Your request to receive 30 days for every 30 days served effective 01/01/1992 has been granted. Attached is an updated Master Record and Time Computation.

Not satisfied with DPSC's response, Bradley proceeded to step two, arguing again that double good time credit should be applied to his entire sentence. In the Second Step Response Form, DPSC denied Bradley's request for any further relief.

Thereafter, Bradley filed a petition for judicial review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, in accordance with La. R.S. 15:1171, er seq., contesting the calculation of his good time. The matter was referred to a commissioner for review pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1188, who recommended to the district court judge that DPSC's decision be affirmed and Bradley's petition be dismissed, with prejudice.¹ Bradley timely filed a traversal of that recommendation, reiterating his arguments to the court. On May 15, 2024, the district court adopted the commissioner's recommendation, affirmed DPSC's decision, and dismissed Bradley's petition for judicial review with prejudice at his costs. Bradley appealed.²

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Bradley asserts that DPSC erred in applying the wrong good time act to his sentence. He further alleges the commissioner and the district court erred in finding that he was not entitled to double good time credit retroactive to the date of sentencing. Bradley notes that when he signed the “Good Time Rate Option and Approval Form” on August 17, 1995, indicating his desire to receive double good time, the effective date of his eligibility should have been listed as the date of his sentencing, November 16, 1989.

As previously noted, Bradley committed the offense of attempted second-degree murder on March 26, 1989. He was found guilty as charged and sentenced on November 16, 1989. According to the record, DPSC erroneously calculated Bradley's time under former La. R.S. 15:571.4, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 665, § 1 (“Act 665”), which allowed inmates whose crimes were committed after September 9, 1977, to earn 15 days per month for time actually served, to be applied to diminution of sentence. However, with the passage of 1987 La. Acts, No. 848, § 1, effective January 1, 1988, the Legislature enacted La. R.S. 15:571.14(8), which applied to any inmate sentenced after July 1, 1982, and provided that such inmates, who were otherwise eligible for diminution of sentence, would be eligible to receive double good time credit, 30 days for every 30 days served.³ See former La. R.S. 15:571.14(B).

Act 848 remained in force until January 1, 1992, when the Legislature enacted 1991 La. Acts, No. 138, § 1 (“Act 138”). Act 138 repealed La. R.S. 15:571.14 in its entirety, incorporating the double good time provision into La. R.S. 15:571.3(B) in part, as follows:

Every inmate in the custody of the department who has been convicted of a felony and sentenced to imprisonment for a stated number of years or months may earn, in lieu of incentive wages, a diminution of sentence by good behavior and performance of work or self improvement activities, or both, to be known as “good time”. ․ The amount of diminution of sentence allowed under the provisions of this Section shall be at the rate of thirty days for every thirty days in actual custody, including time spent in custody with good behavior prior to sentence for which defendant is given credit.

Thus, after January 1, 1992, the effective date of Act 138, a state prison inmate could receive 30 days good time credit toward diminution of sentence for every 30 days spent in prison. However, Section 5 of Act 138 limited the act's temporal application by providing: “The provisions of this Act shall apply only to persons sentenced on or after the effective date of this Act and shall apply prospectively only to the remaining portion of any sentence of any person serving a sentence or sentences on or after the effective date of this Act.”

In his appeal, Bradley cites to Cox v. Whitley, 612 So.2d 158 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So.2d 1001 (La. 1993) and Owens v. Stalder, 2006-1120 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/07), 965 So.2d 886, and argues the law is clear that he is entitled to double good time credit retroactive to the date of his sentencing. In Owens, petitioner, Kenneth W. Owens, was sentenced on January 4, 1989, to serve 21 years at hard labor following a felony conviction and his subsequent adjudication as a second felony offender. This sentence was made consecutive to a 9-year hard labor sentence imposed the same date for the offense of attempted manslaughter. In 2004, Owens filed a petition for judicial review seeking immediate release from custody on the basis that his good time credits had been miscalculated. He argued that his good time credits had been improperly computed by DPSC based on Act 665. Noting that the law changed with the passage of Act 848, Owens asserted that double good time credit should be applied to this entire sentence. Owens, 965 So.2d at 887.

Owens claimed that after the passage of Act 138, he was offered the opportunity to choose double good time credit under its provisions, but refused to sign the form presented to him. However, in 1997, he was again given the opportunity to select double good time credit pursuant to Act 138, and he signed an approval form that stated he was eligible to receive good time credit at that rate, effective January 5, 1997. Id. On review of Owens’ claim, the commissioner concluded that the computation of Owens’ good time credit at the rate of 15 days for every 30 days served from his sentencing date of January 4, 1989, until January 5, 1997, and at 30 days for every 30 days served after that date was correct. The district court agreed, dismissing Owens’ claim. Id. at 889.

Citing the court's earlier decision in Cox, the Owens court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the matter to DPSC with instructions to amend Owens’ prison record to reflect the appropriate credit for double good time earned from the date of imposition of sentence:

[T]his conclusion is contrary to this court's judgment in [Cox]. In that case, the inmate had been sentenced on December 14, 1983, to serve twenty-one years in prison for manslaughter. This court noted that when Act 848 was enacted, it provided that inmates sentenced to the custody of DPSC on or after July 1, 1982, who were otherwise eligible for diminution of sentence, would be eligible to receive increased diminution of sentence in the amount of thirty days for each thirty days served. “Since Cox had been sentenced after July 1, 1982, he was then eligible for double good time.” However, he did not execute an approval form for double good time until December 29, 1987. That form stated beneath his signature that he was approved for double good time effective August 30, 1986. Like Owens, Cox had exhausted his administrative remedies and his petition for judicial review to the district court had been dismissed. This court found “that the [district] court committed legal error in finding Cox was not entitled to double good time retroactive to ․ his date of sentencing.” This court further stated that subsequent amendments of the statutes limiting credit for double good time could not be applied retroactively to divest Cox of his vested right to credit for double good time between his sentencing date and the date he was deemed eligible after signing the approval form.

Our decision in this case is controlled by Cox. Even though DPSC regulations may have required Owens to sign an approval form in order to be eligible for double good time credits, DPSC presented no evidence that it ever offered Owens the opportunity to sign a form that stated and recognized the correct effective date. And just as in the Cox case, Owens’ right cannot be limited by his signature on an approval form reflecting the application of a subsequent amendment to the statute and providing a later effective date for his double good time credit. Therefore, the judgment of the district court constituted legal error and must be reversed. [Citations omitted.]

Owens, 965 So.2d at 889.

As Bradley was sentenced before the effective date of Act 138, we agree with the commissioner and the district court below that Act 138 cannot be applied in this case to afford Bradley double good time retroactive to the date of his sentencing. Nonetheless, while Bradley's arguments on appeal may have been inartfully expressed, we are constrained to follow Cox and Owens in considering Bradley's claims herein. See Cox, 612 So.2d at 159-160; Owens, 965 So.2d at 889.

Much like the petitioners in Owens and Cox, Bradley was sentenced to the custody of DPSC after July 1, 1982. Thus, pursuant to Act 848, if Bradley was otherwise eligible for diminution of sentence, he was also eligible to receive increased diminution of sentence in the amount of thirty days for each thirty days served. See Cox, 612 So.2d at 159. Moreover, the Legislature did not attach a temporal element to Act 848 that would preclude the retroactivity of its application back to an inmate's sentencing date. See Cox, 612 So.2d at 159-160 (finding that we must assume the Legislature intended to permit double good time credit retroactive to date of sentencing because it did not otherwise limit the credits in Act 848). Accordingly, pursuant to Act 848, if Bradley was otherwise eligible for diminution of sentence at the time, he should receive diminution of sentence in the amount of 30 days for each 30 days served from the date of the imposition of sentence.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's May 15, 2024 judgment dismissing Wilbert Bradley's suit and render judgment in favor of Wilbert Bradley and against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. It is hereby ordered that this matter be remanded to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections to compute the good time to which Wilbert Bradley is actually entitled considering any factors otherwise affecting his eligibility for diminution of sentence. After said computation is made, the Department of Public Safety and Corrections is ordered to amend the records, including his Master Prison Record, accordingly. Appeal costs in the amount of $520.00 are assessed against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.

REVERSED, RENDERED, AND REMANDED TO THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The offices of commissioner of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court were created by La. R.S. 13:711 to hear and recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state prisoners. La. R.S. 13:713(A). The district judge “may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part the findings or recommendations made by the commissioner and also may receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the commissioner with instructions.” La. R.S. 13:713(C)(5).

2.   On review of the district court's judgment under La. R.S. 15:1177, no deference is owed by the court of appeal to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the district court, just as no deference is owed by the Louisiana Supreme Court to factual findings or legal conclusions of the court of appeal. Bell v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2020-0067 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/20), 315 So.3d 301, 303-304.

3.   Good time credits are determined by the law in effect at the time the offense is committed. Tarver v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2020-1126 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/12/21), 326 So.3d 297, 305.

LANIER, J.

McClendon, C.J. concurs