TRUFUND FINANCIAL SERVICES INC v. CITY OF BATON ROUGE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE (2025)

Plaintiff in reconvention, the City of Baton Rouge-Parish of East Baton Rouge (City/Parish), appeals a summary judgment dismissing its indemnity and hold harmless claims against defendant in reconvention, TruFund Financial Services, Inc. (TruFund). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1

Following Hurricane Gustav in 2008, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a Disaster Recovery-Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) to the State of Louisiana Office of Community Development - Disaster Recovery Unit (the State). Pursuant to a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) dated March 19, 2009, the State, as the administrator of the CDBG disaster recovery program, made a grant award of nearly twenty-two million dollars “available” to the City/Parish (the Grant) for the purpose of funding a City/Parish-implemented recovery program and a City/Parish-implemented affordable rental housing program.²

The CEA expressly provided that the City/Parish's rights and obligations under the agreement were as a “grant recipient” as set forth in 24 CFR 570.501.³ Further, the CEA provided as follows:

[The City/Parish] is responsible for complying with said regulations and for implementing the Program in a manner satisfactory to the [State] and HUD and consistent with any applicable guidelines and standards that may be required as a condition of the [State's] providing the funds, including but not limited to all applicable CDBG Program Administration and Compliance requirements set forth by [the CEA] and the Statement of Assurances (attached hereto as Appendix A) executed by [the City/Parish] and made a part hereof. The [State's] providing of Grant Funds under [the CEA] is specifically conditioned on [the City/Parish's] compliance with this provision and all program and CDBG regulations, guidelines and standards.

In November 2011, the City/Parish engaged Seedco Financial Services, Inc., now TruFund, whereby TruFund would utilize a portion of the Grant funds to administer a program providing affordable business loans and technical assistance to small businesses impacted by Hurricane Gustav and to certain newly established businesses in designated recovery districts (the Small Business Loan Program). Under the terms of the Public Services Agreement between the City/Parish and TruFund (the Contract), the City/Parish agreed to reimburse TruFund for eligible expenses of the Small Business Loan Program up to a maximum of $2.6 million, which reimbursements were conditioned upon the City/Parish's actual receipt of the Grant funds from the State. The Contract required that TruFund adhere to detailed administrative requirements regarding financial management, documentation, record keeping, performance reporting, and payment procedures, including Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 570 (the Housing and Urban Development regulations concerning CDBGs), and all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and polices governing the funds provided in the Contract.

Under the terms of the Contract, TruFund certified that the activities carried out with the funds provided thereunder would meet the CDBG program's national objectives to benefit to low/moderate income persons and would be consistent with eligible activities. The Contract provided that the City/Parish would monitor TruFund's performance against national objectives and levels of accomplishment, which were set forth in the Contract. Any substandard performance as determined by the City/Parish constituted non-compliance under the Contract. Further, if the City/Parish had probable cause to believe TruFund was not complying with the applicable rules or regulations, the Contract authorized the City/Parish to withhold Contract funds until the non-compliance was corrected. Additionally, the Contract included an indemnification clause obligating TruFund to indemnify the City/Parish against any third-party claims arising out of the services performed under the Contract.

From 2012 through 2015, TruFund issued small business loans and incurred expenses of approximately $1.72 million in administering the Small Business Loan Program. TruFund submitted multiple reimbursement requests to the City/Parish, and the City/Parish reimbursed two of those requests in an amount of $515,450.15, leaving approximately $1.2 million in unreimbursed requests.

In January 2016, TruFund filed suit for breach of contract against the City/Parish to recover the unreimbursed $1.2 million, claiming such was due under the Contract. The City/Parish answered the suit, denying that it owed TruFund outstanding amounts. The City/Parish also filed a reconventional demand against TruFund for $12,420.65, claiming TruFund had breached its contractual obligations by receiving a provisional reimbursement of $12,420.65 on or about May 20, 2015, and then failing to provide the correct supporting documentation required by the Contract. The City/Parish also claimed TruFund was unjustly enriched by this same amount of $12,420.65. TruFund answered the reconventional demand, generally denying all allegations. Thereafter, the City/Parish twice supplemented its reconventional demand to assert a breach of contract claim against TruFund for $515,450.15, the amount the City/Parish had already reimbursed to TruFund. The City/Parish alleged TruFund had provisionally received the $515,450.15 in October of 2012 and failed to provide requested supporting documentation to demonstrate compliance with the Contract. Further, the City/Parish alleged that, because of TruFund's noncompliance with the Contract, the State was demanding return of the $515,450.15. Relying on the Hold Harmless provision of the Contract, the City/Parish alleged that TruFund was responsible for the return of the $515,450.15.

On May 1, 2019, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of TruFund, dismissing only the City/Parish's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claim prior to the City/Parish's supplemental reconventional demand. By amended judgment dated February 12, 2020 (which superseded the May 1, 2019 judgment), the judgment was certified as final. The City/Parish appealed that portion of the judgment dismissing the breach of contract claim and challenged the designation as final for purposes of immediate appeal in TruFund I, 2021 WL 1609238 at *4-5. This court found that viewing the entire scope of the case, appellate review of the City/Parish's narrow $12,420.65 breach of contract claim would be of little value and that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the judgment as final.⁴ Accordingly, this court dismissed the appeal. Id. at *4.

After the City/Parish amended its reconventional demand to include breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims in the amount of $515,450.15, TruFund obtained a second partial summary judgment on October 27, 2023, which was certified as final, dismissing with prejudice the City/Parish's reconventional demand against TruFund insofar as the claims asserted were premised on a theory of breach of contract or unjust enrichment. On appeal, this court found the judgment properly designated and reviewed the merits of the appeal. TruFund II, 403 So.3d at 1142-45. However, this court reversed the trial court's grant of TruFund's partial summary judgment, concluding that TruFund failed to carry its initial burden of proof as mover showing entitlement to summary judgment on the City/Parish's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. Id. at 1145-46.

On September 22, 2023, TruFund filed a third motion for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the City/Parish's indemnity and hold harmless claim asserted in the reconventional demand. TruFund argued that the indemnity provision in the Contract was limited to services performed under the Contract and did not include the City/Parish's obligations to the State under the CEA, which TruFund characterized as “contractual obligations to a third party.” The City/Parish opposed the motion. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TruFund, dismissing with prejudice the City/Parish's indemnity and hold harmless claims. A judgment memorializing same was signed on December 15, 2023. The City/Parish timely appealed.⁵

On appeal, the City/Parish assigns as error the trial court's finding that (1) TruFund carried its burden of proof that there were no material facts in dispute regarding TruFund's potential liability to the City/Parish for recovery of the $515,540.15 in Grant funds such that TruFund was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (2) sustaining the TruFund's objection to the introduction of the affidavit of Anita Lockett by the City/Parish.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

A ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo standard, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Murphy v. Savannah, 2018-0991 (La. 5/8/19), 282 So.3d 1034, 1038 (per curiam).

Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1), the initial burden is on the mover. However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Rather, the mover must point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1).

 Exclusion of Evidence

We first address the City/Parish's second assignment of error maintaining that the trial court erred in excluding the City/Parish's evidence submitted in opposition to TruFund's motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(2), any objection to a document filed or referenced in opposition to the motion for summary judgment “shall be raised in a timely filed ․ reply memorandum.” (Emphasis added.) TruFund plainly did not object to any document filed or referenced in the City/Parish's memorandum in opposition. Instead, TruFund raised an objection to the affidavit of Anita Lockett for the first time at the November 27, 2023 hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the trial court was required to consider the affidavit Anita Lockett and erred in failing to overrule the untimely and improperly raised objection.⁶ See Bartlett v. A-1 Serv. Co. of Houma, LLC, 2023-1016 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/17/24), 389 So.3d 158, 163. The City/Parish's second assignment of error has merit.

Merits of Summary Judgment

Considering the City/Parish's first assignment of error, we must evaluate whether TruFund carried its burden as mover, whether a material factual dispute remains, and whether TruFund is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Through its third motion for summary judgment, TruFund sought to dismiss the City/Parish's indemnity and hold harmless claims advanced in the reconventional demand against TruFund. Because the party seeking to enforce an indemnity agreement bears the burden of proof, McKinney v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 590 So.2d 1220, 1222 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 1302 (La. 1992), TruFund would not bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial and only needed to point out the City/Parish's lack of factual support for one or more elements essential to its claim.

Initially, we observe that no material facts are in dispute.⁷ Rather, the motion for summary judgment presents questions of law: whether the Hold Harmless provision is applicable to the City/Parish's claims against TruFund, which in this case involves both interpretation of the Contract and analysis of the applicable law and jurisprudence, and whether the City/Parish improperly attempts to have TruFund indemnify the City/Parish for a contractual obligation the City/Parish owes to the State.

According to the City/Parish's reconventional demand (as amended), the City/Parish transmitted two separate payments to TruFund in October of 2012 totaling $515,450.15 based on “certain documentation purporting to evidence [TruFund's] initial entitlement to the reimbursement of certain monies it allegedly expended in the extension of small business loans to potentially eligible borrowers in accordance with the terms of the [Contract]․” The City/Parish alleged that TruFund was advised following the October of 2012 receipt of $515,450.15 of the necessity of providing follow-up and supporting documentation as required under the terms of the Contract. In allegedly failing to provide such documentation, the State made demand upon the City/Parish for the return of the Grant funds in the amount of $515,450.15. The City/Parish alleged that TruFund is the party ultimately responsible for the return of the Grant funds in the amount of $515,450.15 demanded by the State, relying on the indemnity and hold harmless language in the Contract.

The purpose of an indemnity agreement is to allocate the risk inherent in the activity between the parties to a contract. Naquin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 2005-2103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1156, 1161, writ denied, 2006-2476 (La. 12/15/06), 945 So.2d 691. The obligation to indemnify may be express, as in a contractual provision, or may be implied in law even in the absence of an indemnity agreement. McCary v. Oceaneering International, Inc., 2017-1163 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/27/18), 243 So.3d 613, 616 (citing Nassif v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 98-3193 (La. 6/29/99), 739 So.2d 183, 185). When the indemnity obligation is expressed in a contract between the parties, such a contract forms the law between the parties and must be interpreted according to its own terms and conditions. See McCary, 243 So.3d at 616.

The determination of whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law. McCary, 243 So.3d at 616. When a contract can be construed from the four corners of the instrument without looking to extrinsic evidence, the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a matter of law and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. Here, the provision, entitled “Hold Harmless” provided:

[TruFund] shall defend, indemnify, hold harmless, and exempt the [City/Parish], its officers, agents, servants, and employees from and against any and all liabilities, suits, actions, legal proceedings, claims, demands, damages, costs, expenses, and attorney's fees which may arise out of services performed under this agreement, including any and all liability or responsibility for anyone claiming through or under them by way of subrogation or otherwise.

The language of the indemnity is broad, requiring TruFund to indemnify, hold harmless, and exempt the City/Parish from and against “any and all liabilities, suits, actions, legal proceedings, claims, demands, damages, costs, expenses, and attorney's fees․”

In its motion for summary judgment, TruFund argued that the indemnity provision is limited to claims arising out of the services performed by TruFund, maintaining that its services were simply the “provision of affordable business loans and related technical business assistance to small business[es] impacted by Hurricane Gustav.” To bolster its argument TruFund cited to Dean v. Griffin Crane & Steel, Inc., 2005-1226 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/06), 935 So.2d 186, writ denied, 2006-1334 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So.2d 387.

In Dean, 935 So.2d at 188, Abita Brewing Company, L.L.C. (Abita) contracted with Griffin Crane & Steel, Inc. (Griffin) to secure the services of a large crane and operator to move and position large fermentation tanks at the brewery. After the task was completed, the crane operator departed the brewery by 1:30 p.m. to return to the Griffin's premises. At 2:12 p.m., the crane operator was in a motor vehicle accident. After the tort victims in the accident sued Griffin, Griffin filed a third-party demand against Abita seeking to be indemnified pursuant to the terms of the contract. Id. The terms of the contract provided that Abita was to indemnify and hold Griffin harmless against “any loss, damage, claims or liability however caused, even if caused by [Griffin's] sole negligence, arising out of the performance of the work while using [Griffin's] equipment.” Id. at 190. (Emphasis removed.) While Griffin argued that the motor vehicle accident arose out of the “performance of the work,” this court disagreed, finding that the contract expressly defined the work as unloading tanks and that the accident occurred after the completion of the defined work and not at the defined job location. Id. at 192.

Unlike the contract in Dean and contrary to TruFund's argument, the scope of services provided in the Contract are not so limited. Pursuant to the activities identified under the “Scope of Services,”

[TruFund] will be responsible for administering the [CBDG] assisted activities described in this [Contract] in a manner satisfactory to the [City/Parish] and consistent with any standards required as a condition of providing these funds.

[TruFund] shall operate a program, which provides affordable business loans and related technical business assistance to small businesses impacted directly or indirectly by Hurricane Gustav and certain businesses newly established in designated recovery districts following Hurricane Gustav (the “Small Business Loan Program”). The purpose of the assistance is to further the recovery of affected small businesses and neighborhood communities through the loan assistance, retention and creation of jobs and to catalyze economic development in underserved districts in East Baton Rouge Parish.

CDBG assistance under this [Contract] shall be exclusively for the program administration, direct business loan assistance and related technical assistance to qualifying and eligible businesses for the purchase of inventory, purchase of equipment, working capital, loan refinancing and other operational business expenses. CDBG assistance will reimburse [TruFund] for related program expenses, including utilities, supplies and staff salaries. The activities supported through this [Contract] will benefit the communities in or around the underserved districts in East Baton Rouge Parish and enable the creation and retention of jobs and job opportunities for qualifying individuals.

[TruFund] shall maintain program and financial records documenting the eligibility criteria, loan process and agreements, technical assistance provided, program marketing efforts, job creation and retention, employee income verification, provision of services, loan servicing, program income receipt and use for eligible expenses and all [TruFund] expenses relative to persons and businesses receiving services under this program.

[TruFund] will administer all tasks in the provision of these services in compliance with all applicable Federal, State and local rules and regulations governing these funds, and in a manner satisfactory to the [City/Parish].

A summary of [TruFund's] Scope of Program Services is attached as Exhibit D and an approved CDBG [Disaster Recovery Unit] Application for Economic Development Program is attached as Exhibit E.

Moreover, the scope of program services identified in Exhibit D to the Contract included, in part, TruFund providing loans with certain terms; providing reasonable access to documentation pertaining to the administration and use for federal funds necessary to facilitate reviews and audits to the State of HUD officials; requiring borrowers, through loan documents, to provide certain information and to provide access to documentation and information pertaining to the administration and receipts of federal funds; providing quarterly reports, including information on businesses assisted, loans, and jobs created; monitoring loans per internal loan policies and CBDG regulations; and establishing a revolving loan account to allow for the repayment of principal and interest on the loan funds. Accordingly, to the extent that the City/Parish incurred any “liabilities, suits, actions, legal proceedings, claims, demands, damages, costs, expenses, and attorney's fees,” arising out of the performance of any of TruFund's services under the Contract, which includes all those identified in the Scope of Services provision and related exhibits, TruFund is obligated to defend, indemnify, hold harmless, and exempt the City/Parish pursuant to the Hold Harmless provision.

The City/Parish argued that TruFund's substandard performance of the services provided in the Contract – specifically, the failure of TruFund to provide the requisite support documentation for its use of Grant funds - caused the State to make claims and demand upon the City/Parish for the return of those Grant funds such that it is entitled to defense and indemnity from TruFund. In support of its assertion that the State's demands and claims against the City/Parish arose out of TruFund's substandard performance of services, the City/Parish attached to its opposition the affidavit of Lasonta Davenport, the former Resilience Implementation Manager for the State who attested, in part, that the City/Parish and TruFund had “a responsibility when they submit[ted] a draw request to ensure the underlying activity and expenditure complies with all applicable laws and directives”; “[s]ubsequent monitoring revealed deficiencies in, among other things, TruFund's loan files”; the State issued Monitoring Report dated July 18, 2016 “identified as a ‘concern’ TruFund's lack of support documentation for its use of loan funds”; the State requested that the City/Parish show that it received documentation from TruFund showing that TruFund's recipients used the loan funds for allowable costs; the State “provided follow-up technical assistance to TruFund intended to enable TruFund to comply with all applicable laws and directives”; and TruFund did not cure the deficiencies; an October 18, 2018 Monitoring Report was issued upgrading the State's “concern” over TruFund's inadequate loan documentation to a “Finding of Deficiency.” Both the July 18, 2016 and October 18, 2018 Monitoring Reports referenced in Davenport's affidavit were attached as an exhibit thereto.

In light of the fact that the scope of services under the Contract is broader than TruFund posited and in view of the evidence submitted by the City/Parish, we do not find that TruFund is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this basis. Nevertheless, TruFund also argued that the Hold Harmless provision did not encompass the City/Parish's obligations to the State under the CEA, claiming they were contractual obligations to a third party not expressly contemplated in the Hold Harmless provision. In support of the arguments advanced, TruFund relied on McKinney, 590 So.2d 1220.

In McKinney, South Central Bell Telephone Co. (Bell) entered into a master contract for work on utility poles with Crescent Construction Co. (Crescent). The master contract included an indemnity provision, which stated Crescent would hold harmless, defend, and indemnify Bell from “all claims and suits for loss, injury or damage ․ which may arise in or result from the performance of the work covered by [the] contract[.]” Id. at 1223.

An employee of Crescent who was injured while working on the utility poles filed suit against Bell and Louisiana Power & Light (LPL), the owner of the electrical line. Id. at 1220-21. LPL filed a cross-claim against Bell and a third-party demand against Crescent. Id. at 1221. The cross-claim alleged, among other things, LPL was entitled to indemnification and/or contribution from Bell for any alleged fault on the part of Bell for the accident pursuant to the terms of the joint use agreement entered into by Bell and LPL in 1978. Id. at 1221 and 1224.

Thereafter, Bell filed a third-party demand against Crescent, alleging that Crescent was required to indemnify Bell against any and all liability arising out of the performance of the master contract. Id. at 1221. While Crescent agreed to defend and indemnify Bell on the main demand as well as the tort claims by LPL on the cross-claim, Crescent refused to defend, indemnify, or hold harmless Bell on the contractual indemnity claims of LPL. Crescent and Bell filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to whether the language of the master contract between them provided indemnification for the cross-claims of LPL against Bell. The district court found Bell was entitled to indemnity. Id.

On appeal, Crescent argued that the master contract with Bell did not encompass liability resulting from Bell's joint use agreement with LPL to be responsible for one-half of the damages resulting from property damage or personal injuries caused by the concurrent negligence of Bell and LPL. Id. at 1225. This court agreed and held that because the agreement between Bell and Crescent did not expressly contemplate that Crescent would indemnify Bell for Bell's contractual indemnity obligations to LPL, Crescent was not liable to so indemnify Bell. Id. at 1227. While this court found that, as between Bell and Crescent, the parties intended to shift the risk of loss or damage for losses and damages to persons or property resulting from or arising out of the performance of the work covered by the master contract, this court declined to find that Crescent was obligated to cover Bell's contractual indemnity obligations to LPL under the joint use agreement.

The court in McKinney relied upon cases in support of its ruling, to wit: Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the indemnitee is entitled to express notice that the indemnitor may be required to pay damages for the liability of a third party assumed in an agreement between the indemnitee and the third party and that the indemnitee was not liable to indemnify the indemnitor for the indemnitor's agreement to indemnify the third party), and Foreman v. Exxon Corp., 770 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that the indemnification was limited to claims based upon tortious and not contractual injury and declining to require indemnitee to indemnify indemnitor for amounts indemnitor owed pursuant to an indemnification provision of a contract with a third party). Notably, the McKinney, Corbitt, and Foreman cases all involved situations in which an indemnitor sought to be indemnified by its indemnitee for third party contractual indemnification and in which the pertinent indemnification agreements specified that the indemnitee would indemnify the indemnitor for claims under worker's compensation, claims for damage for personal injury and property damages, and claims for illness and death. However, in this case, the City/Parish is not requesting TruFund indemnify the City/Parish's indemnity obligations to the State under the CEA, nor is the Hold Harmless clause at issue limited to personal and property damage and the like. We find these cases distinguishable.

After de novo review, we do not find that TruFund was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of TruFund and against the City/Parish, dismissing the City/Parish's indemnity and hold harmless claim.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the trial court's December 15, 2023 judgment granting summary judgment in favor of defendant in reconvention, TruFund Financial Services, Inc., and dismissing with prejudice the indemnity and hold harmless claims of plaintiff in reconvention, City of Baton Rouge-Parish of East Baton Rouge, is hereby reversed. All costs of this appeal in the amount of $24,593.50 are assessed to TruFund Financial Services, Inc.

REVERSED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   According to the CEA, the State “shall make available” to the City/Parish the funds, subject to the terms and conditions of the CEA. Grant funds would be “drawn” by the City/Parish upon approval by the State after the submission of proposals and individual infrastructure project applications.

3.   Section 570.501 of Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides, in part, as follows:(a) One or more public agencies, including existing local public agencies, may be designated by the chief executive officer of the recipient to undertake activities assisted by this part. A public agency so designated shall be subject to the same requirements as are applicable to subrecipients.(b) The recipient is responsible for ensuring that [Grant] funds are used in accordance with all program requirements. The use of designated public agencies, subrecipients, or contractors does not relieve the recipient of this responsibility.The recipient is also responsible for determining the adequacy of performance under subrecipient agreements and procurement contracts, and for taking appropriate action when performance problems arise․

4.   In TruFund I, 2021 WL 1609238 at *4, this court expressly stated that the trial court's certified judgment addressed only the narrow issue of the Parish's $12,420.65 breach of contract claim against TruFund because that was the only amount at issue when TruFund filed its motion for summary judgment.

5.   The City/Parish filed its appeal prior to this court's reversal of TruFund's second summary judgment. After the trial court denied the Parish's request for appeal, the City/Parish timely filed a notice of intent to apply for supervisory writs out of an abundance of caution. This court ordered that the trial court grant the City/Parish an appeal from the December 15, 2023 judgment. Trufund Fin. Servs., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge/Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 2024-0132 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/24), 2024 WL 2106020, writ denied, 2024-00714 (La. 11/6/24), 395 So.3d 873. This appeal followed.

6.   We note that the trial court and this court on de novo review may only consider evidence that is admissible under the express provisions of La. Code Civ. P. arts. 966 and 967. Mandeville P'ship v. A Luxury Transp., LLC, 2021-1450 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/24/22), 348 So.3d 763, 770 (citing Huggins v. Amtrust Ins. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 2020-0516 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/20), 319 So.3d 362, 366).

7.   The City/Parish did not list any contested issues of fact.

HESTER, J.

Wolfe, J. concurs without reasons.