KING v. AMOS 29374 (2025)

Plaintiff John King appeals the judgment of the trial court, finding in favor of Defendant Renee Amos and dismissing his petition with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John King owned a 2011 red Chevrolet Traverse that he left at his mother's house after the hurricanes hit the Lake Charles, Louisiana area in 2020. He allowed his former girlfriend, and mother of his children, Charmaine Colston to use the vehicle. Renee Amos is a notary public in Lake Charles. On September 7, 2021, Charmaine Colston appeared before Ms. Amos and executed a fraudulent title transfer of the Chevrolet Traverse, transferring the vehicle to herself. Mr. King testified that he was in New Jersey and New York on the day of the transfer.

In October 2021, Mr. King filed a police report for forgery/fraud, naming Charmaine Colston as the suspect. Mr. King testified that he learned of the fraudulent transfer in August 2022, when an investigative report completed by the Lake Charles Police Department was released to him. In the interim, Charmaine Colston sold the vehicle. When Mr. King stopped paying for insurance on the vehicle, his license was suspended. He was required to pay a fee to have his license reinstated. He also paid off the balance on the vehicle in the amount of $8,400.00.

On August 31, 2023, Mr. King filed a petition for damages against the notary, Ms. Amos. The petition alleged unauthorized exercise of Ms. Amos's notarial powers and professional negligence. Specifically, Mr. King alleged that she breached her duty by executing the transfer of title because he was owner of the vehicle and he was not present to sign the transfer.

A trial on the merits was held on November 14, 2024. The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Amos, finding that Mr. King failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Amos “engaged in any incorrect or improper conduct in processing this matter.” Oral reasons were assigned, and a judgment was signed on November 21, 2024. Mr. King now appeals.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Mr. King first argues that the trial court applied the incorrect burden of proof; therefore, the standard of review in this case should be de novo. We disagree.

In his brief, Mr. King contends that the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof because it did not make any credibility determinations in this case. According to Mr. King, the burden shifted to Ms. Amos once the trial court was satisfied that Mr. King was not in Lake Charles on the day of the transfer. However, Mr. King also states in brief that “[t]he trial court found the testimony of all witnesses credible.” If the trial court found a witness credible, then a credibility determination was made.

“In all civil cases, the appropriate standard for appellate review of factual determinations is the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, which precludes the setting aside of a trial court's finding of fact unless that finding is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety.” Hayes Fund for First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 14-2592, p. 8 (La. 12/8/15), 193 So.3d 1110, 1115. An appellate court cannot overturn the trial court merely because it would have decided the case differently. Id. Rather, “the appellate court must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court's conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong.” Id. at 1116. The appellate court must look at the entirety of the record to determine whether the trial court was manifestly erroneous. Id. The issue for the appellate court is whether the factfinder's conclusion was reasonable. Id.

[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong ․

․

Accordingly, an appellate court on review must be cautious not to re-weigh the evidence or to substitute its own factual findings just because it would have decided the case differently:

[w]hen findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. But where such factors are not present, and a factfinder's finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

Id. at 1116 (second alteration in original).

Great deference is given to the trial court's findings “because it observes and participates in the live presentation, while the appellate court merely reviews the cold transcript.” Id. at 1116–17.

Mr. King's petition specifically states:

5. Plaintiff aver[s] that Defendant was negligent and/or committed malpractice and breached ethical conduct and duties, in the following regard:

(a) By failing to require Charmaine Colston to require John King Sr. to appear in person with proper credentials before notarizing title and illegal bill of sale. This is the main and only relevant point that matters.

Because he was not in Louisiana at the time of the transfer, Mr. King alleges that Ms. Amos abused her professional powers. “A notary is liable both for deliberate malfeasance in the course of her official duties and for negligence in performing those duties.” Bergeron v. Bergeron, 23-161, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/16/23), 377 So.3d 817, 820.

In its oral reasons, the trial court found that, based on the evidence adduced, Mr. King was out-of-state on September 7, 2021, the date of the transfer of title. The trial court also found Ms. Amos's testimony to be credible. The trial court explained that it was Ms. Amos's testimony that Ms. Colston and a man appeared before her in order to execute a transfer of title of an automobile. Due to the frequency of her work, she could not recall if that same man was Mr. King. The trial court further explained that Ms. Amos stated that the person who appeared before her showed her the required identification, she verified same, and she notarized their signatures. She further testified that it is her custom and practice that everyone that comes before her to execute a notarial act is required to show her their identification, and she verifies it.

In its oral reasons, the trial court explained:

[T]he one (1) missing link that the Court really needed so that the Court can make a ․ a ․ a decision here is Ms. Colston. She's the missing link, so to speak. Ms. Colston isn't here to testify. Seems to me, she'd [have] been the one. You get her in here. You put her on the stand. Who went with you? Who was there? What happened? I find it of no moment that a Notary who does, I think you know, she testified thousands of these things over the years, that a Notary who does this doesn't specifically remember everything about a particular deal. They just know their protocol. Ms. Colston, however, this would be a rather significant and unique event in her life and, uh, she would be the party who would be best situated to tell us what in the world happened that day, who was with her, uh, etcetera. All right?

The trial court ruled that Mr. King failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Amos provided illegal notarial services to Charmaine Colston or that she intentionally notarized a false title transfer and false bill of sale in this matter.

As stated previously, Mr. King testified that he was not in Lake Charles on the day of the title transfer. In support of this contention, Mr. King's wife testified that she was with him in New York on September 7, 2021. A review of Ms. Amos's testimony shows that Ms. Amos stated that she does not recall if it was Mr. King that appeared before her to execute the title transfer. However, someone purporting to be Mr. King did accompany Ms. Colston. According to Ms. Amos, she verified his identification. While she could not specifically remember the day or the transfer due to the significant number of notarial acts, she has completed over the course of her career, she testified that it is her regular practice to do so. She also testified that if anything does not seem right, she contacts the local justice of the peace.

Mr. King cites Collins v. Collins, 629 So.2d 1274 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 94-422 (La. 4/4/94) 635 So.2d 1110, for the proposition that a notary is liable for failing to identify the seller in a bill of sale. In Collins, the plaintiff brought suit against his ex-wife and a notary public arising from the ex-wife's fraudulent sale of property co-owned by the plaintiff and ex-wife. The ex-wife appeared in the office of the notary with someone purporting to be plaintiff, who forged plaintiff's signature, in order to convey two lots to a purchaser. The case came before the court on an exception of no right or no cause of action. The appellate court found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action against the notary. In doing so, the appellate court cited Summers Brothers, Inc. v. Brewer, 420 So.2d 197 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1982).

In Summer Brothers, Inc., a corporation sued another corporation and others for fraud, including a notary public who notarized a document containing forged signatures. However, in that case it was proved that the notary public notarized the document after the signatures were already on the contract, thereby committing deliberate malfeasance. The court stated, “There is also no question in the court's mind that Mr. Mills affixed his signature and his notary seal after all the signatures had been affixed thereto and this is not in accordance with the law and the jurisprudence of this state.” Id. at 201.

Deliberate malfeasance was not proved in the present case nor was negligence. We agree with the trial court that the testimony of Ms. Colston would have been helpful to the court in determining whether Ms. Amos was at fault. Mr. King contends that the fact that Ms. Colston's testimony in this case is absent does not diminish Ms. Amos's fault. However, we find Ms. Amos's fault has not been established, and Ms. Colston's testimony could have helped in that regard. We agree with the trial court that there are other explanations, including that Ms. Colston appeared with someone purporting to be Mr. King who was utilizing fake identification. This is not implausible. However, only Ms. Colston can answer these questions.

For the reasons above, we cannot say that the trial court was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in determining that Mr. King failed to prove Ms. Amos's negligence.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of these proceedings are assessed to Plaintiff, John Clifford J. King.

AFFIRMED.

BRADBERRY, Judge.