MORRIS v. ACCESS HOME INSURANCE COMPANY (2025)

This is a hurricane damages case. Plaintiffs, Jason Morris and Jennifer Morris, seek supervisory review of the trial court's interlocutory judgment of December 26, 2024, which denied their motion for summary judgment to enforce appraisal amounts.¹

Plaintiffs reside in Beauregard Parish. Their home was badly damaged by Hurricanes Laura and Delta. At all relevant times, a homeowner's policy issued by Access Home Insurance Company (“Access”) was in full force and effect covering Plaintiffs’ home. In pertinent part, the Access policy states:

SECTION I – CONDITIONS

․

E. Appraisal

If you and we fail to agree on the amount of the loss, either may demand an appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will choose a competent and impartial appraiser within 20 days after receiving a written request from the other. The two appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot agree upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we may request that the choice be made by a judge of a court of record in the state where the “residence premises” is located. The appraisers will separately set the amount of loss. If the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed upon will be the amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will set the amount of loss.

Each party will:

1. Pay its own appraiser; and

2. Bear the other expenses of the appraisal and umpire equally.

․

I. Loss Payment

We will adjust all losses with you. We will pay you unless some other person is named in the policy or is legally entitled to receive payment. Loss will be payable 60 days after we receive your proof of loss and:

1. Reach an agreement with you;

2. There is an entry of a final judgment; or

3. There is a filing of an appraisal award with us.

At some point before the subject damages were sustained, Access amended the policy by special endorsement to add the following language:

SECTION I – CONDITIONS

․

E. Appraisal the following sentence is added:

This Condition is nonbinding.

Plaintiffs made a separate claim with Access for each hurricane. Access, in turn, inspected the home after each storm and made partial payments on both claims. But early in the adjustment process, Access became insolvent. Thereafter, in December 2021, the adjustment of Plaintiffs’ claims was formally assumed by Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (“LIGA”). LIGA then sent its own appraiser to inspect the home.

Ultimately, Plaintiffs filed suit against LIGA in August 2022. Then, two months later, LIGA's appraiser and Plaintiffs’ appraiser reached an agreement as to the amount of loss caused by each hurricane. The agreement was reduced to writing and submitted to the parties. Plaintiffs agreed with the appraisal awards; LIGA did not.

Eighteen months later, in April 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment to enforce appraisal amounts. The hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion was December 16, 2024. The trial court denied the motion from the bench. The court's ruling was reduced to a written judgment signed on December 26, 2024. Plaintiffs now seek supervisory review of this judgment.

In reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, we apply the de novo standard of review using the same criteria applied by the trial court to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880.

“[A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). Significantly, “[t]he burden of proof rests with the mover.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1).

Plaintiffs here, as the movers for summary judgment, had the burden of proving two things: first, that there was no genuine issue of material fact. And second, that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. With this in mind, Plaintiffs’ writ application asserts as follows:

When LIGA refused to honor the [appraisal] awards, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based only on the Appraisal Awards and the Access policy language that stated, “If the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed upon will be the amount of loss.”

Plaintiffs note that the appraisers here did just this: they submitted a written report of an agreement (one for each hurricane) to LIGA. Thus, according to Plaintiffs, the amount agreed upon is the amount of loss.

In response, LIGA concedes that the law between the parties is the Access insurance contract. But LIGA contends that the Access policy clearly states that appraisals are non-binding. LIGA then cites Lighthouse Ranch for Boys, Inc. v. Safepoint Ins. Co., 22-1988 (E.D. La. 3/16/23), 2023 WL 2540295). In that case, the trial court explained that an appraisal provision which expressly states that an appraisal award is non-binding cannot be confirmed by the court. Id. Hence, LIGA argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

In reply, Plaintiffs argue that the non-binding language in the policy endorsement is ambiguous. We disagree. Put simply, the appraisal provision in the Access policy is non-binding.

But our analysis does not end here: Plaintiffs also assert that their “Motion for Summary Judgment is not simply based on the appraisal provision of the underlying policy, but is based on uncontradicted summary judgment evidence demonstrating Plaintiffs suffered ‘separate and distinct’ damages from Hurricane Laura versus Hurricane Delta.”

On the one hand, Plaintiffs point out that both appraisers agreed on the amount of loss caused by Hurricane Laura, that both appraisers agreed on the amount of loss caused by Hurricane Delta, and that both appraisers agreed there was no duplication of damages in the two awards. But on the other hand, Plaintiffs concede that the appraisers could not determine in every instance which hurricane caused what damage. In our view, this alone creates a genuine issue of material fact.

In sum, the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment to enforce appraisal amounts.

DECREE

Plaintiffs’ application for supervisory writ is denied. Plaintiffs are also assessed with the costs of this writ proceeding.²

WRIT DENIED.

In this appeal, Plaintiffs, Jason Morris and Jennifer Morris, seek review of the trial court's partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (“LIGA”).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs reside in DeQuincy, Louisiana. Their home sustained serious damage from Hurricane Laura, which made landfall on August 27, 2020, and Hurricane Delta, which made landfall on October 9, 2020. At all relevant times, a homeowner's policy issued by Access Home Insurance Company (“Access”) was in full force and effect covering the home.

Plaintiffs made a separate damage claim with Access after each hurricane. Access, in turn, inspected the home after each storm and made partial payments on both claims. But early in the adjustment process, Access became insolvent. Thereafter, in December 2021, LIGA assumed all rights, duties, and obligations of Access. LIGA then sent its own appraiser to inspect the home.

Ultimately, Plaintiffs filed suit against LIGA in August 2022. Then, two months later, LIGA's appraiser and Plaintiffs’ appraiser reached an agreement and rendered two joint appraisal awards: one for Hurricane Laura and one for Hurricane Delta. Plaintiffs agreed with the appraisal awards; LIGA did not.

Fourteen months later, in December 2023, LIGA filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit Plaintiffs’ maximum recovery to one policy limit. Four months after that, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment to enforce the appraisal awards. Both motions were continued numerous times. Then, during a June 2024 hearing on LIGA's motion to continue, the trial court concluded that the parties’ summary judgment motions covered the same subject matter and should be heard together. The trial court then set the hearing on both motions for August 19, 2024. That hearing was later continued without date.

Next, on October 28, 2024, Plaintiffs filed to refix the hearing on their motion for summary judgment. The trial court, in turn, fixed the hearing for December 16, 2024. Yet LIGA waited until early December to refix its motion for summary judgment. Indeed, on December 6, 2024, LIGA filed a motion for expedited hearing. LIGA requested that its motion for summary judgment be refixed for December 16, 2024, which was ten days later. Plaintiffs immediately filed an objection, pointing to the mandatory notice provisions of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966. Even still, the trial court granted LIGA's motion for expedited hearing—both summary judgment motions were thus set for December 16, 2024.

At that hearing, the trial court orally granted LIGA's motion for partial summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ motion. The court's ruling on LIGA's motion was reduced to a written judgment signed on December 30, 2024. Plaintiffs have now appealed that judgment.¹

On appeal, Plaintiffs assert two assignments of error:

1) The trial court erred in fixing LIGA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for hearing in violation of the time constraints imposed by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966. The judgment should be reversed and set aside.

2) The trial court erred in finding Plaintiffs could not make a recovery for damages resulting from Hurricane Delta (except for the cost of replacing the roof felt) because Plaintiffs made no repairs after Hurricane Laura other than replacement of the roof felt, even though all appraisers/adjusters agreed they made every effort to distinguish damages between the two hurricanes and there was no “overlapping” or “duplication” of damages.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

 Subject Matter Jurisdiction

At the outset, LIGA challenges our exercise of appellate jurisdiction. In essence, LIGA contends that the trial court improperly designated its judgment of December 30, 2024, as a final judgment. We disagree.

The judgment at issue is a partial summary judgment. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(E). When it was signed on December 30, 2024, it did not constitute a final judgment for purposes of an immediate appeal because it lacked the appropriate certification language under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B)(1).² So in response, Plaintiffs did two things. First, they applied for a supervisory writ. Their writ application was filed in docket number 25-26. And second, they appealed the judgment.

A few weeks later, on January 28, 2025, a panel of this court in the writ proceeding remanded the case “to the trial court for consideration of whether the judgment at issue should be designated a final appealable in accordance with La.Code Civ.P. art. 1915(B)(1).” Morris v. Access Home Ins. Co., 25-25 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/21/25), ––– So.3d ––––, 2025 WL 1450647. Two days later, the trial court designated its partial summary judgment as a final and appealable judgment.

At this point, LIGA correctly notes that the designation by the trial court is not determinative of this court's jurisdiction. “Rather, this court's jurisdiction to decide this appeal hinges on whether the certification was appropriate.” OAT Trustee, LLC as Trustee for Girod Titling Trust v. Elite Inv. Grp., LLC, 21-1402, p.12 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/29/22), 347 So.3d 938, 946. In addition, when a trial court fails to give explicit reasons for the certification, as in our case, the determination of whether the certification was proper is reviewed de novo on appeal. R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113.

In Messinger, the Louisiana Supreme Court identified a handful of non-exclusive factors for a court to consider in determining the appropriateness of certification. But according to the court, “the overriding inquiry ․ is whether there is no just reason for delay.” Id. at 1122–23.

Here, Plaintiffs’ first assignment of error challenges the trial court's compliance with the procedural requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966. These procedural requirements are mandatory, and there is no legitimate reason for us to delay our review of this issue. LIGA's jurisdictional challenge is without merit.

 Assignments of Error

As stated earlier, Plaintiffs’ first assignment of error contends that “[t]he trial court erred in fixing LIGA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for hearing in violation of the time constraints imposed by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966.” We agree.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 states in relevant part:

C. (1) Unless otherwise agreed to by all of the parties and the court:

(a) A contradictory hearing on the motion for summary judgment shall be set not less than thirty days after the filing and not less than thirty days prior to the trial date.

(b) Notice of the hearing date shall be served on all parties in accordance with Article 1313(C) or 1314 not less than thirty days prior to the hearing.

The notice requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(1) are fundamental to procedural due process. Acadian Props. Northshore, L.L.C. v. Fitzmorris, 17-424 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/1/17), 234 So.3d 927. Notice under Article 966(C)(1) applies to both originally scheduled hearings as well as rescheduled hearings. Dehart v. Jones, 18-764 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/27/19), 269 So.3d 801. Thus, when notice has not been timely given under Article 966(C)(1)(b), and when the party opposing summary judgment objects on this basis, the trial court has no discretion to allow the hearing to go forward. Broussard v. Gulfport Energy Corp., 18-839 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/5/19), 273 So.3d 434.

Here, on December 6, 2024, LIGA filed a motion for expedited hearing, requesting that its motion for summary judgment be refixed for December 16, 2024. Plaintiffs, in turn, immediately filed a written objection based on noncompliance with the notice requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(1). The trial court nevertheless fixed the hearing for December 16, 2024. At that hearing, Plaintiffs reiterated their objection. The trial court overruled the objection and went forward with the hearing.

In the end, the bottom line is this: the record before us must reflect that all procedural requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966 have been met, including documentation showing that the notice of the hearing was timely served not less than thirty days before the hearing. Yet here, the procedural requirements have not been met. The trial court therefore erred in going forward with the hearing on summary judgment.³

DECREE

For the above reasons, the trial court's partial summary judgment in favor of Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association is vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings. The costs of this appeal are assessed to Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Also at that time, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association. Plaintiffs’ appeal of that judgment is pending in this court under docket number 25-110. And although Plaintiffs’ writ application and appeal have been consolidated, this memorandum opinion addresses only the disposition of the writ application.

2.   This memorandum opinion is issued in compliance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.1(B).

1.   On December 26, 2024, the trial court signed an interlocutory judgment denying Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have applied for supervisory review of that judgment in docket number 25-25. And although the writ proceeding and this appeal have been consolidated, our opinion here addresses only the disposition of the appeal.

2.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915(B)(1) states:When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

3.   Based on our disposition, we need not address Plaintiffs’ second assignment of error.

FITZGERALD, Judge.