LAWLESS v. PAE HOLDING CORPORATION (2025)

This workers’ compensation case involves an injury sustained by Plaintiff/Appellee, Deanne Lawless, when she exited her vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to her workplace, stepped on a rock, and fell, twisting and breaking her ankle. Ms. Lawless was employed by PAE Holding Corporation (also referred to herein as “PAE” or “Amentum”). The workers’ compensation court found that, at the time of her injury, Ms. Lawless was in the course and scope of her employment and awarded benefits. The workers’ compensation court also declined to credit PAE for the payment of short-term disability benefits. This appeal follows. After review, we affirm the October 7, 2024 Judgment finding that Ms. Lawless suffered an injury by accident while in the course and scope of her employment with PAE and that PAE failed to meet its burden in establishing the amount of an offset for short-term disability payments.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Ms. Lawless filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation on August 29, 2022, asserting that on July 20, 2022, she fell while at work and injured her right ankle and right leg while employed by Amentum as a Quality Advisor. In her claim, Ms. Lawless asserted that no wage benefits had been paid, and no medical treatment had been authorized.  ¹ Amentum answered the claim, denying the allegations but asserting its entitlement to a credit/offset for any indemnity or benefits paid, including disability insurance benefits received by Ms. Lawless from July 21, 2022, through October 25, 2022, and any additional benefits received after October 25, 2022. Amentum further alleged Ms. Lawless was not in the course and scope of her employment when she fell.

The trial was held on July 16, 2024. The parties entered several stipulations, namely: (1) “Ms. Deanne Lawless was employed by Amentum,” (2) “her average weekly wage is $1,322.80” with a corresponding compensation rate “of $743.00,” (3) “the medical treatment received by Ms. Lawless from the date July 20[th] of 2022 and the right ankle surgery she underwent is related to her incident of July 20th of 2022,” and (4) “Ms. Lawless was excused or put on a no-work status on August 2nd of 2022, and she was allowed to return to sedentary work July 12th of 2023.”

At trial, Ms. Lawless explained her position for Amentum as an auditor, which required she “go to different sections, shops, and make sure they're ․ doing what's in their ․ standard operating procedure - - and safety[.]” Her contract began in 2009, during which the company had three different names, the most recent being Amentum. Amentum is a contractor that performs work at Fort Polk, now Fort Johnson.² Amentum, and Ms. Lawless, worked in Building 4386 at Fort Johnson since approximately 2015. Her position included the need to use her personal vehicle at times to drive to the different shops being audited at Fort Johnson when a work vehicle was not available. Ms. Lawless was a salaried employee paid to work from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM but was told to record all hours actually worked.

Regarding her injury, Ms. Lawless recounted that on July 20, 2022, she arrived at work, exited her vehicle, and started walking to the building from the parking lot when she stepped on a rock, twisting her ankle and falling to the ground. Although she knew she injured herself, she made it to the building and informed her boss, Chuck Bailey, that she needed to seek medical attention. Mr. Bailey instructed her to see a workers’ compensation doctor and that Timothy Osmun would set it up for her. After being seen by a nurse, Mr. Osmun took Ms. Lawless to Beauregard Business Partners. Ms. Lawless returned to work that day but was instructed to return to Beauregard that afternoon to have a boot put on because she had a fracture. Ms. Lawless logged her work time for that day beginning at 7:00 AM, and her injury occurred after that start time.

Ms. Lawless was contacted by a representative from Sedgwick, Mr. Kirkendal. Later that week, Ms. Lawless saw her own doctor who recommended she see an orthopedic surgeon. The orthopedic surgeon first required an MRI. Ms. Lawless testified that Mr. Kirkendal was called regarding each of these visits before they occurred and, to her knowledge, each visit was approved.

In August, Ms. Lawless was mailed a workers’ compensation benefits check, but before she received it, she was instructed by Mr. Kirkendal that her claim was being denied and that she was not to cash the check.

Ms. Lawless testified that she attempted to return to work in October of 2022, but was told she had to be cleared one hundred percent to come off short-term disability. Eventually, her injury required right ankle surgery. While she was out of work, Ms. Lawless testified that she did receive short-term disability benefits, but did not recall who paid for those benefits or the amount of benefits that she received.

PAE called Kevin Perondi to testify as the program manager of the Amentum contract. Mr. Perondi explained that Amentem owns PAE, and that before Amentum's contract at Fort Johnson, the contract was with AECOM. Mr. Perondi testified that he worked for AECOM and transitioned to Amentum. Mr. Perondi explained that pursuant to the Performance Work Statement with the government, Amentum employees worked from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM, though because of OSHA reporting regulations, each employee reported the total hours accumulated that day. Additionally, Amentum only had responsibilities over Building 4386 and the outdoor area between the parking lot and the building, but not the parking lot itself. The parking lot was not specifically for Amentum employees.

PAE then called Timothy Osmun. Mr. Osmun is the environmental health and safety manager for Amentum. Mr. Osmun and Ms. Lawless's supervisor, Chuck Bailey, investigated the parking lot after Ms. Lawless's accident but did not feel any hazard needed to be reported. Mr. Osmun explained that he investigated the accident despite the injury not occurring within Amentum's footprint because he was responsible for buildings all over Amentum's footprint, not just that one building.

Both parties submitted post-trial briefs. Amentum asserted that the evidence supported a finding that Ms. Lawless was not in the course and scope of employment when she was injured because the injury occurred before the workday began, she was not on a special mission for her employer, and the parking lot in which the injury occurred was not the employer's work site and the employer had no responsibility over the parking lot. On the other hand, Ms. Lawless argued that she began her workday at 7:00 AM and was being paid at the time her injury occurred, the parking lot was in close proximity to the Amentum office and one of three that Amentum employees could park in, and Ms. Lawless, as an Amentum employee, would encounter a hazard in the parking lot at a higher frequency than the general public. Thus, Ms. Lawless asserted that she was in the course and scope of her employment.

The workers’ compensation court provided Reasons for Judgment. After summarizing the evidence and testimony presented at trial, as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence, the workers’ compensation court found:

Here, Ms. Lawless arrived to work on the military base, parked her vehicle in the parking lot closest to her office building, and was walking to her building when she stepped on a rock and fell. While the lot she parked in was not marked as exclusively for Defendant's employees, Ms. Lawless was instructed to park there. Other employees who work in the same building as Ms. Lawless, including the program manager, park their personal vehicles in that same lot.

Ms. Lawless had arrived to work when the accident occurred. She was no longer going or coming. While she had not yet crossed the threshold to her office building, she was in the parking lot where she was instructed to park for work. Further, on the day of the accident, she parked her vehicle at 7:00 AM and included this time in her calculation of work hours on her timesheet, as was her custom, and she was never reprimanded or told not to calculate her time that way. Also, she occasionally traversed that parking lot to conduct her work duties, considering that she used her personal vehicle to travel around the base to perform audits.

Additionally, much testimony was presented regarding who was responsible for the maintenance of the parking lot versus other areas of the installation. However, that is not the standard or issue here. The facts presented here are unique, in that this accident occurred on a military base. The entire installation belongs to the government. Thus, what otherwise constitutes the Employer's premises in this case must be considered.

․ In this case, Ms. Lawless worked in Building 4386. However, her work was not confined to the building alone. She also conducted audits in different locations on the base. Some of those locations were not in walking distance, thus she had to drive. When a company vehicle was not available, she drove her personal vehicle. Thus, the parking lot herein, under the facts of this case, is a part of the Defendant's premises considering Ms. Lawless’ duties encompassed her traversing the lot to complete her assignments. As such, she was on the Employer's premises at the time of her accident.

Accordingly, the court finds that Ms. Lawless met her burden to establish that she suffered personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment and is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

Regarding Amentum's failure to prove its entitlement to a credit, the workers’ compensation court noted Ms. Lawless's testimony that she did not recall the amount she received in short-term disability payments, despite opposing counsel's suggestion that she previously stated in her deposition that she received $18,000.00. The workers’ compensation court noted the deposition was not admitted. Furthermore, “no other evidence was presented to calculate the offset. Thus, this court has no choice but to find that Defendant failed to meet its burden of proof to establish the amount of the offset.”

The workers’ compensation court rendered a judgment in favor of Ms. Lawless on October 7, 2024. Pertinent to the appeal herein, the judgment held that Ms. Lawless established she was injured and that her injury arose “out of and in the course of her employment” with PAE. The judgment further awarded Ms. Lawless temporary total disability benefits totaling $36,407.00 for the months of August 2, 2022, to July 12, 2023. The judgment specifically held that PAE was not entitled to a credit for any short-term disability received between July 21, 2022, through January 2023, because PAE failed to carry its burden in establishing the amount of the offset.

PAE asserts two assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court erred in finding that Deanne Lawless was in the course and scope of her employment when she fell in a public parking lot adjacent to her employer's premises when there was no evidence presented that she was on a special mission for her employer or was engaged in any work activity at the time of her fall.

2. The trial court erred in failing to give Amentum credit for the short-term disability benefits received by [P]laintiff after her fall when the uncontradicted evidence showed that Amentum paid 100% of the premium for a six[-]month short[-]term disability policy and that [P]laintiff applied for and received short[-]term disability benefits.

DISCUSSION:

The question of whether a claimant is entitled to compensation benefits is a question of fact, and a WCJ's determination may not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Only when documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or that story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it, may the appellate court find manifest error.

Posey v. NOMAC Drilling Corp., 44,428, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/12/09), 16 So.3d 1211, 1215 (citations omitted).

Assignment of Error One—Course and Scope of Employment:

When a worker brings a workers’ compensation claim against her employer, she bears the burden of initially proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she suffered a work-related injury. Bruno v. Harbert Int'l Inc., 593 So.2d 357 (La.1992); Ford v. Bechtel O.G.C. Constr. Servs., Inc., 16-554 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/16), 209 So.3d 110. PAE alleges the workers’ compensation court erred in concluding Ms. Lawless suffered an accident in the course and scope of her employment because she was coming to work but was not yet at work—she was not on the clock and was not on the employer's premises. Our circuit ³ has previously quoted Posey, 16 So.3d at 1214, which discussed this issue at length:

An employee is entitled to compensation benefits if he receives a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. LSA–R.S. 23:1031(A); McLin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc., 2002-1539 (La. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1135. The requirement that an employee's injury occur “in the course of” employment focuses on the time and place relationship between the injury and the employment. McLin, supra; Weber v. State, 93-0062 (La. 4/11/94), 635 So.2d 188. An accident occurs in the course of employment when the employee sustains an injury while actively engaged in the performance of his duties during work hours, either on the employers’ premises or at other places where employment activities take the employee. McLin, supra, Mundy v. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 593 So.2d 346 (La.1992). The requirement that an employee's injury “arise out of” the employment relates to the character or origin of the injury suffered by the employee and whether this injury was incidental to the employment. McLin, supra;Williams v. Regional Transit Authority, 546 So.2d 150 (La.1989).

Additionally, this court in Francisco v. Harris Management Co., 94-136, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94), 643 So.2d 386, 388, considered the requirements of “arising out of” and “in the course of” in relation to one another:

An employer is responsible for compensation benefits to an employee who is injured by an accident “arising out of” and “in the course of” his employment. La.R.S. 23:1031 A. An accident “arises out of” employment if the risk from which the injury resulted was greater for the employee than for a person not engaged in employment. Mundy v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 593 So.2d 346 (La.1992). The term “in the course of” brings into focus the time and place relationship between the risk and the employment. Raybol v. Louisiana State University, 520 So.2d 724 (La.1988). The two requirements cannot be considered in isolation from each other. A strong showing by the claimant with reference to the “arising out of” requirement may compensate for a relatively weak showing on the “in the course of” requirement, or vice versa. Raybol, at p. 726,.

Furthermore, the Posey court explained the “going and coming” rule, which is argued by PAE in this case:

Generally, injuries sustained by an employee while traveling to and from work are not considered to have occurred within the course of employment and, therefore, are not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. McLin, supra;Brown v. Southern Ingenuity, Inc., 44,082 (La.App. 2d Cir. 2/25/09), 4 So.3d 974. This rule, often referred to as the “going-and-coming rule,” is premised on the theory that, ordinarily, the employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves his work to go home until he resumes his work. McLin, supra;Yates v. Naylor Indus. Services, Inc., 569 So.2d 616 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 92 (La.1991).

However, the well-established “going-and-coming rule” is subject to the following exceptions recognized by the jurisprudence: (1) if the accident occurred on the employer's premises; (2) if the employee was deemed to be on a specific mission for the employer; (3) if the employer had interested himself in the transportation of the employee as an incident to the employment agreement either by contractually providing transportation or reimbursing the employee for his travel expenses; (4) if the employee was doing work for his employer under circumstances where the employer's consent could be fairly implied; (5) if the employee was injured while traveling to and from one work site to another; (6) if the employee was injured in an area immediately adjacent to his place of employment and that area contained a distinct travel risk to the employee (“the threshold doctrine”); or (7) if the operation of a motor vehicle was the performance of one of the duties of the employment of the employee. L.J. Earnest Const. v. Cox, 30,506 (La.App. 2d Cir. 5/13/98), 714 So.2d 150; Yates v. Naylor Indus. Services, Inc., 569 So.2d 616 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 92 (La.1991). Whether an exception applies is a question of fact. L.J. Earnest Const., supra.

The “threshold doctrine” generally involves a special risk attributable to the location of the work premises that is different from the risks to which the general traveling public is exposed or that is more aggravated in the area adjacent to the employer's premises than elsewhere. Mundy, supra. Under this doctrine, an employee who meets with an accident not on his or her employment premises while traveling to and from work, can recover if he or she successfully proves that (1) a distinctive travel risk exists for the employee in going to or coming from work, and (2) the risk exists immediately adjacent to his or her place of work. Robinson v. Brown, 35,430 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 396, writ denied, 2002-0912 (La. 3/22/02), 811 So.2d 924; Templet v. Intracoastal Truck Line Inc., 255 La. 193, 230 So.2d 74 (1969).

Posey, 16 So.3d at 1217.

PAE suggests that this is a classic case of the “coming and going” rule in workers’ compensation wherein no exceptions to the general rule apply and asserts the workers’ compensation court erred in finding otherwise. PAE argues that, according to her own testimony, Ms. Lawless was injured before she started working on July 20, 2022, and was not on a special mission for her employer at the time of her injury. PAE also asserts that the parking lot in which the injury occurred was a public lot maintained by the government, not Amentum, though Amentum employees were permitted to park their vehicles in the lot.

Ms. Lawless alleges that the workers’ compensation court correctly found that she was not only injured on her employer's premises, but that she was being paid at the time of her injury as well. Citing Edigo v. Otis Elevator Co., 19-229 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/19), 283 So.3d 592, Ms. Lawless asserts that, even if the parking lot was public and not technically Amentum's premises, as an employee, she would encounter any defect in the parking lot with a higher frequency than the general public and the parking lot was in close proximity to where she performed work duties. Ms. Lawless was also provided a key to access the locked gate between the parking lot and Building 4386.

Additionally, Ms. Lawless argues that the testimony supports a finding that she was being paid at the time of her injury: she customarily listed 7:00 AM as her start time, and did the day of her injury, her timesheet was not denied, and she was never reprimanded for this manner of logging her hours. Her time sheet for the day of her injury was approved by her employer.

The workers’ compensation court found Ms. Lawless was “no longer going or coming” to work but had “arrived to work when the accident occurred.” The workers’ compensation court noted that “she parked her vehicle at 7:00 AM and included this time in her calculation of work hours on her timesheet, as was her custom, and she was never reprimanded or told not to calculate her time that way.”

At trial, there was testimony from both Ms. Lawless and Mr. Perondi regarding Amentum's work hours and pay. Ms. Lawless testified that she was a salaried employee, but when reporting her hours online, she was instructed “to put in the hours that you put in” even though she was only paid for eight hours. Ms. Lawless further explained that, doing this, she could take off for an appointment without using leave time. On the day of her injury, Ms. Lawless logged ten hours, but admitted she normally logs approximately nine hours per day. Specifically, Ms. Lawless explained: “You couldn't put your hours in until after 2 or 3. Whatever time you came in and turned on your computer and started working until you left, that's how many hours you put in.” Despite explaining her start time as beginning with turning on her computer, Ms. Lawless immediately testified that, on the day of her injury, the ten hours she worked started “[a]t 7, when I got there.”

On cross-examination, Ms. Lawless stated that she logs her time from when she pulls into the parking lot and goes inside. Regarding keeping their time, Ms. Lawless explained:

A ․ I pulled in and got out of my truck and started walking in. And I knew it was 7 because - - because I looked at my clock when I got out and I try to do that because I go in and start up my computer right away.

Q And so those ten hours that you logged you were paid for on this day?

A Yes

Q And so those hours were approved by your employer?

A Yes.

Q Can you explain or tell the Court was that your common practice?

A Yes. I usually got there by 7, sometimes 6:30. It depended if I needed to take off a day. They would let you come in and put in the extra hours and take it off since you're not getting paid for it. But even the day before I put in nine hours and that was approved. I mean, we've always done that. We were told by Mr. Perondi to put all your hours in, and it looks good for the government that you're there extra hours even though you're only getting paid for eight.

․

Q ․ At Amentum was there someone there that had to approved [sic] your timesheets?

A Yes. Chuck Bailey did, and then it went to - - I don't know if Mr. Perondi did or not after him, but my manager Chuck Bailey approved our time.

Q And were your time sheets ever denied or not approved?

A No. No.

Q And were they aware of how you put in your time and how you started your day?

A Yes. It wasn't unusual to work 48 hours a week, but - - time for that, but you only got paid for the 40. And it was stressed to us by our timekeeper lady and Mr. Perondi to go ahead and put all your time in. Even if you worked through lunch, you put that hour in.

Ms. Lawless agreed that the hourly employees worked from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM with one hour off for lunch. But it was her opinion that those hours applied to the hourly employees.

Mr. Perondi's testimony was similar to Ms. Lawless's testimony regarding work hours. Mr. Perondi explained that the PWS [Performance Work Statement] specifies work hours from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM, but that it does not contain a distinction between hourly or salaried employees. Furthermore, there are no clocks for employees to punch in, but each employee manually logs their time into the computer system. The time is not logged as a start and end time, but instead, each employee reports the total hours accumulated that day. Employees were told to report their total hours, even if it exceeded forty hours per week for which they were paid (salary), because OSHA 300 reporting required the actual hours worked to be logged for safety reports. Lastly, while Mr. Perondi had the authority to approve or disapprove of Ms. Lawless's time, her supervisor, Chuck Bailey, regularly held that responsibility.

The Performance Work Statement, entered into evidence, provided the following regarding work hours:

Installation Operating Hours – Normal installation operating hours are 0730 – 1630, Monday through Friday, excluding Federal holidays, with a one hour lunch period from 1130 to 1230. The Contractor shall be adequately staffed during these hours in order to meet mission requirements with no flexible schedules (unless otherwise noted throughout this PWS) ․ All requirements to work additional hours outside of normal operating hours will be approved by the Contracting Officer.

Based on the testimony, we cannot say the workers’ compensation court erred in finding that Ms. Lawless's injury occurred during her work hours. Ms. Lawless was a salaried employee and expected to record her hours worked, even if those hours exceeded the 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM work hours listed in the PWS, which also gave the contracting officer the authority to approve hours outside of normal operating hours. Ms. Lawless routinely calculated her time based on her arrival and was not instructed to end this practice. Thus, we find no manifest error in the workers’ compensation court's conclusion that Ms. Lawless's injury occurred during her work hours.

The workers’ compensation court also found that Ms. Lawless's injury occurred on Amentum's premises under the unique facts of this case. At trial, Ms. Lawless, Mr. Perondi, and Mr. Timothy Osmun all testified regarding Amentum's premises. Ms. Lawless testified that her office was in Building 4386. She was instructed to park in the lot where she was injured by PAE when AECOM held the contract prior to Amentum. That lot was adjacent to Building 4386. In fact, she was even instructed to back into a parking spot for safety reasons. Ms. Lawless traversed this parking lot often, not only when she came to and from work, but she when the company “section” vehicle was not available and she was required to use her personal vehicle to carry out job duties, such as auditing at other areas of Fort Johnson. While other lots were available for parking, Ms. Lawless explains those were for the other buildings:

Q Ms. Lawless, was this parking lot labeled by any kind of signage or anything as public parking?

A No.

Q Did all of the Amentum employees that you worked with park in this parking lot?

A Yes.

Q How long had you been parking in that parking lot as an employee of PAE Holdings?

A Okay. Probably since 2015 or ’16. I can't remember which year they took over, but yes ․

․

Q Now, is there any other parking area that you could have parked in to get to your office where this X is?

A That's a parking area up there, but that's for other Amentum buildings.

Q And that's - - what you're talking about is not - -

A Right, right.

Q - - shown on this map?

A Yeah. And there's a parking area back here somewhere where some of the guys in this shop would park at [b]ut that was back here. But most of these vehicles that you see in there are military vehicles inside. You can't go inside the gate that's right there.

․

Q The parking lot that we're talking about where you said you parked - -

A Yes.

Q - - that is the closest in proximity to your office to park at; correct?

A Yes.

․

Q Is there any kind of special pathway, sidewalk, or anything from the parking lot directly to that door?

A Yes. You had to go down this hill - - or get to here to the sidewalk, and it went down a hill and there was another gate there. You went through that gate, and then you went inside the gate and to the door.

․

Q During the course of your employment with Amentum or PAE Holdings, were you ever instructed to park somewhere else?

A No.

Ms. Lawless also testified that it was her understanding that the general public could not simply come and park in that parking lot to visit. To get to the area, one would need to check in at the gate, hand over your ID, explain your reason for being on the installation, receive a piece of paper, and then drive in. It was not common for the public to be in that parking lot, unless the person was on site for an interview or something of that nature. However, Ms. Lawless admitted that, once inside the military installation, there was no gate to the parking lot requiring an Amentum employee card to access the lot and that, if they wanted, anybody inside of Fort Johnson could park in that lot. She also admitted there were no designated parking spots or parking area for Amentum employees.

Ms. Lawless testified that she had a set of keys to the gate between the parking lot and the building where her office was located. Those keys were given to her by a “key master” who worked for Mr. Perondi.

PAE called Mr. Perondi to testify, and he explained the responsibilities of Amentum regarding Building 4386:

Q So let's talk about the performance work contract and the responsibilities of Amentum under that contract. And the responsibilities are with respect to who has responsibilities on one side of the fence and the other side of the fence.

․

Q What does Amentum's property consist of?

A As for the PWS [Performance Work Statement], everything within the confines of that fence line on the interior portion of that we are responsible. That whole building belongs to the government, but the government puts it onto our property. It is hand receipted to us as government-furnished equipment, GFE. So then it goes onto our hand receipt; we are signed for each and every one of those buildings, so we're directly responsible for everything within that compound.

․

A ․ Everything within the perimeter of this red line - - everything in here by my contract I am responsible to maintain.

This here, this parking lot up here, all these parking lots I have no responsibility․

Mr. Perondi also testified that the parking lot next to Building 4386 is open to anyone who needs to conduct business in that building, including customers and patrons. He explained that, since he has been the project manager since 2018, he has not put out a directive instructing Amentum employees to park in the parking lot at issue. However, he admitted that there was no parking area under the responsibility of Amentum for employees like Ms. Lawless to park their personal vehicles. Mr. Perondi further admitted that Ms. Lawless was required to go out to conduct quality audits, as well as work at her desk in Building 4386.

PAE also called Timothy Osmun, Amentum's environmental health and safety manager, on its behalf. Mr. Osmun drove Ms. Lawless to receive medical care on the day of her injury before returning to Fort Johnson. When Mr. Osmun returned to work at Amentum, he and Chuck Bailey walked to the parking lot to investigate whether anything needed correction following Ms. Lawless's accident. After investigating, Mr. Osmun did not feel any hazard needed to be reported to the government. While he saw some pebbles and gravel, Mr. Osmun asserted that he only saw “typical debris” that would be found in a parking lot. Lastly, Mr. Osmun was asked why he investigated the accident when it allegedly did not occur within Amentum's footprint:

Q You said as part of your investigation you and Chuck Bailey went to the parking lot where Ms. Lawless was injured.

Why not just call somebody at Fort Polk and say, hey, there was an injury [in] y'all’s parking lot; why [don't] you go inspect it?

A Because I have - - between employees and subcontractors approximately 400 other people on the entire footprint. I don't want somebody else to get hurt if it's something I can prevent. That's my job.

Q Right.

Even though it's beyond the Amentum Building 4386; correct?

A I'm responsible for buildings all over the footprint, not just that one building. That's not my only place of - - that's where my office is, but I go over the entire post.

Q What do you - - just for clarification because you can imagine and lot of y'all’s terminology is foreign to us. So when you say the entire post, if you could maybe explain that in a little bit - -

A Okay.

Q - - more detail.

A All right. My office is in 4386 on Louisiana Avenue.

․

A We have prepo (phonetic) North Fort which - - and I don't know mileage - - approximately 8 to 10 miles from my office. I have people that work for Amentum there.

Q Right.

A I have people in no less than eight different locations on South Fort, so I'm all over.

․

Q And as of the day of Ms. Lawless’ incident, was it your understanding that there were other Amentum employees that parked in that parking lot in addition to her?

A Yes.

Q And so are you saying that was part of the reasoning for you and Chuck Biley [sic] to go out there was related to protect[ing] Amentum employees?

A It was to protect everybody. We have Amentum employees, our customers come through there, our subcontractors. You know, there's people all over. It's my job.

The Performance Work Statement designated the responsibilities of Amentum on the Fort Johnson footprint:

3.7 Government Furnished Facilities and Real Property

3.7.1 The Government will furnish facilities, including (fixed) equipment ․ The Contractor shall share facilities ․ with the Government. The Government reserves the right to substitute functionally equivalent buildings during the terms of this contract. The Government will provide 30 days advance notice to the Contractor of any proposed move. The Contractor shall not be relieved of its responsibilities for providing all of the services required by the terms of this contract because of or during such moves. Upon completion of this contract the Contractor shall return Government-furnished facilities in the same or better condition as when originally furnished less fair wear and tear.

․

3.7.3 The Government will provide parking areas for privately owned vehicles (POV). Contractor personnel shall comply with all Fort Polk regulations and directives concerning POV traffic and parking.

․

3.8.6 The Contractor shall perform minor maintenance such as changing light bulbs; replacing outlet covers and similar tasks such as would normally be performed by a homeowner. The Government will provide other maintenance and repairs through the DPW Preventative Maintenance program or the Service Order system․

3.8.7 The Government may provide scheduled custodial services for Contractor operated administrative areas on a limited basis in accordance with the current DPW contract․

3.8.8 The Government will provide pest control services as required.

3.8.9 The Contractor shall keep all areas controlled and occupied by the Contractor neat and clean, free from over-grown vegetation, trash, leaves, and debris. The Contractor shall be responsible for incidental grass (weed) trimming/mowing not provided under the Directorate of Public Works (DPW).

3.8.10 The Government will provide snow removal outside the Contractor's area of responsibility at Contractor-occupied facilities. The Contractor shall clear areas adjacent to GFF[Government-Furnished Facilities] as required to gain safe access to facilities from parking areas. This may include sidewalks, walk ways or other incidental areas.

․

4.3 Vehicles

4.3.2 ․ Contractor personnel shall park POVs only in areas designated for POV parking. The Contractor shall encourage the use of employee carpools.

4.3.3 Contractor Owned Contractor Operated (COCO) vehicles – The Contractor shall provide vehicles as necessary to perform the contract requirements.

The workers’ compensation court considered the fact that the entire installation was a military base owned by the government, presenting a unique situation. Although the PWS did not delegate any responsibility of Amentum over the parking lot, it indicates that private vehicles would only be permitted to park in “provided parking areas” and those vehicles must comply with the installation's “regulations and directives concerning POV traffic and parking.” Ms. Lawless was instructed to park in this lot, which is the lot closest to the building in which she worked, the other Amentum employees in Building 4386 also parked in this lot, and her employment duties required her to traverse the parking lot.

Several cases provide insight as to how to consider an employer's premises or premises adjacent area in workers’ compensation, though most involve the “going and coming” rule, i.e., the employees were either not yet on the clock or had just clocked out when their injury occurred. In Edigo, 283 So.3d 592, this court reviewed and affirmed a grant of summary judgment, finding the employer was immune from tort liability because the employee's injury arose in the course and scope of her employment. The employee arrived early to work and used an elevator on the employer's premises to go from the Atrium to the first floor to wait until her clock-in time as a food service worker. When she exited the elevator, she tripped and fell due to a defect in the elevator, causing it to be unlevel. This elevator was used by both hospital employees and the general public. The facts of the case were uncontested; thus, the court had to decide a question of law: “whether these undisputed facts arose in the course and scope of [the employee's] employment[?]” Id. at 594. The employee in Edigo argues, as Amentum does in this case, that to be in the course and scope of employment, it must be proved that “she was injured while performing her duties ․ and that the accident arose from that work.” Id. at 595. Citing Bosse v. Westinghouse Electric, Inc., 93-1898 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/17/94), 637 So.2d 1157, writ denied, 94-1623 (La. 9/30/94), 642 So.2d 878, the Edigo court stated:

We disagree. To allow parties recovery in workers’ compensation and/or employers to assert tort immunity under such narrow circumstances ignores the reality of employment, particularly in large places like hospitals. Bosse was not performing any specific job duties when he was exiting the elevator, yet, he was in close proximity to the place where he would be. The facts here are indistinguishable from Bosse.

Edigo, 283 So.3d at 595–96. Although the elevator was part of the employer's premises herein, this court noted the exceptions to the “coming and going” rule and further focused on the character or source of the risk giving rise to the injury in making its determination of whether an accident arises out of employment. The court noted the difference in an injury arising from a premises defect rather than an independent act of negligence:

The Bosse court explained the rationale proving there is no importance in the fact that the general public uses the elevator as noted by Kathlene: Kathlene, as a person who worked there, would be presumed to encounter the risk of the defective elevator at a much higher frequency than the general public. Therefore, she had a much greater chance of being exposed to this particular risk of injury. This satisfies the “arose out of” factor, while the Bosse court further found that Bosse's arrival at the seventh floor “may also be considered within the course and scope of that employment.” Id. at 1159.

Id. at 595.

Additionally, the fifth circuit in Hall v. House, Golden, Kingsmill and Riess, 97-988 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/27/98), 717 So.2d 250, writs denied, 98-2195, 98-2205 (La. 11/25/98), 729 So.2d 565, considered whether an attorney was in the course and scope of his employment when he left work and was abducted, carjacked, and later murdered, in a parking garage that did not belong to his employer. The fifth circuit reviewed the case as a “going and coming” scenario and noted:

(1) each case must be decided on its distinct merits,

(2) as a general rule, when an employee is traveling to and from work he is not covered by workers’ compensation but this rule has been the subject of jurisprudentially established exceptions, and

(3) one of the recognized exceptions is the threshold doctrine.

Id. at 251. The court also noted the exceptions to the “going and coming” rule which include “(1) if the accident happened on the employer's premises” and “(6) if the employee was injured in an area immediately adjacent to his place of employment and that area contained a distinct travel risk to the employee, also known as the threshold doctrine[.]” Id. (emphasis in original). In finding the threshold exception applied, the court reiterated that the parking lot was only two blocks away, the employer did not provide parking spaces for all employees on the premises, and though not required, the employee was expected to have a vehicle available to carry out work duties which included driving to other locations. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the employer also did not direct the employee as to where to park and he was free to choose where to park. The majority noted that the employee “did not have to park in that particular lot in the 700 block of O'Keefe Avenue; however, he had to park somewhere near the Energy Center and it was reasonable that he park where he did, two blocks away.” Id. at 252.

Pursuant to the threshold doctrine, the court considered the nature of the parking lot and found “evidence establishing the very dangerous nature of the parking lot” and that the employer “was aware of this widespread criminal activity and had complained to the police.” Id. at 252. In affirming the trial court, the fifth circuit concluded:

The trial judge found that Hall was in the course and scope of his employment when abducted and that the abduction took place “․ from the parking lot area of his work place.” Inasmuch as close calls in workers’ compensation cases are usually made in favor of the employee, we cannot say the District 7 judge was manifestly wrong in finding that Hall's work place, considering all relevant aspects and particulars, extended to the parking lot or that she erred in applying the threshold doctrine to these meaningful factors.

If Hall had satisfactorily entered his automobile and safely driven off the parking lot, he would have been on his way home and not covered by workers’ compensation statutes. Before that, he was, as the trial judge determined, within the scope of his employment and on the threshold of his work premises.

Id. at 252-53.

In Theriot v. Full Service Systems Corp., 14-1199 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/27/15), 166 So.3d 1190, this court concluded that an employee was in the course and scope of her employment when she arrived at her job at L'Auberge Casino prior to her shift and was parking in the lot employees were instructed to park in when she was struck by another co-worker. Despite not being on the clock yet, this court found the accident occurred on the employer's premises and, thus, was covered by workers’ compensation. However, Judge Gremillion disagreed, stating:

For purposes of the first exception, though, “employer's premises” means “only that area where the employees are confined during their employment hours when they are engaged in their employer's industry, labor, or trades.” Justice v. Sylvester, 499 So.2d 590, 593 (La.App. 5 Cir.1986), writ denied, 503 So.2d 491 ([La.] 1987). The accident must also relate spatially and temporally to the functions or duties the employee performed while working. Id. Here, the WCJ apparently concluded that “premises” simply means “property owned by the employer.” This interpretation represents an erroneous conclusion of law, and the majority compounds this erroneous conclusion. The Yates quotation is simply a shorthand list, and as such is simple dicta that should not be relied upon to shape future holdings, as was done in the Williams case cited by the majority and in the present matter. It further does not suffice to say that the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act are to be liberally construed, when what the majority is actually liberally construing is dicta that merely attempted to summarize prior case law.

No evidence established that Ms. Theriot's duties were performed outside the casino premises. She described her duties as “doing custodial work, cleaning, cleaning the bathrooms and, you know, vacuuming the—the cafeterias and—I was doing all sorts of work.” Therefore, the “premises” exception does not apply to Ms. Theriot's case. The WCJ manifestly erred.

․

․ No exception to the general rule that going to and coming from work is outside the course and scope of employment was proven. That the accident occurred in the casino parking lot is irrelevant because Ms. Theriot was still outside the area in which she was confined during her employment hours and where she engaged in the labor and industry of her employer. Course and scope of employment is determined by the functions the employee is engaged in at the time an accident occurred and not whether the employee had crossed an invisible property line.

Id. at 1196-96 (Gremillion, dissenting) (footnote omitted). In this case herein, Ms. Lawless did traverse the parking lot to her vehicle during her work hours in order to carry out work duties, though, admittedly, she was not on a mission for her employer at the time of her injury, but instead, was walking to her desk to begin her duties for the day.

In Francisco, 643 So.2d 386, this court reversed the trial court's summary judgment finding that a nurse was not in the course of her employment when she slipped and fell in her employer's parking lot fifteen minutes before her shift. The parking lot was under construction. The employee “testified that she did not know what caused her to fall; however, she remembered that afterward, she was covered with sand and her foot was caught between two concrete parking barriers” and that it “was very dark because the new lighting had not yet been installed.” Id. at 387. This court did not find “the risk that Francisco encountered in her employer's parking lot to be neutral, i.e. unrelated to her employment.” Id. at 388. Instead, as an employee, Francisco “encountered any hazardous or defective conditions that may have been present in its parking lot more frequently and to a greater extent than the general public. Her heightened exposure was solely due to her employment.” Id.

However, in Robinson v. Brown, 35,430 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/19/01), 803 So.2d 396, writ denied, 02-0192 (La. 3/22/02), 811 So.2d 924, the second circuit affirmed a finding that the employee was not in the course and scope of employment when she was injured on the curb of a sidewalk and public street outside of her employer's building. The employee had arrived for work, made it to the door where she saw a note that the building was closed due to weather, and began walking back toward the public parking lot where she parked. Before she could reach the lot, she slipped on ice and fell. The second circuit considered the “going and coming” rule and the exceptions thereto but found none applies. The court specified that the employee was not on her employer's premises at the time of her fall, she never began work that day, and there was nothing “unique or unusual about the area in which the accident occurred so that [she] was exposed to dangers greater than or different from those to which the general traveling public was exposed on that day.” Id. at 399. Therefore, the employee was not within the course and scope of her employment when she was injured.

Herein, Ms. Lawless arrived in the parking lot and started logging her work hours for which she was paid. The parking lot at issue was not two blocks away as in Hall, but adjacent to the building in which she worked. Furthermore, Ms. Lawless's uncontradicted testimony was that she was instructed to park in this lot. She was also provided with a key to access the gate between the parking lot and Building 4386. Both the parking lot and Building 4386 are part of the larger military installation of Fort Johnson, though the PWS only gave Amentum maintenance responsibilities for the building and outside area immediately adjacent to the building. Even still, there were no parking lots specifically for Amentum employees alone to park their personal vehicles, which at times were used to carry out their employment duties. Even Mr. Osmun, Amentum's environmental health and safety manager, testified that he investigated the parking lot following Ms. Lawless's fall rather than calling someone from Fort Johnson because he was responsible for Amentum's entire footprint and employees.

Based on the above and the unique facts of this case, we cannot say the workers’ compensation court committed manifest error in concluding that Ms. Lawless had arrived at work, that she was no longer going or coming, and that she was on her employer's premises at the time of her injury.

Assignment of Error Two—Credit for Benefits Paid:

In its second assignment of error, PAE asserts that the workers’ compensation court erred in failing to award it a credit or offset for the short-term disability it allegedly paid to Ms. Lawless. PAE cites La.R.S. 23:1225(C)(1)(c), which provides an employer a credit when the employee receives compensation from a disability benefit plan in the proportion funded by the employer. PAE then alleges that the undisputed facts proved Amentum paid 100 percent of the premiums for short-term disability for its employees, for up to six months, and that Ms. Lawless applied for and received these benefits following her injury. Thus, PAE argues it was error for the workers’ compensation court to deny it a credit. Ms. Lawless asserts that Amentum failed to present any evidence of the amount Ms. Lawless received in short-term disability benefits.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1225(C)(1)(c) provides:

C. (1) If an employee receives remuneration from:

(a) Benefits under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Law.

․

(c) Benefits under disability benefit plans in the proportion funded by an employer.

(d) Any other workers’ compensation benefits,

then compensation benefits under this Chapter shall be reduced, unless there is an agreement to the contrary between the employee and the employer liable for payment of the workers’ compensation benefit, so that the aggregate remuneration from Subparagraphs (a) through (d) of this Paragraph shall not exceed sixty-six and two-thirds percent of his average weekly wage.

Though dealing with La.R.S. 23:1225(A) pertaining to social security disability benefits, this court has previously stated that “Section 1225 is a wage-loss benefit coordination statute. Benefit coordination laws serve a dual purpose in the system of wage-loss protection; namely, these laws assure an employee receives some type of recovery for lost wages, while precluding him from receiving duplicative benefits that exceed his actual pre-injury wages.” Greene v. Highlands Inc. Co., 14-223, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/14), 159 So.3d 496, 500 (citation omitted). The statute limits or reduces workers’ compensation benefits that an employee is otherwise entitled to; thus, the statute must be strictly construed. Id.; See also Cousins v. City of New Orleans, 608 So.2d 978 (La.1992). The Greene court further explained that the employer has the burden of proving “both entitlement to and the amount of the credit” that it claims. Id. (quoting Jones v. General Motors Corp., 03-1766, p. 12 (La. 4/30/04), 871 So.2d 1109, 1117.

Ms. Lawless cites this court's opinion in Mouton v. Walgreen Co., 07-1403 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/08), 981 So.2d 75, in support of the workers’ compensation court's finding that PAE Holdings did not carry its burden in proving its entitlement to an offset for short-term disability payments it alleges Ms. Lawless received. In Mouton, the employee alleged she was injured in the course and scope of her employment and filed a disputed claim for compensation further alleging her employer, Walgreens, denied her request for workers’ compensation and medical benefits. As an alternative response to the suit, Walgreens asserted it was entitled to a credit under La.R.S. 23:1102 because the employee received short-term disability benefits that were funded by Walgreens. The trial court did not award an offset and this court affirmed, stating:

After reviewing the record, we find that Walgreens did not carry its burden of proof by establishing the amount of the disability offset. At the hearing, Russo testified that for the period of April 14, 2004 to June 21, 2004, Mouton received $4,602.65 for short-term disability. She stated that that policy was funded entirely by Walgreens; however, she was “not sure what they paid for it.” Given the lack of documentation regarding the amount and date of payments and the details of Walgreens’ employer funded disability plan, we find no error in the workers’ compensation judge's failure to credit Walgreens for any short-term disability payments made to Mouton. See Romero v. Northrop-Grumman, 01-24, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/30/01), 787 So.2d 1149, 1155, writ denied, 01-1937 (La. 10/26/01), 799 So.2d 1144 (wherein this court held that the employer was not entitled to a credit for medical and disability benefits where it “did not provide adequate evidence of its entitlement to such benefits at the hearing on the matter.”) See also Traweek v. City of West Monroe, 30,571, p. 13 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/13/98), 713 So.2d 655, 663, writ denied, 98-1936 (La. 11/6/98), 727 So.2d 449 (wherein this court “delete[d] that portion of the judgment allowing for an unspecified and unproven credit or offset.”)

Id. at 88.

On cross-examination, Ms. Lawless was questioned about receiving short-term disability benefits. Ms. Lawless testified that she did not recall whether Amentum paid for short-term disability benefits but admitted that she received these benefits after workers’ compensation was declined. She also testified that she did not recall the amount she received in those benefits:

Q The short-term disability policy would have provided you with benefits for six months which means that if it started from the day of the accident, it would have terminated in January of 2023, because that's a six-month time frame.

A I do not know but I'm going to say okay.

Q And you testified in your deposition that you had received $18,000 that you remember of short-term disability benefits.

A I don't remember the amount. Y'all have that, I don't.

Mr. Osmun also testified that he had some knowledge of Amentum's health insurance and disability benefits:

Q As part of your duties are you familiar with the health insurance that is provided by Amentum?

A Somewhat. I'm not an expert.

Q For an employee such as Ms. Lawless, does Amentum provide any percent of the health coverage that she has?

A No. Our insurance is solely on us.

․

Q And as the manager with environment health and safety, are you also familiar with the short-term disability policy for Amentum?

A Basic knowledge. Not totally in depth, but yes, sir.

Q Does Amentum pay for short-term disability coverage for its employees?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long does the short-term disability policy or how long is the short-term disability policy in effect?

A Six months. 180 days I think is how it is written.

On cross-examination, Mr. Osmun further testified that he did not know any details about any benefits Ms. Lawless may have received:

Q Do you know if Ms. Lawless had to take any measures to renew benefits every couple of weeks or anything within that six-month period?

A No, ma'am, I don't. Once an employee's [sic] on short term, it's totally out of my - - I don't see any reports; I don't get any information. So I really don't know what goes after that.

Q So while they have the opportunity, Amentum employees, to receive six months’ worth of short-term disability benefits, is it fair to say it doesn't necessarily mean they'll get the full six months of benefits?

A Is it fair to say? Depending on the incident. I don't know.

Q They may not get that full six months depending on the injury; is that true? Is that how the program works?

A Well, I'm not detailed, but to my understanding of our short term - - in fact, when I had shoulder surgery last year, I was only out three weeks.

Q So that's what you got short-term benefits; right?

A Before they approved mine. I didn't get paid. But it didn't take me six months. I was back and [sic] work before that.

But I can't say as far as anything you have to do in between because I've never - - I don't deal with that.

Unlike this case, in Mouton, the court denied a credit despite the record containing the amount the employee received in short-term disability payments and the fact that it was a policy funded entirely by the employer because the record failed to contain the amount and date of payments, and the details of the employer funded disability plan. The record herein is even more deficient as it fails to contain even the amount that Ms. Lawless received in short-term disability payments. Ms. Lawless's deposition, though referenced, was not admitted, and no other evidence of the disability plan or payments made to Ms. Lawless was admitted. The workers’ compensation court found that “no other evidence was presented to calculate the offset.” We agree. Considering the above, we find no error in the workers’ compensation court's finding that PAE failed to meet its burden of proof in establishing the amount of the offset of which it claims entitlement to.

DECREE:

Accordingly, we affirm the workers’ compensation court's October 7, 2024 Judgment finding that Deanne Lawless met her burden in establishing that she suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with PAE Holding Corporation. We also affirm the judgment finding that PAE Holding Corporation is not entitled to a credit for any short-term disability benefits received by Deanne Lawless as it failed to meet its burden in establishing the amount of the offset. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Appellant, PAE Holding Corporation.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After Ms. Lawless's injury was reported, Amentum filed a 1002 controversion of compensation on August 10, 2022, notifying Ms. Lawless that her claim was being denied as the “carrier asserts claimant was not in the course and scope of employment” and “suffers from [a] pre-existing condition.”

2.   This opinion will refer to the Fort as “Fort Johnson,” though the quoted record and testimony may, at times, still use the name “Fort Polk.”

3.   See Williams v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 11-59 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/11), 68 So.3d 616, writs denied, 11-1793, 11-1794 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So.3d 384.

PERRET, Judge.