STATE OF LOUISIANA v. SHEDRICK DOSHAWN METOYER (2025)

FACTS

This incident regards a traffic stop involving the defendant, Shedrick Deshawn Metoyer, and a man named Courtland King. Mr. King was driving the vehicle while the defendant rode in the front passenger seat. The trooper who conducted the traffic stop searched Mr. King's vehicle and found a large quantity of drugs concealed underneath the floor of both the driver and front passenger side. Also, the trooper found several items in the backseat that were potential drug paraphernalia.

On January 3, 2022, the state charged the defendant by bill of information with two counts of possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with an aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more. Each count was a violation of La.R.S. 40:967. Specifically, the dangerous substances were cocaine and methamphetamine. On January 5, 2022, the defendant pled not guilty to both charges. Though the defendant's trial was set for March 14, 2022, several motions to continue were filed and granted, and his trial did not begin until January 8, 2024.

Before January 8, however, the state sought to introduce the defendant's three prior drug convictions as other crimes evidence. On November 20, 2023, the trial court held a hearing, found the state had met its burden of proof, and allowed the introduction of the convictions over the defendant's objection. The defendant filed a notice of intent to seek supervisory writs and was given the return date of December 6, 2023. His writ was a partial success. This court allowed the introduction of the defendant's convictions as other crimes evidence, but it restricted the state from using this evidence to prove either opportunity or identity. As for motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake, however, the evidence remained admissible. State v. Metoyer, 23-756 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/27/23) (unpublished opinion).

The defendant was tried and found guilty on both counts by a jury. On January 12, 2024, the state filed a habitual bill of information alleging the defendant was a fourth or subsequent felony offender. On April 10, 2024, a hearing was held on a motion for new trial and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied these motions and told the parties they were to return on April 23, 2024, for a hearing regarding the defendant's habitual offender status. As a result of this April 23 hearing, for oral reasons and evidence adduced, the trial court found the defendant to be a fourth felony offender.

The defendant was to be sentenced on May 8, 2024, but he was only sentenced on one count that day. He received a sentence of sixty-five years at hard labor for the possession of Schedule II cocaine with an aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more. Six days later, on May 14, the defendant received another sixty-five years for possession of Schedule II methamphetamine. The court ordered the two sentences, which were imposed under La.R.S. 15:529.1, to run concurrently, and the court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence.

On October 10, 2024, the defendant's appeal was lodged with this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. Mr. Metoyer's feet were near hidden drugs. There was no evidence he knew drugs were in the car or how to get to them. There was little evidence about his relationship with the car, its driver, or its owner. As such, no reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt he constructively possessed the drugs. His convictions should be reversed, his sentences vacated, and judgments of acquittal entered.

2. The Trial Court abused its discretion when it allowed into evidence records of Mr. Metoyer's prior convictions. There was no evidence these convictions involved constructive possession, concealed/hidden drugs, or alleged interstate drug trafficking. Therefore, they were not relevant to whether Mr. Metoyer constructively possessed drugs in this case. Mr. Metoyer's convictions should be reversed, his sentences vacated, and this matter remanded for further proceedings.

3. Mr. Metoyer's criminal history likely resulted from self-medication for psychiatric issues, struggles with drug addiction, and youthful impulsiveness and lack of brain development. Nonetheless, he had an established work history and supported his family. A much shorter sentence would allow Mr. Metoyer to return to supporting his family after receiving proper care, treatment, and punishment. Therefore, his sentences should be vacated, and this matter remanded for resentencing.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there is one issue worth noting.

The habitual offender bill alleges the predicate offense of domestic abuse battery by strangulation is defined as a crime of violence, citing La.R.S. 14:2(B)(48). According to the supreme court, the penalty provision in effect at the time the predicate offense was committed is the applicable penalty provision. State v. Washington, 22-239 (La. 11/16/22), 349 So.3d 996. In 2020, the legislature added domestic abuse battery by strangulation (La.R.S. 14:35.3(L)) as an enumerated crime of violence. 2020 La. Acts No. 101, § 1 and La.R.S. 14:2(B)(48). Thus, at the time the predicate offense was committed (September 3, 2012), it was not an enumerated crime of violence. Non-enumerated offenses, however, may still be considered crimes of violence since the list “is merely illustrative, not exhaustive.” State v. Oliphant, 12-1176, p. 8 (La. 3/19/13), 113 So.3d 165, 170.

[U]nlisted offenses may be denominated as crimes of violence under the general definition of the term provided by the statute. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 45,430 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/11/10), 47 So.3d 553, writ denied, 10–2384 (La.3/4/11), 58 So.3d 474 (battery of a correctional facility employee is a crime of violence); State v. Hinton, 08–1849 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/13/09), 6 So.3d 242, 244 (list illustrative, not exhaustive); State v. Fontenot, 06–0226 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/12/06), 934 So.2d 935 (molestation of a juvenile a crime of violence as defined in La.Rev.Stat. § 14:2).

Id.

When the defendant committed the predicate offense in the present case, “crime of violence” was defined as follows:

B. In this Code, “crime of violence” means an offense that has, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, and that, by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense or an offense that involves the possession or use of a dangerous weapon. The following enumerated offenses and attempts to commit any of them are included as “crimes of violence[.]”

La.R.S. 14:2(B) (Version on September 3, 2012).

At that time, domestic abuse battery by strangulation was defined, in pertinent part:

A. Domestic abuse battery is the intentional use of force or violence committed by one household member upon the person of another household member.

B. For purposes of this Section:

․

(3) “Strangulation” means intentionally impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of the victim.

La.R.S. 14:35.3 (Version on September 3, 2012).

Considering the above, we find the predicate offense of domestic abuse battery by strangulation qualified as a crime of violence despite the fact that it was not an enumerated crime of violence at the time it was committed. See State v. Theophile, 19-467 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/11/19), 287 So.3d 53, writ denied, 20-75 (La. 11/10/20), 303 So.3d 1047 (domestic abuse battery involving strangulation designated as a crime of violence).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

The defendant denies knowing narcotics were in the car. He says his only connection with Mr. King was that they went on a four-day trip to Houston from Alexandria. He says there was no evidence concerning how long or how well they knew each other. There was also no history of prior arrests involving both men and no evidence of where both men lived. The car was neither owned by Mr. King nor the defendant. There was no evidence that the defendant ever drove the car. There was no evidence to establish how long the narcotics had been in the car. Though Trooper Davis saw a one-half-inch to one-inch portion of a clear bag on the driver-side floorboard, there was no testimony that the defendant could have seen this clear bag from his seat. The defendant contends that the only evidence of his guilty knowledge was his shaky and sweaty hands. He suggests he was nervous because Mr. King, the driver of the car, had active warrants and no driver's license. Also, the defendant had prior interactions with police, was a convicted felon, and feared his past would prejudice him. Lastly, the defendant asserts the state failed to offer any evidence to establish that any of his prior convictions involved constructive possession, hidden drugs, and/or alleged interstate transportation of narcotics. As such, the evidence the state chose to produce related to his three prior convictions failed to establish that he constructively possessed the narcotics in this case.

Relevant law

The analysis for insufficient evidence claims is well-settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Additionally, “the testimony of a single witness, absent internal contradictions or irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, is sufficient to support a conviction.” State v. Jeter, 09-1004, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 33 So.3d 1041, 1043.

Regarding appellate review in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, this court has stated the following:

When the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 provides that the state “must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” in order to convict. State v. Camp, 446 So.2d 1207, 1209 (La.1984). “Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which elemental factors may be inferred according to reason, experience and common sense.” State v. Burns, 441 So.2d 843, 845 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983). However, La.R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review on appeal than the rational juror's reasonable doubt standard. The statute serves as a guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence. On appeal, the issue is whether a rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that all reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded. State v. Williams, 13-497 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 124 So.3d 1236, writ denied, 13-2774 (La. 5/16/14), 139 So.3d 1024.

State v. Baumberger, 15-1056, pp. 10−11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 200 So.3d 817, 826−27, writ denied, 16-1251 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 859, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 950, 138 S.Ct. 392 (2017).

The defendant was convicted of possession of Schedule II cocaine, aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more, and possession of Schedule II methamphetamine, aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:964 classifies both cocaine and methamphetamine as Schedule II substances. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(C) and (D) state that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule II “unless such substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner[.]” Furthermore, knowingly or intentionally possessing the controlled substance in an aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more is deemed as production, manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent.

Regarding constructive possession, in State v. Magdaleno, 03-618, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/03), 856 So.2d 1246, 1249–50, writ denied, 03-3342 (La. 3/26/04), 871 So.2d 347, this court said the following:

Regarding the charge of possession, the State is not required to prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the cocaine; instead, the defendant may be found to have been in constructive possession. State v. Scott, 00-113 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 768 So.2d 112, citing State v. Montgomery, 98-775 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/27/99), 734 So.2d 650. If the State's case is premised upon constructive possession, the State must prove that the controlled dangerous substance was within the defendant's dominion and control or in his joint possession. Scott, 768 So.2d 112, citing State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983), and State v. President, 97-1593 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/15/98), 715 So.2d 745, writ denied, 98-2115 (La.12/11/98), 729 So.2d 590. Joint possession is described in State v. Segura, 546 So.2d 1347 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989), as two people willingly and knowingly sharing a direct right in the thing and an ability to exercise control over it. Constructive possession is established by reference to the factors set forth in State v. Toups, 01-1875 (La.10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, in an examination of the facts at hand: for example, the defendant's knowledge that illegal drugs are in the area; the defendant's relationship with the person who has physical possession of the drugs; the defendant's access to the area where the drugs were found; evidence of recent drug use by the defendant; and the defendant's physical proximity to the drugs. A sixth factor given parenthetical reference in Toups is “evidence that the area was frequented by drug users.” Toups, 833 So.2d at 913, citing Bujol v. Cain, 713 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1049, 104 S.Ct. 726, 79 L.Ed.2d 187 (1984). In addition, the State must prove the defendant's guilty knowledge. Toups, 833 So.2d at 913. However, the mere presence of someone in the area where the controlled dangerous substance is located or mere association with the person found to be in possession of the controlled dangerous substance does not constitute constructive possession. Id.; see also State v. Walker, 369 So.2d 1345 (La.1979), State v. Cann, 319 So.2d 396 (La.1975).

Guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See State v. Hunter, 09-1487 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/10), 41 So.3d 546.

As for the instant case, the defendant had three prior convictions for drug possession. His first and second convictions were for the possession of cocaine in an amount exceeding twenty-eight grams. His third was for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. As noted above, the defendant objected to the introduction of his three prior convictions and took a writ to this court. However, after this court allowed the introduction of the defendant's prior convictions as evidence, the defendant, prior to trial, stipulated to the admissibility of his prior convictions while maintaining the same objection that this court had reviewed and disposed of.¹

In addition to the defendant's three prior convictions, the state presented one witness during the defendant's trial. State Trooper Isaac Davis testified that on March 12, 2021, at around 12:02 a.m, he pulled over a white Toyota Venza for improper lane usage. The defendant was sitting in the front passenger seat of the Venza, while his co-defendant, Mr. King, was driving. At first, Mr. King gave the trooper a fake name, but the trooper quickly discovered the lie and confronted Mr. King who then confessed to his real name. The trooper soon thereafter learned Mr. King had active warrants and a suspended license.

Mr. King said he and his passenger were coming from Houston where they had been staying for four days. Trooper Davis asked the defendant the same questions he asked Mr. King, and the defendant told the same story. He and Mr. King had been staying in Houston and were now on their way to Alexandria. The defendant seemed nervous to Trooper Davis. When Trooper Davis asked the defendant to hand him the registration for the car and then shook the defendant's hand, the hand was sweaty. Trooper Davis also noticed there was no luggage inside the vehicle. The lack of luggage and the defendant's nervous behavior prompted Trooper Davis to ask Mr. King for permission to search the car. Mr. King consented.

Trooper Davis testified that before searching Mr. King's car he waited about fifteen minutes for a Vernon Parish deputy to arrive, explaining that in the past he had stopped many vehicles coming from Texas which were found to contain large amounts of narcotics. Mr. King and the defendant were escorted from the car. Trooper Davis searched the front driver's side. He testified as follows:

I located between the carpet - - and where the center console is of the vehicle that runs into the dash area, where the carpet runs up to the center console by the gas petals [sic], I noticed a plastic baggy sticking out of between the carpet and the hard plastic. When I pulled this baggy out, and pulled the carpet down to look down into that area, the nature [sic] void of that area, I located a large bag of suspected Methamphetamine.

The defendant and Mr. King were arrested and separated. Trooper Davis testified that he asked the defendant if he knew anything about the methamphetamine. The defendant said no, but to Trooper Davis, the defendant did not seem alarmed or surprised that drugs were found in the car. Davis returned to the driver's side of the vehicle. He pulled the carpet back and shined a light to the passenger side. “From the driver's side,” he testified, “I could see narcotics on the nature void from the passenger side where you could access it from the passenger side, because from where I was on the driver's side, I couldn't reach through there and reach the narcotics on that side.” He went around to the passenger side where the defendant had been sitting, pulled back the carpet, and retrieved the suspected narcotics. There, Trooper Davis found one vacuum-sealed brick of cocaine, another quart-sized bag of methamphetamine, and two more bags of suspected cocaine.

Trooper Davis testified that later in his investigation he was told the defendant had been arrested three times before for “possession with intent of Cocaine.” Trooper Davis questioned the defendant, who denied any knowledge of the discovered drugs.

The traffic stop and the search of Mr. King's vehicle was caught on Trooper Davis's body camera. This footage was entered into evidence and was played to the jury. The video showed Trooper Davis finding not only drugs but also suspected drug paraphernalia, such as deodorizer (a type of soap used for “cutting” drugs) and a crockpot (used for “cooking” drugs), which the trooper found in the backseat. Once the video reached the moment where Trooper Davis found the brick of cocaine, Trooper Davis was asked how close that cocaine was to where the defendant had been sitting. Trooper Davis answered, “Inches, half a foot, maybe.” The brick was where the passenger carpet met the console where the defendant's feet should have been.

On cross-examination, Trooper Davis testified that Mr. King lied to him as to what the deodorizer was for. Mr. King claimed the deodorizer was to be consumed in their protein shakes. Additionally, Trooper Davis testified that though drugs and suspected drug paraphernalia were discovered in the car, none was discovered on the defendant's person. Also, the car was linked to a relative of Mr. King and had no ties to the defendant.

In State v. Cooks, 12-237 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/30/13), 108 So.3d 1257, writ denied, 13-454 (La. 9/20/13), 123 So.3d 164, the fifth circuit found the state had presented sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's constructive possession of a large amount of marijuana that had been discovered in the trunk of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger. The fifth circuit stated:

In particular, defendant's behavior when pulled over and questioned by police, the inconsistent stories concerning their itinerary, the short turn-around trip, the four cell phones, the rental vehicle leased to an absent third party, and the air freshener, tend to support the conclusion that defendant and the driver had constructive possession over the contraband found in the trunk of the vehicle.

Id. at 1267. Additionally, the court said that the “defendant's guilty knowledge may be inferred by the [defendant's] inconsistent stories and the strong odor of marijuana present in the vehicle.” Id. The court also noted the following cases:

In State v. Morgan, 557 So.2d 977 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990), writ denied, 564 So.2d 317 (La.1990), the appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to show constructive possession by the defendant of contraband found in the trunk of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. In concluding that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal substances, the court considered that the defendant had permission to use the vehicle where the contraband was found; the defendant and the owner of the vehicle had a personal relationship; the defendant was wearing a beeper and had an address book indicating that he may be involved in drug trafficking; and the defendant was observed stuffing objects under the front seat of the vehicle which were later identified as a small handgun and a small quantity of narcotics.

In State v. Odle, 02–226 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/13/02), 834 So.2d 483, writ denied, 03–625 (La.6/20/03), 847 So.2d 1219, the appellate court found that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the passenger of the vehicle had constructive possession of the cocaine found in the gas tank. In making this determination, the court noted that the defendant was acting abnormally, gave information to the police that was inconsistent with that given by the driver, and was surrounded by a gasoline smell as well as an air freshener smell while in the vehicle. The court also considered that rags containing gasoline were found in the cargo area of the vehicle, the gas tank had recently been tampered with, and there were several cans of cocaine in the gas tank.

Likewise, in State v. Robbins, [43,129 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/19/08),] 979 So.2d [630] at 638–639, the appellate court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant driver had constructive possession of the marijuana found in the trunk of the car, even though the passenger testified at trial that the driver had no knowledge that he had purchased the marijuana and put it in the trunk. In finding constructive possession, the court noted that the trunk of the car was equally accessible by both occupants of the vehicle as they embarked on a trip from Texas to Florida. Further, the marijuana was not hidden in any manner to raise a strong inference that one party may have had the complete control over the drug to the exclusion of the other. The appellate court determined that the defendant's guilty knowledge could be inferred from the fact that the passenger smelled of marijuana, establishing defendant's direct involvement with the drug. Moreover, the court noted that the men both gave inconsistent details about their trip and their relationship to one another.

Cooks, 108 So.3d at 1265–66.

As for the instant case, when viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the state, we find there was sufficient evidence to find the defendant constructively possessed cocaine and methamphetamine. The hypothesis that the defendant could have been a passenger in the car without knowledge of the contraband could have reasonably been rejected by the jury since, first, it appears the defendant had a close relationship with Mr. King given that he and King both stated that they had spent four days together in Houston and were both on their way to Alexandria. Second, a considerable amount of cocaine and methamphetamine was inches from the defendant's feet and easily accessible. Third, Trooper Davis testified that the defendant seemed nervous during his interaction with the trooper. Fourth, items used to cook and cut drugs were visible in the backseat of the car. Lastly, the defendant had a history of drug possession. While this alone would not be enough to find the defendant's guilty knowledge, this history in conjunction with other facts of this case, such as the large amount of drugs in the car and drug paraphernalia, permitted the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant jointly possessed the drugs found under his feet.

For these reasons, we find this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

As noted above, the defendant previously opposed the use of his prior drug convictions as evidence and filed a pre-trial writ concerning this issue. Consequently, this court has already addressed this issue. The defendant does not dispute this court's denial of his pre-trial writ.

However, the defendant contends the state offered no evidence or testimony at trial showing his prior narcotics convictions were relevant to his motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident in the present matter. He argues there was no evidence or testimony to establish that any of these prior convictions involved concealed or hidden narcotics, the alleged interstate transportation of narcotics, or the alleged constructive possession of narcotics. The defendant states:

Indeed, the State offered no factual basis to establish that Defendant's conduct in these prior convictions had any relevance to the instant matter. Thus, Defendant's prior convictions could have been used only to attempt to prove that Defendant was guilty in this case because at the time of his arrest in this matter he was a convicted drug dealer/possessor.

This, the defendant concludes, is exactly the type of prejudicial use of prior convictions that must not be allowed under a La.Code Crim.P. art. 403 analysis.

The defendant acknowledges that this court in its prior writ ruling correctly recognized that evidence, “ ‘[a]lthough relevant ․ may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.’ ” He notes additionally that “ ‘[t]he term ‘unfair prejudice’ as to a criminal defendant speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged. State v. Henderson, 12-2422, p. 2 (La. 1/4/13), 107 So.3d 566, 568.’ ” He contends this scenario is what occurred at trial. That state used his prior convictions for no other purpose but to lure the jury into finding him guilty on grounds different from those of the charged offense.

In its brief, the state notes this court, when it denied the defendant's pre-trial writ, said, “The three prior convictions the State seeks to introduce into evidence are all convictions for drug possession and are all relevant to proving the Defendant's guilty knowledge of and constructive possession of the drugs in the vehicle in the instant case.” Metoyer, 23-756. The state contends this court has already contradicted the defendant's assertion that the state failed to prove the relevance of the defendant's prior convictions during trial, saying, “The convictions pretrial were relevant to prove guilty knowledge of constructive possession of the drugs, which was affirmed by the jury in their finding of guilt based on the evidence presented at trial.”

Relevant Law

Although a criminal defendant's prior bad acts may be relevant and otherwise admissible under LSA-C.E. art. 404(B), the court must still balance the probative value of the other crimes, wrongs or acts evidence against its prejudicial effects before the evidence can be admitted. LSA-C.E. art. 403. The probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. As used in the balancing test, “prejudicial” limits the introduction of probative evidence of prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial. The term “unfair prejudice,” as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.

State v. Henderson, 12-2422, p. 2 (La.1/4/13), 107 So.3d 566, 567–68 (citations omitted).

The defendant's assertion that the state provided no evidence showing his prior narcotics convictions were relevant to his motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident in the present matter neglects the fact that during trial the defendant stipulated to the foundation of his prior convictions and did not want the jury to hear the details of the convictions while objecting to their introduction using the same basis he had provided in his pre-trial writ to this court. This court has recently addressed the “law of the case” doctrine in State v. Tucker, 22-735 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/23), 368 So.3d 187. Therein, this court stated:

As this court explained in State v. Dickerson, 14-170, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 140 So.3d 904, 909, writ denied, 14-1466 (La. 3/13/15), 161 So.3d 638:

Under the “law of the case” doctrine, prior decisions of the appellate court are considered binding and may not be reconsidered on appeal absent clear error. Juneau v. State, 06-1653 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/07), 956 So.2d 728, writ denied, 07-1177 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.2d 1004; State v. Molineux, 11-275 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/19/11), 76 So.3d 617, writ denied, 11-2556 (La. 3/30/12), 85 So.3d 117. “[T]he [law of the case] doctrine is discretionary and should not be applied where it would effectuate an obvious injustice or where the former appellate decision was clearly erroneous.” Juneau, 956 So.2d at 733 (quoting Trans La. Gas Co. v. La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 96-1477 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/97), 693 So.2d 893, 896) (alternations in original).

Further, in State v. Dugas, 21-85, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/11/22), 2022 WL 1487006 (unpublished opinion), writ denied, 22-947 (La. 9/7/22), 345 So.3d 426, it was noted, “[T]his court has continued to apply the doctrine as a discretionary tool of judicial economy ․ The present case provides another illustration of the need for the use of the doctrine in some form.” We further note this court's decision in Dugas is supported by the supreme court's statement in Day v. Campbell-Grosjean Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp., 260 La. 325, 330–31, 256 So.2d 105, 107 (1971), “Nevertheless, the law-of-the-case principle is applied merely as a discretionary guide: Argument is barred where there is merely doubt as to the correctness of the former ruling, but not in cases of palpable former error or so mechanically as to accomplish manifest injustice.”

Tucker, 368 So.3d at 193.

The defendant provides no evidence that this court's ruling on his pre-trial writ was of “palpable former error,” nor does he demonstrate the state used his prior convictions beyond the purposes expressly permitted by this court. Tucker, 368 So.3d at 193.

Further, we disagree that the defendant's prior convictions were not relevant to the instant case since they did not regard either the constructive possession of narcotics, the interstate transportation of narcotics, or the concealing of narcotics. In State v. Scott, 09-1658 (La. 10/22/10), 48 So.3d 1080, the supreme court found a defendant's prior drug convictions committed at the same address were relevant to prove that defendant's constructive possession of the drugs and his intent to distribute the contraband. As noted above, this court has already concluded the defendant's convictions were relevant to proving his guilty knowledge of and constructive possession of the drugs that were found in the vehicle in which he was a passenger. The probative value of the three prior drug convictions, moreover, outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Metoyer, 23-756.

We find this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

The defendant contends his two sixty-five-year concurrent sentences are excessive. The defendant did not object to his sentences at the time they were imposed. His motion to reconsider sentence did not assert any specific reasons for why his sentences were excessive other than that a sentence imposed within the statutory limit may still be excessive when it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and makes no contribution to the goals of punishment. He is therefore limited to a bare claim of excessiveness. La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E).

Relevant Law

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005–06 (alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Here, the defendant received two sentences of sixty-five years at hard labor which were to run concurrently, and he was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender. As a fourth habitual offender, the defendant was subject to the following penalty provision:

(4) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then the following sentences apply:

(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life.

(b) If the fourth felony and no prior felony is defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B) or as a sex offense under R.S. 15:541, the person shall be imprisoned for not less than twenty years nor more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. If twice the possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction is less than twenty years, the person shall be imprisoned for twenty years.

(c) If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), or a sex offense as defined in La.R.S. 15:541 when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the offense, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

La.R.S. 15:529.1(A).

As noted in the errors patent discussion, the defendant's previous conviction of domestic abuse battery is considered as a crime of violence. Therefore, of the above penalty provisions, the most lenient, section (4)(b), is not applicable. La.R.S. 14:2(B). At the same time, since the offenses at issue herein are not crimes of violence or sex offenses, the most severe provision, section (4)(c), is also not applicable. Consequently, section (4)(a) is the penalty provision that applies to the present case. Thus, upon the defendant's adjudication as a fourth habitual offender, the possible punishment for each of his offenses increased to a minimum sentence of twenty years and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) and (G); La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1)(b) and (D).

The trial court provided the following reasons for imposing its sentences:

[Defendant's] approximately 30 years of age.

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Okay, of course, I ordered a PSI, and I received the PSI. I carefully studied the pre-sentence report and considered all the factors as to the nature of the present offenses in light of Article 894.1, and then I will make the following findings: Substantial grounds do not exist or tend to justify or excuse the defendant's criminal conduct. He didn't act under strong provocation by anybody in this situation. He's 30 years of age. I believe the PSI stated maybe he was single, although he does - - we're not quite there, but he does have several children I believe from [Defendant's] memorandum. He's in relatively good health․

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He completed the seventh grade at Pineville Junior School in Pineville ․

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․ [Defendant] had a history of I believe substance abuse and alcohol ․

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Okay. Likewise, he has received drug and/or alcohol treatment in the past ․

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․ [Defendant] ․ is a fourth felony offender for the purposes of the habitualization, but [Defendant] has a very extension [sic] criminal history, whether that history just be arrest and/or convictions. It's [sic] starts all the way back in 2011 with possession with intent to distribute. He plead guilty in 2012, I believe, to possession of Cocaine instead of possession of with intent. That's a felony. That was, I believe, he had five years at hard labor. His probation was revoked from that. Then in 2012, he had possession with intent, resisting an officer, and he plead guilty to that with possession of Cocaine, five years and that probation was revoked as well. In 2012, there was a contempt of court, and there was no disposition found. In 2012 there was another two felonies and two misdemeanors, I believe, but there's no disposition found. In 2013, with Alexandria PD there was a contempt, and there's no disposition found. In 2013, there's domestic abuse strangulation, home invasion. These are arrests in 2017. The home invasion was dismissed, that was part of a plea, and he plead [sic] guilty to domestic abuse strangulation - - well, no, it was found - - he had two years and it was credit for time served, so that's a felony conviction. In 2013, failure to pay fine, no disposition found, that was in Pineville. Then the Sheriff's Department from Rapides in 2013, there were several misdemeanor grade offenses there, which including resisting an officer that he plead [sic] guilty to and was sentenced on those misdemeanors. In 2013, he was arrested for second degree murder, illegal carrying of a weapon and possession of stolen things, three felonies. He plead [sic] guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, and the other charges were dismissed. In 2014, in St. Landry Parish he has a misdemeanor grade offense that shows that there's still, I guess, a bench warrant out there on that one, but it is a misdemeanor and not a felony. In 2016, illegal carrying of weapon, supply of felon with a firearm, and those charges was [sic] dismissed in 2017. In 2017, he had simple battery, and there's no records could be found on what the disposition of that. 2018, contempt of court, no disposition found. 2018, from the Sheriff's Department, disturbing the peace and resisting an officer, remaining on premiss [sic], aggravated flight from an officer, possession of Scheduled II, manufactured [sic] distribution possession of Scheduled I, felony, illegal carrying of a weapon, felony, obstruction of justice. In 2020, he plead [sic] guilty to possession with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon other charges were dismissed. He was sentenced on those by the Sheriff's Office again. In 2020, he was manufactured [sic] distribution of Schedule I, felony grade, simple battery and there's no disposition that can be found on those. And then 2021, he has these current charges that was found guilty of on these two felonies. He has in 2023, he has a felony arrest for cruelty to juveniles. His pretrial I guess was 2/21/2024. So, those I don't have a disposition on those. And then in 5/11/2023, he was arrested for contempt of court, manufactured [sic] distribution of possession of Scheduled I, and then in 9/11/2023 those charges were dismissed by that. It appears that he has had since these Vernon charges have originated that there's been at least two other felony arrests for Mr. Metoyer. One, I guess, I don't have the disposition of, but it's still active.

Shortly after the trial court made the last remark, the defendant's counsel, Mr. Cortello, informed the court that the defendant had to go to court for the two other felony charges. Afterwards, the court noted the defendant was a fourth felony offender, and then stated the following:

[Defendant's] not likely to respond favorably to probationary treatment. The sentence in this case is 20 years to life imprisonment. Matter of fact, because he's habitualized he's not entitled to probation. So, there is an undue risk during any period of suspended sentence, but he's not entitled to that, but honestly, the defendant would commit another crime, I mean, he's been arrested on these and he bonded out and he has at least two other felony arrests since these were started. The defendant is in need of correctional treatment or custodial environment. A lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's offense.

This court has already reviewed and upheld the convictions and sentences of the defendant's co-defendant, Mr. King, who drove the car containing the cocaine and methamphetamine. State v. King, 24-367 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/19/25), __ So.3d __ (2025 WL 540540). Mr. King, like the defendant, was a fourth habitual offender with a previous crime of violence, and like the defendant he was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine with an aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more. Unlike the defendant, however, Mr. King was convicted of the responsive verdict of attempted possession of cocaine with an aggregate weight of twenty-eight grams or more. The trial court nevertheless imposed a sixty-year hard labor sentence for each conviction and set them to run concurrently. When reviewing similar sentences in Mr. King's case, this court stated the following:

Defendant cites State v. Stokes, 19-128 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/4/19), 279 So.3d 517, as an example of a case wherein a sixty-year habitual offender sentence was found to be excessive. Stokes was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, was adjudicated a fourth habitual offender, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Stokes’ habitual offender adjudication was reduced to a third habitual offender and he was again sentenced to life imprisonment. Because of ameliorative changes in the law, Stokes’ life sentence was vacated and his case was remanded for resentencing. Stokes was then resentenced to a sixty-year sentence as a third habitual offender. In a bare-excessiveness review, the court of appeal found the sixty-year sentence to be excessive, noting: Stokes possessed fifty rocks of crack cocaine valued at $10.00 each; his prior convictions consisted of attempted simple burglary and simple burglary, neither of which were crimes of violence; and his underlying conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine was his only drug offense. The court also discussed numerous cases where third habitual offenders received forty-five years or less.

We find that Stokes is distinguishable from the present case. The defendant in Stokes was ultimately found to be a third habitual offender with a maximum sentence of sixty years, whereas the present Defendant was adjudicated a fourth habitual offender with a possible maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

Defendant also cites several cases wherein lesser sentences were imposed in similar circumstances. In State v. Jackson, 52,057 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 253 So.3d 907, writ denied, 18-1558 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So.3d 596, a thirty-year sentence was upheld for possession of cocaine, fourth habitual offender, where there was a long history of drug distribution. As in the present case, Jackson faced a sentencing range of twenty years to life. Additionally, like the present Defendant, Jackson had an extensive criminal history, had both his probation and parole revoked on several occasions, and had other drug distribution charges pending.

In State v. Henry, 42,416 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/19/07), 966 So.2d 692, writ denied, 07-2227 (La. 8/29/08), 989 So.2d 95, the appellate court upheld a twenty-five year sentence for possession of alprazolam, fourth habitual offender, when the sentencing range was twenty years to life. Henry was actually a fifth felony offender whose prior criminal history did not include crimes of violence or drug offenses. Unlike Henry, the present Defendant's criminal history includes both crimes of violence and drug offenses.

Both Defendant and the State cite State v. Cooley, 22-140 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/22) (unpublished opinion) (2022 WL 5061602), wherein the defendant received mandatory life sentences for two of his convictions (aggravated battery and possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine) and concurrent twenty-five year sentences for the remainder of his convictions for attempted possession of temazepam (CDS IV), attempted possession of zolpidem tartrate (CDS IV), and attempted possession of tramadol (CDS IV). Pertinent to this case is the fact that Cooley received the maximum sentence of life imprisonment for possession of morphine sulfate (CDS II) as a fourth habitual offender. This court affirmed Cooley's sentences noting, “The trial court indicated that it reviewed the mitigating facts but focused on the defendant's ongoing lifestyle as a drug offender and sentenced the defendant in compliance with the habitual offender law.” Id. at p. 10.

In addition to Cooley, the State cites State v. Brown, 22-483 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/16/22), 353 So.3d 919, writ denied, 22-1791 (La. 5/2/23), 359 So.3d 1279, in support of its argument that Defendant's sentences are not excessive. In Brown, this court affirmed eighty-year sentences for a fourth habitual offender convicted of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, possession of methamphetamine, and illegal carrying of a weapon while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance.

Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. The record demonstrates that Defendant has a lengthy criminal history, and he has been given numerous opportunities to reform and has failed to do so. Further, the record supports the trial court's reasoning that lesser sentences would deprecate the seriousness of the offenses and that there is an undue risk during the period of a suspended sentence or probation that Defendant would commit another crime. The trial court thoroughly detailed the factors it found in aggravation and the fact that no mitigating factors existed. The sentences are not out of proportion to the seriousness of the offenses, nor do they shock the sense of justice. Therefore, the trial court did not err in sentencing Defendant to concurrent sentences of eighty years at hard labor for counts one through three and forty years at hard labor for count four.

Id. at 934.

Considering the cases discussed above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing concurrent sixty-year sentences in the present case. The sentences were mid-range sentences and were ordered to run concurrently.

King, ___ So.3d at ___. (24-367, pp. 18–20.)

This court's reasoning in Mr. King's case applies equally to the defendant's case. The defendant received mid-range sentences that were ordered to run concurrently, and the trial court provided a clear factual basis for imposing the defendant's sentences, which are similar when compared to similar cases. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Counsel did not want the jury to hear about the defendant's convictions “in full detail.”

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT CHIEF JUDGE