JOSEPH CORY LALONDE v. CHANDA WYNNE PRATHER LALONDE (2025)

Appellant, Chanda Wynne Prather Lalonde (hereafter Chanda), appeals the trial court's judgment finding she was not free from fault in the breakup of her marriage to Appellee, Joseph Cory Lalonde (hereafter Cory), thus precluding her from receiving final spousal support following the parties’ divorce. For the following reasons, finding Chanda failed to meet her burden of proving she was free from fault, we affirm the judgment of the trial court finding she was precluded from receiving final spousal support.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Chanda and Cory were married on November 12, 2003, in Vernon Parish. During their marriage, the couple lived at various campuses throughout Louisiana due to Cory's employment as an LSU University Police Officer. In 2019, they were living in the Chancellor's house at LSU-Eunice. The chancellor at that time lived in Lafayette and had no use for the home, thus allowing Cory and Chanda to live there. When a new chancellor was hired in 2019, Cory and Chanda could no longer live in that house, forcing them to seek new living arrangements. During the period where Cory was informed he could no longer live in the Chancellor's house at LSU-Eunice, Chanda was at her mother's house in Palestine, Texas, where she visited often. Chanda testified her mother was in poor health and needed her assistance.

Upon moving their possessions out of the Chancellor's house, Cory moved into his mother's house in Breaux Bridge. Chanda remained in Texas with her mother. The parties apparently reached an arrangement where Chanda would stay in Texas and Cory would visit approximately once a month. Cory testified at trial as to how things evolved after having to move out of the Chancellor's house:

At that time, we had decided that we were going to – she did not – she made it very clear to me that she did not want to live with my mother in the residence here in Breaux Bridge. I understood that. She was going to stay in Texas, I was going to stay in Breaux Bridge because of my work, and that we would – we had kind of informal arrangement that, you know, she would come back to Louisiana.

In the meantime, we were going to start looking for – we even discussed because, yes, the plan for many years was, once I retired, to move to Texas, however, that was going to be several years off at that point. So she was going to come to Louisiana, I was going to come to Texas. We had agreed to kind of go back and forth. I would go to Texas, say, one weekend a month, and she would come to Louisiana, and in the meantime, we would start – I had started looking for houses in the Eunice area. Matter of fact, within the first month after we had moved out of – [be]cause we finished moving out of the house and the residence on June 30th because it was the very last day of June, that was the final day we had to be out, so it was the very next morning, July 1st, is when Chanda took the truck and the trailer with the items she wanted to bring to Texas.

Cory testified that he began looking for properties near the campus in Eunice, but it never got to the stage of buying or renting because Chanda informed him she would not be moving back to Louisiana. He further testified:

At some point, on two separate occasions, I would say in July, I don't have the exact date, in phone conversations with Chanda, she became extremely irate with me and basically screaming through the phone, that she was tired of Louisiana, that she would never come back to Louisiana, that we would never buy property in Louisiana again, to the point where, I mean, she was irate about it․ So at that point, I never brought that subject up again. It was obvious she was dead set on not living in Louisiana anymore. Unfortunately, I was in a position where, with my career, I've been a police officer since 1994. I've been – currently in the LASERS system for right at 22 years. I couldn't afford to pick up and leave my job and move to Texas, which is what she wanted. She did ask me to look. I did start preliminarily looking and looking into seeing what I could possibly do, even if that was getting out of law enforcement, but there was nothing at the amount of money, the salary I was currently making, after 20-plus years in law enforcement, there was nothing comparable in Texas that I would be able to go do and that would be financially feasible for us.

Chanda testified that Cory would come to Texas occasionally to see her and that he always financially supported her during the period after she moved to Texas. Chanda stated she did not go to Louisiana, testifying that Covid was one major reason why. Chanda also stated that it was her and Cory's plan to eventually retire in Texas and build their own place on Chanda's parents’ land. Chanda asserted she had to confront Cory in February of 2021 as to what he was doing, and at that time he admitted to having an affair. Despite being angry, Chanda stated she still wanted to reconcile with Cory and continue their marriage. In March of 2021, Cory visited Chanda in Texas and bought her a truck. Chanda said she was not aware of Cory's plans to get a divorce until he told her he had filed for divorce. She said they had discussed a possible separation but not divorce. Chanda testified that Cory never asked her to come back to Louisiana, and stated she would have returned to Louisiana (albeit with her mother) to make the marriage work if Cory would have asked. On cross-examination, Chanda acknowledged that she refused to stay in Louisiana after they were evicted from their campus housing at LSU-Eunice:

Q. Okay. But you would not move anywhere else in Louisiana, would you, and you made that clear to him?

A. I made it very clear; crystal clear.

Q. And you have very strong feelings about Louisiana, don't you?

A. I do, because I have PTSD from courts and everything else due to our custody battle that we fought for years for our children [with her former husband].

On October 11, 2023, Cory filed a Petition for Divorce under La.Civ.Code art. 103(1) (spouses with no minor children). A General Answer of Denial was filed on behalf of Chanda by appointed curator ad hoc as she was residing in Texas at that time. On January 29, 2024, an Amended Answer and Reconventional Demand was filed by Chanda seeking an award of interim spousal support and in due course an award of final spousal support. Interim support was stipulated to be $2,000.00 per month retroactive to January 29, 2024, to terminate in accordance with law.

The parties were divorced on April 18, 2024 after over 20 years of marriage. Chanda sought Permanent Periodic Spousal Support. Cory opposed the award, alleging fault on Chanda's part in the breakup of their marriage. A trial on the issue of fault was held on June 28, 2024, from which the above referenced testimony was adduced. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court gave the following oral reasons for finding Chanda was at fault in the breakup of the marriage:

THE COURT:

The Court must decide whether the wife in this case, Ms. Chanda Lalonde, is free from fault causing the breakup of the marriage. The spouse filing for spousal support must be without fault and bear the burden. Fault contemplates conduct or substantial acts of commissions or omissions by spouse violative of her marital duties and responsibilities.

The Court has read Ashworth, and the Court finds Ashworth to be factually distinguishable from this case. The Court looks at Voycel versus Voycel .(ph) The Third Circuit talks about fault in the comments; fault continues to mean misconduct that rises to the level of one of previously existing fault grounds for legal separation for divorce. For example, conduct such as adultery, habitual intemperance, conviction of a felony, cruel treatment or outrages, public defamation, abandonment, an attempt on another's life, fugitive status, and intentional non-support constitute fault.

In this case, Ms. Lalonde at some point leaves Louisiana and moves to Texas. Through her own testimony, she mentions that she was not coming back to Louisiana and that she suffered from PTSD. The Court, looking at the timeline, sees that the husband, through his testimony, which the Court finds credible, made several trips to Texas, however, Ms. Lalonde never came back to Louisiana, and that corroborates her testimony about the PTSD. It also shows that Ms. Lalonde wanted Mr. Lalonde to abandon his job in Louisiana to move to Texas.

As a result, this cruel treatment through her leaving Louisiana and not coming back to the marriage and wanting him to move to Texas shows that she is not free from fault in the marriage. Therefore, I do not find her free from fault.

MR. DURIO (Counsel for Chanda):

Judge, you know I respect you and I respect your ruling. I ask you to reconsider. In your ruling, you said she had PTSD, and that's been corroborated. That goes directly towards abandonment. If you left without lawful cause and constantly refuse to return. That's her cause for not –

THE COURT:

It's a pretext. It's a pretext because she left because of the custody. So it's not because – she left Louisiana. Whatever she left Louisiana for, she left the marriage. So she could use that as a pretext, but she left the marriage with no intent to come back to Louisiana. Her husband was in Louisiana.

MR. DURIO:

I understand, Judge. Just note my objection for the record. We'll file an appeal.

Chanda subsequently filed this appeal, asserting that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding Chanda to be at fault in the dissolution of the marriage.

ANALYSIS

Chanda's lone assignment of error challenges the trial court's finding that she was found at “fault” in the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Specifically, she contends that the evidence presented of their marriage difficulties and the arrangement mutually entered into by her and Cory does not constitute conduct of a serious nature that was a cause of the dissolution of the marriage.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 111 addresses what is required for an order of final periodic spousal support. That article provides “in a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court ․ may award final periodic support to a party who is in need of support and who is free from fault prior to the filing of a proceeding to terminate the marriage in accordance with the following Articles.” Louisiana Civil Code Article 112 lists various factors for the trial court's consideration in determining whether an award of final periodic spousal support is merited. Louisiana Civil Code Article 112(A) provides, in pertinent part, “When a spouse has not been at fault and is in need of support, based on the needs of that party and the ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be awarded final periodic support․”

The above articles establish that freedom from fault is a prerequisite to a former spouse's claim for final periodic spousal support. “The claimant spouse has the burden to ‘affirmatively prove’ his or her freedom from fault.” Wolff v. Wolff, 07-332, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 966 So.2d 1202, 1205. Only after the claimant spouse has satisfied that burden by prima facie evidence does the burden shift to the payor spouse to otherwise demonstrate fault.

A review of the record reveals that during the hearing Chanda did not focus upon the statutorily required burden of demonstrating that she was free from fault in the dissolution of the marriage. Instead, both Chanda and Cory focused on casting fault upon one another. The trial court then failed to set forth its findings within the burden-shifting framework set forth in La.Civ.Code arts. 111 and 112. This is illustrated in the trial court's judgment, which states it found Chanda to “be at fault in the breakup of the marriage and therefore permanently barred from collecting Permanent Spousal Support.” The trial court similarly focused on Chanda's fault in its reasons for ruling, ostensibly finding evidence of cruel treatment. At no point did the trial court focus on the fact that Chanda was first required to affirmatively prove that she was free from fault prior to the filing of the petition for divorce. See Tucker v. Tucker, 22-23 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/8/22), 344 So.3d 808, writ denied, 22-1078 (La. 10/18/22), 384 So.3d 732. The trial court instead focused only on Cory's evidence as to Chanda's fault.

Ordinarily, trial court findings of fact are reviewed on appeal under manifest error standard. However, as stated in Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735:

[W]here one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de novo review of the record to determine a preponderance of the evidence. A legal error occurs here when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. When such a prejudicial error of law skews the trial court's finding of a material fact and causes it to pretermit other issues, the appellate court is required, if it can, to render judgment on the record by applying the correct law and determining the essential material facts de novo. [Citations omitted.]

Therefore, as we have found the trial court committed legal error by applying an incorrect legal standard, we are required to determine the facts de novo from the entire record and render a decision on the merits. Id.

A review of the record establishes Chanda simply failed to satisfy her required burden of proving she was free from fault in the dissolution of the marriage. Rather than putting on proof that she was a loving and supportive wife, Chanda failed to come forth with sufficient evidence—or any evidence—showing that she was free from fault in the dissolution of her marriage to Cory. Thus, the burden of production never shifted to Cory. Therefore, we are constrained to affirm the trial court's judgment barring Chanda from collecting permanent spousal support as she failed to meet her legally mandated burden of proof.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court finding Chanda Wynne Prather Lalonde barred from receiving final spousal support is hereby affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against, appellant, Chanda Wynne Prather Lalonde.

AFFIRMED.

LEDRICKA J. THIERRY JUDGE