STONEBRIDGE HEALTH SYSTEMS LLC v. SHEILA MILLER (2025)

Plaintiff, Stonebridge Health Systems, LLC, appeals the grant of a no cause of action in favor of Defendant, Sheila W. Miller, relating to claims of defamation. For the following reasons, we reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Stonebridge filed a petition for damages on October 27, 2023, alleging Miller defamed it in a letter published on October 5, 2023, in The Cameron Parish Pilot, a local newspaper in Cameron Parish since 1957. The letter was annexed as an exhibit to the petition. In 2017, Miller resigned from the Lower Cameron Hospital Service District Board of Commissioners which owns South Cameron Memorial Hospital (the hospital). Stonebridge was the operator of the hospital and Calcasieu Oaks, a separate portion of the hospital, from 2014-2023. Miller filed an exception of no cause of action in January 2024. Following a hearing in April 2024, the trial court conditionally granted the exception but allowed Stonebridge to amend its petition to more particularly state a cause of action. Stonebridge filed its first amended and restated petition for damages in June 2024. Miller filed an exception of no cause of action in July 2024. After a hearing in August 2024, the trial court granted Miller's exception of no cause of action. From a judgment rendered on September 26, 2024, Stonebridge appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred in granting Miller's Second Exception of No Cause of Action.

2. The trial court erred in considering factual statements from Miller's counsel during the August 28, 2024 hearing.

3. The trial court erred in failing to examine each defamatory statement alleged in the Amended Petition separately and then in the context of the whole Publication.

4. The trial court erred in finding the Publication, as a whole, was not defamatory.

5. The trial court erred in failing to reach a finding as to whether the false statements of fact alleged in the Amended Petition were defamatory in nature.

6. The trial court erred in failing to reach a finding as to whether the opinions alleged in the Amended Petition were defamatory in nature.

7. The trial court erred in finding Stonebridge not a private entity.

8. The trial court erred in failing to reach a finding as to whether the true statements of fact alleged in the Amended Petition conveyed a defamatory innuendo.

9. The trial court erred in finding the Amended Petition did not plead a cause of action for defamation.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, we review the trial court's grant of an exception of no cause of action using the de novo standard of review. ERA Helicopters, LLC v. Amegin, 15-753 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/15), 181 So.3d 241.

The purpose of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to determine the sufficiency in law of the petition. The burden of showing that the plaintiff has stated no cause of action is upon the exceptor. The public policy behind the burden is to afford the party his day in court to present his evidence. Jarrell v. Carter, 577 So.2d 120 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 582 So.2d 1311 (La.1991). The exception is triable on the face of the papers, and for the purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception, the court must presume that all well-pleaded facts in the petition are true. All reasonable inferences are made in favor of the nonmoving party in determining whether the law affords any remedy to the plaintiff. LA.CODE CIV.P. arts. 927, 931; Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So.2d 618 (La.1984)․

Generally, under La.Code Civ.P. art. 931 parties may introduce no evidence to support or controvert the exception. See, e.g., Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson, 96-1010 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 751, 754, writ denied, 97-1066 (La. 6/13/97), 695 So.2d 982.

․

An exception of no cause of action is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which the plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the petition that there is some insurmountable bar to relief. Thus, dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the petition itself clearly show that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action, or when its allegations show the existence of an affirmative defense that appears clearly on the face of the pleadings. [City of New Orleans v.] Board of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 640 So.2d [237] at 237 [(La. 1994)]. A court appropriately sustains the peremptory exception of no cause of action only when, conceding the correctness of the well-pleaded facts, the plaintiff has not stated a claim for which he can receive legal remedy under the applicable substantive law.

City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Dir. of La. State Museum, 98-1170, pp. 9-10 (La. 3/2/99), 739 So.2d 748, 755–56.

The bar to sustain an exception of no cause of action is high. An exception of no cause of action tests whether the facts alleged can support any remedy under the law. Industrial Companies, Inc. v. Durbin, 02-665 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1207. Thus, a plaintiff's petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless there is no doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts entitling it to relief. Id. “Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded to the language of the petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency and affording the plaintiff the opportunity of presenting evidence at trial.” Id. at 1213.

[W]hether plaintiff can successfully prove that defendants are liable under the applicable laws in this case is a matter of proof that goes to the merits of plaintiff's claims. The merits of a claim are to be determined after findings of fact, upon a motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits, and whether a plaintiff will prevail on the merits is not an appropriate consideration on an exception raising the objection of no cause of action.

State ex rel, Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 21-856, p. 19 (La. 10/21/22), 351 So.3d 297, 311.

Thus, the merits of the defamation claim are not before us; the only issue to be determined is whether the petition states sufficient facts to assert a defamation claim under the law. We find that it does.

The publication is reprinted in full:

Dear Lower Cameron Parish Residents,

I have had several former constituents question me regarding my resignations both from the Cameron Parish School Board and the Lower Cameron Hospital Service District/South Cameron Memorial Hospital Board.

The School Board resignation was simply to provide more time to attend to family members. I will continue to support the school families, faculty and staff, and the superintendent in any way that I can.

My decision to resign from the Hospital Board is more complicated. I am in full support of the need for healthcare throughout our parish and particularly concerned about my neighbors along the coast. I welcomed the news about the engagement of the architectural firm to design the repairs to the Health Unit for temporary use as a Primary Care Clinic, along with the ongoing services of the Cameron Parish Health Unit, and the new elevated and strongly designed South Cameron Memorial Hospital which WILL include an Emergency Department, even though others will try to convince you otherwise. I was particularly happy to hear about the partnership with Lake Charles Memorial Hospital to operate both the South Cameron Primary Care Clinic and South Cameron Memorial Hospital. Following Hurricanes Laura and Delta, I quickly became concerned about efforts to repair the hospital, so as not to have to meet the elevation requirements that residences and businesses are required to meet. It seemed foolish to me to set up for another disaster, instead of mitigating the next one by building higher and stronger. Recommendations as to what needed to be done were discussed with an attorney that represented both the hospital and the operating company, presenting a conflict of interest, and often discussing in phone calls what should have been discussed in board meetings. An insurance consultant was also being paid, even though the Police Jury had retained legal representation to go after the insurance company. The fact that the insurance policies were in the name of the operating company allowed for the operating company to collect a substantial payment ($1,000,000) for business interruption, in addition to governmental COVID financial relief. In my opinion, there was a lack of transparency of both income and expenditures of South Cameron Hospital, even though the operator's contract provided that this financial information be presented each month before receiving the hospital's property taxes that they received each year (About 1.2M per year). I understand that this same information has been requested through our District Attorney's office with no response to date from the former operator's attorney. There was not a clear understanding of how patients were referred to Calcasieu Oaks, even though they were operating with South Cameron Hospital licenses. There were always comments about the high value of Calcasieu Oaks to the board and others, but never a value of South Cameron Hospital's licenses to Calcasieu Oaks or to their operating company. While not prohibited by law, family members of the operating company and board providing various services to the hospital eliminated opportunities or other businesses to bid and perhaps obtain a better price. Since I stood nearly alone with these concerns and so many others, I felt I could not make a positive difference, so I resigned.

I congratulate the current board on getting all this done over the past year when nothing substantial was done in the two years following the storms. Thankfully, Cameron Parish Police Juror Scott Trahan saw a need for changes with the board and made those changes happen. I am especially supportive of partnering with Lake Charles Memorial Hospital to provide management services and a variety of resources. I also commend the board for negotiating with two of our LNG industries to serve their employees and contractors, as well. We look forward to our former dedicated and hardworking local employees to perhaps work in these new facilities.

I am always available if you would like to discuss anything.

Paid for by Sheila Miller

Sincerely, Sheila Miller

Stonebridge's initial Petition for Damages stated in part:

5.

On October 5, 2023, Sheila Miller caused a communication to be published in the Cameron Pilot, attached as Exhibit A, which contained multiple false and defamatory statements regarding Stonebridge.

6.

Such statement contained multiple false and defamatory statements regarding Stonebridge, including, but not limited to:

(i) Allegations that Stonebridge caused a conflict of interest by retaining an attorney regarding the rebuilding of South Cameron Memorial Hospital.

(ii) Allegations that Stonebridge had collusively discussed matters “which should have been discussed in board meetings” in private phone calls;

(iii) Allegations implying that Stonebridge collusively “eliminated opportunities for other businesses to bid and perhaps obtain a better price”;

(iv) Allegations implying that Stonebridge did not fulfill its contractual obligations;

(v) Allegations implying that Stonebridge wrongfully received financial assistance related to the COVID-19 Provider Relief Fund; and

(vi) Allegations implying that Stonebridge wrongfully received a payment from business interruption insurance.

7.

The allegations are false.

Following the trial court's order to supplement the initial petition, Stonebridge filed its First Amending and Supplemental Petition that further elaborated on its allegations of defamation. It stated in part:

7.

The Publication, when considered as a whole and in the context in which it was published is defamatory per se.

8.

The Publication, to be meaningfully analyzed and understood, should not be divided into individual statements removed from the context created by the whole. Divorcing the individual statements from the context in which they were made would strip them of any meaning ascribed to them by the author or readers.

9.

Nevertheless, at the direction of the Court, the Plaintiff herein pleads that the Publication contained defamatory statements regarding Stonebridge which, when read alone, are clearly false and defamatory statements of fact, statements of opinion which imply defamatory acts, or truthful statements which carry a defamatory implication. The statements contained in the publication include:

(i) Exhibit 1 contains the following sentences in succession:

I have had several former constituents question me regarding my resignations both from the Cameron Parish School Board and the Lower Cameron Hospital Service District/South Cameron Memorial Hospital Board. The School Board resignation was simply to provide more time to tend to family members. I will continue to support the school families, faculty and staff, and the superintendent in any way I can. My decision to resign from the Hospital Board is more complicated.

Stonebridge cannot attest to the veracity of whether Defendant's former constituents have inquired into the purpose of her resignation from the Cameron Parish School Board (“School Board”) or the Board of Commissioners for the Lower Cameron Hospital Service District (“Hospital Board”). However, the presentation of this fact, followed by an explanation for her resignation from the School Board, and a statement that her resignation from the Hospital Board was “more complicated,” indicates that the statements which follow this fact will explain the “complicated” reasons for Defendant's resignation from the Hospital Board.

(ii) Exhibit 1 contains the following sentences in succession:

I welcomed the news about the engagement of the architectural firm to design the repairs to the Health Unit for temporary use as a Primary Care Clinic, along with the ongoing services of the Cameron Parish Health Unit, and the new elevated and strongly designed South Cameron Memorial Hospital which WILL include an Emergency Department, even though others will try to convince you otherwise. I was particularly happy to hear about the partnership with Lake Charles Memorial Hospital to operate both the South Cameron Primary Care Clinic and South Cameron Memorial Hospital.

Stonebridge cannot attest to the veracity of Defendant's claims that she was particularly happy or welcomed any of the facts discussed in the foregoing statements. However, the manner in which this is written (i.e. a statement of satisfaction, followed by an emphasized statement of satisfaction) implies that Defendant was more enthused regarding the announcement that Lake Charles Memorial Hospital would operate the Hospital. Read in pari materia alongside the statements discussed supra in ¶8(i), the implication is that Defendant's resignation from the Hospital Board was “more complicated” due to some issue which was resolved by this new partnership with Lake Charles Memorial Hospital.

(iii) Exhibit 1 contains the following sentences in succession:

Following Hurricanes Laura and Delta, I quickly became concerned about efforts to repair the hospital, so as not to have to meet the elevation requirements that residences and businesses are required to meet. It seemed foolish to me to set up for another disaster, instead of mitigating the next one by building higher and stronger. Recommendations as to what needed to be done were discussed with an attorney that represented both the hospital and the operating company, presenting a conflict of interest, and often discussing in phone calls what should have been discussed in board meetings.

Considering the prior statements discussed supra, beginning this statement with “[f]ollowing Hurricanes Laura and Delta, I quickly became concerned ․,” implies that Defendant was still on the Hospital Board at the time of Hurricanes Laura and Delta. This is demonstrably false. Hurricane Laura made landfall on the Louisiana coast on August 27, 2020, and Hurricane Delta made landfall on the Louisiana coast on October 9, 2020. Defendant resigned from her position on the Hospital Board in 2017. However, she is quick to invoke her former position in this effort to cause damage to Stonebridge's professional reputation. All sentences following this clause are then colored by the false implication that Defendant is speaking as an authority with personal knowledge of the information. Additionally, the mention of the “operating company” is very clearly intended to refer to Stonebridge.

Defendant then states that the efforts to repair the hospital “seemed foolish,” that the recommendations were discussed with an attorney that presented a conflict of interest, and that the discussions were improperly held via telephone. First, the statement that an attorney represented both the Hospital District and Stonebridge in any negotiation over repairs to the hospital is false. Further, although this attorney represented the Hospital District and Stonebridge in separate matters, the representation presented no conflict of interest. Second, the statement that discussions of the repairs for the hospital “should have been discussed in board meetings,” is defamatory and implies false facts. The Hospital District is bound to follow Louisiana's Open Meetings Law, La.R.S. 42:11, et seq, a statute which is intended to ensure that public business be performed in an open and public manner. Defendant is implying that Stonebridge and the Hospital were violating open meetings law with some clandestine discussion, outside of the public eye. Read in pari materia with the foregoing statements, Defendant is stating that she resigned from the Hospital Board for complicated reasons which were relieved by new Lake Charles Memorial Hospital partnership with the Lower Cameron Hospital Service District, including the surreptitious violation of Open Meetings Law and legal ethics by Stonebridge and the Hospital District.

(iv) Exhibit 1 contains the following sentences in succession:

The fact that the insurance policies were in the name of the operating company allowed for the operating company to collect a substantial payment ($1,000,000) for business interruption, in addition to governmental COVID financial relief.

The statement that Stonebridge collected COVID-19 financial relief from the government is true. Additionally, the statement Stonebridge was able to collect a substantial payment of approximately $1,000,000.00 in business interruption insurance proceeds is true. The Agreement required Stonebridge to carry $1,000,000.00 of business interruption insurance coverage to ensure the solvency of the operation during the casualty recovery period and to secure payment of rent following a disaster, a payment of $112,800 which Stonebridge made to the Hospital District from its business interruption proceeds. In fact, Defendant, during her time on the Hospital Board, publicly voted to approve the Agreement which contained this requirement. This sentence appears completely unrelated to the rest of the publication unless read in the context in which Defendant has placed it. Defendant couched this statement between implied allegations of criminal and ethical wrongdoing, see supra, ¶8(iii), and direct allegations of contractual violations, see infra ¶8(v). Thus, the statement, although true, obviously implied that Stonebridge's receipt of business interruption insurance proceeds and governmental COVID financial relief was improper.

(v) Exhibit 1 contains the following sentences in succession:

In my opinion, there was a lack of transparency of both income and expenditures of South Cameron Hospital, even though the operator's contract provided that this financial information be presented each month before receiving the hospital's property taxes that they received each year (About 1.2M per year). I understand that this same information has been requested through our District Attorney's office with no response to date from the former operator's attorney.

The statement that the Agreement conditioned the Hospital District's obligation to pay Stonebridge on Stonebridge's presentation of certain financial information to the Hospital Board is true. However, the Agreement was amended in 2018, to remove the condition to provide that information every month, among other things. Even still, Stonebridge always honored the requirement that it present financial information as a condition to receive payment, and the Hospital District always enjoyed the availability of Stonebridge's books during the term of the Agreement under other provisions. This statement is preceded by the clause “there was a lack of transparency of both income and expenditures of South Cameron Hospital.” Even though the Defendant begins this statement with “[i]n my opinion,” this blatantly false statement obviously is intended to imply that the Defendant's perception of a lack of transparency was caused by Stonebridge's failure to fulfill a contractual obligation. Stonebridge fulfilled all contractual obligations during the term of the Agreement.

Defendant then states that she believes that financial information was requested through the District Attorney's office, and that Stonebridge has not responded. This statement is also true. However, when reading the statement in the context of the statements which precede and follow it, the statement furthers the defamatory implication that Stonebridge has improperly and surreptitiously concealed financial information in a manner which violated its obligations under the Agreement. Further, Stonebridge responded to the District Attorney's request for financial information.

(vi) Exhibit 1 contains the following sentences in succession:

There was not a clear understanding of how patients were referred to Calcasieu Oaks, even though they were operating with South Cameron Hospital licenses. There were always comments about the high value of Calcasieu Oaks to the board and others, but never a value of South Cameron Hospital's licenses to Calcasieu Oaks or to their operating company.

These statements are demonstrably false. In accordance with the requirements of the Agreement, Stonebridge presented utilization statistics, management reports, and financial information concerning the operations of the Hospital and Calcasieu Oaks every month at Hospital Board meetings. Perhaps Defendant did not have a clear understanding of the relationship between Calcasieu Oaks, the Hospital, and Stonebridge; however, this is likely false, since Defendant publicly reviewed, accepted, and approved the information presented by Stonebridge on these topics during her tenure as a member of the Hospital Board. To suggest otherwise would be to suggest that Defendant abrogated and neglected her duty as a Hospital Board member.

Further, in the context in which it is written, the statement patients were referred to Calcasieu Oaks in an improper manner, implies that Stonebridge violated one of the many federal and state laws prohibiting healthcare providers from referring patients to themselves. This implication is false and defamatory.

(vi) Exhibit 1 contains the following sentences in succession:

While not prohibited by law, family members of the operating company and board providing various services to the hospital eliminated opportunities or other businesses to bid and perhaps obtain a better price.

The introductory clause to this statement specifically frames the remainder of the sentence in a manner that suggests that, although actions taken by Stonebridge were not illegal, the actions were improper, unethical, or morally reprehensible. It is true that there is no law which prohibits Stonebridge from contracting with family members to provide services. However, it is not true that Stonebridge “eliminated opportunities for other business to bid and perhaps obtain a better price” by any action or inaction of Stonebridge. When read alone, and in the context of the entire Publication, this statement is defamatory per se.

(vii) Exhibit 1 contains the following sentences in succession.

Since I stood nearly alone with these concerns and so many others, I felt I could not make a positive difference, so I resigned.

This statement is a bookend to the statements discussed in ¶8(i), supra. It serves to confirm what was implied previously–the wholly fabricated lie that Defendant resigned from the Hospital Board due to events and happenings which occurred after she resigned from the Hospital Board. Upon information and belief, Mrs. Miller never voiced objections or concerns to any of the foregoing “concerns” during her time as a member of the board. Additionally, after her resignation in 2017, Mrs. Miller never attended any meeting of the Hospital Board as a member of the public.

The petition goes on to state:

10.

The allegations of professional improprieties deter others from associating or dealing with Stonebridge and expose Stonebridge to contempt and ridicule.

11.

The allegations injure Stonebridge's professional reputation and are, therefore, defamatory per se.

12.

Defendant made such allegations knowing that they were false or with reckless disregard for the truth.

13.

These defamatory statements have directly caused Stonebridge to suffer significant damage to its professional reputation.

14.

Stonebridge is entitled to all general and special damages permitted under Louisiana law arising out of Defendant's defamatory actions.

In order to prevail in a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must navigate the sometimes-complex law relating to defamation.

Defamation is a tort involving the invasion of a person's interest in his or her reputation and good name. Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 05–1418 (La.7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669, citing Costello v. Hardy, 03–1146 (La.1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129. Four elements are necessary to establish a claim for defamation: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury. The fault requirement is generally referred to in the jurisprudence as malice, actual or implied. Kennedy, supra; Costello, supra. Thus, in order to prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other fault, published a false statement with defamatory words which caused plaintiff damages. Trentecosta v. Beck, 96–2388 (La.10/21/97), 703 So.2d 552. To be actionable, the words must be communicated or published to someone other than the plaintiff. Wyatt v. Elcom of La., Inc., 34,786 (La.App.2d Cir.6/22/01), 792 So.2d 832. In addition, it is well settled that truth is an absolute defense to defamation. Thompson v. Lee, 38,930 (La.App.2d Cir.10/27/04) 888 So.2d 300, writ denied, 04–2936 (La.2/4/05), 893 So.2d 873, citing Louisiana Claims Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 38,709 (La.App.2d Cir.6/23/04), 877 So.2d 294, writ denied, 04–1890 (La.10/29/04), 885 So.2d 595; Wyatt, supra, and Bell v. Rogers, 29,757 (La.App.2d Cir.8/20/97), 698 So.2d 749.

If even one of the required elements of the tort is lacking, the cause of action fails. Even when a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the essential elements of defamation, recovery may be precluded if the defendant shows either that the statement was true or that it was protected by a privilege, absolute or qualified. Wyatt, supra.

By definition, a statement is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another so as to lower the person in the estimation of the community, deter others from associating or dealing with the person or otherwise expose the person to contempt or ridicule. Kennedy, supra; Costello, supra. In Louisiana, defamatory words have traditionally been divided into two categories: those that are defamatory per se and those that are susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Words which expressly or implicitly accuse another of criminal conduct or which by their very nature tend to injure one's personal or professional reputation, without considering extrinsic facts or circumstances, are considered defamatory per se. Kennedy, supra.

When a plaintiff proves publication of words that are defamatory per se, falsity and malice (or fault) are presumed, but may be rebutted by the defendant. Kennedy, supra; Costello, supra. Injury may also be presumed. Id. When the words at issue are not defamatory per se, a plaintiff must prove, in addition to defamatory meaning and publication, falsity, malice (or fault) and injury. Id.

Watson v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 47,295, pp. 4-6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/20/12), 93 So.3d 855, 858-59.

The issue before us is whether Stonebridge alleges false and defamatory statements.

[T]here are three types of defamatory statements: 1) false defamatory statements of fact; (2) statements of opinion which imply false defamatory facts; and (3) truthful statements which carry a defamatory implication. [Fitzgerald v. Tucker] 98-2313 [La. 6/29/99], at 11-13, 737 So.2d [706] at 716-17. This latter, or third, type of defamatory statement is referred to in the jurisprudence as defamation by implication or innuendo, and “occurs when one publishes truthful statements of fact, and those truthful facts carry a false, defamatory implication.” Id., 98-2313 at 12, 737 So.2d at 717. In other words, it occurs where a defamatory meaning can be insinuated from an otherwise true statement. Id.; Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So.2d 185, 188 (La. 1981). However, it is actionable only if the statements regard a private individual and private affairs. Id., 98-2313 at 13, 737 So.2d at 717. Where public affairs are concerned, the publication of true statements is encouraged, and there can be no civil or criminal liability for such, regardless of ill-will or improper motive on the part of the speaker. Schaefer, 406 So.2d at 188 (citing Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964)).

Johnson v. Purpera, 20-1175, p. 16 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 374, 389.

In Guilbeau v. The Times of Acadiana, 94-1270, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/9/95), 661 So.2d 1027, 1031 (emphasis added), a panel of this court affirmed the trial court's finding of no cause of action in a defamation claim and stated:

The question of whether a communication is capable of a particular meaning and whether that meaning is defamatory is one for the court.

This question is answered by determining whether a listener could have reasonably understood the communication, taken in context, to have been intended in a defamatory sense. In order to determine whether the statement is actionable, the court must consider each portion of the defamatory statement separately and then consider each portion in the context of the entire article.

To be actionable, defamatory words must be “of and concerning” the plaintiff or, directly or indirectly, cast a personal reflection on the plaintiff. Accusation of criminal conduct is defamatory per se, and in such cases proof of actual malice is not required.

Although Stonebridge's brief assigns a number of errors relating to the trial court's “findings,” the trial court provided no oral or written reasons for granting the no cause of action. Further, Stonebridge does not address several of its assignments of error in brief. Regardless, we review the pleadings de novo to determine if Stonebridge has stated a cause of action for defamation.

The threshold issue is whether defamatory words were used in the publication when reading the entirety of the publication. As noted above in Guilbeau, this requires that we address “[w]hether the communication was reasonably capable of conveying the particular meaning or innuendo ascribed to it by the plaintiff. The second is whether that meaning is defamatory in character.” Johnson, 320 So.3d at 388. The final question, “whether the meaning in question was in fact conveyed to and understood by the recipient of the communication” is a question of fact inapplicable in a no cause of action. Id. It is our duty to determine if the words in the publication “are capable of a particular meaning and if that meaning is defamatory.” Id.

When read in isolation, a number of the allegations are not defamatory of Stonebridge. For example, whether an attorney has a conflict of interest is not defamatory of Stonebridge. Similarly, whether a consultant has been hired in addition to an attorney is not defamatory. Stonebridge has alleged falsity of several statements including Stonebridge's transparency relating to income and expenditures and its procedure for patient referral. Stonebridge further alleges statements that are factually true but have defamatory inuendo such as the receipt of COVID-19 relief and business interruption insurance proceeds and failure to produce information to the District Attorney. We find that Miller's publication, even as to claims that Stonebridge admits are true, is capable of being painted in a negative light and as improper, in other words, defamation by inuendo. When read in context of the whole publication, we agree with Stonebridge that Miller's communication was capable of at times, conveying illegal behavior (such as failing to build to code and hold open meetings) and, at the very least, conveying shady, underhanded, and unethical practices by Stonebridge. While we do not find any of the statements defamatory per se, we find the letter as a whole susceptible of defamatory meaning.

When the words at issue are not defamatory per se, the plaintiff must prove, in addition to defamatory meaning and publication, falsity and malice. Costello [v. Hardy], 03–1146, p. 12, 864 So.2d [129] at 140. Malice, or the lack of a reasonable belief in the truth of the statement, may sometimes be inferred or implied from the circumstances surrounding the communication. Lemeshewsky v. Dumaine, 464 So.2d 973, 975–976 (La.App. 4 Cir.1985). In cases involving statements about a public figure or a matter of public concern, however, the plaintiff must prove actual malice, that is, that the defendant either knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Romero v. Thomson Newspapers (Wisconsin), Inc., 94–1105, pp. 6–7 (La.1/17/95), 648 So.2d 866, 869–870.

Heine v. Reed, 09-0869, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/16/09), 28 So.3d 529, 534, writ denied, 10-102 (La. 4/5/10), 31 So.3d 365.

Stonebridge alleges that Miller's publication and the facts relating to the defamation claims (the hurricanes) occurred years after she resigned from the board, despite the implication throughout the publication that these were the reasons she resigned. Additionally, the fact that Miller caused her missive to be published in the local newspaper suggests a conscious desire to cast her accusations and inuendo as far and wide as possible. When taken as true, these facts allege malice on Miller's part.

Identity

Miller argues that because Stonebridge Health Systems is not mentioned by name and is only referred to as the “operator,” its reputation cannot be ruined. Defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff. McConathy v. Ungar, 33,368 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/23/00), 765 So.2d 1214, writ denied, 00-2678 (La. 11/17/00), 774 So.2d 982 “If the word used contains no reflection on a particular individual, no averment or innuendo can make it defamatory as an innuendo cannot make the person certain which was uncertain before.” Carter v. ABC News, Inc., 55,623, p. 12 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/26/24), 399 So.3d 1, 13, writ denied, 24-1182 (La. 12/11/24), 396 So.3d 966. The trial court noted at the hearing on the exception, “if you know anything about the situation in Lower Cameron, you probably could figure out who the operator was.” We agree and find that the identity of the operator referred to in the publication was easily ascertainable through a basic internet search.

Privilege

Miller argues the publication is subject to a privilege because it relates to matters of public concern. Whether a privilege applies is beyond the scope of a no cause of action hearing.

The defense of a qualified privilege must be specially pleaded. Trahan v. Ritterman, 368 So.2d 181 (La.App. 1st Cir.1979). Additionally, the introduction of certain elements of proof, such as “good faith”, are required in asserting a privilege to an action in defamation. Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So.2d 723 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1962). Since La.C.C.P. Art. 931 prohibits the introduction of evidence in support of or in opposition to the exception of no cause of action, it necessarily follows that the defense of immunity based upon an allegation of a privilege cannot be raised by the peremptory exception of no cause of action. Gianfala v. Allemand, 444 So.2d 150 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). Defendant's plea of privilege was therefore improperly raised on the exception of no cause of action.

Juneau v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury, 482 So.2d 1022, 1029 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/1986).

Having reviewed Stonebridge's allegations in its amended petition, we find Stonebridge has successfully stated a cause of action. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of the exception of no cause of action.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court granting the exception of no cause of action in favor of Defendant-Appellee, Sheila Miller, is reversed. All costs are assessed equally between the parties.

REVERSED.

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE