JAMES v. LANDRY (2025)

In this personal injury suit, the plaintiff, Edward James, sought damages for injuries sustained when the driver of the vehicle in which he was a passenger rear-ended a stationary vehicle on the roadway. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Adam Landry and his insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon (collectively “the defendants”), and dismissed James’ claims with prejudice.¹ James’ motion for new trial was denied. He now appeals. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arose out of a rear-end collision that occurred in March of 2016 on S. Acadian Thruway in Baton Rouge. Shondreka James was driving a Chevrolet Suburban in the right northbound lane of S. Acadian Thruway when she struck the rear-end of a Kia Soul that was stationary in her lane of travel. Shondreka's husband, Edward James, who is the plaintiff in this matter, was riding as a guest passenger in the vehicle. The James’ four children were also in the vehicle. The collision occurred in the afternoon after the Jameses left the St. Patrick's Day parade. The defendant, Adam Landry, the operator of the Kia Soul (Landry vehicle), had stopped the vehicle in the right northbound lane of S. Acadian Thruway.

James filed suit for damages on February 16, 2017. On January 4, 2023, Landry filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Incorporated Memorandum in Support, & Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. On January 17, 2023, Safeco filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, adopting Landry's motion. The defendants argued that Shondreka failed to pay adequate attention under the circumstances and had “plenty” of time and space” to avoid the Landry vehicle; thus, James could not rebut the presumption of fault against Shondreka for the rear-end collision. In collision. In support of his motion, Landry attached, inter alia, excerpts of Shondreka's deposition testimony and the Affidavit of Michael S. Gillen, a traffic accident investigator and reconstructionist.

In relevant part, Shondreka testified she was traveling at 38 - 40 miles per hour and that the speed limit was 40 miles per hour. She testified it was raining, which she acknowledged warrants extra caution, especially when driving a large, heavy vehicle like her Suburban. She stated that her windshield wipers and headlights were on. Shondreka explained that as she came out of a curve, she saw the Landry vehicle and, a few seconds later, realized the vehicle was not moving. Shondreka testified in her deposition as follows:

[O]nce I came around that curve, I mean it happened so fast. So once I came around that curve I got cars on my left-hand side. I've got trees and a fence on the right-hand side. I mean I'm observing the road and then I see this vehicle, but I mean, I can't go left, I can't go right and once I was able to actually get over a little bit I still end up hitting it in the back.

* * *

Because of the weather conditions, like it was raining, you know. I got my headlights on. Windshield wipers on. You got tree branches hanging from being, you know, for it being raining, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. So -- and once again the car didn't have lights on it so I wasn't able to see them, you know, right away.

* * *

․I tried to avoid that car once I actually seen him, but I wasn't able to get over fast because of there being two lanes. I had cars in my left-hand lane. I actually applied my brakes. I slid before I hit him.

* * *

The road is wet. It's drizzling off and on. I have vehicles on my left. I have a vehicle in front of me that I see now is gray, with no lights on. So when you see a vehicle in front of you with no lights you assume it's still — it's moving, I mean, it's in the road, right. Until I notice that it's not moving kind of when I get a little closer. Now we [sic] applying my brakes because I know this vehicle is not moving to get over.

Shondreka provided an approximate location along the roadway where her vehicle was when she first saw the Landry vehicle. Shondreka further testified that she knew the Landry vehicle was stopped with no lights on because after the collision, she observed the vehicle and there was no driver in the vehicle and no keys in the ignition.

Michael Gillen conducted a collision investigation based on a review of the pleadings and deposition testimony, and an accident site examination. In his affidavit, accepting Shondreka's report of how the accident occurred, Gillen concluded:

Ms. James, a professionally licensed driver familiar with the handling characteristics of her vehicle, had ample time and distance to stop before crashing into the rear of Mr. Landry's Kia. She was able to see the area of impact at least 550-850 ft before the crash. This allowed her to have as much as 12.7sec PRT[2] and still come to a stop. Even if Ms. Landry [sic] was not able to discern Mr. Landry's Kia at that distance, and had to rely on looming,[3] she would have been able to perceive the Kia, have 1,5sec PRT, and [would have been] able to stop with less than full braking to avoid the collision.”

A hearing on the motion was set for June 1, 2023. On May 30, 2023, James filed a Motion for Continuance and Alternatively, Memo in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. On the morning of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion for continuance and, according to the record before us, did not consider the opposition in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2) as it was untimely filed.⁴ Following the hearing, the trial court adopted the reasons set forth by the defendants and granted the motions for summary judgment dismissing James’ claims with prejudice. On June 27, 2023, James filed a Motion and Order for New Trial which was denied. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant.⁵ Murphy v. Savannah, 2018-0991 (La. 5/8/19), 282 So. 3d 1034, 1038 (per curiam). After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3); Campbell v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 2019-0036 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/9/20), 294 So. 3d 522, 526.

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1); Lucas v. Maison Ins. Co., 2021-1401 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/22), 358 So. 3d 76. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Instead, after meeting his initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the mover may point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, summary judgment shall be granted unless the adverse party can produce factual evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1); Lucas, 358 So. 3d at 84.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Hooper v. Lopez, 2021-1442 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/22/22), 344 So. 3d 656, 661, as clarified on reh'g (Sept. 1, 2022), writ denied, 2022-01421 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So. 3d 501; Janney v. Pearce, 2009-2103 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/7/10), 40 So. 3d 285, writ denied, 2010-1356 (La. 9/24/10), 45 So. 3d 1078.

A “genuine” issue is a triable issue, which means that an issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree. A fact is “material” when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to a plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Kasem v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 2016-0217 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/10/17), 212 So. 3d 6, 13. Since the applicable substantive law determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material must be viewed in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Chapman v. Haynes, 2022-0288 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/22), 352 So. 3d 1023, 1027; Bryant v. Premium Food Concepts, Inc., 2016-0770 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/17), 220 So. 3d 79, 82, writ denied, 2017-0873 (La. 9/29/17), 227 So. 3d 288.

Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. See Leet v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of East Baton Rouge Parish, 2018-1148 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/28/19), 274 So. 3d 583, 587.

Liability/Presumption of Fault/Sudden Emergency Doctrine

Louisiana courts have adopted a duty-risk analysis in determining whether to impose liability under the general negligence principles of La. C.C. art. 2315. For liability to attach under a duty-risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care (the duty element); (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard of care (the breach of duty element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause in fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of protection element); and (5) actual damages (the damage element). Pinsonneault v. Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 2001-2217 (La. 4/3/02), 816 So. 2d 270, 275-76. Breach of duty, cause in fact, and actual damages are all factual issues. Snearl v. Mercer, 99-1738 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 780 So. 2d 563, 574, writs denied, 01-1319 (La. 6/22/01), 794 So. 2d 800 and 01-1320 (La. 6/22/01), 794 So. 2d 801. Where there are concurrent causes of an accident, the proper inquiry is whether the conduct in question was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. Whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and thus, a cause in fact of the injuries, is a factual question to be determined by the fact finder. Bonin v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 2003-3024 (La. 7/2/04), 877 So. 2d 89, 94; Manno v. Gutierrez, 2005-0476 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/29/06), 934 So. 2d 112, 116-17.

La. R.S. 32:81(A) provides that “[t]he driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” Under La. R.S. 32:81, a following motorist owes a high degree of care to maintain a reasonable and prudent distance behind a lead vehicle; the duty imposed by this statute is significant, so much so that a breach of this duty is presumed when a rear-end collision occurs. Hooper, 344 So. 3d at 662; Bieber v. Genesis Indem. Ins. Corp., 2005-2185 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 2006 WL 3105587, at *6 (unpublished). The rule is based on the premise that a following motorist whose vehicle rear-ends a preceding motorist either has failed in his responsibility to maintain a sharp lookout or has followed at a distance from the preceding vehicle which is insufficient to allow him to stop safely under normal circumstances. See Bieber, 2006 WL 3105587 at *6.

The rear-ending driver may rebut the presumption of negligence by proving that he had his vehicle under control, closely observed the preceding vehicle, and followed at a safe distance under the circumstances. The following motorist may also avoid liability by proving that the driver of the lead vehicle negligently created a hazard that he could not reasonably avoid. Elee v. White, 21-0229 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/21/21), 332 So. 3d 97, 102, writ denied, 2021-01732 (La. 1/19/22), 331 So. 3d 329. The sudden emergency doctrine embodies this exception to the general rule that a following motorist is presumed negligent if he collides with the rear of a leading vehicle. The doctrine provides that a following motorist will be adjudged free from fault if the following motorist is suddenly confronted with an unanticipated hazard created by a favored vehicle, which could not be reasonably avoided, unless the emergency is brought about by the following motorist's own negligence. Cane v. O'Brien, 2023-0718 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/24), 384 So. 3d 1003, 1010, writ denied, 2024-00478 (La. 6/25/24), 386 So. 3d 1082; Ly v. State Through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 633 So. 2d 197, 201 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 93-3134 (La. 2/25/94), 634 So. 2d 835.

The sudden emergency doctrine is not limited to situations where the person claiming the benefit of the defense is the person in immediate peril. Rather, it is the unanticipated hazard which is the foundation for invoking the sudden emergency doctrine. Manno, 934 So. 2d at 117; Armstrong v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 646, 648 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 560 So. 2d 30 (La. 1990). The rationale for the doctrine is the principle that a person confronted with a sudden emergency, who does not have sufficient time to weigh and consider the best means to avoid an impending danger, should not be held to the same standard of control, care, and caution as someone who has ample opportunity to fully exercise judgment and reason. This rationale applies equally, regardless of whether the person in imminent peril is the defendant claiming the defense or another person who the defendant recognizes to be in a position of imminent peril. Manno, 934 So. 2d at 117; Whiddon v. Hutchinson, 94-2000 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/96), 668 So. 2d 1368, 1374, writs denied, 96-0731, 0775 (La. 5/10/96), 672 So. 2d 923. Application of the sudden emergency doctrine requires factual determinations concerning whether the driver was confronted with imminent peril and whether there was sufficient time to consider and weigh the circumstances in order to take action to avoid an impending danger. Manno, 934 So. 2d at 117. Thus, by its nature, the sudden emergency doctrine is rarely appropriate on a motion for summary judgment. See Manno, 934 So. 2d at 117.

DISCUSSION

There is no dispute that Shondreka had a statutory duty as a following motorist, even as to a stationary vehicle,⁶ and is presumptively negligent for the rear-end collision. James bears the burden of proof at trial on the application of the sudden emergency doctrine to rebut the presumption of Shondreka's negligence, to either reduce or eliminate her liability for the collision. As previously mentioned, James failed to timely oppose the motions for summary judgment below. On appeal, defendants argue that in the absence of any opposition to the motions for summary judgment, there has been no evidence presented creating a genuine issue of material fact which could overcome the motions. The defendants further suggest that because Gillen based his expert opinion on information provided by Shondreka, there is no dispute of fact and the trial court was correct in accepting Gillen's opinion and granting the summary judgments. We are not persuaded by the defendants’ arguments.

Despite James’ failure to timely oppose the motions below, a de novo review of the record requires us to examine the record on summary judgment before the trial court to determine if any genuine issues of material facts exist rendering summary judgment inappropriate and warranting a trial by a factfinder. After review, we conclude that Shondreka's deposition testimony and Gillen's affidavit, which were properly attached to Landry's motion for summary judgment, are contradictory regarding whether or not Shondreka was faced with a sudden emergency which she could not reasonably avoid. Thus, Shondreka's deposition testimony creates material factual issues on fault rendering summary judgment improper. Specifically, Shondreka testified that despite her best efforts to avoid hitting the Landry vehicle, she was not able to do so because of the weather, road conditions, traffic and tree branches preventing her from changing lanes, lack of lights on the stopped vehicle, and the fact that she did not immediately perceive that the Landry vehicle was not moving. On the other hand, Gillen concluded that under the circumstances as described by Shondreka, she had adequate time and distance to stop before colliding with the Landry vehicle. This evidence presents factual and credibility issues that are material to a determination of whether Shondreka was 100 percent at fault, or had some fault in this accident. A reasonable fact finder might find Shondreka to be credible in her testimony that she did all that she could reasonably do to avoid the accident and was not able to do so. On the other hand, a reasonable fact finder might conclude that under these facts, there was no “sudden emergency,” so as to insulate Shondreka from liability, or could credit Gillen, concluding that under any scenario presented, Shondreka could have reasonably stopped before colliding with the Landry vehicle. These are factual determinations concerning whether Shondreka was confronted with imminent peril and whether there was sufficient time for her to consider and weigh the circumstances in order to take action to avoid the impending danger, the existence of which render summary judgment improper. See Manno, 934 So. 2d at 117. The trial court erred in granting Landry's motion for summary judgment and dismissing with prejudice James’ claims against him.

We now address Safeco's motion for summary judgment which, from the record, appears to be a “me too” motion for summary judgment. Safeco's motion, which was filed and heard prior the August 1, 2023 effective date of the 2023 amendments to La. C.C.P. art. 966, stated that it “fully supports and joins in Adam Landry's Motion for Summary Judgment, Incorporated Memorandum in Support, and Statement of Undisputed Material Facts filed on January 3, 2023.” Safeco did not include a memorandum in support of its motion nor did it file any evidence in support of its motion. This Court has previously found such “me too” motions, wherein a party attempts to adopt and incorporate the evidence, authorities, and arguments set forth in another motion simply by reference thereto, did not meet the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 966 in effect at the time the motion for summary judgment was submitted and heard, because materials elsewhere in the record cannot be considered on summary judgment. See Ricketson v. McKenzie, 2023-0314 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/4/23), 380 So. 3d 1, 7; McKeane v. LA Ren Fest, LLC, 2023-1003 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/24), 390 So. 3d 936, 941, writ denied, 2024-00775 (La. 10/8/24), 394 So. 3d 271, and writ denied, 2024-00740 (La. 10/8/24), 394 So. 3d 274. Accordingly, because Safeco failed to raise any argument or file any evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment that would satisfy its initial burden, we find, pursuant to our de novo review, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Safeco.

In light of our findings herein, we pretermit any discussion of the denial of James’ motion for new trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Adam Landry and Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon and dismissing Edward James’ claims with prejudice are reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs of appeal are assessed equally to Adam Landry and Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his original Petition, James also named as a defendant Foremost Insurance Company, the uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier of the driver of the vehicle in which James was riding. Foremost was dismissed from the case on James’ motion on March 20, 2017.

2.   According to Gillen, it is generally accepted that 1.5 seconds is the typical time for someone to perceive and react (PRT) to a normal anticipated event, while unexpected or more complex events would require more time to process.

3.   Gillen defined looming as the “rate at which an object appears to expand as it approached, based on the width of an object and the closing speed.” Accepting as true Shondreka's testimony that the Landry vehicle was stopped with no brake lights illuminated, Gillen considered that she may have relied on looming to perceive the stopped vehicle. Even so, Gillen opined that Shondreka still would have had time to stop her vehicle and avoid the collision.

4.   James did not seek supervisory review of this ruling and has not assigned it as error on appeal.

5.   We note that we must apply the version of La. C.C.P. art. 966 in effect on January 4, 2023, when James filed his motion for summary judgment and on June 1 2023, when the motion for summary judgment was heard. Article 966 was amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 317, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2023), and 2023 La. Acts No. 368, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2023). The 2023 amendments to La. C.C.P. art. 966 are substantive and cannot be applied retroactively. See La. C.C.P. art. 966, Comments—2023, Comment (F); Martin v. ISC Constructors, L.L.C., 2023-0707 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/13/24), 387 So. 3d 630, 634 n.5; Ricketson v. McKenzie, 2023-0314 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/4/23), 380 So. 3d 1, 6.

6.   When a vehicle is disabled and must be parked temporarily upon the main travel part of a highway, it is the motorist's duty to remove the vehicle as soon as possible and to “protect traffic” until the vehicle is removed from the highway. Nonetheless, the first duty of a motorist is to maintain a sharp lookout ahead. See Barber Bros. Contracting Co., LLC v. Capitol City Produce Co., LLC, 2023-00788 (La. 6/28/24), 388 So. 3d 331, 350, reh'g granted, 2023-00788 (La. 8/2/24), 389 So. 3d 828, and on reh'g, 2023-00788 (La. 12/19/24), 397 So. 3d 404. An approaching motorist has the duty to discover a stalled vehicle, if he can do so with the exercise of the required degree of care. Id. Even if an obstruction on a road is illegal, e.g., a stalled vehicle, a motorist is not absolved from the duty to look ahead and exercise the required degree of care in observing that obstruction. Id., Desadier v. Safeway Ins. Co., 97-1412 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/8/98), 712 So. 2d 925, 929, writ denied, 98-1249 (La. 6/26/98), 719 So. 2d 1058; Lindstrom v. Arnold, 421 So. 2d 1178 (La. App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 423 So. 2d 1183 (La. 1982).

BALFOUR, J.