STATE OF LOUISIANA v. QUANTERRIUS McNEAL (2025)

The defendant, Quanterrius McNeal, was charged by bill of information with aggravated second degree battery (count one), in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.7; and introduction or possession of contraband in a state correctional institution by an inmate (count two), in violation of La. R.S. 14:402(A), (B), and (G)(2). He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was convicted as charged on both counts. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for new trial and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to fifteen years on count one and one year on count two. The trial court ordered the sentences be served consecutively to one another and count two to be served consecutively to any sentences he was serving.¹

The State subsequently filed a habitual offender bill of information, and the trial court adjudicated the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender with respect to count one only and sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his challenges for cause of three prospective jurors. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions, as well as his habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentence, on count one. However, we vacate the original sentence imposed on count one, as well as the sentence imposed on count two, and remand for resentencing on count two.

FACTS

On May 4, 2022, the defendant, an inmate at Rayburn Correctional Center, stabbed another inmate, Percy Antoine, multiple times in the neck, face, and shoulder with a “[m]etal brace hinge from a folding step ladder fashioned into an edged weapon, known as a shank.” The incident occurred in their shared prison cell and was recorded on surveillance footage. Antoine was unarmed and was standing with his back to the defendant when he was attacked.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of prospective jurors Tammy Stewart, Gloye Mead, and Jimmy Seibert.

An accused in a criminal case is constitutionally entitled to a full and complete voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to the exercise of peremptory challenges. See La. Const. art. I, § 17(A). The purpose of voir dire examination is to determine prospective jurors’ qualifications by testing their competency and impartiality and discovering bases for the intelligent exercise of cause and peremptory challenges. State v. Borne, 2023-0755 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/23/24), 387 So.3d 13, 15.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 797(2) provides the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that the juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. Further, a defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the grounds that the relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. La. Code Crim. P. art. 797(3). However, the law does not require a jury be composed of individuals who are totally unacquainted with the defendant, the prosecuting witness, the prosecuting attorney, and the witnesses who may testify at trial. Rather, the law requires jurors be fair and unbiased. State v. Morgan, 2017-0932 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/20/18), 2018 WL 947011, *7 (unpublished), writ denied, 2018-0465 (La. 1/14/19), 260 So.3d 1215, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1568, 203 L.Ed.2d 730 (2019); State v. Halford, 2020-0585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/4/21), 327 So.3d 1004, 1012, writ denied, 2021-00866 (La. 11/3/21), 326 So.3d 884, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 2658, 212 L.Ed.2d 612 (2022).

A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. However, a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause is afforded broad discretion due to the trial court's ability to observe prospective jurors during voir dire. Halford, 327 So.3d at 1012. Moreover, a prospective juror's seemingly prejudicial response is not grounds for an automatic challenge for cause, and a trial court's refusal to excuse him on the grounds of impartiality is not an abuse of discretion, if after further questioning the prospective juror demonstrates a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. Id. at 1013. We presume prejudice when the trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause and the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. This is because an erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge violates his substantial rights and constitutes reversible error. State v. Kang, 2002-2812 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So.2d 649, 651-52.

Prospective Juror Tammy Stewart

The first prospective juror at issue is Tammy Stewart. Stewart indicated she knew Reed Wallace, one of the State's witnesses, who she had worked with about eight years ago. Stewart stated that she had not had any contact with him since then. She further stated that there was nothing about their prior working relationship which would prohibit her from being fair and impartial. When asked whether the prospective jurors would require the State to prove motive, Stewart said she would be curious about the motive. The State asked Stewart if she could convict absent a clear motive if she believed beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant committed the crimes, and Stewart responded: “Yes, I think so.”

Later, Stewart said she “kind of” agreed with another prospective juror who said he would “be singing like a canary” if he was accused of something he did not do. She was not, however, explicitly asked if she would require the defendant to testify after being instructed on his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Defense counsel challenged Stewart for cause based on Stewart's ostensible opinion the defendant should testify at trial. The State responded that although Stewart said she wanted to hear from the defendant, she did not indicate any belief that a defendant's failure to testify would automatically demonstrate guilt. The trial court denied the challenge for cause without objection, and the defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse Stewart.²

In accordance with La. Code Crim. P. art. 800(A), a defendant may not assign as error a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause made by him, unless an objection thereto is made at the time of the ruling. The nature of the objection and grounds therefore shall be stated at the time of objection. Thus, by failing to contemporaneously object to the trial court's refusal to grant the challenge for cause, the defendant waived any claims on appeal regarding the challenge at issue. See State v. Mullen, 2018-0643 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/21/18), 269 So.3d 772, 778-79, writ denied, 2020-00408 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So.3d 529; see also State v. Sagastume, 2022-01824 (La. 12/8/23), 379 So.3d 1243, 1245.

Prospective Juror Gloye Mead

The next prospective juror at issue is Gloye Mead. Like Stewart, Mead agreed with another prospective juror who said he would “be singing like a canary” if he was wrongly accused. Defense counsel initially challenged Mead for cause based on her indication that she would testify if accused and presumably would want the defendant to testify on his own behalf. The trial court denied the challenge after finding Mead was rehabilitated, after which defense counsel said Mead was acceptable. The State later exercised a backstrike to excuse Mead.³

Initially, we note defense counsel did not contemporaneously object to the trial court's denial of his challenge for cause of Mead, thereby precluding review of the ruling. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 800(A); Sagastume, 3 79 So.3d at 1249. Moreover, defense counsel did not exercise a peremptory challenge against Mead; rather, defense counsel accepted her as a juror before the State struck her. An erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause which does not deprive a defendant of one of his peremptory challenges does not provide grounds for reversing his conviction and sentence. A defendant must use one of his remaining peremptory challenges curatively to remove the juror or waive the complaint on appeal, even in a case in which he ultimately exhausts his peremptory challenges. State v. Campbell, 2006-0286 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 810, 856, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1040, 129 S.Ct. 607, 172 L.Ed.2d 471 (2008); State v. Blank, 2004-0204 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 113, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494, 169 L.Ed.2d 346 (2007). Because the defendant did not object to the trial court's ruling nor did he use one of his peremptory challenges to remove Mead, we find the defendant waived review of the trial court's denial of his challenge for cause.

Prospective Juror Jimmy Seibert

The final prospective juror at issue is Jimmy Seibert. Seibert stated he worked with witness Reed Wallace about ten years ago but had not seen him since then. Seibert indicated he could be a fair and impartial juror and could fairly evaluate Wallace's credibility despite their prior working relationship. Defense counsel challenged Seibert based on his relationship with Reed and his alleged agreement with the prospective juror who said he would testify if he was innocent. The State did not hear Seibert agreeing with the prospective juror, and the trial court ruled as follows:

With Mr. Seibert, he did work with the witness, ten years ago. He has had no contact since. When I asked what sort of relationship they had, was it the sort of relationship where even outside of work you would have them into your home. He indicated there had been no contact in at least ten years. I asked if he could evaluate that credibility like you would everybody else, so I felt like he was rehabilitated. He was not one of the ones that you didn't rehabilitate yourself after the speech. The cause is denied. That makes him Juror 6.

Defense counsel objected to the trial court's ruling, and Seibert was accepted as a juror, as the defense had already exhausted his peremptory challenges.

We find no reason to disturb the trial court's rulings on appeal. As noted by the supreme court, La. Code Crim. P. art. 797(3) does not list a prospective juror's relationship to a witness among those relationships where an influence is reasonably implied. See State v. Holmes, 2022-0328 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/6/23), 377 So.3d 260, 264, writs denied, 2023-01359, 2023-01484 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 708, citing State v. Baldwin, 388 So.2d 664, 671 (La. 1980). Rather, the party challenging the prospective juror must demonstrate the personal relationship would influence the juror's verdict. Holmes, 377 So.2d at 264. Seibert's responses, as a whole, fail to reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. See State v. Brown, 2018-01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 265, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d 596 (2022).

The reviewing court should afford great deference to the trial court's determination, as the trial court was in the best position to assess the prospective jurors’ credibility and candor. Additionally, the voir dire as a whole supports the trial court's finding that Seibert could be fair and impartial. Upon reviewing the record, we find the trial court's rulings denying the challenges for cause of Stewart and Mead are not preserved for review, and we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's challenge for cause of Seibert. This assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found several patent errors.

First, the record reflects the trial court failed to vacate the defendant's original sentence before imposing his enhanced sentence on count one. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(D)(3) provides, in pertinent part: “When the judge finds that [a defendant] has been convicted of a prior felony or felonies ․ the court shall sentence him to the punishment prescribed in this Section, and shall vacate the previous sentence if already imposed[.]” A trial court's failure to vacate the original sentence and to impose an enhanced sentence results in an illegal sentence. In such situations, this court routinely vacates the original sentence imposed to conform to the requirements of the habitual offender statute and has found it unnecessary to vacate the habitual offender sentence or remand for resentencing. Such an approach is consistent with the intent of the trial court and is in the interest of judicial economy. See State v. Jackson, 2000-0717 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/16/01), 814 So.2d 6, 9 (en banc), writ denied, 2001-0673 (La. 3/15/02), 811 So.2d 895; State v. Harris, 2014-0729 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/14), 2014 WL 5801512, *3 (unpublished). Thus, we vacate the original fifteen-year sentence imposed to conform to the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3).

On count two, the defendant was convicted of introduction or possession of contraband in a state correctional institution by an inmate and sentenced “to serve one year on the contraband charge[.]”⁴ Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:402(G)(l) requires a fine of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars and imprisonment for up to ten years with or without hard labor. If a defendant who has been convicted of an offense is sentenced to imprisonment, the court shall impose a determinate sentence. La. Code Crim. P. art. 879.

The sentence imposed on count two is indeterminate as the trial court failed to specify whether it was to be served with or without hard labor. See State v. Rochefort, 23-344 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/7/24), 383 So.3d 256, 259; State v. Matthew, 2007-1326 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 5/28/08), 983 So.2d 994, 998, writ denied, 2008-1664 (La. 4/24/09), 7 So.3d 1193. As such, we must vacate the sentence, remand the case for the imposition of a determinate sentence, and instruct the trial court to specify whether the sentence is to be served with or without hard labor. See State v. Leger, 2017-0461 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/11/20), 303 So.3d 337, 349.

Finally, the transcript reflects the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 930.8(C) directs the trial court to inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief at the time of sentencing. See State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentences and is not grounds to reverse the sentences or remand for resentencing. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1142-43.

Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions, as well as his habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentence, on count one. We vacate the defendant's original sentence on count one. We further vacate the defendant's sentence on count two and remand for resentencing.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AND ENHANCED SENTENCE ON COUNT ONE AFFIRMED; ORIGINAL SENTENCE ON COUNT ONE VACATED; AND SENTENCE ON COUNT TWO VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The defendant filed a motion for appeal following his original sentencing and a subsequent motion for appeal following his habitual offender adjudication and sentencing. Both motions were granted and are included in the record before this court.

2.   On appeal, the defendant inaccurately states he made a contemporaneous objection following the denial of each of his challenges for cause. The record, however, reflects he did not lodge an objection after the trial court's rulings on prospective jurors Stewart or Mead.

3.   The defendant mistakenly argues Mead served on his jury, though she was peremptorily struck by the State.

4.   The court minutes and the commitment order reflect the sentence was ordered to be served in the Louisiana Department of Corrections, though the sentencing transcript does not indicate the sentence was imposed at hard labor. Where there is a discrepancy between a minute entry and the transcript, the transcript prevails. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

THERIOT, J.