PASTOR WILLIE SMITH AND MRS LEDGER SMITH v. ST JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH ET AL (2025)

Appellants/plaintiffs, Pastor Willie Smith and Mrs. Ledger Smith, seek review of the trial court's June 27, 2024 judgment denying their renewed motion for preliminary injunction against defendants, Miranda Perrilloux, Lanelle Perrilloux, Jerome Perrilloux, and Cheryl Perrilloux (collectively “the Perrillouxs”), and defendant, St. John the Baptist Parish (“the Parish”). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants’ residence, 116 Smith Dr., is located adjacent to the Perrillouxs’ property in LaPlace, in St. John the Baptist Parish. For several decades, the Perrillouxs have operated Perrillouxs’ Auto Repair on their property. The condition of and storage of “junk” or abandoned vehicles on the Perrillouxs’ property is at the center of this litigation.

On August 14, 2020, appellants filed a petition for damages and injunctive relief against the Perrillouxs and the Parish. On March 18, 2022, appellants filed a motion for preliminary injunction with several attached exhibits. The motion contended that the Perrillouxs’ storage of junk vehicles on the property is in violation of state law and several parish ordinances, and in “defiance of an order issued” by the trial court in 1997. The motion asserted the Perrillouxs “failed to maintain their property in a safe and hygienic manner, and as a result, the property is overgrown with weeds; the property has fostered an abundance of rodents and pests; and the property has been an ugly, malodorous nuisance for many years.” Appellants averred that the Perrillouxs’ actions and inactions caused appellants’ property to be devalued and caused them mental anguish and other harm. The motion contended that despite knowledge of the Perrillouxs’ “illegal conduct” and appellants’ resulting harm, the Parish has failed to enforce the applicable laws, ordinances, and the trial court's order, and therefore, failed to protect appellants’ property rights. The motion asserted that appellants have suffered irreparable injury due to the “unlawful and negligent conduct” of the Perrillouxs and the Parish. Appellants requested that the trial court grant the motion for preliminary injunction, order the Perrillouxs to remove the junk vehicles from their property within three business days of judgment, and require the Parish to enforce state laws, parish ordinances, the trial court's prior order, and to protect appellants’ property rights.

An evidentiary hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction was held on April 22, 2022, and the trial court heard testimony and exhibits were admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. On June 6, 2022, the trial court denied appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction against the Perrillouxs and the Parish. In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court found that the appellants did not make a showing of irreparable harm.

On December 6, 2022, appellants filed a renewed motion for preliminary injunction against the Perrillouxs and the Parish, contending that they now had the evidence the trial court previously found was lacking to prove irreparable injury. Considering the “proffered evidence of property devaluation and irreparable injury,” appellants requested the trial court grant their renewed motion for preliminary injunction, order “the Perrillouxs to remove the junk vehicles from their property within three business days of judgment,” and require “the Parish to meaningfully enforce state laws, this Court's orders, and parish ordinances, and to adequately protect [their] property rights.” Appellants attached several exhibits to the renewed motion for preliminary injunction, including exhibits attached to the original motion for preliminary injunction, two appraisal reports, and photographs.

On May 18, 2023, the parties appeared for an evidentiary hearing on appellants’ renewed motion for preliminary injunction. The trial court heard testimony from two witnesses: Debra Hebert and Reynauldo Smith. Debra Hebert, an expert in the field of residential real estate, testified regarding the valuation of appellants’ property, as stated in two appraisal reports she authored and issued on October 30, 2020. Ms. Hebert testified that one appraisal was an “as is” value of appellants’ property, which included an “adverse view” of the junk or abandoned vehicles, and the second appraisal was the value of appellants’ property without an “adverse view.” She testified appellants’ property would be worth more money “with a typical view without abandoned vehicles.” She testified the difference between the values listed on the two appraisals was about $38,000.00. On cross-examination, Ms. Hebert was questioned regarding her use of the term “illegally” parked vehicles in her reports. Ms. Hebert stated that appellants initially informed her the vehicles were illegally parked. She also researched and saw that it was zoned residential, stating that “it didn't seem like the zoning for that area would be appropriate to have all of those abandoned vehicles.” Ms. Hebert conceded she did not review any parish ordinances to determine whether the vehicles were legally or illegally parked. When asked if she would have stated that the vehicles were illegally parked if it was shown that the Perrillouxs were grandfathered in under “the ordinance,” Ms. Hebert replied “[p]ossibly not if I would have had that evidence.” Ms. Hebert also stated she had to go to another parish to find what she considered a comparable house that had previously sold, i.e., one that had sold with a view that was adverse. She testified that the appellants have not asked her to do an update to her appraisal. Ms. Hebert agreed that if she was asked to do an appraisal of the property now and the vehicles were not there, it is likely that appellants’ property would appraise for more.

Mr. Smith testified that the appellants are his parents and he visited the property the day before the hearing. He stated there were several vehicles on the west side of the Perrillouxs’ property with “broken windshields, busted tail lights, one wrecked vehicle, vehicles missing wheels,” and they have been there “probably at least a year and a half.” Mr. Smith stated junk vehicles, such as the ones he described, have been on the Perrillouxs’ property since “the mid to late ‘90s” and there has been a “constant recycling of different wrecked junk vehicles.” Mr. Smith confirmed the vehicles are periodically removed from the Perrillouxs’ property. He was shown photographs and identified two photographs he took “probably earlier this year” of vehicles he described as junk vehicles on the lot west 1 of the Perrillouxs’ auto mechanic shop. 2 He stated the vehicles were still there on the day of the hearing. When questioned whether he could see those vehicles from appellants’ house, Mr. Smith responded, “[t]hese particular ones, I wouldn't say I would see them from my parents’ home.” Mr. Smith was asked if he was aware that appellants’ only complaint concerned the “east” side of the Perrillouxs’ property as shown by appellants’ pleadings and his father's prior testimony, to which Mr. Smith replied that he did “not realize that.” He stated that the east side is not the only side where junk cars were stored. Mr. Smith conceded that as of the day of the hearing, there were no junk or abandoned vehicles on the east side of the Perrillouxs’ property, which was the side of the property closest to his parents’ house. On redirect, Mr. Smith testified that as of the day of the hearing, there were junk vehicles on the Perrillouxs’ property. In contravention to his earlier testimony on cross-examination, Mr. Smith stated on redirect that he could see junk vehicles from his parents’ property and those vehicles were still present.

After this testimony, the parties made arguments in support of and in opposition to the renewed motion for preliminary injunction. The only exhibits that were admitted into evidence during the hearing were the two appraisal reports authored and issued by Ms. Hebert, and the photographs identified by Mr. Smith (Exhibits C, D, and E). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On June 27, 2023, the trial court denied appellants’ renewed motion for preliminary injunction and issued written reasons the same day.

This appeal followed.

APPLICABLE LAW

A preliminary injunction is an interlocutory procedural device designed to preserve the status quo between the parties pending a trial on the merits. Wechem, Inc. v. Evans, 18-743 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/30/19), 274 So.3d 877, 884, writ denied, 19-01176 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So.3d 600. The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent the occurrence of future acts that may result in irreparable injury, loss, or damage to the applicant. Id. In general, a party seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction must show that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue. USI Ins. Servs., LLC v. Tappel, 09-149 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/10/09), 28 So.3d 419, 424, writ denied, 09-2697 (La. 02/26/10), 28 So.3d 271. Irreparable injury means the petitioner cannot adequately be compensated in money damages or suffers injuries which cannot be measured by pecuniary standards. Bernhard MCC, LLC v. Zeringue, 19-529 (La. App. 5 Cir. 09/09/20), 303 So.3d 372, 377, writ denied, 20-01172 (La. 12/08/20), 306 So.3d 434.

A preliminary injunction merely requires a prima facie showing of a good chance to prevail on the merits. McCord v. West, 07-958 (La. App. 5 Cir. 03/25/08), 983 So.2d 133, 140, citing Bank One, Nat. Ass'n v. Velten, 04-2001 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/17/05), 917 So.2d 454. In making a prima facie showing, the plaintiff is required to offer less proof than is necessary in an ordinary proceeding for a permanent injunction. Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 05-2499 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/20/06), 951 So.2d 247, 255, n.8, citing State through Louisiana State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists of the Dep't of Health and Human Services v. Atterberry, 95-0391 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/09/95), 664 So.2d 1216, 1220.

Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that there is a distinction between a prohibitory injunction (i.e., an injunction to preserve the status quo) and a mandatory injunction sought to order specific action(s) (i.e., “the doing of something”, as a matter of procedure and evidence). Saer v. New Orleans Regional Physician Hosp. Organization, 14-856 (La. App. 5 Cir. 03/25/15), 169 So.3d 617, 620-21 (Internal citation omitted). A mandatory injunction essentially has the same effect as a permanent injunction; and thus, a party seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the preliminary injunction. Id.

A plaintiff is entitled to circumvent the irreparable harm requirement when the injunction sought is prohibitory, not mandatory, and when the prohibited conduct is unlawful or unconstitutional. See, e.g., Yokum v. Pat O'Brien’s Bar, Inc., 12-217 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/15/12), 99 So.3d 74, 81 (finding that a prohibitory injunction preventing defendant from playing excessively loud music did not require a showing of irreparable harm); Delesdernier v. Floyd, 15-331 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), 182 So.3d 1159, 1163 (“Once a petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the conduct to be enjoined is reprobated by law, the petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief without the necessity of showing that no other adequate remedy exists.”).

Although an owner of immovable property generally has the right to use his property as he pleases, the owner's right may be limited if his use causes damage to neighbors. Perniciaro v. Hamed, 20-62 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/20), 309 So.3d 813, 828. The rights and obligations of neighbors are governed by La. C.C. arts. 667-669. These articles provide:

La. C.C. art. 667:

Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him. However, if the work he makes on his estate deprives his neighbor of enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his works would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case. Nonetheless, the proprietor is answerable for damages without regard to his knowledge or his exercise of reasonable care, if the damage is caused by an ultrahazardous activity. An ultrahazardous activity as used in this Article is strictly limited to pile driving or blasting with explosives.

La. C.C. art. 668:

Although one be not at liberty to make any work by which his neighbor's buildings may be damaged, yet every one has the liberty of doing on his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor.

Thus he who is not subject to any servitude originating from a particular agreement in that respect, may raise his house as high as he pleases, although by such elevation he should darken the lights of his neighbors's [neighbor's] house, because this act occasions only an inconvenience, but not a real damage.

La. C.C. art. 669:

If the works or materials for any manufactory or other operation, cause an inconvenience to those in the same or in the neighboring houses, by diffusing smoke or nauseous smell, and there be no servitude established by which they are regulated, their sufferance must be determined by the rules of the police, or the customs of the place.

Whether an activity is classified as prohibited under La. C.C. art. 667 or as a mere inconvenience under La. C.C. art. 668 depends on the reasonableness of the conduct. Perniciaro, 309 So.3d at 828. Reasonableness of the conduct is reviewed considering the circumstances and upon “consideration of factors such as the character of the neighborhood, the degree of the intrusion and the effect of the activity on the health and safety of the neighbors.” Id., citing Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So.2d 1071, 1077 (La. 1985).

To obtain injunctive relief under La. C.C. arts. 667 through 669 (i.e., the nuisance articles), a party must prove irreparable injury under La. C.C.P. art. 3601 and must show real damage. Parish of East Feliciana ex rel. East Feliciana Parish Police Jury v. Guidry, 04-1197 (La. App. 1 Cir. 08/10/05), 923 So.2d 45, 53, writ denied, 05-2288 (La. 03/10/06), 925 So.2d 515.

Although the judgment on a preliminary injunction is interlocutory, a party aggrieved by a judgment either granting or denying a preliminary injunction is entitled to an appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 3612. Appellate review of a trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction is limited. Appellate courts review the denial of a preliminary injunction under the manifest error standard. Mary Moe, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 03-2220 (La. 04/14/04), 875 So.2d 22, 29. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial court's judgment shall not be disturbed. Saer, 169 So.3d at 620; Bernhard MCC, LLC, 303 So.3d at 378; Neill Corp. v. Shutt, 20-0269 (La. App. 1 Cir. 01/25/21), 319 So.3d 872, 878, citing Hill v. Jindal, 14-1757 (La. App. 1 Cir. 06/17/15), 175 So.3d 988, 1002, writ denied, 15-1394 (La. 10/23/15), 179 So.3d 600.

TRIAL EVIDENCE and DISCUSSION

On appeal, appellants assert the following assignments of error: 1) the trial court erred in finding the Perrillouxs’ storage of junk vehicles on the lot adjacent to the Smiths’ property did not violate the law (i.e., La. C.C. arts. 667 through 669); and 2) the trial court erred in finding that the appellants have not suffered an irreparable injury caused by the Perrillouxs’ storage of junk vehicles on the lot adjacent to the appellants’ property, and by the Parish's refusal to protect the appellants’ property rights. The appellants argue the Perrillouxs’ storage of junk vehicles on the lot adjacent to their property amounts to maintenance of an illegal junkyard. Appellants allege the junkyard substantially interferes with the enjoyment of their property, violating La. C.C. arts. 667 through 669. Further, appellants aver that such junkyards are specifically designated as nuisances and prohibited by the St. John the Baptist Parish Code of Ordinances. Appellants contend they have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable harm, and they provided the trial court with evidence of irreparable injury, which the trial court previously indicated was lacking in their first request for a preliminary injunction.

Initially, we find the record shows that in rendering its decision, the trial court improperly considered testimony and exhibits not properly admitted into evidence at the May 18, 2023 hearing on appellants’ renewed motion for preliminary injunction. Although consideration of testimony and exhibits not admitted into evidence was not assigned as an error in this case, the Supreme Court and this court have routinely held that appellate courts may not consider exhibits not properly admitted into evidence. Quinn v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 12-152 (La. 11/02/12), 118 So.3d 1011; Freeman v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation, 20-283 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/10/20), 307 So.3d 335, 338; Wood Materials, LLC v. City of Harahan, 17-142 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/02/17), 228 So.3d 293, 295. Exhibits not properly and officially offered and admitted into evidence cannot be considered, even if they are physically filed into the trial court record. Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Services, Inc., 07-2143 (La. 05/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88; Scheuermann v. Cadillac of Metairie, Inc., 11-1149 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/31/12), 97 So.3d 423, 426. Except as otherwise provided by law, documents attached to memoranda do not constitute evidence and cannot be considered as such on appeal. Denoux, 983 So.2d at 88. Appellate courts are courts of record and may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record, or receive new evidence. Id.; La. C.C.P. art. 2164.

During the hearing and in closing argument to the trial court on the renewed motion for preliminary injunction, counsel for both parties referred to (1) testimony and exhibits admitted into evidence at the prior motion for preliminary injunction hearing held on April 28, 2022; (2) the April 28, 2022 hearing transcript; and (3) exhibits attached to appellant's original motion for preliminary injunction and the renewed motion for preliminary injunction. However, upon review of the record, we find the only exhibits admitted into evidence at the May 18, 2023 hearing on the renewed motion for preliminary injunction were Ms. Hebert's two appraisal reports (Exhibits C and D) and photographs (Exhibit E). Additionally, only two individuals testified at the renewed motion for preliminary injunction: Ms. Hebert and Mr. Smith. The trial court's written reasons indicate that the court did improperly consider testimony and exhibits not admitted into evidence during the May 18, 2023 hearing. Therefore, to the extent the trial court considered testimony and exhibits not properly admitted into evidence at May 18, 2023 hearing in rendering its decision to deny the renewed motion for preliminary injunction, we find the trial court erred. Nevertheless, for the following reasons, we find the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that appellants failed to satisfy the requirements for a preliminary injunction and in denying appellants’ renewed motion for preliminary injunction.

A review of appellants’ renewed motion for preliminary injunction shows that the appellants are seeking an order (1) requiring the Perrillouxs to remove the junk or abandoned vehicles from the property within three business days of a judgment in their favor; and (2) requiring the Parish to “meaningfully enforce state laws, [the trial court's prior] orders, and parish ordinances, and to adequately protect the [appellants’] property rights.” Because the request seeks to order the Perrillouxs to take a specific action, this constitutes a request for a mandatory injunction, which requires appellants to prove irreparable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, to obtain injunctive relief under the nuisance articles, appellants must prove irreparable injury under La. C.C.P. art. 3601 and must show real damage. Parish of East Feliciana ex rel. East Feliciana Parish Police Jury, 923 So.2d at 53.

At the renewed motion for preliminary injunction hearing, to show irreparable injury, appellants presented the testimony of Ms. Hebert and the two appraisal reports she issued in 2020 to show the difference in the value of their property with and without an adverse view. Specifically, Ms. Hebert testified that the value of appellants’ property was affected by the adverse view of the junk vehicles as could be seen by the $38,000 difference in the appraisals of appellants’ property. As previously stated, irreparable injury means that the petitioner cannot adequately be compensated in money damages or suffers injuries which cannot be measured by pecuniary standards. Bernhard MCC, LLC, 303 So.3d at 377. The trial court found that appellants’ evidence showed that they could be compensated with monetary damages for any sustained injuries. We agree, and find appellants failed to sustain their burden of establishing irreparable injury because they can be compensated with monetary damages for any allegedly sustained injuries.

Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in declining to reach the issue of whether the Perrillouxs’ use of their property constitutes a nuisance. Appellants assert that the record demonstrated that the Perrillouxs’ storage of junk vehicles (i.e., maintenance of a junkyard) constitutes a nuisance in violation of La. C.C. arts. 667 through 669. Appellants argue that the Perrillouxs’ conduct “unquestionably interfered” with appellants’ use of their property. In support of this contention, appellants refer to Pastor Smith's testimony, regarding the alleged condition of the Perrillouxs’ property and its affect and interference with their enjoyment of their property. Appellants further contend the Perrillouxs’ use of their property is designated as a nuisance per se by the Parish's Code of Ordinances, sections 26-50, 113-180 and 113-182. Appellants argue that the Perrillouxs’ storage of junk vehicles is therefore expressly prohibited by the Code of Ordinances.

Appellants argue that the Perrillouxs’ maintenance of a junkyard, which constitutes a nuisance, caused appellants’ serious discomfort and substantially interfered with their use and enjoyment of the property, such that they have suffered irreparable injury. Appellants allege that the Perrillouxs’ junkyard, while ostensibly tied to a lawful repair business, constitutes an unlawful nuisance because it: (1) devalues appellants’ property; (2) is an “eyesore,” (3) “attracts snakes and rodents;” and (4) “omits odors.” As such, appellants contend the junkyard seriously disrupts appellants’ use and enjoyment of their own property, causes them substantial discomfort, and materially intrudes with the character of their residential neighborhood. Appellants claim that the Perrillouxs’ use of the junkyard and the Parish's failure to bring the Perrillouxs into compliance with the law has caused appellants real damage, not a mere inconvenience.

Despite appellants’ arguments to the contrary, the record does not contain any evidence to support their contention that the Perrillouxs’ use of their property is in violation of any law or ordinance or that they have suffered irreparable injury. Unfortunately, appellants rely on exhibits and testimony from the original motion for preliminary injunction hearing that were not admitted into evidence during the renewed motion for preliminary injunction hearing. The only individuals who testified at the May 18, 2023 hearing on the renewed motion for preliminary injunction were Ms. Hebert and appellants’ son, Mr. Smith.

Ms. Hebert testified about the value of the property in 2020, and she was not asked to update her valuation of the property as of the date of the hearing. Ms. Hebert was unable to testify as to the condition and value of the property as of the date of the hearing. Mr. Smith, through his testimony, attempted to show that there were junk vehicles on the Perrillouxs’ property. However, his testimony established that the Perrillouxs have an auto repair shop, they are constantly recycling wrecked junk vehicles on the property, and the vehicles are periodically removed from the property. The few photographs Mr. Smith identified with junk or abandoned vehicles were on the lot on the west side of the Perrillouxs’ property, which is not the lot closest to appellants’ property. On cross-examination, Mr. Smith stated he could not see “these particular vehicles” from his parents’ house, but on redirect he stated he could see junk vehicles from his parents’ house. Mr. Smith also conceded that as of the day of the hearing, there were no junk or abandoned vehicles on the east side of the Perrillouxs’ property, which was the side of the property closest to his parents’ house and the subject of the allegations.

Additionally, despite appellants argument in brief that the Perrillouxs violated specific state laws and parish ordinances, appellants did not present any evidence at the renewed motion for preliminary injunction hearing that (1) the Perrillouxs violated any law or ordinance; (2) which law or ordinance the Perrillouxs allegedly violated; or (3) that the Parish allegedly failed to enforce said law or ordinance. Therefore, we find the testimony and exhibits admitted at the renewed motion for preliminary injunction were insufficient to show that the Perrillouxs violated an ordinance or law or that the Parish failed to enforce said ordinance or law.

Consequently, based on the evidence, we find the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that appellants did not show irreparable injury and therefore did not meet their burden for a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ renewed motion for preliminary injunction.

DECREE

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of appellants’ renewed motion for preliminary injunction.

AFFIRMED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. WISEMAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

(504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY APRIL 30, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

24-CA-491

E-NOTIFIED

40TH DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

HONORABLE J. STERLING SNOWDY (DISTRICT JUDGE)

ALEXANDRA L. GJERTSON (APPELLANT)

JOHN W. JOYCE (APPELLANT)

SAMUEL J. ACCARDO, JR. (APPELLEE)

MICHAEL A. BALASCIO (APPELLANT)

MAILED

LANCE W. WATERS (APPELLANT)

ATTORNEY AT LAW

909 POYDRAS STREET

SUITE 2350

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70112

DEBORAH E. DUGAS (APPELLEE)

ATTORNEY AT LAW

POST OFFICE BOX 554

RESERVE, LA 70084

JEROME PERRILLOUX AND LANELLE

PERRILLOUX (APPELLEE)

POST OFFICE BOX 724

GARYVILLE, LA 70051

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Smith testified that the photographs are of junk vehicles on the “west side closer to the River Road. Right adjacent to the mechanic shop.” [sic]

2.   The photographs were admitted into evidence as Exhibit E. Identifying the photographs, Mr. Smith stated, “one of the vehicles in [sic] wrecked, another vehicle is missing the front grill, another vehicle is missing a tire, the rusted hubcap is exposed. That's basically what I see on these two pictures and potentially one vehicle seems to be maybe missing a window.” [Emphasis added.] Exhibit E, however, contains six photographs. The minute entry states only that photos were admitted as Exhibit E. Although unclear, we assume from the record that all six photographs were admitted.

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST JUDGE