STATE v. SHEPPARD (2025)

Defendant, Dennis Sheppard, appeals his conviction for the second degree murder of Jyra Holmes. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's conviction, amend defendant's sentence and affirm as amended, and remand with instructions.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 4, 2021, a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant, Dennis Sheppard, with the second degree murder of Jyra Holmes (hereinafter “the victim” or “Jyra”) in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant was arraigned and pled not guilty.

On September 28, 2023, a unanimous twelve-person jury found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant filed motions for new trial and post verdict judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. On October 30, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. 1 This appeal followed.

EVIDENCE AT TRIAL  2

On November 2, 2020, Deputies Chad Dear and Ted Chaisson of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (JPSO) responded to a “disturbance” at 1544 West Chelsea Road, which was subsequently classified as a homicide. Deputy Dear testified that when he arrived at the scene, he attempted to render aid to a female victim who was lying in the parking area, but she appeared to be lifeless. He stated the female had a large zip tie around her neck. At that time, EMS was notified through the dispatch system that the scene was safe, and was on the way. Deputy Dear assisted in securing the scene, locating and securing witnesses. 3 He did not see defendant at the scene.

Detective Scott Bradley, with the homicide section of JPSO and lead detective, also responded to the scene. When he arrived, he observed a female lying on the driveway with a zip tie fastened around her neck. Detective Bradley testified the female had been pronounced deceased at the scene and evidence was collected at his direction. 4 He spoke with two eyewitnesses, Patti Joseph and Deborah Coston, while other officers spoke to Jada and James McNair. After reviewing the witnesses’ statements and photographs of the crime scene, he developed defendant as a suspect and authored a warrant for his arrest.

Detective Bradley stated one of the items recovered from the scene was a cell phone case, but the cell phone itself, which belonged to the victim, was missing. Officers learned of the victim's phone and obtained a search warrant to “ping the phone.” Another search warrant was obtained “to ping” defendant's cell phone and to locate defendant. Three days after the homicide, the return on the search warrant for defendant's cell phone indicated it was in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. Detective Bradley contacted members of the U.S. Marshall Service, who coordinated with the Bay St. Louis Police Department, and defendant was located and arrested.

After defendant's arrest, Detective Bradley drove to Mississippi, spoke to the manager of the motel where defendant was arrested, and confirmed defendant checked in on November 3, 2020. 5 Detective Bradley testified he and his partner met with defendant at the police station in Hancock County, Mississippi, where defendant waived his Miranda 6 rights, and gave a recorded statement.

In the recorded statement, which was admitted into evidence and played for the jury, defendant stated he had been with Jyra since 2013, they lived together, and were together until recently. He said he paid rent for Jyra and himself and Jada, Jyra's twin sister, paid her own portion. When questioned as to what happened the day Jyra was killed, defendant said he could not really remember what happened that day. He said the day started out normal, even though the power was still out from the hurricane. Entering their house, defendant said you could see his tool bag and a suitcase on the floor because he was packing to go to a job in North Carolina. He had his backpack on because he was leaving and was going to come back in the morning for his tools. He remembered walking inside and out of the apartment several times that day and Jyra kept trying to stop him. Defendant said one time when he walked inside, Jyra was on the phone, but he did not know who she was talking to and he did not want to know. He walked out of the house again, stating all he wanted to do was leave and go to work, and Jyra started screaming and yelling at him. He explained he has a tendency to walk away if he hears something he does not want to hear and she would not let him walk away this time, she wanted him to listen. He said he was afraid because she was his support system, emergency contact, and he did not have anyone else in Louisiana. Defendant said that without her, his life was “screwed.” Defendant stated the only thing Jyra could do to hurt him would be if she was with someone else. When “things happened,” defendant repeatedly stated he could not recall what he said or his “moves.”

Defendant continually stated in the interview that he did not know what happened to Jyra and he could not “see” what happened to her; all he could see was “anger.” He denied drinking or doing drugs that night, stating he could not fathom hurting someone he loved. Defendant claimed no matter how mad he and Jyra might get with each other, it did not last long. When pressed by the detectives as to what Jyra said to him, defendant claimed Jyra said he wanted to do what he wanted to do, like leaving, instead of staying and talking to her. Defendant stated that if he stayed, it would only make things worse. He repeated again that he did not know what he did to Jyra and he was told that he killed her. Defendant claimed Jyra was aggressive and he wanted to leave and cool off. One of the times he walked outside, Jyra followed him. Afterwards, he went back into the house once more.

Defendant continued to state throughout the interview that he did not know what happened, what he did, or what she said. Defendant claimed it was physical the entire time, but then stated Jyra did not grab him. He did not remember getting a zip tie, putting his hands or a zip tie around Jyra's neck, pushing her down, or talking to the ladies that were there. He said he did not remember saying “f**k her, let her die.” However, he later stated he remembered talking to “Ms. Pat” and could “hear” her asking him what he was doing, but that at the same time, he was thinking “what the f**k is going on.” He described the evening as a blur and did not recall leaving the house. He said he did not recall where the taxi picked him up or how he got there. Defendant stated he learned from the news that he killed Jyra and that she was strangled.

Defendant acknowledged that he uses zip ties for work and that no one else had access to them. He told the detectives he made a mistake, his anger went too far, he was remorseful, and he was not “playing crazy.” He said he killed her. Defendant said he tried to walk away, he “f**ked up,” his “life is gone,” and so was Jyra's. Defendant said he lost his cool “like never before” and it ended with Jyra being gone. He repeatedly claimed he could not see the “zip tie part” of the altercation. He could not recall getting the zip tie or putting it around her neck.

After defendant gave his statement, he was transported to Jefferson Parish. Search warrants for his phone and to collect a DNA buccal swab of defendant were obtained. Detective Bradley acknowledged that the police were never called to defendant and Jyra's apartment for a domestic violence complaint and neither were arrested for domestic violence against the other. Nevertheless, Detective Bradley testified that he did not uncover any evidence throughout his investigation showing that defendant was provoked and that this was a heat of blood killing.

Sergeant Kurt Ziegler with JPSO was involved in investigating the homicide at 1544 West Chelsea Road. He stated he executed a search warrant for the victim and defendant's apartment. Sergeant Ziegler identified photographs of the residence, including boxes, a black bin, an ice chest, and suitcases, clothing, tools, other work gear, and mail, all belonging to defendant. He stated that the black bin with the yellow bi-fold lid was open before they began searching, and inside they found a couple of large white plastic zip ties, consistent with those used to murder the victim. Sergeant Ziegler explained that this open box indicated to him that the zip tie used to murder the victim had been recently retrieved from that box prior to the killing. A prescription bottle belonging to defendant was on a nightstand in the master bedroom. The photographs of defendant's personal belongings were to establish defendant's residence in the apartment, and more importantly, his ownership of the black box that contained the zip ties. He testified that nothing inside the apartment was indicative of a struggle.

Jada Holmes, Jyra's twin sister, testified that in November 2020, she and Jyra lived at 1544 West Chelsea Boulevard, Apartment C, in Harvey, where they had lived for seven years. She was dating James McNair and Jyra was dating defendant, Dennis Sheppard. Jyra had been dating defendant since approximately 2013. Jada testified that Jyra and defendant's relationship “started out fine, but [Jyra] just had an issue with him drinking and his general attitude,” and they argued. When questioned as to whether the arguments were “typical boyfriend, girlfriend disagreements” or if they were “violent encounters,” Jada responded, “more like jerk and rages.” Jada acknowledged that neither she nor Jyra reported any domestic violence incidents to the police and she could not recall any incidents of physical violence. However, she did see defendant act in a jealous manner towards Jyra by telling her she should not talk to certain people or by saying things like “you're my woman.” Jada testified that initially, only she and Jada lived in the apartment, but later defendant moved in with them. 7 After defendant moved in, she was not as comfortable with the living situation and she felt like a visitor.

Jada testified that in early 2020, Jyra and defendant separated. Jyra told defendant to find somewhere else to live, but because Jyra did not give him a specific time to leave, he continued to reside there. Jada stated defendant “never left,” and would only leave to “work a job for about a week or so” and then return. After the breakup, Jyra started seeing Frederick William Tee, who lived in Miami, Florida. Jada testified that between July and November of 2020, Jyra only saw Mr. Tee “about twice.” Jada testified that Mr. Tee did not visit Jyra in Jefferson Parish, and Jyra never had any other men at the apartment other than defendant.

Jada testified that on November 2, 2020, she left for work early in the morning and Jyra was awake. The power at their house was still out from Hurricane Zeda, but it was on at the hotel where she worked and at the snowball stand they owned. She talked to Jyra throughout the day and planned to pick her up after work so they could work on cleaning up the snowball stand. Jada testified she left work between 5:15 and 5:30 P.M. and texted Jyra. When she arrived at her apartment, she saw police everywhere but did not see defendant. Jada said that when she got home, she saw her sister's body on the ground. She spoke to the police and learned that her sister was dead. At that time, she called her boyfriend, James McNair, and told him that defendant killed Jyra. Jada testified that Mr. McNair came over and she also notified other family members.

Patti Joseph testified that in 2020, she lived next door to Jada, Jyra, and defendant on West Chelsea Road and they were “neighborly.” On November 2, 2020, her friend Deborah Coston picked her up early in the day. Upon returning that night, she stated that the electricity was still out due to the hurricane, and the only lights on in the area were from Ms. Coston's truck's headlights. In the headlights, she saw two people “scuffling,” coming out of the apartment complex door, who she identified as defendant and Jyra. Ms. Joseph testified defendant was pulling Jyra by her neck with a “belt buckle, like a leash,” or “something like a choker,” and they were in the driveway coming towards the street. She did not see defendant put anything around Jyra's neck. At one point, defendant pushed Jyra down on the ground. When she exited the truck, Ms. Joseph stated defendant made a “nasty remark” to her and she remembered hearing Jyra plead for defendant to stop. Ms. Joseph said Ms. Coston tried to get the zip tie off Jyra's neck but was unable to remove it. She tried to get defendant to stop and called out for neighbors to help, but the neighbors were too scared, so they called 911. Ms. Joseph did not know where defendant went afterwards. On the day of the trial, she could not remember what, if anything, defendant said that night. Nevertheless, Ms. Joseph confirmed that after the police arrived that night, she told them everything she saw and heard. Ms. Joseph later identified defendant in a lineup as the perpetrator.

Deborah Coston similarly testified that upon returning to Ms. Joseph's apartment building, a man and a woman she did not know were fighting. The man was trying to choke and beat the woman, and he was dragging and pulling her. She stated the man did not want to stop. Ms. Coston stated the woman was trying to get him to stop but he just kept attacking her. Ms. Coston testified she tried to get some neighbors across the street to help, but they did not want to get involved. When she crossed back over the street, she saw the woman on the ground with a “tie” around her neck. Ms. Coston testified it was a “tie like you would tie around a bag.” She heard defendant tell the woman that he was going to kill her. She did not see defendant put the “tie” around Jyra's neck. 8 Ms. Coston testified that the man “took off.” Ms. Coston testified that she did not try to take the tie off of Jyra's neck because she did not have her cutters in her truck. Regardless, she stated the tie was tight around the woman's neck, and she could not put anything under it. They were scared because the woman was not moving or breathing. She stated that they called the police. 9 After the police arrived, she informed the police what she saw and heard.

James McNair testified he dated Jada for several years, during the same time defendant dated Jyra. When defendant and Jyra ended their relationship, Mr. McNair stated he was “on and off” with Jada and could not give a lot of details concerning the breakup. He was aware that they both started seeing other people. As for defendant, Mr. McNair testified that although defendant had started to see others, he seemed to still be struggling with the breakup. He confirmed that at the time of the murder, defendant was still living with Jada and Jyra. 10

Mr. McNair stated he was not dating Jada at the time of Jyra's murder, but after Jada called, he headed to scene. While he was driving to the apartment, Mr. McNair testified that he called defendant. He stated defendant was distraught, and when he asked what happened, defendant replied he did not know, claiming he “blacked out.” Mr. McNair testified he told defendant that Jyra was deceased, and defendant started crying. Defendant stated repeatedly that he had thrown his life away, and then defendant ended the phone conversation. Mr. McNair stated that after arriving on the scene, defendant called him back; however, defendant did not say much when he realized Jada was near. Mr. McNair testified Jada took his phone to talk to defendant and at that point, defendant hung up. Defendant called back about fifteen minutes later, but he hung up again when he realized Jada was still near. Mr. McNair testified he informed the police about his phone conversations with defendant.

Defendant testified at trial that he and Jyra were together for roughly seven years and there were no instances of domestic abuse. He stated they were in the process of breaking up because they were having problems “off and on.” Defendant indicated they agreed to separate and at the time of the incident, he was days away from leaving and not returning. He contends he was waiting to go “not to North Carolina, but to Tennessee, to Nashville for 3 1/212 to six years.”

He stated he never hit or bruised Jyra and that he loved her. Defendant stated he felt it was his job to protect and help Jyra. He stated he never planned to kill or hurt her. Defendant testified that something bad set him off that day, that he lost control, and that it ended in Jyra's death. He was packing to leave and then was planning on coming back the next morning for the rest of his tools. He attempted to leave when Jyra went to where she kept her suitcase and returned with “Frederic's T-shirt on with Prada on and she was smelling like Prada cologne.” It was a white, long T-shirt with “the cologne all on it.” He explained that Frederic was the man Jyra was seeing in Miami. He knew for years that Jyra was seeing somebody else, specifically Frederic, “off and on” for years, and he has known about Frederic since 2014. Defendant stated that he and Jyra had their “ups and downs,” and there were times she would go out of town. Defendant denied being jealous of Frederic. He stated that day was the first time he smelled the cologne of another man in their house.

Defendant said Jyra grabbed him by the shoulder and he told her to let go. Defendant recalled Jyra saying no, he was not going anywhere, and that he was going to stay and fight her. He told Jyra he could not fight with her. Jyra grabbed him again and said she wanted to “work it out” and she was “insistent on [defendant] staying.” Defendant testified he told Jyra that she had lost her mind, and she then changed clothes, putting on a gray T-shirt and jeans. She told him that no matter what, he was not going anywhere. Defendant testified that she touched him and tried to kiss him “after being gone with a man.” He stated the smell was still on her skin after she changed clothes, and when he smelled the cologne, it was “like a hole” in him.

Defendant testified that he put his shoes on downstairs and returned upstairs. When he came downstairs, he could see Jyra was on the phone with Frederic telling him that she had never seen defendant like this, that he was going to “f**k over” her and Frederic and her and her sister, and to call his neighbor. At that point, he walked out and was trying to leave the house and Jyra grabbed him again, tried to hold him, when all he wanted to do was leave. He could not say what happened afterwards. He recalled being angry and stated it was “like a gray area.”

The next thing defendant remembered was Ms. Joseph's voice asking “what are you doing? You know better than that. What are you doing? That ain't [sic] what you supposed to do.” Then Ms. Joseph slapped him and said “what's wrong with you?” At that point, he could not see anything happening and he could only hear Ms. Joseph's voice. When defense counsel asked what was wrong with him, defendant replied “trauma,” and stated he was “heartbroken.” Defendant testified he had never felt that much anger or pain and that Jyra hurt him. He said it was the worst thing in his life. However, when asked about whether he was jealous of another man, defendant said he was not jealous of Frederic because he knew about him. Defendant admitted he was offended by Jyra's actions of putting on another man's clothes and smelling like the other man. He could not state how he came into possession of the zip tie used to kill Jyra, but believed he must have had it in his pocket because “[t]hey came out of his pocket.” He said he could not remember when the zip tie came into play. When asked how Jyra's braid was pulled from her head, defendant stated he did not believe he had a fist fight with Jyra on that day. Nevertheless, defendant later admitted that Ms. Joseph intervened because he and Jyra were involved in a physical altercation. He admitted that something set him off that day and he lost control and it ended in the death of Jyra.

Defendant recalled speaking to Detective Bradley and acknowledged that he saw the video but claimed that he could not remember anything he said because he was “shocked.” He testified that he never told the detective that he did it. Defendant stated he would never hurt Jyra like that and he was very remorseful. Defendant agreed that it takes a conscientious act to take a zip tie and put it around a person's neck. He acknowledged that it takes two hands to use the zip tie. He agreed that he knew that when a zip tie is tight, it cannot be removed. He stated he did not remember getting the zip tie and putting it in his pocket but stated his stuff was open as he packed. He viewed zip ties that were admitted into evidence, acknowledging that they came from his pocket, they were his, and the zip ties were in his house.

During his testimony, defendant admitted he had a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Although he initially denied further convictions, he ultimately admitted to convictions in Georgia for shoplifting, second degree criminal damage to property, aggravated assault, abandonment of child/nonsupport, driving with a suspended license, and possession of cocaine.

Dr. Ellen Connor, an expert in forensic pathology, conducted an autopsy on Jyra and authored a report. Dr. Connor testified that she removed the zip tie from Jyra's neck and diagnosed asphyxia due to ligature strangulation as the cause of death, finding the manner of death to be a homicide. Dr. Connor identified the injuries to Jyra, which included (1) a few abrasions and contusions around the ligature on her neck, as well as on her face; (2) Jyra's scalp had a purple contusion, a superficial laceration, an abrasion, and part of her hair was missing on the top left part of her head; (3) the nails on her left hand were torn and there was an abrasion on her knuckle; and (4) other blunt force injuries. Dr. Connor identified photographs taken during the autopsy, which were admitted into evidence and published to the jury. She agreed that one particular photograph showed the outline of the “little square” part of the zip tie, that was positioned to the right front of Jyra's neck.

Kara Kovach, an expert in forensic biology and DNA analysis, performed DNA testing related to this case and authored a report. Ms. Kovach testified that a zip tie was submitted for testing and that she performed Y chromosome DNA testing on the “cable tie” because there was an overwhelming amount of female DNA in the sample. From a swab of the front of the neck, Ms. Kovach stated she found two male DNA contributors (one major male contributor and at least one minor male contributor). She testified that defendant and all male individuals in his paternal lineage could not be excluded as major male contributors to that DNA. She did not obtain any useable results from her testing of a swab from the zip tie.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT of ERROR

In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree murder. Defendant acknowledges that he had a physical altercation with Jyra, but the evidence presented at trial failed to establish that defendant had the specific intent to kill her. He contends he “blacked out” during the altercation and his demeanor on that evening indicated that he acted out of character with both Jyra and with the two women who tried to intervene. Defendant asserts that, because the State did not prove the element of specific intent to kill, the jury committed reversible error in returning a guilty verdict for second-degree murder. Defendant argues that Jyra's death was not the result of an intent to kill but from his uncontrollable anger. He contends he was confronted by his ex-girlfriend, who wanted to rekindle their relationship while smelling like her new lover. Defendant claims he repeatedly attempted to leave, but Jyra prevented him from doing so. Defendant asserts that he felt like Jyra was toying with his emotions and that he responded in anger, which was out of character. He contends that his actions constituted manslaughter, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree murder.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine if the evidence, whether direct, circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Granado-Gonzalez, 23-387 (La. App. 5 Cir. 07/03/24), 392 So.3d 909, 915, writ denied, 24-905 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 66. A review of a record for sufficiency of the evidence does not require the court to ask whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but instead, whether any rational tier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Granado-Gonzalez, 392 So.3d at 915.

Review for sufficiency of evidence requires the reviewing court to defer to the actual trier of fact's rational credibility calls, evidence weighing, and inference drawing. State v. Douglas, 23-331 (La. App. 5 Cir. 02/28/24), 383 So.3d 266, 276, writ denied, 24-434 (La. 10/23/24), 394 So.3d 1282. This deference to the fact-finder does not permit the reviewing court to decide whether it believes a witness or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id.

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. State v. Robertson, 22-363 (La. App. 03/29/23), 360 So.3d 582, 590. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. McGinnis, 23-472 (La. App. 5 Cir. 07/31/24), 392 So.3d 963, 973. When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of an offense, La. R.S. 15:438 provides, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test from the Jackson standard, but rather, provides a helpful basis for determining the existence of reasonable doubt. State v. Garrison, 19-62 (La. App. 5 Cir. 04/23/20), 297 So.3d 190, 204, writ denied, 20-547 (La. 09/23/20), 301 So.3d 1190. All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Here, defendant was convicted of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, which in this case is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Defendant argues that he should have been convicted of manslaughter rather than second degree murder. The offense of manslaughter is defined as a homicide that would be first or second degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. La. R.S. 14:31; State v. Monterroso, 22-390 (La. App. 5 Cir. 04/26/23), 361 So.3d 1177, 1190, writ denied, 23-745 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 447.

Sudden passion and heat of blood distinguish manslaughter from murder, but they are not elements of the offense. State v. Thompson, 18-273 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/28/18), 259 So.3d 1257, 1266, writ denied, 18-2077 (La. 09/06/19), 278 So.3d 372. Instead, they are mitigating factors that may reduce the grade of the offense. Id. In order to be entitled to the lesser verdict of manslaughter, the defendant is required to prove the mitigatory factors by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Davis, 22-281 (La. App. 5 Cir. 03/08/23), 360 So.3d 82, 90, writ denied, 23-507 (La. 01/10/24), 376 So.3d 133. Provocation and time for cooling are questions for the jury to determine under the standard of the average or ordinary person, one with ordinary self-control. Id. The question for the appellate court on review is whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the mitigatory factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

The jury was presented with manslaughter as a responsive verdict, but found the defendant guilty of second degree murder. The guilty verdict establishes that the jury found that the State had presented sufficient evidence of second degree murder. Our review of the record and evidence supports the jury's finding that there was insufficient provocation, that defendant's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled at the time the offense was committed.

Furthermore, multiple witnesses testified that Jyra and defendant separated earlier in the year. Defendant testified he was aware in 2014 that Jyra was seeing Frederic “off-and-on” for years and denied being jealous of Frederic. Defendant testified that he and Jyra ended their relationship before this incident. Mr. McNair testified that defendant started to see other people after they separated in 2020. We find all of the evidence showed that the murder was not immediately preceded by defendant's discovery that Jyra had a relationship with another man. See Monterroso, 361 So.3d at 1191.

Defendant claims that there was ample evidence to show he was irritated by Jyra's action of trying to reconcile with him while she smelled like Frederic's cologne, and he had never smelled another man's cologne on Jyra. He contends every time he tried to leave, Jyra blocked his exit. He claims that Jyra's actions provoked him to respond in an aggressive manner, which was completely out of character for him. He asserts his actions did not amount to a specific intent to kill Jyra, especially since he “blacked out” and did not recall what happened. He contends his actions show that Jyra's death was the result of his uncontrollable anger, not a result of a specific intent to kill. However, the testimony established that at the time of Jyra's murder, defendant and Jyra had been separated for a while and both of them were seeing other people. Although defendant claimed Jyra having Frederic's cologne on “hurt” him, he repeatedly stated he was not jealous of Frederick and was aware Jyra was seeing him on and off for years. Moreover, by defendant's own admission, Jyra changed out of the clothes that he claimed smelled like Frederic's cologne into different clothes, and they subsequently went outside before defendant put a zip tie around her neck, and killed her.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second degree murder and that defendant failed to carry the burden necessary to reduce the charge of second degree homicide to manslaughter. This assignment of error lacks merit.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT of ERROR

In his second assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the State, over defense counsel's objection, to use over forty photographs of the victim's body at the crime scene and nude photographs of her on the autopsy table, for the purpose of proving how the victim died. Defendant argues the photographs were excessive, gruesome, graphic, and intended to inflame the jury.

During Deputy Dear's trial testimony, the State offered several crime scene photographs into evidence and defense counsel objected. At a bench conference, defense counsel stated that redundancy of the photographs formed the basis of his objection. Specifically, he stated there were thirty-one photos, ten of which showed the same body in the same position. Defense counsel argued there was no reason to show the jury that many photographs to demonstrate one corpse and the photographs were intended to prejudice the jury. The State disagreed, stating that since the lights were out at the time, the only lighting on the body was from the camera's flash used by JPSO. The State asserted the officers could not get one good picture so they took different angles. The trial court overruled the objection and the photographs were admitted into evidence. Deputy Dear was then extensively questioned about each photograph by the State and defense counsel.

Later in the trial at another bench conference, defense counsel again objected to the use of numerous photographs of the victim. Defense counsel argued that it was already stipulated or admitted that defendant was responsible for Jyra's death, and therefore, the coroner could establish her death and the manner of death with three or four photographs. Defense counsel contended the State did not need to show every angle of how the zip tie band was around Jyra's neck nor her naked body on the autopsy table, opining the use of all of the photographs served no purpose beyond prejudicing the jury.

The State responded that 20 out of 140 possible photographs were selected so the coroner could articulate and show the jury how she formed her opinion because of the unique nature of the cause of death. The State requested defense counsel to identify which of those photographs he was objecting to. Defense counsel responded that there were ten photographs of the marks from the zip tie and some photographs included the victim's face and breasts.

The trial court viewed all of the photographs objected to by defense counsel and the State explained the significance of each photograph stating the photographs were not gruesome or graphic, and agreed to place a post-it note over portions of the victim's body for modesty. The trial court overruled defense counsel's objections, noting the State agreed to cover the victim's breasts in one picture. The trial court opined that otherwise, the chosen pictures were respectful and preserved the victim's dignity. Later, when the State offered the autopsy photographs into evidence, defense counsel voiced his continuing objection.

“Photographs are generally admissible if they illustrate any fact, shed any light upon an issue in the case, or are relevant to describe the person, thing, or place depicted.” State v. Magee, 11-574 (La. 09/28/12), 103 So.3d 285, 322, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 830, 134 S.Ct. 56, 187 L.Ed.2d 49 (2013). Even when the cause of death is not at issue, the State is entitled to the moral force of its evidence, and post-mortem photographs of murder victims are generally admissible to prove corpus delicti, to corroborate other evidence establishing cause of death, location, placement of wounds, or positive identification of the victim. State v. Brown, 18-1999 (La. 09/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 244, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d 596 (2022). Photographic evidence will be admitted unless it is so gruesome as to overwhelm the reason of the jurors and lead them to convict the defendant without sufficient evidence—specifically, when the prejudicial effect of the photographs substantially outweighs their probative value. Id. Moreover, the cumulative nature of photographic evidence does not render it inadmissible if it corroborates the testimony of witnesses on essential matters. State v. Cartagena, 11-774 (La. App. 5 Cir. 03/13/12), 90 So.3d 1170, 1177. The admission of gruesome photographs is not reversible error unless it is clear that their probative value is substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. State v. Johnson, 09-992 (La. App. 5 Cir. 06/29/10), 47 So.3d 449, 453, writ denied, 10-1704 (La. 01/28/11), 56 So.3d 966. Generally, an appellate court places great weight upon a trial court's ruling on the relevancy of evidence and such a determination will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id.

We find the trial court did not err in finding the crime scene and autopsy photographs to be admissible. Because of the manner of death by asphyxiation, and because the autopsy photographs admitted were prior to the body being examined, we find the photographs were not particularly graphic. The crime scene and the visible injuries were not especially bloody or gruesome, and any unclothed portions of the victim's body in the autopsy photographs were covered for the jury's viewing.

The State explained the purpose of each of the autopsy photographs and the trial court viewed them before finding them admissible. Upon review, we find the autopsy photographs showed different angles and the scale of various injuries on the victim's body. Also, as to the crime scene photographs, the photographs were taken at night in an area that lacked electricity. Consequently, the photographs are particularly dark, and they appear to show different aspects of the crime scene as illuminated by the camera's flash. Furthermore, the crime scene and autopsy photographs appear to corroborate the witnesses’ testimony. Therefore, we conclude that the probative value of the photographs is not outweighed by their alleged prejudicial effect. Moreover, we find that given the evidence against defendant, it appears unlikely the jurors found him guilty based on the alleged inflammatory nature of the crime scene and autopsy photographs. See State v. Ramirez, 09-350 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/09), 30 So.3d 833, 851; State v. Holliday, 17-1921 (La. 01/29/20), 340 So.3d 648, 705, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 141 S.Ct. 1271, 209 L.Ed.2d 10 (2021); Brown, supra. 11 Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ERRORS PATENT

This court reviewed the record for errors patent according to the mandates of La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). The following errors patent require correction.

First, the record reflects defendant was found guilty on September 28, 2023. The uniform commitment order (UCO), however, shows defendant's adjudication date as October 30, 2023. Accordingly, we order the trial court to correct the UCO to reflect the correct adjudication date and direct the Clerk of Court for the 24th Judicial District Court to transmit the original of the corrected UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 892 B(2) and the Department of Corrections’ legal department. See State v. Gilbert, 23-121 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/08/23), 377 So.3d 378, 388, writ denied, 23-1640 (La. 05/29/24), 385 So.3d 704; State v. Isaac, 17-87 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17), 229 So.3d 1030, 1043, writ denied, 17-2106 (La. 6/15/18), 257 So.3d 679.

Secondly, the sentencing minute entry does not reflect that defendant's conviction of second degree murder is a crime of violence. Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 890.3 C, second degree murder “shall always be designated by the court in the minutes as a crime of violence.” As such, we order the trial court to correct the minute entry to designate defendant's conviction for second degree murder as a crime of violence. See State v. Lowry, 23-392 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/15/24), 389 So.3d 261, 273; State v. Le, 22-468 (La. App. 5 Cir. 08/09/23), 370 So.3d 162, writ denied, 23-1230 (La. 02/06/24), 378 So.3d 752.

Finally, we find the trial court imposed an illegal sentence. At sentencing, the trial court stated, “I will order any and all programs available in the Department of Corrections for you to participate in while you're there.” [Emphasis added.] The sentencing minute entry and UCO reflect that the trial court recommended any and all programs available in the Department of Corrections. The transcript prevails where there is an inconsistency between the minute entry and the transcript. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

A trial court has no authority to dictate how defendant's sentence is to be served once he is in the custody of the Department of Corrections. See State v. Goff, 13-866 (La. App. 5 Cir. 04/09/14), 140 So.3d 146, 152, writ denied, 14-1018 (La. 12/08/14), 153 So.3d 440. La. C.Cr.P. art. 882 A provides, “An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review.”

Because the trial court cannot order the defendant to participate in any available programs, it can only be recommended, we amend the sentence imposed to recommend, rather than order, that defendant be allowed to participate in any and all available programs, which appears to be the trial court's original intent.

DECREE

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction. Defendant's sentence is amended, and as amended, is affirmed. We remand this case to the trial court with instructions.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to the sentencing transcript, the trial court stated:And so with that said, you're being set for sentencing today. The mandatory sentence on second-degree murder is life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. Mr. Sheppard, you've thrown away two -- well, you've caused the victim to be deceased and then now you've thrown your life away and I think some testimony came out during the trial regarding you indicating you had thrown your life away and it's unfortunate for both of you. And God bless the victim and God bless you in your future, sir. And that's the sentence of the Court.Based on the trial court's comments and subsequent advisements as shown in the sentencing transcript, we find the trial court imposed the mandatory life sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on defendant. We find that defendant's sentence is procedurally a proper determinate sentence, particularly based on the court's use of the present tense when the court stated “And that's the sentence of the Court.” See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 871 A; 872; 879; State v. Samuel, 19-408 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/5/20), 291 So.3d 256, writ denied, 20-398 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So.3d 77; State v. Galatas, 11-1342 (La. App. 1 Cir. Feb. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 440461, writ denied, 12-519 (La. 9/12/12), 98 So.3d 817.

3.   Deputy Dear identified several photographs taken at the scene of the homicide, including Jyra's body and the zip tie around her neck, which were admitted and simultaneously shown to the jury.

4.   The detective was shown photographs of the scene and identified the “slack end of the zip tie” around Jyra's neck. Detective Bradley further identified the following collected items: an empty cell phone case, the victim's clothes, two slippers, and a section of braided hair.

5.   The manager provided the records of defendant's check-in, surveillance footage showing the date and time of defendant's arrival at the motel in a taxi, which was shown to the jury, and the backpack defendant had upon check-in. The check-in records listed defendant's address as 1544 West Chelsea Road, the scene of the homicide. The jury was also shown surveillance video from inside the taxi cab.

6.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

7.   It is unclear from the testimony when defendant moved in the apartment. Based on Jada's testimony, Jyra was dating defendant for approximately seven years, the length of time she lived in the apartment.

8.   Ms. Coston testified that neither she nor Ms. Joseph put the tie around Jyra's neck or touched Jyra.

9.   Nancy Clary, with the JPSO 9-1-1 communications center, identified a detailed history and audio recording, and the 9-1-1 call was played for the jury.

10.   Defendant stayed in one bedroom and Jyra and Jada stayed in the other bedroom. Jada similarly testified to the living arrangements after defendant and Jyra ended their relationship.

11.   See also Cartagena, supra; Magee, supra; Johnson, 47 So.3d 449; State v. Condley, 04-1349 (La. App. 5 Cir. 05/31/05), 904 So.2d 881, writ denied, 05-1760 (La. 02/10/06), 924 So.2d 163; State v. Chattman, 01-556 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/01), 800 So.2d 1043, writ denied, 01-3320 (La. 12/19/02), 833 So.2d 332.

WINDHORST, J.