STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ANDREW DAVID WETZEL (2025)

The defendant, Andrew David Wetzel, was charged by bill of information ¹ with simple arson, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:52, and initially pled not guilty. He thereafter withdrew his not guilty plea, pled guilty as charged, and was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor.² He subsequently stipulated to his status as a second felony habitual offender.³ The trial court vacated the original sentence and imposed an enhanced sentence of twenty years imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The defendant later filed pro se motions seeking, in part, to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. The defendant now appeals, challenging pre-plea rulings, his waiver of counsel, his guilty plea, and his stipulation to the habitual offender bill of information. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 4

According to the bill of information and the transcript of the Boykin 5 hearing, on April 20, 2009, by the use of an explosive substance or the setting of a fire, the defendant intentionally damaged property of another, a school bus, without the consent of the owner, Lilian Gonzalez. The damage was greater than five hundred dollars.⁶

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR AND PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 3 AND 6

In the sole counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues his waiver of counsel was not intelligently and voluntarily made. In pro se assignments of error numbers three and six, he argues the trial court erred in allowing him to plead guilty pro se and stipulate to the habitual offender bill of information without a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

While the Louisiana and United States Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel, a defendant may elect to represent himself if the choice is “knowingly and intelligently” and the assertion of the right is “clear and unequivocal.” See U.S. Const. amend. VI; La. Const. art. I, § 13; State v. Bonit, 2005-0795 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/10/06), 928 So.2d 633, 637, writ denied, 2006-1211 (La. 3/16/07), 952 So.2d 688, citing, Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Thus, an accused has the right to choose between the right to counsel and the right to self-representation. State v. Brown, 2018-01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 223, cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d 596 (2022).

In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a trial court may not force a lawyer upon a defendant when he insists he wants to conduct his own defense and voluntarily and intelligently elects to proceed without counsel. However, he must ask clearly and unequivocally to proceed pro se and he must also make his request in a timely manner. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; Bonit, 928 So.2d at 637. Further, he must be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so the record demonstrates “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.

Faretta made clear that an accused's “technical legal knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” Id., 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. In State v. Santos, 99-1897 (La. 9/15/00), 770 So.2d 319 (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a trial court confronted with an accused's unequivocal request to represent himself need only determine whether the accused is competent to waive counsel and is “voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” Santos, 770 So.2d at 321 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541).

The United States Supreme Court has not prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who elects to proceed without counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election to proceed without counsel will depend on a range of factors, including the defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding. Evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system is relevant to the question of whether or not he knowingly waived constitutional rights. State v. Robinson, 2008-0820 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/4/10), 42 So.3d 435, 437-38, writ denied, 2010-1549 (La. 5/20/11), 63 So.3d 974. Whether the defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally asserted the right to self-representation must be determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case. See Brown, 330 So.3d at 223.

In the instant case, prior to his guilty plea, the defendant confirmed he wished to terminate his counsel's appointment, also noting he spoke to her about the plea deal approximately one week before the Boykin hearing.⁷ The trial court stated it could not advise the defendant to represent himself, adding, “It's never a good idea for a person to represent [himself]. I know you have a lot of experience with the law, but it's a layman's experience, not an attorney's. So it's not wise for you to not have an attorney.” The defendant reiterated that he did not want an attorney, stating, “It's a simple plea. I've done it before a few times.”

The defendant stated he understood the ramifications of his decision and confirmed it was his desire to represent himself. The trial court offered the defendant the opportunity to ask any questions about representing himself, but the defendant elected not to do so. The terms of the plea agreement as to both cases and the habitual offender proceedings were then set forth in the record. The defendant stated he understood the agreement, noting the terms were previously discussed “in detail” and confirmed he was previously advised against self-representation. The first Boykin colloquy then began. The defendant was again advised of his right to an attorney and again stated he did not want an attorney.

After a thorough review of the record and the applicable jurisprudence, we find no violation of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel in this matter. The record shows the trial court carefully inquired into the defendant's decision to terminate counsel and represent himself at the guilty plea and habitual offender proceedings. The defendant clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to represent himself in proper person. He made this decision despite the trial court's warnings about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Further, the defendant's prior experience with the judicial process and criminal justice system is relevant to his waiver of counsel.⁸ We find the defendant's decision was made with his eyes wide open. Thus, the record does not support the defendant's counseled and pro se assertions. Accordingly, the counseled assignment of error and pro se assignments of error numbers three and six are without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 4, 9-13

The defendant raises several pro se assignments of error challenging his guilty plea. In pro se assignment of error number four, he argues his plea was not free, knowing, and voluntary. In pro se assignment of error number twelve, he claims at the time of his plea, he believed he was pleading guilty under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).⁹ Additionally, he argues the plea agreement was breached when the State failed to release his property and/or reduce his sentence (pro se assignment of error number nine), the State failed to set forth a factual basis for the guilty plea (pro se assignments of error numbers ten and eleven), and he believed his guilty plea included an agreement to reduce his sentence (pro se assignment of error number thirteen).

A guilty plea is a conviction and, therefore, should be afforded a great measure of finality. State v. Young, 2020-0049 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/20), 315 So.3d 904, 910, writ denied, 2020-01402 (La. 2/9/21), 310 So.3d 177. A plea of guilty waives a criminal defendant's fundamental right to a jury trial, right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, due process requires, as a prerequisite to its validity, that the plea be a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of known rights. There must be an affirmative showing in the record that the defendant was informed of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers and that he knowingly and intelligently waived them. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712; State v. Joseph, 2012-0085 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/15/13), 2013 WL 596149, *1 (unpublished).

In State v. Lewis, 421 So.2d 224, 225-26 (La. 1982), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a trial court may permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing if the court finds that the guilty plea was not entered freely and voluntarily, or there was an inadequate Boykin colloquy advising the defendant of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, making the guilty plea constitutionally infirm. A constitutionally infirm guilty plea may be set aside either by means of an appeal or post-conviction relief. Young, 315 So.3d at 907.

There is no absolute right to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty. The withdrawal of a guilty plea is within the discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal only if that discretion is abused or arbitrarily exercised. State v. Sheppard, 2018-1412 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/19), 2019 WL 2635678, *1 (unpublished). Generally, the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be reversed on appeal if the record clearly shows the defendant was informed of his rights and the consequences of his plea, and the plea was entered voluntarily. State v. Cheatham, 2016-1648 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/2/17), 222 So.3d 757, 759.

A criminal plea agreement is analogous to a civil compromise. State v. Rider, 2023-0164 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/23), 3 79 So.3d 49, 52, writ denied, 2023-01711 (La. 6/5/24), 385 So.3d 1160; see La. Civ. Code art. 3071, et seq. In determining the validity of plea bargain agreements, Louisiana courts generally refer to rules of contract law, while recognizing at the same time that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to fairness may be broader than his or her rights under contract law. State v. Porche, 2020-0246 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/20), 318 So.3d 184, 187-88; see also La. Civ. Code art. 1927. The four elements of a valid contract are: 1) the parties’ capacity to contract; 2) the parties’ mutual consent that is freely given; 3) the existence of a certain, lawful object for the contract; and 4) the existence of a lawful purpose, or cause, of the contract. Rider, 379 So.3d at 52; see La. Civ. Code arts. 1918, 1927, 1966, & 1971.

Error, fraud, or duress may vitiate consent. See La. Civ. Code art. 1948. If the plea agreement calls for a legal sentence and the trial court agrees, the trial court is bound by the terms of the agreement. Under substantive criminal law, there are two alternative remedies for a breach of a plea bargain: (1) specific performance of the agreement, or (2) nullification or withdrawal of the plea. Porche, 318 So.3d at 188. The party demanding performance of a plea bargain agreement has the burden of proving its existence and the terms thereof. Id.

Herein, on June 27, 2022, the Boykin proceeding for the instant case was combined with a separate case in which the defendant, in accordance with interrelated plea agreements,¹⁰ pled guilty to simple burglary, stipulated to his status as a habitual offender, and was sentenced to an enhanced sentence of twenty years imprisonment at hard labor, to be served concurrent to the twenty-year sentence imposed in the instant case. As to the pleas, the defendant was questioned and informed of his rights in two successive colloquies, first as to the instant case, and then as to his simple burglary plea.

Before the instant plea, the trial court questioned the defendant regarding his date of birth and confirmed his ability to read and write. As to each plea, the defendant executed a waiver of rights form fully advising him of his rights and confirmed he went over and understood the forms. Likewise, in open court, the trial court informed the defendant of his Boykin rights (right to trial by jury, right against compulsory self-incrimination, and right of confrontation), his right to an appeal, and that by pleading guilty, he would be waiving his rights. The defendant indicated he understood those rights and understood he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty.

The defendant agreed that he wished to plead guilty and denied being forced, threatened, coerced, intimidated, or made any promises. The defendant agreed to a stipulation that the discovery within his possession consisted of a factual basis for the instant offense. Prior to the stipulation, the trial court stated the name of the charged offense, simple arson, the date of the offense, the manner in which the property was damaged, the type of property damaged, the owner of the property, and the cost of the damage. The defendant stated he understood the charge. The trial court then asked the defendant if he had any questions regarding the simple arson offense, and the defendant stated he did not.

Additionally, the trial court discussed the defendant's right to be retried by a jury on the instant offense, explained the verdict would be required to be unanimous in a retrial, and informed the defendant he was waiving that right. The trial court informed the defendant of his right to call witnesses on his behalf, his right to confront witnesses, his right to the presumption of innocence, and informed the defendant that he would be waiving these rights by pleading guilty. The defendant agreed that by pleading guilty, he was, in effect, proclaiming, “I'm guilty of this.”

The record does not reflect the instant case involved a plea pursuant to Alford. As detailed above, at the Boykin hearing the defendant did not claim his innocence or enter an Alford plea, he specifically stipulated to the existence of a factual basis for the plea, and he agreed that he was proclaiming his guilt by pleading to the offense. Since the defendant did not proclaim his innocence, the trial court was not put on notice that there was a need for an inquiry into the factual basis. Therefore, a factual basis was not required during the guilty plea colloquy. See State v. Gonzales, 2009-2282 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/7/10), 2010 WL 1838401, *2 (unpublished) (the due process clause imposes no constitutional duty on state trial judges to ascertain a factual basis prior to accepting a guilty plea).

Further, at the guilty plea proceedings, the defendant did not preserve any issue for appeal pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976).¹¹ An unqualified plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects and precludes their review by either appeal or post-conviction relief. Crosby, 338 So.2d at 588. Insofar as the defendant seeks to assert a claim of actual innocence on appeal, any such claim was waived when he entered the unqualified guilty plea. In accordance with the foregoing, we find no merit in pro se assignments of error numbers four, ten, eleven, and twelve.

In pro se assignment of error number nine, the defendant contends the State violated the plea agreement by failing to release his property.¹² In pro se assignment of error number thirteen, he makes an unsupported inquiry as to whether he believed, at the time of his plea, that there was an agreement with the State to later reduce his agreed upon sentence. We note these alleged errors were assigned in the defendant's separate appeal on his simple burglary conviction, filed in this court. The defendant reassigned the errors in this appeal, block quoting the record of his separate appeal.¹³ Further, the defendant fails to fully develop or support his arguments, include citations or references to the instant record, or cite any legal authority regarding his claims.

A mere statement of an assigned error in brief without argument or citation of authority does not constitute briefing. State v. Jarvis, 2021-1181 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/25/22), 340 So.3d 1137, 1142. This court may consider as abandoned any assignment of error that has not been briefed. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). As the defendant failed to develop or support the assertions therein, we consider pro se assignments of error numbers nine and thirteen abandoned. See also State v. Cotton, 2015-1623 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/15/16), 194 So.3d 69, 79, writ denied, 2016-0897 (La. 4/24/17), 221 So.3d 69 (the party demanding specific performance of the State's promise as part of a plea agreement has the burden of proving the existence of such an agreement).

Further, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in this case. As stated, a defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Such a withdrawal is predicated on a legal cause, that is, on a showing made by a defendant that his plea bargain was constitutionally infirm, creating a legal defect that nullifies the agreement between the parties. See State v. Williams, 2017-0339 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/17), 2017 WL 4082429, *1 (unpublished). The record reflects a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant's rights and the trial court's compliance with the constitutional requirements for the taking of voluntary guilty pleas. The defendant was sentenced in accordance with a plea bargain set forth in the record prior to and at the time of the pleas, to twenty years on each habitual offender adjudication, to be served concurrently. Thus, pro se assignments of error numbers four and nine through thirteen are meritless and/or abandoned.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 1, 2, 5, AND 7

In his pro se brief, the defendant raises additional arguments challenging his stipulation to the habitual offender bill of information. Specifically, he argues the trial court: failed to advise him of his right to remain silent (pro se assignment of error number one); failed to advise him of his right to a hearing (pro se assignment of error number two); erred in finding his stipulation was free and voluntary (pro se assignment of error number five); and failed to advise him of the fifteen-day period to enter objections (pro se assignment of error number seven).

A trial court's failure to properly advise a defendant of his rights under the Habitual Offender Law requires that the habitual offender adjudication and sentence be vacated. Prior to accepting a defendant's acknowledgement, confession, or admission to the allegations of the habitual offender bill, the trial court must advise the defendant of the right to remain silent and of the right to a formal hearing wherein the State would have to prove the allegations of the habitual offender bill. State v. Harmason, 2008-0399 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/14/08), 2008 WL 4908728, *2 (unpublished). Furthermore, the language of the Habitual Offender Law must be strictly construed. An implicit and integral aspect of the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1 is the court's duty to inform the defendant of his right to remain silent. State v. Gonsoulin, 2003-2473 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/25/04), 886 So.2d 499, 501 (en banc), writ denied, 2004-1917 (La. 12/10/04), 888 So.2d 835.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1(D)(1)(a), which details the requirements for advising a defendant of his rights under the Habitual Offender Law, provides, in pertinent part:

If, at any time ․ it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of a felony ․ the district attorney of the parish in which subsequent conviction was had may file an information accusing the person of a previous conviction. Whereupon the court in which the subsequent conviction was had shall cause the person ․ to be brought before it and shall inform him of the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law and shall require the offender to say whether the allegations are true. If he denies the allegation of the information or refuses to answer or remains silent, his plea or the fact of his silence shall be entered on the record and he shall be given fifteen days to file particular objections to the information ․

(Emphasis added).

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 551 provides that an arraignment consists of the reading of the indictment to the defendant by the clerk in open court, and the court calling upon the defendant to plead. The reading of the indictment may be waived. The arraignment and the defendant's plea shall be entered into the minutes of the court and shall constitute a part of the record. La. Code Crim. P. art. 551(A). While a habitual offender proceeding results in sentencing enhancement, rather than a separate criminal conviction, the requirement under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) that the defendant be brought before the court, informed of the allegations and of his right to a formal hearing, and be made to admit or deny the allegations, conforms with the above definition of an arraignment. Gonsoulin, 886 So.2d at 501-02.

In the instant case, after the trial court accepted the defendant's guilty plea and imposed the original sentence, the State announced it filed a habitual offender bill of information and read the predicate offense alleged therein. The trial court asked the defendant if he had reviewed the habitual offender bill of information. The defendant confirmed that he previously received and reviewed a copy of the bill. The trial court informed the defendant of his rights regarding the habitual offender bill of information, stating, “And I understand that even though we've agreed to this point, you could still have the State have to prove this to the Court that you have this previous conviction. And you do have a right to a hearing on that. Do you understand that?” After the defendant responded positively, the trial court stated, “But you're going to give up your right to a hearing on it?”

Initially, we note the trial court was not statutorily required to inform the defendant of the fifteen days to object to the habitual offender bill of information, as the defendant did not deny the allegation, refuse to answer, or stand silent as to the bill. We further find the defendant was sufficiently advised of his rights at his arraignment, the advice of rights was sufficient to comply with the requirements of La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a), and the defendant confirmed he understood those rights. The law does not expressly state the court is required to inform the defendant of his rights at each phase of the habitual offender proceeding. The law requires the record demonstrate the proceedings as a whole were fundamentally fair and accorded the defendant due process of law. Gonsoulin, 886 So.2d at 502. Herein, the record as a whole demonstrates the defendant was accorded fundamental fairness and due process of law. We find the defendant's interests were fully protected and any technical non-compliance with the statutory directives in La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(a) was harmless in this case. See State v. Brooks, 2012-13 89 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/26/13), 2013 WL 11104266, *2 (unpublished). Thus, we find no merit in pro se assignments of error numbers one, two, five, and seven.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 14 AND 8

In pro se assignment of error number fourteen, the defendant argues the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea was contrary to the law, as the trial court did not appoint a sanity commission or rule on his competency after granting his motion to appoint a sanity commission. He argues the plea must therefore be nullified. Finally, in pro se assignment of error number eight, the defendant argues the “cumulative impact” of the errors raised in his pro se brief violated his due process rights.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects an individual's right not to proceed to trial while legally incompetent. State v. Abbott, 2022-0096 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 356 So.3d 423, 429. In Louisiana, “[m]ental incapacity to proceed exists when, as a result of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.” La. Code Crim. P. art. 641. Louisiana law imposes a legal presumption that a defendant is sane and competent to proceed. See La. R.S. 15:432; State v. Carmouche, 2001-0405 (La. 5/14/02), 872 So.2d 1020, 1041; State v. O'Brien, 2014-0899 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/23/14), 168 So.3d 627, 632 (per curiam). Given the presumption of sanity under Louisiana law, the burden lies with the defendant to establish that he lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and that he is unable to assist with his defense in a meaningful way. State v. Bell, 2014-073 7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/14), 2014 WL 5801517, *5 (unpublished), writ denied, 2014-2577 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So.3d 145.

Furthermore, a defendant does not have an absolute right to the appointment of a sanity commission. State ex rel. Seals v. State, 2000-273 8 (La. 10/25/02), 831 So.2d 828, 832. The fact that the defendant's capacity to proceed is called into question does not, for that reason alone, require the trial court to order a mental examination of the defendant; rather, it must have reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant's capacity. Bell, 2014 WL 5801517 at *4. See also La. Code Crim. P. art. 643. It is well established that “reasonable grounds” to doubt the defendant's mental capacity to proceed exist where one should reasonably doubt the defendant's capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense. State ex rel. Seals, 831 So.2d at 832; State v. Brown, 2012-0752 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/10/13), 2013 WL 1459156, *10 (unpublished). The appointment of a sanity commission rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Bell, 2014 WL 5801517 at *5.

In State v. Bridgewater, 2000-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 892-93, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003), two defense attorneys, in five separate motions, moved to have the trial court appoint a sanity commission. In denying the multiple motions, the trial court relied on two factors: (1) that the defendant was found competent about a year earlier, albeit in a different, unrelated case in which he was represented by different counsel; and (2) that in its prior interactions with the defendant, the trial court personally observed that the defendant exhibited a good understanding of his current circumstances and a good handle on legal concepts. The Louisiana Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion therein by the trial court in declining to appoint a sanity commission under the circumstances. Bridgewater, 823 So.2d at 893.

Herein, the defendant notes he filed a motion to appoint a sanity commission prior to the instant guilty plea; however, he concedes the motion is not in the record. The record reflects the trial court noted a sanity ruling was pending in the defendant's other case, not the instant case. The trial court further noted it would not proceed with the instant case until the sanity issue was determined in the other case. At a hearing months later, the trial court noted there was a sanity hearing in the other case and that the defendant had been found competent.

The record reflects the defendant did not file a motion to appoint a sanity commission in the instant case. Nonetheless, the trial court halted the proceedings until the defendant was found competent in the other case. The record does not indicate the defendant presented medical evidence or that the trial judge observed anything to indicate the defendant lacked the capacity to proceed. Thus, we find no indication that a sanity commission and/or hearing was warranted in the instant case. The trial judge had the opportunity to observe and engage in several colloquies with the defendant. The record shows the defendant was coherent and comprehensive throughout his court appearances, and his answers to questions were responsive. The defendant's statements throughout the proceedings indicate he understood the proceedings.

Given the presumption of sanity, we find the defendant failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in relying on the competency ruling in the separate case and its own observations and interactions with the defendant. See Id. at 893. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in accepting the defendant's guilty plea without appointment of a sanity commission in this case. As we find the defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing reasonable grounds for the trial court to believe he was mentally deficient, there is no need to nullify the conviction or remand for nunc pro tunc hearing on the issue. See State ex rel. Seals, 831 So.2d at 833. Considering the foregoing, we find no merit in pro se assignment of error number fourteen. Moreover, as no merit has been found in the defendant's other assigned errors, his due process claim raised in pro se assignment of error number eight based on the alleged cumulative impact of the other assigned errors is likewise meritless.

PATENT ERROR REVIEW

In his pro se brief, the defendant asks this court to review the record for patent errors. Whether requested or not on appeal, pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

The record reflects after imposing the sentence, the trial court advised the defendant his “sentence is going to be final today, and your two years to file for post-conviction relief begins today.” However, a defendant generally has two years “․after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final․” to seek post-conviction relief. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(A). The prescriptive period does not initially begin to run until the judgment of conviction and sentence have both become final under La. Code Crim. P. art. 914 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922. Under La. Code Crim. P. art. 922, an appellate court's judgment becomes final if no application for rehearing has been made, when the timely application has been made or denied, or when a timely writ of review has been made and denied.

Thus, the trial court failed to properly advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for seeking post-conviction relief. However, the trial court's failure to properly advise the defendant has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. State v. Hollins, 2023-0785 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/19/24), 387 So.3d 641, 652, writ denied, 2024-00487 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So.3d 865. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we instead advise the defendant La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. Id.

CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The defendant was originally charged in the bill of information with seventeen separate offenses, but the State severed the instant offense, proceeded to trial on this offense only, and nol-prossed the other counts.

2.   Prior to the defendant's guilty plea, the trial court vacated and set aside his previous conviction of the instant offense, which was based on a non-unanimous jury verdict.

3.   The habitual offender bill of information filed by the State alleges a prior conviction in 2008 of issuing worthless checks.

5.   See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

6.   At the Boykin hearing, the parties stipulated discovery established a factual basis for the offense. In addition to the instant offense, the defendant also entered a guilty plea in a separate case. The defendant further filed an appeal in that case in this court, raising several assignments of error, most overlapping with the assignments of error in the instant case. State v. Wetzel, 2023-1316 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/22/24), 2024 WL 4863871 (unpublished).

7.   Several other attorneys appointed to represent the defendant were either terminated or withdrew, seemingly due to the defendant's aversion to being represented by counsel. (Prior R. 7, 9, 123, 127, 334, line 8-Prior R. 335, line 21; R. 761, lines 16-22).

8.   We note the defendant has a lengthy history of pro se filings and self-representation. State v. Wetzel, 2014-1788 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/27/15) (unpublished) (noting the defendant had filed more than fifty writ applications in the previous six-year period, and that the defendant has habitually burdened and abused the legal system); Wetzel v. Tanner, No. 16-5765, 2016 WL 3127302, *1 (E.D. La. 2016) (noting that federal court records showed he filed more than forty civil lawsuits; at least twelve prior civil complaints were dismissed as frivolous and/or for the failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted; he was barred on at least twenty-three occasions from proceeding with his civil complaints as a pauper in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

9.   The “best interest” or Alford plea is one in which a defendant pleads guilty while maintaining his innocence. State v. Henry, 2012-0841 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/21/12), 2012 WL 6681849, *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2013-0110 (La. 6/21/13), 118 So.3d 406. Pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted “unless there is a factual basis for the plea” and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, n.10, 91 S.Ct. at 167, n.10.

10.   The negotiations involving both pleas began on June 7, 2022, when the parties discussed seventeen possible conditions proposed by the defendant, most of which are not at issue in this appeal. Wetzel, 2024 WL 4863871 at *3, n.4.

11.   As the record further reflects, at the pre-plea hearing on June 7, 2022, to negotiate the terms of the pleas, the State objected to the defendant being allowed to plea under Crosby, and the defendant withdrew his previous request to do so. Wetzel, 2024 WL 4863871 at *3.

12.   We note the defendant did not specify in his brief what property he claims the State failed to release.

13.   This court denied the defendant's pro se motion to supplement the instant record with the transcript cited in his brief, that was included in the record of his separate appeal.

WOLFE, J.