SAMUEL CHAPPETTA v. ARIELLE DUMAS (2025)

In this domestic appeal, defendant/appellant, Arielle Dumas, seeks review of the trial court's November 19, 2024 judgment, denying Ms. Dumas’ motion to obtain court approval to relocate the minor child. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment denying the motion to relocate.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This litigation involves a mother's (Ms. Dumas) request for relocation with her minor child, whose father is plaintiff/appellee, Samuel Chappetta. Ms. Dumas and Mr. Chappetta were never married but were involved in a relationship and had a child, who was born in May 2018.

On December 18, 2018, Mr. Chappetta filed a rule to establish paternity, child custody, and visitation. By consent judgment dated February 6, 2019, Mr. Chappetta was declared the biological father of their minor child, and the parties were awarded joint custody. In this consent judgment, the parties agreed to a visitation schedule, pursuant to which the child primarily lived with Ms. Dumas during the school year, and Mr. Chappetta had custody of the child every other weekend and Tuesday evenings. However, during the summer from June 1 through August 7, the child primarily lived with Mr. Chappetta, and Ms. Dumas had custody of the child every other weekend and Tuesday evenings.

In January 2024, Mr. Chappetta filed a motion to modify custody, alleging that co-parenting with Ms. Dumas had become increasingly difficult, that Ms. Dumas did not share information about the minor child with him, and continuously made disparaging remarks about Mr. Chappetta in front of the minor child. Mr. Chappetta also alleged that: (1) Ms. Dumas would continually prevent him from speaking with the child on the phone when he was in her custody; (2) Ms. Dumas took the child to Baton Rouge on one weekend when the child was scheduled to be with Mr. Chappetta and refused to bring him back to New Orleans; (3) Ms. Dumas enrolled the child in a different school for the 2022-2023 school year and did not inform Mr. Chappetta; (4) Ms. Dumas did not inform Mr. Chappetta of the child's pre-K graduation or invite him to attend; and (5) Ms. Dumas allegedly told the minor child repeatedly that his father is irresponsible and incapable of taking care of him.

After a hearing officer conference in April 2024, the hearing officer recommended modifying the custody schedule to allow the father every other weekend and one overnight visit every Wednesday. Because neither party objected to this recommendation modifying custody, it became the judgment of the court.

In April 2024, Ms. Dumas sent Mr. Chappetta written notification of her intent to relocate, as required by the Louisiana Relocation Statute. In response, Mr. Chappetta notified Ms. Dumas of his objection to the relocation.

On May 14, 2024, Ms. Dumas filed a motion for authority to relocate the minor child out of state to Houston, Texas. In the motion, Ms. Dumas stated that the Internal Revenue Service had offered her position in Houston, Texas. Ms. Dumas stated that the new position greatly increased her salary and would allow her to provide the child with more opportunities.

In her motion to relocate, Ms. Dumas asserted that the relocation to Texas was in the child's best interest because he would have access to a better education and extra circular activities not necessarily available to him in the greater New Orleans area. Ms. Dumas also asserted that relocating to Texas would not drastically affect the child because he would be entering first grade. At the time of the relocation, the child was in kindergarten at Lake Forest Charter School.

Ms. Dumas further indicated that she and the child would have additional family support in Texas, including sisters, aunts, and cousins, most of whom are close in age to the child. If the relocation was granted, Ms. Dumas offered Mr. Chappetta one weekend a month and all holiday and summer breaks except one week during the Christmas break.

After a hearing officer conference, the hearing officer recommended that the relocation be granted and an interim judgment to that effect was entered pending a trial court hearing on Mr. Chappetta's objection. The hearing officer found the relocation was in the child's best interest based on: (1) Ms. Dumas’ increased salary; (2) Houston public school opportunities; and (3) Mr. Chappetta would have an almost equivalent amount of visitation with custody the entire summer, almost all holiday breaks, and one weekend a month.

Prior to the trial court hearing on the motion to relocate, the parties submitted memoranda regarding their respective positions on the relocation. Mr. Chappetta argued that the relocation should be denied because the distance between Houston and New Orleans would make his visitation with the child during the school year almost non-existent. He asserted that his participation in the child's daily life and a healthy and loving relationship between him and the child is vital to the child's development. He claimed that Ms. Dumas has shown a pattern of thwarting Mr. Chappetta's relationship with his son, and that relocation would exacerbate this pattern. 1

Ms. Dumas argued that the hearing officer considered all the factors and properly recommended that relocation was in the child's best interest. Ms. Dumas pointed out, like the hearing officer, that the increased opportunities for the child and the enhancement of the child's life available due to the substantial increase in Ms. Dumas’ salary were in the child's best interest. 2

THE RELOCATION TRIAL

We point out initially that the parties have presented minimal, if any, documentary evidence regarding the potential impact on the child of relocating to Texas or remaining in New Orleans. The trial court relied primarily on the parents’ testimony in making its decision.

At trial, Ms. Dumas provided the trial court with her educational and employment background and her efforts towards advancing her career. She recently completed a masters’ degree in business administration with a concentration in accounting in December 2023. While working towards her masters’ degree, Ms. Dumas worked as a systems accountant for the United States Department of Agriculture in New Orleans, Louisiana for three years.

Because she was unable to advance at the Department of Agriculture and increase her income, Ms. Dumas began looking for other employment opportunities after obtaining her masters’ degree. She sought to continue her employment with the federal government due to the benefits and retirement program. She tried to remain in New Orleans but was offered employment with the Internal Revenue Service in Houston, Texas and Washington D.C. She ultimately chose the position in Texas because it was closer to New Orleans.

Ms. Dumas began her employment with the IRS in Texas on June 16, 2024. Although she moved in June 2024 to begin her job, the child remained in New Orleans with Mr. Chappetta until school started before relocating to Texas. Ms. Dumas testified that she was earning $59,966.00 a year at the Department of Agriculture, and that her salary increased to $83,671.00 a year with the IRS. Thus, the new employment in Texas resulted in an annual increase of $23,705.00.

Ms. Dumas testified that she has health insurance for the child, and that she primarily handles choosing doctors, scheduling appointments, and bringing the child to the appointments.

In New Orleans, the child attended a public school, Lake Forest Charter School, for kindergarten. Prior to his Lake Forest acceptance, Ms. Dumas prepared the child for the required testing for acceptance into Lake Forest. Ms. Dumas choose Lake Forest in New Orleans for the child because it was a better school academically than most public schools. She stated that in Metairie, she would have had to put him in private school and pay tuition for an education comparable to Lake Forest. 3

In Texas, the child has been attending a public school, Sienna Crossing Elementary School for first grade. At Sienna, the child attends tutoring to assist with his reading development. Ms. Dumas testified that for grading purposes, the school uses developing, progressing, and excelling as indicators with excelling being the highest. As for his progress, Ms. Dumas stated that at the start of the school year, the child's report card marked that he was “developing,” but that he has since improved to “progressing.” Ms. Dumas did not introduce into evidence any of the child's report cards or letters from teachers about his progress. The record also does not contain any documentary evidence regarding Sienna's ranking or educational programs.

Ms. Dumas testified that in New Orleans, she and the child lived in the 9th Ward on Pauline Street. In Texas, they live in a safe neighborhood, and the child has made several friends in the neighborhood and at school. The child rides the bus to and from school and goes to school with many of the children in the neighborhood. She testified that the neighborhood children also often play together after school and on the weekends. There are also many parks and extracurricular activities available to him. Ms. Dumas’ teenage daughter lives with them in Texas. She also has two sisters and two cousins living in Houston, and three of the four have children. Ms. Dumas stated the child is close to his aunts and cousins, and they are able to see them more often now that they are living in Texas.

She testified the child moved to Texas in early August 2024 at the start of school after spending the summer with Mr. Chappetta. Ms. Dumas testified that she invited Mr. Chappetta to come out to the open house and school supply drop-off and to be part of the first day of school. She stated she would continue to invite Mr. Chappetta to events and functions for the child in Texas. Mr. Chappetta also has access to the child's school information.

Although Ms. Dumas questioned Mr. Chappetta's concern about education, at trial, he testified that, if the relocation was denied, he would make education a priority. Mr. Chappetta committed to enroll and pay for his child to attend either St. Ann Parish School or St. Angela Merci School in Metairie.

Mr. Chappetta testified that co-parenting with Ms. Dumas has been difficult. He testified that he had to seek additional time with his child through the courts on three different occasions. He initially had one day of visitation, then every other weekend, and finally every other weekend with one weeknight. The last visitation modification also allowed Mr. Chappetta to have the child during the summertime, with Ms. Dumas having custody of the child every other weekend and one weeknight during the summer.

Mr. Chappetta stated that in December 2019, Ms. Dumas prevented him from taking the child on one of his scheduled visits, claiming the child did not feel well. After the police arrived, Mr. Chappetta was able to take the child.

Mr. Chappetta indicated that co-parenting since the child has been living in Texas is even more difficult because he and Ms. Dumas do not speak. In addition, he is not always able to speak to the child on a daily basis apparently because the child is sleeping by 6:00 P.M. some evenings. Further, since moving to Texas, Mr. Chappetta claimed Ms. Dumas has prevented him from having the child on at least two of his designated weekends. He testified that when he went to Houston for the child's first day of school, he had very little time with his son.

Mr. Chappetta also informed the court of a domestic abuse incident in 2020 during which Ms. Dumas swung at him and scratched his face. She was arrested as a result of this incident. At this time, there were competing protective orders against both parties. The parties consented to dismiss these protective orders.

As to his living arrangements, Mr. Chappetta lives with his mother in a two-bedroom apartment in Metairie and pays $600 towards the rent. Mr. Chappetta's mother has a room, the child has a room, and Mr. Chappetta sleeps on a daybed. Ms. Chappetta's mother is available to help take care of the child.

Mr. Chappetta works 40 hours a week as a security officer at the Waldorf Astoria Roosevelt Hotel in New Orleans and takes home about $2,900 a month. He is certified as an EMT, but has never worked as an EMT. Mr. Chappetta pays Ms. Dumas $410 a month in child support plus $50 for the child's health insurance. Ms. Dumas claimed Mr. Chappetta is often behind in child support payments. Mr. Chappetta acknowledged at trial he was $120 in arrears for child support.

THE RELOCATION JUDGMENT

After hearing testimony, the trial court ruled on the relocation request in open court on October 18, 2024. Before rendering its ruling, the trial court recited the factors relevant to evaluating whether a relocation is in the best interest of a child, indicating that he was considering the relevant factors. With regard to this case, the court stated, in pertinent part, the following:

The reality is, in this particular situation, that Ms. Dumas has a better opportunity for her employment in Houston than she does presently here in the New Orleans area. I believe that the educational opportunities for Drew in the Houston area, at least the Court's feeling, have not been proved to be significantly different than those educational opportunities that are available here in the New Orleans area, particularly considering the possibility of parochial or private school for his education.

The fact that he is able to participate in neighborhood activities, playing with kids in the area, is not to be underestimated. I think that's important in a child's development. * * * It appears that he has that ability in Houston, but he has never been given the opportunity to live with his father in the Metairie area where those same opportunities may exist where he is, in fact, going to school in near proximity to where he may be living and have the opportunity to participate in that type of neighborhood parish relationship.

The trial court indicated that it believed Ms. Dumas was sincere in doing what is best for the child and recognized that the ability to earn more money would benefit the child. The court, however, found that the loss to the non-relocating parent would be significant because that parent loses the ability to participate in the child's daily life. As a result, the trial court concluded the relocation was not in the child's best interest and denied the relocation request.

The trial court stated that it believed mid-year might be the best time for the child to change schools and return to New Orleans, but ordered that Mr. Chappetta was obligated to determine which school the child would attend and work out a time frame relative thereto. The trial court also ordered that once the child began school in New Orleans, the visitation schedule should reverse with Mr. Chappetta having the child during the school year and Ms. Dumas having the child in the summer.

Ms. Dumas asserts the trial court erred in not considering all the relocation factors enumerated in La. R.S. 9:355.12. On this issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the trial court is not required to expressly analyze each factor in its oral or written reasons for judgment in a relocation case. Gathen v. Gathen, 10-2312 (La. 5/10/11), 66 So.3d 1, 9. The Gathen court pointed out that La. R.S. 9:355.12 does not expressly require it, and a trial court is never required to give oral reasons. Id. Further, a trial court is not required to give written reasons unless requested by a party in most types of non-jury cases. Id., citing La. C.C.P. art. 1917.

Before ruling on the motion to relocate in this case, the trial court expressly cited the factors and discussed those factors relevant to this case. In addition, the trial court heard testimony from both parents and the child's paternal grandmother. Based on our review, we find no legal error warranting de novo review of the trial court's judgment. Thus, in reviewing the judgment, we will evaluate whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mother's request to relocate. A trial court's determination in a relocation matter is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned an appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Curole v. Curole, 02-1891 (La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 1094, 1096.

RELOCATION LAW

Similar to judicial decisions involving children in the context of divorce, adoption, and termination of parental rights, Louisiana's relocation statutes retain the “best interest of the child” standard as the fundamental principle governing decisions made pursuant to its provisions. Curole, 828 So.2d at 1096. The relocating parent has the burden of proving that the proposed relocation is: (1) made in good faith; and (2) in the best interest of the child. La. R.S. 9:355.10.

La. R.S. 9:355.14 A states the factors the court must consider in deciding whether the proposed relocation is in the best interest of the child. They are:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the relationship of the child with the person proposing relocation and with the non-relocating person, siblings, and other significant persons in the child's life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development.

(3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between the non-relocating person and the child through suitable physical custody or visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child's views about the proposed relocation, taking into consideration the age and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by either the person seeking or the person opposing the relocation, either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the other party.

(6) How the relocation of the child will affect the general quality of life for the child, including but not limited to financial or emotional benefit and educational opportunity.

(7) The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation.

(8) The current employment and economic circumstances of each person and how the proposed relocation may affect the circumstances of the child.

(9) The extent to which the objecting person has fulfilled his financial obligations to the person seeking relocation, including child support, spousal support, and community property, and alimentary obligations.

(10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting person.

(11) Any history of substance abuse, harassment, or violence by either the person seeking or the person opposing relocation, including a consideration of the severity of the conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation.

(12) Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

A reviewing court should look to the reasons and factors the trial court expressly considered in reaching its decision, and for the factors the trial court did not expressly discuss, the reviewing court should determine whether the trial court's lack of expressed consideration of any factors led the court to abuse its discretion in reaching its ultimate decision on relocation. Gathen, 66 So.3d at 10.

On appellate review, if the trial court's findings are reasonable based upon the entire record, the reviewing court may not reverse even if it is convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact it would have weighed the evidence differently. Duerson v. Duerson, 23-311 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/23), 379 So.3d 742, 753.

REVIEW OF THE RELOCATION JUDGMENT

The Good Faith Requirement

The person requesting relocation must first show the proposed relocation is made in good faith. La. R.S. 9:355.10. Appropriate reasons for relocation include: to be close to significant family or other support networks; for significant health reasons; to protect the safety of the child or another member of the child's household from a significant risk of harm; to pursue a significant employment or educational opportunity; or to be with one's spouse (or equivalent) who is established, or is pursuing a significant employment or educational opportunity in another location. Wylie v. Wylie, 52,800 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So.3d 1256, 1259.

We agree with the trial court's determination that Ms. Dumas’ request to relocate has been made in good faith. Ms. Dumas established that she has proposed moving to Texas because of a significant employment opportunity in Texas, and because family members live in the Texas area where she proposes relocating. The record indicates that Ms. Dumas’ financial situation would improve in Texas due to her increased salary with the IRS. Ms. Dumas therefore met her burden of proving she proposed the relocation in good faith.

Application of the Factors

The person requesting relocation must also show the proposed relocation is in the best interest of the child. La. R.S. 9:355.10. This determination is made based on the La. R.S. 355:14 factors. On review, we find the following facts relevant to each factor in this particular case.

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of the relationship of the child with the person proposing relocation and with the non-relocating person, siblings, and other significant persons in the child's life.

The record indicates that Ms. Dumas has been the child's primary caregiver and has provided the majority of financial support for the child. Ms. Dumas has managed the child's medical and educational issues and made the decisions relative thereto. When they lived in New Orleans, Ms. Dumas had custody of the child the majority of time, and Mr. Chappetta had custody every other weekend and one weeknight.

Mr. Chappetta and the child have enjoyed spending time together mostly playing ball. Mr. Chappetta testified that when he had the child with him during the summer after Ms. Dumas moved to Texas, he tried to play outside with his son on a daily basis. Mr. Chappetta's mother also enjoys caring for and spending time with the child. She and Mr. Chappetta live together so she spends time with the child whenever Mr. Chappetta has custody.

While the record indicates Ms. Dumas bears most of the responsibility in caring for and supporting the child, both parents have a strong, close, and loving relationship with the child. Thus, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding it was in the child's best interest to be able to maintain a daily relationship with both parents. This supports the trial court's conclusion to deny the relocation request.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child's physical, educational, and emotional development.

The child is currently six years old and in the first grade. Because the child is in first grade, relocating to a different area would not greatly impact the child's education. Neither party introduced any documentary evidence regarding the child's options for schooling in the New Orleans area or Texas area. The trial court found that, based on the evidence admitted, the child has substantially similar educational opportunities in both places because Mr. Chappetta is willing to enroll and pay for the child to attend a private Catholic school in Metairie.

Ms. Dumas testified that the child is attending Sienna Crossing Elementary School in Texas, that he is progressing academically, and that he has made friends. Ms. Dumas, however, did not introduce any documentary evidence reflecting the programs or facilities within the school, the school's ranking, or the child's progress, such as schoolwork or report cards. Thus, we do not have before us any information to establish that this Texas school is better than any schooling option in the New Orleans area.

Mr. Chappetta also did not introduce any documentary evidence regarding his schooling choices for the child in the Metairie area or to support his testimony that he had contacted two Metairie schools for the child. In addition, while the trial court accepted Mr. Chappetta's testimony he would pay for private school in Metairie, available evidence regarding Mr. Chappetta's income suggests that his current ability to afford private school tuition is questionable.

The law is clear Ms. Dumas has the burden of proving the relocation is in the child's best interest. Ms. Dumas, however, did not present at trial information regarding the child's school, report cards, letters from the child's teachers regarding his development, or any pictures supporting the child's friendships at school. Considering this lack of evidence regarding the child's current school, and the potential for the child to attend a private school in Metairie, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding the schooling opportunities substantially the same in Texas and New Orleans.

We have further considered the impact on the child's emotional development of being separated from Mr. Chappetta for the majority of the year because the child will be in school from August to May. The record suggests that Mr. Chappetta and the child have a strong bond and share similar interests. Thus, the child's separation from his father could prove very difficult for him. We therefore cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in heavily weighing this consideration in denying the motion to relocate.

While it does not appear relocation would not hinder the child's physical or educational development and could have a positive impact, it is unclear how substantial the positive impact of relocation would be on the child's education. In addition, there is evidence the relocation could negatively impact his emotional development.

(3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between the non-relocating person and the child through suitable physical custody or visitation arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.

Given the infeasibility of Mr. Chappetta being able to maintain the current visitation schedule of every other weekend and one weeknight if they relocated, Ms. Dumas offered Mr. Chappetta custody of the child for the entire summer and more time on school holidays. Ms. Dumas’ suggested visitation schedule exhibited an intent to maximize Mr. Chappetta's time with the child when he was not in school. Mr. Chappetta, however, testified that co-parenting with Ms. Dumas was difficult and that there were times when she made it difficult for him to have his scheduled time with the child.

After hearing testimony from both parents, the trial court concluded that it was in the child's best interest to live close to both parents and allow both parents regular, i.e., weekly, participation in the child's life. Based on the record and the deference afforded the trial court, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion relative to this finding. In addition, considering the economic strain traveling to Texas would put on Mr. Chappetta to see the child, this factor weighs in favor of denying the relocation.

(4) The child's views about the proposed relocation, taking into consideration the age and maturity of the child.

This factor is not relevant here, given the child is young, six years old, and did not testify.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by either the person seeking or the person opposing the relocation, either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the other party.

As mentioned above, Mr. Chappetta testified that there have been times when Ms. Dumas has made it difficult for him to have his scheduled time with the child. Thus, Mr. Chappetta's testimony and certain incidents when the child was very young suggest that Ms. Dumas may, at times, have attempted to thwart the child's relationship with Mr. Chappetta. Because there is some evidence of issues relative to whether Ms. Dumas truly assists Mr. Chappetta with maintaining a close relationship with the child and such would likely become exacerbated by the distance of relocation, this factor weighs against granting the relocation request.

(6) How the relocation of the child will affect the general quality of life for the child, including but not limited to financial or emotional benefit and educational opportunity.

The record contains testimony that relocation would generally enhance the quality of life for both Ms. Dumas and the child. Because the relocation allows Ms. Dumas to make substantially more money in Texas, the family has the opportunity to do more and to live with less financial stress. Blake v. Morris, 51,402 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/17), 222 So.3d 1277, 1283 (when relocation has positive economic impact, that weighs in favor of granting relocation). In addition, the relocation allows the family to spend more quality time with extended family, some of whom are cousins close in age to the child and good friends of the child. Further, according to Ms. Dumas, the child has also developed close friendships with neighborhood children with whom he also attends school.

Considering these positive impacts on the child and mother's life, this factor weighs in favor of finding the relocation in the child's best interest.

(7) The reasons of each parent for seeking or opposing the relocation.

The record indicates Ms. Dumas’ reasons for requesting relocation and Mr. Chappetta's reasons for opposing it are all based on the good faith desire to provide the best life they can for their child and to maintain a healthy relationship with him.

(8) The current employment and economic circumstances of each parent and whether or not the proposed relocation is necessary to improve the circumstances of the parent seeking relocation of the child.

The record indicates relocation would greatly improve Ms. Dumas’ current economic circumstances. The IRS job would increase Ms. Dumas’ annual income by more than $20,000. She would also have assistance from her sisters with the child. If Ms. Dumas is more financially secure, she can provide a better life for the child and be mentally less-strained.

Mr. Chappetta testified that he nets $2,900 a month, which amounts to $34,900 a year. In addition, Mr. Chappetta shares a two-bedroom apartment with his mother. As a result, he and the child appear to have to share a room. Mr. Chappetta testified that he sleeps in a daybed when the child is living with him.

Considering these economic and employment-related circumstances, the record indicates the employment and economic circumstances would improve and be beneficial to the child if relocation was granted. As a result, this factor weighs in favor of the relocation.

(9) The extent to which the objecting parent has fulfilled his or her financial obligations to the parent seeking relocation, including child support, spousal support, and community property obligations.

The record indicates that Ms. Dumas bears a substantial majority of the expenses related to caring for the child, which weighs in favor of relocation. Mr. Chappetta, however, has indicated a willingness to provide a private school education for the child, and the trial court's judgment denying the relocation hinges upon Mr. Chappetta's declaration of intent to do so. We cannot say the trial court's decision to allow this to weigh in favor of denying the relocation is an abuse of discretion.

(10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting parent.

As discussed in Duerson, there is an apparent discord between this factor, La. R.S. 355:14 A(10), and La. R.S. 355:14 B, which prohibits the court's consideration of “whether the person opposing relocation may also relocate if relocation is allowed.” Duerson, 379 So.3d at 756. In Duerson, we concluded that La. R.S. 355:14 B prohibits a court from considering whether a parent might relocate if forced to do so in order to maintain a close relationship with the child or children, as opposed to considering simply whether the opposing parent's voluntary relocation is feasible under this factor La. R.S. 355:14 A(10). Id.

Here, it does not appear that Mr. Chappetta would voluntarily relocate to Texas. We therefore do not consider this factor applicable in this case.

(11) Any history of substance abuse, harassment, or violence by either the person seeking or the person opposing relocation, including a consideration of the severity of the conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation.

The record does not contain evidence of substance abuse, harassment or violence such that it weighs in favor or against relocation.

(12) Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

This catch-all consideration further establishes the “best interest of the child” focus in relocation cases and allows the trial court to consider any other factor that affects the best interest of the child, even if not listed. Gathen, 66 So.3d at 12. Here, the trial judge did not expressly consider any other factors. Based on the current record, we also do not believe there are any other relevant factors.

In conclusion, the trial court found Ms. Dumas to have the child's best interest at heart, and did not doubt that the community to which she wishes to relocate would be beneficial to the child. The trial court, however, found that this was only one consideration of the many factors. Thus, although it found benefits to the proposed relocation, the court found that the application of the factors, particularly maintaining a close relationship with both parents, led it to the conclusion that relocation was not in the child's best interest and therefore denied the relocation request.

After a thorough review of the record in its entirety, affording due deference to the trial court's discretion on relocation determinations, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding relocation was not in the best interest of the child. Further, we do not find that the lack of express consideration of certain factors by the trial court in this particular case resulted in or led to an abuse of its discretion. We acknowledge that, on appellate review, if the trial court's findings are reasonable based upon the entire record, the reviewing court may not reverse even if it is convinced that, had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Duerson, 379 So.3d at 757. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying Ms. Dumas’ motion for relocation.

The determination to grant a relocation request is always based on the facts and circumstances unique to each case. Duerson, 379 So.3d at 757-58. Consistent with this premise, our decision in this case is based on the unique circumstances present here, which were developed at the relocation trial through testimony and limited documentary evidence.

DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's November 19, 2024 judgment denying Ms. Dumas’ motion for relocation.

AFFIRMED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

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FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Chappetta attached to his memoranda documents, evidencing two 2019 incidents in which Ms. Dumas assaulted him and refused to give him custody of the child when it was his designated time; and a page of verbally disparaging text messages Ms. Dumas sent to him on unspecified date(s).

2.   Ms. Dumas attached to her memoranda documents, which evidenced her compliance with the notice requirements of the La. Relocation Statute.

3.   Ms. Dumas stated that during her research, she did not find many good public elementary schools in Metairie.

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST JUDGE