ELIZABETH LEBLANC SCHROEDER v. ALAN CONRAD SCHROEDER (2025)

In this domestic matter, the plaintiff appeals a judgment granting in part and denying in part her motion to seal designated pleadings and evidence, citing privacy issues concerning the medical records of the parties and their children. For the following reasons, we convert this matter to an application for supervisory writs and we deny the writ.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Elizabeth LeBlanc Schroeder, and the defendant, Alan Conrad Schroeder, were divorced on May 4, 2022. A trial on the merits concerning the custody of the parties’ minor children was held over a period of ten non-consecutive days from June 26, 2023 through September 29, 2023. During the trial, which was closed to the public pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 135, numerous exhibits were introduced into evidence without objection. Some of the trial testimony and exhibits referenced personal identifiable health information of the parties and their children, including medical and mental health evaluations and treatment. Additionally, the parties provided post-trial memoranda to the trial court which discussed the medical and mental health evidence in detail. A separate judgment on custody was rendered by the trial court on January 22, 2024, and this court affirmed that judgment on February 28, 2025. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 2024-1135 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/28/25), 2025 WL 655597 (unpublished).

Due to the sensitive nature of some of the evidence and pleadings, including the detailed post-trial briefs, Elizabeth filed a motion to seal designated pleadings and evidence on October 17, 2023. Alan and counsel for the minor children opposed Elizabeth's motion to seal. The contested matter was set for hearing on November 3, 2023. At the end of the hearing, the trial court orally ruled that the pediatrician's medical records for the minor children should be sealed, but found that all other evidence and pleadings should not be sealed. The trial court subsequently signed a judgment on January 22, 2024, ordering that the minor children's medical records involving their treatment with their pediatrician, Dr. Jennifer Guidroz, “shall be sealed[,]” but denying Elizabeth's request to seal any other part of the record and evidence. On January 31, 2024, Elizabeth filed a motion seeking to appeal the judgment, which the trial court granted on February 2, 2024. Elizabeth's sole assignment of error is that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling upon the motion to seal.

After the record was lodged, this court issued a rule to show cause, ex proprio motu, on December 4, 2024, noting that the January 22, 2024 judgment appeared to be a “non-appealable ruling.” The rule to show cause ordered the parties to show cause by briefs as to whether the appeal should be dismissed. That matter was referred to this panel to which the appeal is assigned.

DISCUSSION

It is the duty of the appellate court to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the issue is not raised by the parties. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2017-1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So.3d 1044, 1046. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1841 provides that a judgment may be interlocutory or final. A judgment that does not determine the merits, but only preliminary matters in the course of the action is an interlocutory judgment. Conversely, a judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1841. Our appellate jurisdiction extends to final judgments, while an interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly provided by law. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1841 and 2083.

In this case, the trial court did not designate the partial judgment on the motion to seal as final and the judgment does not determine the merits of the custody, community property, or support issues. Rather, the judgment merely resolves a preliminary issue regarding Elizabeth's request to seal the record for privacy reasons. A judgment on a motion to seal the record is an interlocutory ruling, which can be revised at any time by the trial court prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B)(2). See Koerner v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 2024-00134 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 702 (per curiam). See also Glago v. Glago, 2024-0295 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/12/24), 390 So.3d 964, 966. The proper procedural vehicle to contest an interlocutory judgment is by an application for supervisory writs filed within thirty days of the interlocutory judgment. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2201; Myers v. Diaz, 2022-0445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 354 So.3d 78, 81. This court has discretion to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs if the appeal would have been timely had it been filed as a supervisory writ application. Myers, 354 So.3d at 81. Because Elizabeth's appeal of the judgment on the motion to seal was filed within the thirty-day supervisory writ delays, and Alan does not contest timeliness, we convert this appeal to an application for supervisory writs and will consider this matter as such pursuant to our supervisory jurisdiction.¹ See La. URCA, Rule 4-3. See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 1914.

Although there is no specific statutory provision allowing a trial court to seal court records, pursuant to its general supervisory powers the trial court has inherent discretion in sealing records based on the facts and circumstances of the case. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 191 and 1631(A); Copeland v. Copeland, 2007-0177 (La. 10/16/07), 966 So.2d 1040, 1045; Ehlinger v. Ehlinger, 2017-1120 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/29/18), 251 So.3d 418, 427. Thus, it is within the trial court's purview to decide if information is of such a sensitive nature that it should not be disclosed to others. See Copeland, 966 So.2d at 1047. The right of access to public records is to be liberally construed in favor of unrestricted access. When doubt exists about the right to access certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the public's right to see. Ehlinger, 251 So.3d at 426-427. A claim of annoyance, embarrassment, or undue burden or expense is not enough to overcome the public's right of access to public records. Id. at 427. Even so, the right of access is not unlimited. Id.

In Copeland, 966 So.2d at 1046-1047, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a balancing test to be used in analyzing the competing right of access versus the right of privacy. The court noted that individuals involved in civil litigation may be compelled to give evidence which tends to embarrass them or to produce documents of a confidential nature. Id. at 1046. The court found that the balancing test properly subjects a request to have the record sealed to the trial court's discretion, placing the burden of proof on the parties seeking closure, and balancing the parties’ privacy interests against the public's rights of access to court proceedings and documents. Id. at 1047; Ehlinger, 251 So.3d at 428.

Elizabeth maintains that the sensitive and confidential nature of the health information of the parties and their children is regularly protected under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-7, et seq. HIPAA regulates the disclosure of medical information by health care providers. See Findley v. Findley, 2006-266 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 8/16/06), 937 So.2d 912, 915, writ denied, 2006-2280 (La. 10/6/06), 938 So.2d 88. HIPAA's general provisions provide a uniform reporting system for health service facilities and organizations; thus, HIPAA was designed to maintain control over federal dollars spent for medical services. See Bihm v. Bihm, 2005-1550 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 5/31/06), 932 So.2d 732, 735, writ denied, 2006-1695 (La. 10/6/06), 938 So.2d 81. It has specifically been held that HIPAA “does not create a federal physician-patient privilege” and that its privacy rule is procedural in nature. See Bihm, 932 So.2d at 735 (citing Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2004)).

Louisiana law mandates that medical records are not subject to release to anyone other than the patient without consent. See La. Code Evid. art. 510(B)(1). However, there is an exception to this general rule found in Article 510(B)(2)(d), when the communication relates to the health condition of a patient and the patient is a party to a proceeding for custody or visitation of a child or when the patient is a child who is the subject of a custody or visitation proceeding. Consequently, Elizabeth's privacy concerns are outweighed in this custody case where the mental health treatment records and testimony are relevant. See La. R.S. 13:3734(B) and (C). See also Carney v. Carney, 525 So.2d 357, 359 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 530 So.2d 88 (La. 1988), and Caston v. Centers for Psychotherapy, Inc., 619 So.2d 1140, 1141 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). HIPAA was not intended to apply to Louisiana laws governing child custody or to child custody proceedings. Rather, Louisiana law applies in those instances, and the privilege does not apply to parties or minor patients involved in custody disputes. Bihm, 932 So.2d at 735.

When Elizabeth requested that certain evidence and pleadings be sealed to protect the privacy interests of the parties and their children, the trial court exercised its discretion in sealing only the pediatrician's medical records for the minor children. We previously noted that Louisiana has no specific statute providing for sealing court records. Ehlinger, 251 So.3d at 427. A trial court exercises its supervisory power over its own records and files under a general provision to govern proceedings. See Id. Therefore, the balancing of a request to seal certain records in a custody case against the public's constitutional right of access to court proceedings and documents is left to the trial court's discretion. See Ehlinger, 251 So.3d at 428. The trial court was well aware of the evidence in this case, given its three-year management and oversight of this protracted and bitter domestic matter. We will not second-guess the trial court's discretionary interlocutory ruling. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in sealing only the minor children's pediatric medical records.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, we convert Elizabeth LeBlanc Schroeder's appeal to an application for supervisory writs and we deny the writ. All costs are assessed to Elizabeth LeBlanc Schroeder.

APPEAL CONVERTED TO AN APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS; WRIT DENIED.

I agree with the majority's conversion of this appeal to an application for supervisory writs and its denial of the writ. However, I do not think it is necessary to discuss the purpose of HIPAA or whether HIPAA preempts Louisiana law in this case. Although Ms. Schroeder generally asserts that the health information of the parties and the children is protected under HIPAA, she does not argue that HIPAA preempts Louisiana law in this case; nor does she point to any specific HIPAA provison or regulation that would apply herein and that would require the trial court to seal any health records in this case.

Next, even if HIPAA would preempt Louisiana law in this case, I do not think such is relevant in this case, because we are reviewing a judgment denying a motion to seal, not a judgment recognizing a healthcare provider-patient privilege. In other words, Ms. Schroeder has not argued nor proven that any HIPAA protections would apply to a trial court's decision regarding whether to seal a court record in a custody dispute.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A written judgment was contemplated following the November 3, 2023 hearing, such that the appeal delays run from the notice of the written judgment. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1914(B). Counsel for Alan agreed to prepare the requisite judgment and counsel for Elizabeth agreed to file the judgment. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1914(B) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he interlocutory judgment shall be reduced to writing if the court so orders” and “[t]he clerk shall mail notice of the subsequent judgment to each party.” The record does not contain the actual notice mailed by the clerk; however, the record clearly reflects that Elizabeth's motion to appeal, filed on January 31, 2024, was sought within ten days of the signing of the January 22, 2024 judgment.

WOLFE, J.

Greene, J. concurs with reasons.