TEAGUE v. FOREST RIVER INC RV LLC RV LLC (2025)

This is a redhibition/negligent repair case related to a recreational vehicle (RV) purchaser who sought rescission of the sale and damages. The purchaser's claims were dismissed by summary judgment in favor of the RV's manufacturer, seller, and repairer. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 26, 2015, Brian J. Teague purchased a 2015 Cardinal luxury fifth wheel RV from Southern RV, LLC, in Bossier City, Louisiana. The RV was manufactured by Forest River, Inc. Mr. Teague filed a petition on May 1, 2017, alleging that shortly following his purchase, he began to experience problems with the RV. Mr. Teague asserted that he experienced a blowout on three different tires in May of 2016, which “caused the total destruction of all four of the [t]ires and resulted in substantial damage to [the RV].” Mr. Teague further alleged that since May 8, 2016, the RV was plagued with numerous problems that either existed at the time the RV was sold to him and/or were caused by the blowout of the tires. In his petition, Mr. Teague listed the problems, including, but not limited to: (1) damaged rims; (2) broken tire studs; (3) bent door tracks; (4) separation of rivets from the frame, which allowed doors to open while the RV was in motion; (5) damages to the body and the fender of the RV; (6) inoperable levelers and power converter; (7) damage to the hydraulic system; (8) cross-wiring of electrical circuits; (9) a leaky toilet; (10) a faulty shut-off valve for the waste water system; and (11) other defects and/or damages as may be proven at trial. Mr. Teague also alleged that his first discovery of the defects set forth in his petition occurred on and after May 8, 2016.

Mr. Teague named the purported manufacturer of the tires, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Southern RV, and Forest River as defendants, asserting claims against these defendants under a theory of redhibition. Mr. Teague also named Camping World RV Sales, LLC, which had performed repairs to the RV, as a defendant, asserting that Camping World's repairs were “not performed in a good and workmanlike manner.”¹ Mr. Teague eventually settled his claims with Goodyear, and it was dismissed from the suit in 2019.

Southern RV and Forest River jointly filed a motion for summary judgment on September 11, 2023, urging that Mr. Teague cannot meet his burden of proof to show that the RV had redhibitory defects which would entitle him to recovery against them. They further alleged that Mr. Teague's primary allegations, as set forth in the petition, are that four defective tires manufactured by Goodyear caused the problems that he experienced with the RV. In support of their motion, Southern RV and Forest River attached the following exhibits to their motion: (1) excerpts from Mr. Teague's deposition; (2) excerpts from the deposition of their expert, Douglas Lown; (3) excerpts from the deposition of Mr. Teague's expert, Scotty McCannon; and (4) an affidavit and written report by Mr. Lown. Camping World also filed a motion for summary judgment on September 12, 2023, attaching several exhibits to its motion for summary judgment, including the full deposition testimony of Mr. Teague and Mr. McCannon.

In response, Mr. Teague submitted a written opposition to both motions for summary judgment to the court and opposing counsel on October 23, 2023. Several exhibits were attached to Mr. Teague's opposition. Mr. Teague admits, however, that he did not file his opposition and exhibits into the record. At the summary judgment hearing on November 6, 2023, all three defendants objected to Mr. Teague's late-filing of his opposition and exhibits. The trial court declined to consider Mr. Teague's opposition to the summary judgment motions given that he failed to file the opposition and the exhibits attached thereto into the record. Moreover, the trial court did not allow Mr. Teague to argue because he had failed to timely file an opposition. Mr. Teague was permitted to proffer his memorandum in opposition and exhibits.

Following argument, the trial court granted both motions for summary judgment in open court. The trial court subsequently signed a judgment on November 20, 2023, which memorialized its open court ruling and dismissed all of Mr. Teague's claims against Forest River, Southern RV, and Camping World (referred to collectively as “defendants”). Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Mr. Teague timely filed the instant appeal. In this appeal, Mr. Teague challenges the summary judgment rendered in favor of Forest River and Southern RV, but he does not expressly challenge the summary judgment granted in favor of Camping World. Nevertheless, because the trial court rendered judgment in favor of all three defendants and dismissed Mr. Teague's claims against all three defendants, we will discuss the motions for summary judgment together as they relate to Mr. Teague's assignments of error.

On appeal, Mr. Teague raises the following assignments of error: (1) The trial court had sufficient evidence to deny the defendants’ motions for summary judgment without consideration of Mr. Teague's evidence; (2) The trial court erred by refusing to allow Mr. Teague to present oral argument at the underlying summary judgment hearing when he had served his memorandum in opposition and exhibits to the court and all counsel 15 days prior to the hearing; and (3) The trial court erred by refusing to accept into the record the memorandum in opposition and exhibits Mr. Teague had presented to the court and all counsel 15 days prior to the hearing.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. Knight, 2023-1267 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/14/24), 391 So.3d 1126, 1129. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, summary judgment is appropriate. Collins v. Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., 2019-0577 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/21/20), 298 So.3d 191, 194-195, writ denied, 2020-00480 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So.3d 773. A material fact is one that potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. Juneau v. Louisiana Tennis Association, Inc., 2019-0964 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/27/20), 300 So.3d 12, 17. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Sanders v. Swiftships, Inc., 2017-0774 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/20/18), 393 So.3d 371, 377, writ denied, 2018-1912 (La. 1/18/19), 262 So.3d 289. Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Collins, 298 So.3d at 194.

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court on the motion, the mover's burden does not require that all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense be negated. Instead, the mover must point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1). Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the mover is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1); Johnson, 391 So.3d at 1129. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether or not a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Galliano v. CB & I, LLC, 2018-0844 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/10/19), 275 So.3d 906, 909.

In Louisiana sales, the seller is bound by an implied warranty that the thing sold is free of hidden defects. See Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So.2d 840, 842 (La. 1974) (statutorily overruled on other grounds); Morrison v. Allstar Dodge, Inc., 2000-0398 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/11/01), 792 So.2d 9, 14, writ denied, 2001-2129 (La. 11/2/01), 800 So.2d 878. The seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects, or vices, in the thing sold. La. Civ. Code art. 2520. A defect is redhibitory when it either renders the thing useless, or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have bought the thing had he known of the defect. Id. The existence of such a defect gives a buyer the right to obtain rescission of the sale. Id. A defect is redhibitory also when, without rendering the thing totally useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must be presumed that a buyer would still have bought it, but for a lesser price. Id.

Redhibition only covers defects that existed at the time of delivery. La. Civ. Code art. 2530. A defect is presumed to have existed at the time of delivery if it appears within three days of delivery. Id. Even where the defect appears more than three days after the sale, if it appears soon after the thing is put into use, a reasonable inference may arise, in the absence of other explanation or intervening cause shown, that the defect existed at the time of sale. See Griffin v. Coleman Oldsmobile, Inc., 424 So.2d 1116, 1118, (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) and La. Civ. Code art. 2530; 1993 Official Revision Comment (c).

On appeal, Mr. Teague contends that even if the court cannot consider the exhibits he attached to his opposition to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment given that they were not filed into the record, the defendants did not meet their initial burden of proof on summary judgment. As such, he asserts that the burden never shifted to him to establish that genuine issues of material fact existed.

In urging that the burden never shifted, Mr. Teague notes that one of the documents submitted by defendants in support of their motions for summary judgment was a portion of Mr. Teague's deposition. Mr. Teague notes that in his deposition he testified that he experienced electrical problems the first day he took possession of the RV, and those problems continued throughout his ownership of the vehicle. Specifically, in the excerpt from his deposition provided by defendants, Mr. Teague testified:

Actually, the day I picked the RV up the campground I was staying at wasn't far from Southern RV. Once I plugged the RV up at the campsite and opened the door, it started billowing with smoke on the inside of the RV. I was afraid I was going to have a fire. So, I unhooked it. And, I can't remember if I made it to the dealership that evening or the next morning, but I took it straight back to Southern RV and they replaced a converter on the RV.

Mr. Teague further testified that the immediate electrical issues “kind of followed me through[out] the ownership of the unit.” Given that issues arose with the RV within three days of purchase and those issues followed him through his ownership, Mr. Teague avers that the defendants’ own evidence reflects that he is entitled to the presumption of a redhibitory defect as recognized in La. Civ. Code art. 2530. As such, he concludes that defendants failed to meet their initial burden of proof on summary judgment.

In response, defendants contend that they presented evidence sufficient to support their motion for summary judgment on the redhibition claim. Defendants aver that the documents they provided in support of their motion for summary judgment established the following:

1) Mr. Teague admitted in his deposition that he inspected and operated the RV before he purchased it, and the electrical system functioned properly. It was not until he plugged the RV into a campground that the electrical converter started to smoke.

2) Defendants’ expert witness, Mr. Lown, testified that the initial problems with the RV's convertor was caused by substandard or improper wiring at the campground, and not a manufacturing defect.

3) Mr. Lown also testified that the electrical convertor functioned properly when he inspected it.

4) Mr. Teague's expert, Mr. McCannon, admitted that he did not test the electrical system in Mr. Teague's RV or even physically inspect the RV, although he wrote a report on the alleged manufacturing defects. Mr. McCannon's report, however, was not included as an exhibit to the appellees’ motion for summary judgment.

5) Both experts agreed that the damage caused when the RV's tires blew out could have caused the electrical problems after the first convertor-campground problem.

Defendants contend that given the foregoing evidence, they met their initial burden and the burden shifted to Mr. Teague to offer evidence to show that material facts were in dispute. Defendants maintain that Mr. Teague has not done so, especially given that the trial court correctly refused to allow him to file his opposition and the exhibits attached thereto into the record.

While the evidence defendants submitted in support of their motions for summary judgment reflects several problems that arose related to the RV, the evidence they submitted also indicated that these problems were not redhibitory defects that existed at the time of delivery, as required by La. Civ. Code art. 2530. Specifically, the evidence introduced by defendants indicates that the issue at the campground that occurred shortly after Mr. Teague purchased the RV arose from substandard or improper wiring at the campground as opposed to a redhibitory defect in the RV or in the converter.² Moreover, while Mr. Teague indicates that the convertor would eventually be replaced six more times, Mr. Lown, in his report, indicated that the “[s]ubsequent problems with the convertor occurred after the tires on the unit blew out and the undercarriage (including wiring) was damaged, and after [Mr. Teague] had used the unit in various other campgrounds and RV parks.” Similarly, in his deposition, Mr. Lown testified that “most of the issues that occurred with the converters [were] all incurred after this blowout damage,” which Mr. Lown opined was the cause of the converter issues. Mr. McCannon, Mr. Teague's expert, even acknowledged that the blowouts may have been the cause of the RV's issues.

Considering the foregoing, defendants met their initial burden to show that no redhibitory defect existed in the RV at the time of delivery for which they may be responsible. At that point, the burden shifted to Mr. Teague to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed. To meet his burden of proof, Mr. Teague urges that this court should consider the exhibits attached to his opposition to the motion for summary judgment as well as the exhibits submitted by Camping World in support of its motion for summary judgment. Both issues are addressed in turn below.

Mr. Teague notes that the trial court did not consider his exhibits because neither his memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment nor the exhibits attached thereto were filed into the record. Nevertheless, Mr. Teague avers that the memorandum and exhibits were provided to the opposing parties and the court on October 23, 2023, or fifteen days prior to the summary judgment hearing. Moreover, Mr. Teague notes that counsel acknowledged receipt of same at the summary judgment hearing.

Mr. Teague, citing Grimaldi Mechanical, L.L.C. v. The Gray Ins. Co., 2005-0695 (La App. 4 Cir. 6/2/06), 933 So.2d 887, 892, writ denied, 2006-2146 (La. 11/17/06), 942 So.2d 536, avers that the purpose of a pleading is to inform the opponents of the issues, in order to give them an opportunity to present evidence in support of their contentions, and to avoid placing the opponent at a disadvantage by surprise. Mr. Teague maintains that the purpose was served here where he timely provided his memorandum in opposition and supporting documents to the trial court and all counsel. He asserts that no party was at a disadvantage. As such, he contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider the exhibits he filed in opposition to defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

However, we note that La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B)(2) requires that “any opposition to the motion and all documents in support of the opposition shall be filed and served in accordance with Article 1313(A)(4) not less than fifteen days prior to the hearing on the motion.” (Emphasis added.) The 2015 Official Revision Comments to Article 966 provide that “[t]he Article makes clear that all motions, memoranda, and supporting documents shall be served on all parties and filed with the clerk of court.” (Emphasis added.) La. Code Civ. P. art. 966; 2015 Official Revision Comment (d).

In Auricchio v. Harriston, 2020-01167 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So.3d 660, 663, the supreme court confirmed the clear and unambiguous language of Article 966(B)(2) requires that an opposition shall be filed within the fifteen-day deadline established by the article. Therein, the party opposing summary judgment missed the deadline for filing her opposition, but argued that the opposing party was “not prejudiced by the late filing.” Id. The court noted, however, that “[t]he statute mandates compliance without regard to cause or prejudice.” Id. The court also pointed out that limiting judicial discretion by setting a firm deadline for filing an opposition furthers the intent of summary judgment to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court, in reviewing the motion for summary judgment, could not consider the late-filed opposition. Id.

In another supreme court case, Buggage v. Volks Constructors, 2006-0175 (La. 5/5/06), 928 So.2d 536 (per curiam), the court found that the time limitation in La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B) is mandatory. The supreme court concluded that the appellate court erred as a matter of law in considering a late-filed opposition to a motion for summary judgment in its de novo review of the merits of the motion. Id. The court stated that the “opposition had been disallowed by the trial court, which acted within its discretion in excluding an opposition filed a few minutes before the scheduled hearing on the motion.” Id. This court has continuously followed the Buggage holding, most recently in Stonetrust Commercial Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 2021-0721 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/3/22), 341 So.3d 819, 824. See also Poirrier v. Denoux, 2019-1084 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/18/20), 2020 WL 5587089, *4 (unpublished).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966(B)(2) is clear and unambiguous that both the opposition and the exhibits thereto “shall be filed” into the record. Mr. Teague acknowledges that neither his memorandum in opposition nor the attachments thereto were filed into the record. Merely providing these documents to opposing counsel and the trial court within the deadline afforded by the article, but not filing these documents into the record, does not meet the clear requirements set forth in the article. Further, the mere fact that the appellees may not have been prejudiced is irrelevant. Auricchio, 332 So.3d at 663. Accordingly, considering the strict construction of Article 966 as expressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Auricchio, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it did not consider the exhibits attached to Mr. Teague's opposition.

Mr. Teague also contends that in reviewing defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court should consider the exhibits produced by Camping World in support of its motion for summary judgment. However, La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(2) provides that “[t]he court shall consider only those documents filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment[.]” The article does not provide that the parties can rely on documents submitted in connection with other summary judgment motions. See Huggins v. Amtrust Insurance Company of Kansas, Inc., 2020-0516 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/20), 319 So.3d 362, 366-367 (“[I]n reviewing the grant of the summary judgment ․ [the court] may consider only those documents specifically filed in support of or in opposition to the ․ motion for summary judgment[,]” and not documents offered by other parties that are in the record.

We recognize that Article 966, as amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 317, § 1, now allows documents to “be specifically referenced and considered in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment by listing with the motion or opposition the documents by title and date of filing.” La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(4)(b). As noted above, Mr. Teague's opposition was never filed into the record. Even so, the opposition, which was proffered for our review on appeal, does not rely upon the documents submitted by Camping World in its motion for summary judgment nor does it cite to Camping World's exhibits. See Bonano v. Docar Sales, Inc., 2024-0195 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/22/24), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2024 WL 4541269, *9 (The ‘ “me too’ motion failed to comply with the [La. Code Civ. P.] art. 966(A)(4)(b) requirement that the documents previously filed into the record be listed ‘by title and date of filing.’ ”) As such, we cannot consider the evidence attached to Camping World's motion for summary judgment.

Additionally, Mr. Teague urges that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow him to present oral argument at the underlying summary judgment hearing. Mr. Teague avers that the privilege of argument is conditioned on compliance with Rule 9.9 of the Louisiana Rules of District Courts. Specifically, Mr. Teague notes that 9.9(c) provides:

A party who opposes an exception or motion shall concurrently furnish the trial judge and serve on all other parties an opposition memorandum so it is received at least eight calendar days before the scheduled hearing, except for motions for summary judgment, which delays are established by La. Code Civ. [P.] art. 966.

Rule 9.9(e) provides that a party who fails to comply with the foregoing “may forfeit the privilege of oral argument.” Mr. Teague maintains that nothing in Rule 9.9 requires the opposition memorandum be filed into the record, but only that it be timely provided to the court and opposing counsel. Mr. Teague avers that he complied with Rule 9.9(c) and he should have been entitled to argument, even if the opposition was not filed into the record as required by La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B)(2).

The trial court has discretion in deciding whether to allow a party oral argument. O'Connor v. Nelson, 2010-250 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1/11/11), 60 So.3d 27, 32 (“Although there appears to be some discretion with the trial judge to allow oral argument, it is clear that oral argument is a privilege, not a right, and is normally forfeited by the failure to comply with the filing guidelines.”) Because the opposition was not filed in the record as required by Article 966, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Teague's request for oral argument at the summary judgment hearing.

Even if we were to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Teague's request for oral argument, there is no prejudice to Mr. Teague. Specifically, Mr. Teague merely would have been able to present argument at the hearing,³ but he would not have been allowed to introduce any evidence. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(2). Given that no additional evidence could have been introduced at the summary judgment hearing and because this court's review on appeal is de novo, there is no prejudice to Mr. Teague even if the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow him to present oral argument at the summary judgment hearing.

Accordingly, all of Mr. Teague's assignments of error are without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's November 20, 2023 judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Forest River, Inc., Southern RV, LLC, and Camping World RV Sales, LLC, and dismissing Brian J. Teague's claims against those defendants is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff-appellant, Brian J. Teague.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his petition, Mr. Teague also urged that Camping World was a “successor-in-interest” to Southern RV, apparently averring that Camping World was also liable under a theory of redhibition. However, the parties later stipulated that Mr. Teague did not have any viable claims against Camping World under a redhibition theory, and those claims were dismissed.

2.   We recognize that in a portion of his deposition attached to defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Mr. Teague testified that the initial problems “had to do with the RV” and not the campground. However, he also indicated that he was only “speculating what happened,” but believed the converter may have been damaged by a forklift when Southern RV moved it. Mere conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are insufficient to support a finding of a genuine issue of material fact. Marrero v. I. Manheim Auctions, Inc., 2020-0878 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/21), 321 So.3d 406, 409-410.

3.   Argument of counsel, no matter how artful, is not evidence. Tour Holdings, L.L.C. v. Larre, 2018-0503 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/6/18), 267 So.3d 735, 738.

WOLFE, J.