LEE v. CITY OF BAKER SCHOOL SYSTEM (2025)

This is an appeal of a judgment dismissing a mandamus action on a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The City of Baker School Board employed Vereta Lee in various non-tenured administrative roles starting in October of 2011. On July 1, 2015, Ms. Lee was promoted to a position with a higher salary as Supervisor of Student Support Services. Initially, Ms. Lee and the School Board had a written promotional contract for a two-year term, which was renewed multiple times, with and without written contracts, through June 30, 2024. However, on June 16, 2023, the Superintendent of the School Board, J.T. Stroder, notified Ms. Lee that her position was being eliminated due to declining student enrollment and fiscal constraints that required a reduction in force. The notice also informed Ms. Lee that she had the right to a review of the decision, as well as the right to recall should an opportunity for reinstatement arise. The School Board continued Ms. Lee's employment, pay, and medical insurance through October 13, 2023.

Ms. Lee filed a petition against the School Board and the Superintendent, individually and in his official capacity, alleging that her termination violated the Teacher Tenure Law found at La. R.S. 17:441, et seq.¹ Ms. Lee sought a writ of mandamus to compel the School Board and the Superintendent to issue her a new written promotional contract with the mandatory two-year term of July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2024, to reinstate her to her position and, alternatively, for declaratory and injunctive relief, and for attorney fees. Attached to the petition was a copy of Ms. Lee's 2020-2022 contract, which was the last written contract issued to her. The School Board and Superintendent jointly filed dilatory exceptions raising the objections of lack of procedural capacity, the improper use of summary process, improper cumulation of actions, and prematurity, along with peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and no right of action.² The School Board and the Superintendent asserted that Ms. Lee's termination was in accordance with La. R.S. 17:81.4, which allows for reductions in force without consideration of seniority or tenure. Ms. Lee opposed the exceptions in memoranda filed on January 22, 2024, and January 25, 2024.

After a hearing on the exceptions, the trial court granted the dilatory exceptions of improper cumulation and unauthorized use of summary proceedings, and ordered Ms. Lee to amend her petition within thirty days. No ruling was issued as to the peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action at that time. The judgment was signed on February 12, 2024, and on February 20, 2024, Ms. Lee filed an “Amended Petition for Issuance of Alternative Writ of Mandamus.”³

In response to Ms. Lee's amended petition, the School Board and the Superintendent jointly filed a reply brief arguing that Ms. Lee's amended petition still failed to set forth a cause of action against the School Board because the termination of Ms. Lee's non-tenured administrative position was allowed pursuant to La. R.S. 17:81.4, which governs reductions in force. Additionally, they argued that the Superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity, pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1, for all actions he took in his individual and official capacity within the scope of his discretionary authority. After a hearing on the exception of no cause of action on April 24, 2024, the trial court granted the exception and dismissed Ms. Lee's claims against the School Board and the Superintendent. The trial court signed a judgment on May 16, 2024, in accordance with its ruling. Ms. Lee appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her mandamus action.

DISCUSSION

The peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action questions whether the law extends a remedy to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson, 96-1010 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 751, 754, writ denied, 97-1066 (La. 6/13/97), 695 So.2d 982. When presented with an exception of no cause of action, the trial court simply determines whether the facts alleged in the petition and documents annexed to the petition entitle the plaintiff to any relief as a matter of law. See Adams v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 2004-1296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/23/05), 921 So.2d 972, 975, writ denied, 2005-2501 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So.2d 514. The appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's sustaining an exception of no cause of action, because the exception raises a question of law. Id. at 976. No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception, unless evidence is admitted without objection to enlarge the pleadings. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 931; Woodland Ridge Ass'n v. Cangelosi, 94-2604 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/6/95), 671 So.2d 508, 510. The exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true. Treasure Chest Casino, 691 So.2d at 754. However, conclusions of law asserted as fact are not considered well-pled allegations of fact. Hooks v. Treasurer, 2006-0541 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 425, 429, writ denied, 2007-1788 (La. 11/9/07), 967 So.2d 507. Further, when a petition states a cause of action as to any ground or portion of the demand, the exception must be overruled. Any doubts are resolved in favor of the sufficiency of the petition. Treasure Chest Casino, 691 So.2d at 755.

Ms. Lee first asserts that the trial court had no authority to consider the exception of no cause of action when it did not address that exception in the first hearing on the dilatory exceptions raised at the same time. We find no merit in this argument. A peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action may be noticed by the trial court or appellate court sua sponte, on its own motion, at any time prior to submission of the case for a decision. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 927(B). See also Brunner v. Holloway, 2017-0674 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/2/17), 235 So.3d 1153, 1158. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in addressing the exception, and that ruling is properly before this court for review. See Three Rivers Commons Condominium Assoc. v. Grodner, 2016-0067 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/17), 220 So.3d 776, 779, writ denied, 2017-0974 (La. 4/2/18), 248 So.3d 315.

Mandamus is a writ directing a public officer to perform a ministerial duty required by law. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3861 and 3863. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used sparingly to compel something clearly required by law where there is no relief by ordinary means or where delay in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3862; Turner v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2017-1769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/4/18), 252 So.3d 990, 992, writ denied, 2018-1127 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d 1299. A ministerial duty is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law, which leaves no element of discretion to the public officer. Turner, 252 So.3d at 992.

Ms. Lee seeks mandamus relief compelling the School Board and the Superintendent to issue her a new written contract for her non-tenured administrative position through June 30, 2024, even though she admits in her petition that the position was eliminated due to “an alleged reduction in force.” Ms. Lee relies on protections outlined in the Teacher Tenure Law, La. R.S. 17:441, et seq., and specifically depends on language found in La. R.S. 17:444(B)(4)(c)(iii) and (iv), which provide:

(iii) The employee shall be retained during the term of a contract unless the employee is found incompetent or inefficient or is found to have failed to fulfill the terms and performance objectives of his contract. However, before an employee can be removed during the contract period, he shall have the right to written charges and a hearing before a disciplinary hearing officer in the manner provided in [La.] R.S. 17:443.

(iv) The board shall negotiate and offer a new contract at the expiration of each existing contract unless the superintendent recommends against a new contract based on an evaluation of the contractee as provided for in [La.] R.S. 17:391.5, or unless failure to offer a new contract is based on a cause sufficient to support a mid-contract termination as provided in Item (iii) of this Subparagraph, or unless the position as been discontinued, or unless the position has been eliminated as a result of district reorganization, provided that should the position be re-created, the employee, if still employed by the board, shall have first right of refusal to the re-created position.

The purpose of the Teacher Tenure Law is to ensure teachers with security in the position, grade, or status they have attained, and not merely to ensure them with teaching employment. Hays v. Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 2009-1386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/11/10), 39 So.3d 818, 821, writ denied, 2010-1640 (La. 10/8/10), 46 So.3d 1272. However, the tenure law was not intended to guarantee job security where there are no jobs. Id. The Louisiana Legislature enacted the Reduction in Force statute, La. R.S. 17:81.4, in 1983 to allow for school boards to establish rules and policies for the dismissal of teachers and other school employees by the Superintendent at any time that a reduction in force is instituted.⁴ The tenure law imposes a duty on the School Board to negotiate subsequent contracts unless certain grounds for nonrenewal exist: (1) when the Superintendent recommends against a new contract; (2) when there is a cause sufficient to support a mid-contract termination, such as incompetency or inefficiency based on an evaluation; (3) when the position has been discontinued; or (4) when the position has been eliminated as a result of district reorganization. See La. R.S. 17:444(B)(4)(c)(iv); Turner, 252 So.3d at 993.

The legislature is presumed to enact each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Hays, 39 So.3d at 823. All laws pertaining to the same subject matter must be interpreted in pari materia or in reference to each other. See La. Civ. Code art 13; Turner, 252 So.3d at 993. Where possible, courts have a duty to adopt a construction of a statute that harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject matter. Turner, 252 So.3d at 993. The primary question involved in this case is whether the tenure law or the reduction in force law is applicable, and whether Ms. Lee has stated a cause of action under the applicable law.

We first note that Ms. Lee is not a tenured teacher; she is an employee with a promotional contract for an administrative position with the School Board. Ms. Lee does not dispute the reason given for her mid-contract termination as a reduction in force. Rather, she maintains that because she was never deficient or incompetent in the performance of her contract, the School Board and the Superintendent had no justification for terminating her position mid-term. She also argues that her termination was unlawful because the School Board and the Superintendent did not follow mandatory due process procedures required by law.

To accept Ms. Lee's position ignores the reduction in force statute that allows the School Board and the Superintendent to eliminate positions when enrollment and budget constraints require such an action. As previously mentioned, the facts as alleged by Ms. Lee in her petition acknowledge that the reason she was terminated from her position was due to “an alleged reduction in force.” The actions taken by the School Board and the Superintendent were legally permitted under the reduction in force statute, La. R.S. 17:81.4. Furthermore, a remedy is provided in La. R.S. 17:81.4 such that an employee notified of a reduction in force action may request in writing a review of the action and receive notice of the results of the review. Also, an employee may pursue the matter through the School Board's grievance procedure. See La. R.S. 17:81.4(D)(1) and (2). Consequently, Ms. Lee has not sufficiently stated a cause of action entitling her to a writ of mandamus ordering the School Board and the Superintendent to reissue a promotional contract to her.⁵ The trial court correctly dismissed Ms. Lee's petition requesting mandamus relief for failure to state a cause of action.

Finally, we note that when the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception of no cause of action may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. La. Code Civ. P. art. 934; Trepagnier v. Crump, 2023-0040 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 436, 440. If the grounds of the objection cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action shall be dismissed. La. Code Civ. P. art. 934. However, the right to amend a petition is not absolute and the decision to allow amendment is within the discretion of the trial court. Trepagnier, 369 So.3d at 440.

In this case, Ms. Lee amended her petition twice. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to award Ms. Lee an opportunity to amend her petition for a third time. The grounds for the objection of no cause of action cannot be removed by amendment, because the controlling law for issuance of a writ of mandamus under the facts alleged by Ms. Lee does not support a cause of action against the School Board and the Superintendent.⁶ Thus, an amendment would be a vain and useless act in light of the nature of Ms. Lee's claim that is based on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable statutes. See Hooks, 961 So.2d at 432; Compeaux v. Plaisance Inspection & Enterprises, Inc., 93-1165 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/24/94), 639 So.2d 434, 440.

CONCLUSION

The May 16, 2024 judgment of the trial court dismissing Vereta Lee's petition requesting mandamus relief is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Vereta Lee.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Teacher Tenure Law was originally enacted in 1922, then was amended and reenacted in 1936, with the goal of protecting teachers by giving security in their positions. See Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish School Bd., 93-1916 (La. 2/28/94), 633 So.2d 1235, 1241-1242.

2.   The exceptions were filed on two dates: (1) January 17, 2024, a dilatory exception of lack of procedural capacity and a peremptory exception of no cause of action and no right of action, and (2) January 24, 2024, more dilatory exceptions of improper use of summary process, improper cumulation of actions, and prematurity.

3.   This was the second time Ms. Lee amended her petition. The first amended petition was filed before the hearing on the exceptions in order to correct the name of the School Board.

4.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:81.4 provides, in pertinent part:A. [E]ach local public school board shall develop and adopt rules and policies that delegate reduction in force decisions to the superintendent which he shall use in dismissing teachers and other employees at any time a reduction in force is instituted. ․***D. All reduction in force policies of local public school boards and special schools as provided in this Section shall include:(1) The right of an employee notified of an action which results from implementation of a reduction in force policy to request in writing a review of such action and to receive notice of the results of such review.(2) The right of an employee to pursue the matter through the school board's adopted grievance procedure.E. No reduction in force policy adopted by a local public school shall include seniority or tenure as the primary criterion to be considered when instituting a reduction in force.

5.   The copy of the promotional contract annexed to Ms. Lee's petition contains a paragraph about a reduction in force during the term of the contract, which states in pertinent part:Notwithstanding any other provision of this contract to the contrary, should it become necessary for the School Board to effect a reduction in force during the terms of this contract[, Ms. Lee] shall be subject to the provisions of the reduction in force policy of the School Board ․. If application of the reduction in force policy causes [Ms. Lee] to be removed from the position ․, then this agreement shall automatically terminate[.]

6.   We find it unnecessary to discuss at length the qualified immunity of the School Board and the Superintendent pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2798.1. The referenced statute basically provides that a public entity and its officers and employees are immune from tort claims based on their policymaking decisions or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties. See Brown v. White, 2022-1122 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/14/23), 366 So.3d 626, 639. Ms. Lee's action was for a writ of mandamus, not an action for tort damages. Even if she were to attempt to amend her petition to state a tort claim, the amendment would be futile because the School Board and the Superintendent have qualified immunity under these circumstances.

WOLFE, J.