JUDY DAVIS LEDOUX v. RICHARD GLEN LEDOUX STEPHEN BRIAN LEDOUX LEDOUX ENTERPRISES INC AND THE RICHARD HALL LEDOUX REVOCABLE REAL ESTATE TRUST (2025)

Judy Davis LeDoux appeals the 20th Judicial District Court's January 30, 2024 judgment terminating the Richard Hall LeDoux Revocable Real Estate Trust. For the following reasons, we reverse the January 30, 2024 judgment in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter concerns a trust created by Richard Hall LeDoux (“Richard”) on December 14, 2012. The following facts are relevant to this appeal.

On January 17, 1979, LeDoux Electric, Inc. was incorporated with the Louisiana Secretary of State. LeDoux Electric, Inc.’s Articles of Incorporation provided that “[t]he total authorized capital stock of this corporation is One Thousand (1,000) shares of common stock, without fixed or par value.” Richard, as the sole shareholder of LeDoux Electric, Inc., changed the company's name to LeDoux Enterprises, Inc. (henceforth “LeDoux Enterprises”) on December 28, 1994. Richard became the president of LeDoux Enterprises at some point before December 3, 2002.¹

Prior to the establishment of the trust at issue, LeDoux Enterprises purchased several tracts of land consisting of over a hundred acres (collectively “the LE Property”). The instant dispute between the parties relates to control of the LE Property.²

In 1996, Richard purchased an 8.243-acre tract of land from LeDoux Enterprises whereupon he and Judy Davis LeDoux (“Judy”), his wife and the appellant in this matter, built their family home (collectively “the family home”).³ Shortly thereafter, Richard conveyed an undivided one-half interest in this property to Judy. Judy inherited the remaining one-half interest in the family home upon Richard's death and still resides at the family home, which is located in the center of the LE Property but is not part of the LE Property.

On December 14, 2012, Richard executed a series of documents relating to the creation of the trust at issue in this appeal. First, as the president and sole shareholder of LeDoux Enterprises, Richard amended the company's Articles of Incorporation to authorize the issuance of twenty shares of Class A Common Stock with voting rights (“Class A voting stock”) and eighty shares of Class B Common Stock without voting rights (“Class B non-voting stock”). As the sole shareholder, Richard initially became the owner of both the Class A voting stock and Class B non-voting stock. Richard then donated the Class B non-voting stock to the appellees in this matter, his sons Richard Glen LeDoux (“Glen”) and Stephen LeDoux (“Stephen”), with each receiving forty shares. On the same date, Richard created the Richard Hall LeDoux Revocable Real Estate Trust (“the Trust”) and donated his Class A voting stock to the Trust. This appeal concerns the validity of the Trust itself and the authorities that Richard attempted to grant to Judy via the Trust.

In the Trust instrument, Richard, as settlor of the Trust, designated Glen and Stephen as principal beneficiaries. Richard named himself as the income beneficiary and designated Stephen, Glen, and Judy to become successor income beneficiaries upon his death.⁴ The Trust instrument further provided that the Trust would become irrevocable upon Richard's death and “shall terminate immediately after the last to die” of Richard and Judy.

The Trust was amended on five different occasions; these amendments were made on February 7, 2013, January 19, 2014,⁵ January 23, 2014, May 2, 2016, and July 13, 2016. Relevantly, Richard's first amendment to the Trust instrument granted to Judy full and complete use and control for all purposes of any real estate owned by LeDoux Enterprises, subject to Glen and Stephen's rights to enter the property. The first amendment also forbade the sale of any real estate owned by LeDoux Enterprises for ten years following Richard's death.

Richard's subsequent amendments to the Trust instrument included revisions to Glen and Stephen's access to the property. Most pertinent is the fifth and final amendment, wherein Richard again granted to Judy the full and complete use and control for all purposes of any real estate owned by LeDoux Enterprises. The fifth amendment further forbade the sale of the LE Property until Judy no longer resides at the family home or until her death, whichever occurs first. The fifth amendment also made Judy's use and control of the LE Property subject to Glen and Stephen's respective rights to enter the property and/or authorize the entrance of other persons for the purposes of hunting and fishing. Lastly, Richard amended the Trust instrument to name Judy, Glen, and Stephen as joint successor trustees to serve upon his death or disability.

Richard died on August 10, 2020, at which point Judy, Glen, and Stephen became co-trustees and the Trust became irrevocable. On July 5, 2023, Judy filed suit against the Trust, Glen, Stephen, and LeDoux Enterprises. In her petition, she asserted that she had maintained horses on the LE Property prior to and since Richard's death and that Richard built a stable, tack room, corrals, and fences on the LE Property for that purpose. Judy further asserted that Richard's intent in granting to Judy the full and complete use and control of the LE Property was to allow Judy to maintain and enjoy her horses on the property after Richard's death.

Judy alleged in her petition that Glen and Stephen were interfering with her use of the LE Property and violating her rights as co-trustee to use and control the LE Property.⁶ She requested that the trial court declare her rights under the Trust to control, use, and enjoy the LE Property without interference from Glen and Stephen, declare Glen and Stephen's rights to the property be limited to only hunting and/or fishing, and grant a preliminary injunction to that effect.

Glen and Stephen filed an answer to Judy's petition with affirmative defenses on August 4, 2023, wherein they asserted that Richard never actually placed the LE Property (or any property other than the Class A voting stock) into the Trust. They argued that Judy had no legal right or authority over the LE Property as a result.

On August 7, 2023, Judy fax-filed a supplemental and amending petition wherein she set forth additional factual allegations regarding Glen's actions.⁷ On August 10, 2023, Glen and Stephen filed a motion for leave to file a reconventional demand, which was granted on August 14, 2023. In their reconventional demand, Glen and Stephen requested that the trial court declare that Judy has no beneficial interest in the LE Property nor any right to use the LE Property.

Also on August 10, 2023, Glen and Stephen filed an exception of no cause of action and supporting memorandum, wherein they reiterated their argument that Judy has no legal right to the LE Property. On August 28, 2023, Glen and Stephen answered Judy's supplemental and amending petition, restating their previous answer and the arguments within their exception of no cause of action and reconventional demand.

On September 18, 2023, Judy filed an opposition to Glen and Stephen's exception of no cause of action wherein she asserted that although she does not enjoy real rights or a beneficial interest in the LE Property, the Trust instrument validly gave her the authority as co-trustee to use and control the LE Property and any other real estate owned by LeDoux Enterprises.

On October 24, 2023, Glen and Stephen filed a motion for leave to amend and restate their reconventional demand, which was ultimately granted. In their amended and restated reconventional demand, Glen and Stephen sought to have the Trust terminated. They reiterated their argument that the Trust does not own the LE Property and contended that the Trust could not accomplish its alleged purpose of providing for the use and control of LeDoux Enterprise's immovable property as a result.

On December 8, 2023, Judy answered Glen and Stephen's amended and restated reconventional demand, arguing that Richard had exclusive authority as the company's sole shareholder, president, and director to restrict and/or condition the ownership, occupancy, and use of immovable property owned by LeDoux Enterprises.

A hearing on the amended and restated reconventional demand, the exception of no cause of action, and Judy's request for a preliminary injunction was held on January 11, 2024. The January 11, 2024 hearing consisted only of the parties’ arguments and joint exhibits. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated the Trust.

In oral reasons, the trial court stated that the transfer of the Class A voting stock to the Trust did not constitute a donation of the LE Property to the Trust. The trial court further determined that because no immovable property was donated to the Trust, the lack of immovable property in trust necessitates the termination of the Trust pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2607 because the Trust is incapable of accomplishing its purpose and is prohibited by Louisiana law. The trial court also found that the Trust should be terminated pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2606 because continuance of the Trust defeats or substantially impairs the purpose for which it was created.

The trial court further highlighted a clause in the Trust allowing the Trust to be terminated earlier than Judy's death if the value of the Trust property no longer justifies the expenses of the Trust's management or it is otherwise in the best interest of the beneficiaries to do so. The trial court found it to be in the best interest of the beneficiaries to terminate the Trust, opining that there was continuous animosity between the parties.⁸

The trial court signed a judgment terminating the Trust on January 30, 2024.⁹ This suspensive appeal by Judy followed.¹⁰

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Judy assigns the following as error:

(1) The court erred in holding that the Trust should be terminated under La. R.S. 9:2027 because it is both incapable of accomplishing its purpose or its purpose is illegal.

(2) The court erred in holding that the Trust should be terminated under La. R.S. 9:2026 because continuance of the Trust unchanged would defeat or substantially impair the purposes of the Trust.

(3) The trial court erred in concluding without evidence that it is in the best interests of the beneficiaries to terminate the Trust.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is well settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a trial court's findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. In order to reverse a fact finder's determination of fact, an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. In re Mashburn Marital Trusts, 2006-0741 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 1136, 1144; In re Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Trust, 2014-697 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/18/15), 159 So.3d 1101, 1107-08.

With regard to questions of law, the appellate review is simply a review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. On legal issues, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court, but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law and render judgment on the record. In re Mashburn Marital Trusts, 951 So.2d at 1144; In re Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Trust, 159 So.3d at 1108.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The parties disagree as to whether Richard's placement of the Class A voting stock into the Trust validly conveyed to Judy control of the LE Property. Judy contends that the Trust instrument permissibly gave her special powers as a co-trustee, including sole authority and discretion relating to the use of the LE Property. Judy further contends that she has sole authority to exercise voting rights on any matter related to the use and control of the LE Property for any purpose. Glen and Stephen argue in response that the control and authority purportedly conveyed to Judy by the Trust is impossible and unlawful because Richard did not place the LE Property in the Trust.

The requirements and characteristics of Louisiana trusts are found in Louisiana's Trust Code. See La. R.S. 9:1721, et seq.; see also Bridges v. Autozone Properties, Inc., 2004-0814 (La. 3/24/05), 900 So.2d 784, 796. Pursuant to La. R.S. 9:1724, Louisiana's Trust Code is to be interpreted as follows:

The provisions of this Code shall be accorded a liberal construction in favor of freedom of disposition. Whenever this Code is silent, resort shall be had to the Civil Code or other laws, but neither the Civil Code nor any other law shall be invoked to defeat a disposition sanctioned expressly or impliedly by this Code.

A trust is the relationship resulting from the transfer of title to property to a person to be administered by him as a fiduciary for the benefit of another. La. R.S. 9:1731. A trust instrument is the written document creating the trust and all amendments and modifications thereof. La. R.S. 9:1725(8). Property susceptible of private ownership, and any interest in such property, may be transferred in trust. Bridges, 900 So.2d at 796.

The settlor, trustee, and beneficiary are the essential persons in the creation and maintenance of a trust. Bridges, 900 So.2d at 796. A settlor is a person who creates a trust. La. R.S. 9:1761. A trustee is a person to whom title to the trust property is transferred to be administered by him as a fiduciary. La. R.S. 9:1781. A beneficiary is a person for whose benefit the trust is created and may be a natural person, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity having the capacity to receive property. La. R.S. 9:1801.

A principal beneficiary is a beneficiary presently, conditionally, or ultimately entitled to the principal, which is the thing in trust. See La. R.S. 9:1725(4). An income beneficiary is a beneficiary to whom income is payable, presently, conditionally, or in the future, or for whom it is accumulated, or who is entitled to the beneficial use of principal presently, conditionally, or in the future, for a time before its distribution. La. R.S. 9:1725(2).

Richard created the Trust on December 14, 2012, after a series of other transactions. In sum, Richard authorized LeDoux Enterprises’ issuance of twenty shares of Class A voting stock and eighty shares of Class B non-voting stock. Richard, LeDoux Enterprises’ only shareholder at that time, donated the Class B non-voting stock to his sons, Glen and Stephen, with each receiving forty shares. Richard then created the Trust and donated the Class A voting stock to the Trust. Per the Trust instrument and the stipulations of the parties, the corpus of the Trust is the stock certificate of LeDoux Enterprises representing the Class A voting stock, said shares being owned by the Trust.¹¹

The principal beneficiaries of the Trust are Glen and Stephen. The final iteration of the Trust instrument includes the following designations, which took effect upon Richard's death: (1) Judy became income beneficiary for “the remainder of her life” as to any royalties earned from oil and gas production or rents earned from oil, gas, and mineral leases; (2) Glen and Stephen became income beneficiaries as to any other income of the Trust; (3) Judy, Glen, and Stephen became co-trustees; and (4) the Trust became irrevocable. The Trust instrument further provides that the Trust “shall terminate immediately after the last to die” of Richard, who is now deceased, and Judy.

The fifth and final amendment to the Trust instrument further provided the following pertinent restrictions, which are similar to restrictions contained in prior versions of the Trust instrument:

8.8 Restriction. Notwithstanding any other provisions hereof, if LeDoux Enterprises, Inc. continues to own real estate in East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana,12 at the time of the death of Richard Hall LeDoux until Judy Davis LeDoux no longer resides at [the family home] or until her death, [whichever] occurs first, the following conditions and restrictions shall apply to the real estate owned by LeDoux Enterprises, Inc.:

(a) No real estate owned by LeDoux Enterprises, Inc. shall be sold.

(b) Judy Davis LeDoux shall have the full and complete use and control for all purposes of any real estate owned by LeDoux Enterprises, Inc. and shall have the sole authority and right to approve if any persons may enter the property except that [Glen LeDoux] and [Stephen LeDoux] along with any guests that accompany them shall have the right to enter onto the property at any time either may desire, and that [Glen LeDoux] and [Stephen LeDoux] shall have the right to authorize persons to go on to the property for purposes of hunting and fishing.

(c) No mobile homes or travel trailers will be placed on the property.

(d) No camps, storage buildings or other structures will be permitted on the real estate without the prior written approval of Judy Davis LeDoux.

(e) No residence will be constructed on the real estate and no one will live on the real estate without the prior written consent of Judy Davis LeDoux. [Emphasis added.]

Although the parties disagree upon the legal effect of Richard's actions in creating the Trust, the parties have stipulated that the corpus of the Trust is the Class A voting stock issued by LeDoux Enterprises, a corporation. A corporation is a juridical person which has a personality distinct from that of its members. See La. Civ. Code art. 24. The general powers of a corporation include the power to sue and be sued, make contracts, and incur liabilities, as well as the power to purchase, lease, and sell property. See La. R.S. 12:1-302; Succession of Mydland, 94-0501 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 653 So.2d 8, 11; see also City of Ruston v. Family Investment Resources, LLC, 54,163 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/17/21), 330 So.3d 1246, 1252.

Shares are the units into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are divided. La. R.S. 12:1-140(22). A share of a corporation may broadly be defined as the interest or right which the owner, who is called the shareholder or stockholder, has in the management of the corporation, in its surplus profits and, upon dissolution, in all of its assets remaining after the payment of its debts. Olson v. Olson, 48,968 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/23/14), 139 So.3d 539, 546, writ granted, 2014-1063 (La. 10/3/14), 149 So.3d 275, and writ denied as improvidently granted, 2014-1063 (La. 1/28/15), 159 So.3d 448, citing Succession of Quintero, 209 La. 279, 286, 24 So.2d 589, 591 (1945).

Assignment of Error Nos. 1 and 2

Judy challenges the trial court's termination of the Trust pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2027 and La. R.S. 9:2026. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2027 states that the proper court may order the termination or modification of the trust if the purpose for which it is created becomes impossible of accomplishment or illegal. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2026 provides in pertinent part that the proper court may order the termination or modification of a trust, in whole or in part, if the continuance of the trust unchanged would defeat or substantially impair the purposes of the trust.

Judy, Glen, and Stephen became co-trustees of the Trust upon Richard's death. Title to trust property vests in the trustees alone. Bridges, 900 So.2d at 796. The powers of the trustee are those conferred upon the trustee by the trust instrument or those that are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the trust and not forbidden by the trust instrument. La. R.S. 9:2111; Matter of Coleman, 2019-0522 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/20); 2020 WL 2897266 (unpublished) at *5.

Generally, a power vested in three or more trustees may be exercised by a majority of the trustees, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise. La. R.S. 9:2114. However, a trust instrument may confer different powers upon different trustees, in which case each trustee acts independently with respect to those powers conferred upon him. La. R.S 9:2114.1. If discretion is conferred upon a trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise of discretion shall not be subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse of discretion by a trustee. La. R.S. 9:2115. A trustee may exercise all powers of holders of shares of stock or other securities, including the right to vote in person or by proxy. La. R.S. 9:2122.

Judy asserts that Richard's purpose in establishing the Trust (and granting to her the full and complete use and control of the LE Property) was to allow her to maintain and enjoy her horses on the property after Richard's death. Glen and Stephen argue that Richard's placement of the Class A voting shares into the Trust - as opposed to placing the LE Property into the Trust - does not convey to Judy any ownership of the LE Property. They further argue that although Richard could donate into the Trust things that he personally owned, such as the Class A voting shares, he could not donate immovable property owned by LeDoux Enterprises into the Trust.

The property of a corporation is not the property of its individual shareholders, nor does a shareholder have a pecuniary interest in the property owned by the corporation. See La. Civ. Code art. 24, Revision Comments—1987, Comment (d) (“[T]he patrimony of a juridical person is distinct and distinguishable from the patrimony of its members.”); see also Succession of Mydland, 653 So.2d at 11. Although shareholders have certain rights as provided by law and in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, such shareholder rights do not entitle them to any direct ownership interest in property owned by the corporation. A shareholder's ownership interest in the corporation is in the stock issued by the corporation and not the corporate assets. Succession of Mydland, 653 So.2d at 11; see also Olson, 138 So.3d at 546-47, citing Fina Oil & Chemical Co. v. Amoco Production Co., 95-1877 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96), 673 So.2d 668, 672, writ denied, 96-1446 (La. 9/27/96), 679 So.2d 13 53.

Importantly, Judy does not claim that she owns the LE Property by virtue of being a co-trustee over the Class A voting shares. Rather, she seeks to enforce the language of the Trust instrument giving her exclusive use and control of the LE Property.

Richard amended the Articles of Incorporation of LeDoux Enterprises as the president and sole shareholder of the company. The stock certificate evidencing the transfer of the Class A voting shares to the Trust includes signatures by Richard in his capacity as president and secretary. Although Glen and Stephen argue that the voting stock could only confer upon the beneficiaries of the Trust the rights that Richard possessed as a shareholder, their position disregards the fact that Richard, as sole shareholder, controlled every aspect of LeDoux Enterprises prior to his death.

By placing all of the voting shares in Trust, Richard sought to eventually convey ownership of LeDoux Enterprises to his principal beneficiaries, Glen and Stephen. However, per the terms of the Trust instrument, Richard specifically sought to give Judy greater authority over the LE Property than Glen and Stephen until she no longer resides at the family home or until her death, whichever occurs first.

In construing a trust, the settlors’ intention controls and is to be ascertained and given effect, unless opposed to law or public policy. See La. R.S. 9:1761 and La. R.S. 9:1753; Matter of Coleman, 2020 WL 2897266 at *2, citing Richards v. Richards, 408 So.2d 1209, 1211 (La. 1981). A trust instrument shall be given an interpretation that will sustain the effectiveness of its provisions if it is susceptible of such an interpretation. La. R.S. 9:1753; Matter of Calley, 2017-0068 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/17); 232 So.3d 68, 71-72, writ denied, 2017-1781 (La. 12/15/17), 231 So.3d 643. There is a strong public policy in effectuating and protecting the settlor's intent as set forth in the trust document. Albritton v. Albritton, 600 So.2d 1328, 1331 (La. 1992).

Despite revising the Trust document, Richard made it clear from the first amendment that he wished to convey to Judy sole authority and discretion relating to the use of the LE Property until she no longer resides at the family home or until her death, whichever occurs first. Richard sought to accomplish this by placing all of the Class A voting stock into the Trust, naming Judy as one of three co-trustees, and giving Judy additional authority over the LE Property. In other words, Richard attempted to give additional authority to Judy over the LE Property through the same document wherein he gave her partial control of LeDoux Enterprises. He further sought to restrict Glen and Stephen's control of the LE Property through that same method, i.e., by placing the voting shares of the company that owns the LE Property into the Trust.

Richard's placement of the Class A voting shares in the Trust had the legal result of giving all of the existing voting rights relating to LeDoux Enterprises to the co-trustees. Richard then, pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2114.1, conferred additional authority to Judy and restricted the authorities of Glen and Stephen relating to property owned by LeDoux Enterprises. As stated above, the settlors’ intention controls and is to be ascertained and given effect, unless opposed to law or public policy. See La. R.S. 9:1761 and La. R.S. 9:1753; Matter of Coleman, 2020 WL 2897266 at *2. Considering Richard's exclusive authority over LeDoux Enterprises at the time the Trust was created, and further considering that he, as sole shareholder, placed the entirety of the company's voting shares into the Trust, we find that the Trust validly conveys use and authority over the LE Property to Judy. Judy's sole authority and discretion over the LE Property is an exercise of discretion that shall not be subject to control by the court except to prevent an abuse of discretion by Judy. See La. R.S. 9:2115. The record is void of any allegations that Judy has acted imprudently or partially in her role as a co-trustee with additional authority.

We now must determine whether the Trust was validly terminated pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2026 or La. R.S. 9:2027. As provided above, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2027 states that the proper court may order the termination or modification of the trust if the purpose for which it is created becomes impossible of accomplishment or illegal. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2026 provides in pertinent part that the proper court may order the termination or modification of a trust, in whole or in part, if the continuance of the trust unchanged would defeat or substantially impair the purposes of the trust. Considering our findings above - namely, that Richard validly conveyed additional authority over the LE Property to Judy as co-trustee - we conclude that the Trust's purpose is not impossible of accomplishment or illegal. We further find that the continuance of the trust unchanged does not defeat or substantially impair the Trust's purpose. The trial court thus erred in terminating the Trust pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2026 and La. R.S. 9:2027. Judy's first and second assignments of error have merit.

Assignment of Error No. 3

Judy further argues that the trial court erred in concluding without evidence that it is in the best interests of the beneficiaries to terminate the Trust. Judy is referring to a clause within the Trust providing that “[t]he Trustee may terminate the trust earlier when, in his sole discretion, the value of the trust property no longer justifies the expenses of trust management, or it is otherwise in the best interest of the beneficiaries to do so.” This assignment of error has merit.

At the January 11, 2024 hearing, the trial court found it to be in the best interest of the beneficiaries to terminate the Trust, citing “continuous animosity” between Judy and Richard's sons, Glen and Stephen. Although the parties’ pleadings and the arguments of counsel at the January 11, 2024 hearing suggest animosity between the parties, an appellate court must render its judgment upon the record on appeal. La Code Civ. P. art. 2164. Arguments and pleadings are not evidence. In re Melancon, 2005-1702 (La. 7/10/06), 93 5 So.2d 661, 666. Neither party presented evidence at the hearing to establish the existence of animosity between the parties, nor did either party present evidence relating to expenses of managing the Trust or the best interests of the beneficiaries. Because no such evidence was presented, we conclude that the trial court erred in terminating the Trust on this basis.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, we reverse the portion of the 20th Judicial District Court's January 30, 2024 judgment terminating the Richard Hall LeDoux Revocable Real Estate Trust. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Appellees, Richard Glen LeDoux and Stephen Brian LeDoux.

REVERSED IN PART; OTHERWISE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Richard was clearly involved with the formation of LeDoux Enterprises, it is unclear from the record when he became president of the company. Our review of the parties’ joint exhibits reveals that Richard signed an act of cash sale in his capacity as president of LeDoux Enterprises on December 3, 2002.

2.   These tracts were purchased by LeDoux Enterprises in 1992, 2002, and 2011 respectively. Specifically, LeDoux Enterprises purchased two tracts of land, one consisting of 121.55 acres and the other consisting of 13.66 acres, on June 17, 1992. LeDoux Enterprises purchased a 30.00-acre tract of land on December 3, 2002. Later, on March 30, 2011, LeDoux Enterprises purchased a 2.43-acre tract of land.

3.   Although the act of cash sale for this purchase is dated January 15, 1998, the parties stipulated that Richard purchased the 8.243-acre tract of land on January 15, 1996. The act of sale also names LeDoux Electric, Inc. as the seller despite the 1994 name change.

4.   Upon Richard's death, Judy would become the income beneficiary for the remainder of her life as to any royalties earned from oil and/or gas production and as to rents earned from oil, gas, and mineral leases. Glen and Stephen would become the income beneficiaries as to any other income of the Trust.

5.   Although the second amendment is dated January 9, 2014, the parties stipulated that the second amendment was executed on January 19, 2014.

6.   Judy alleged that Stephen cut wires and cleared areas along fence lines such that her horses could escape or become injured, left gates open, moved equipment into areas where the horses may injure themselves, and destroyed and burned a bridge on the property.

7.   Judy alleged that Glen was using her gate and access road to enter the LE Property without her approval. She also alleged that it was Glen who had demolished the bridge on the LE Property, which Judy then had reconstructed. She alleged that, after the reconstruction, Glen demolished the bridge again and burned the wood to prevent reconstruction.

8.   In its oral reasons, the trial court also found Judy's request for preliminary injunction to be moot.

9.   In the January 30, 2024 judgment, the trial court also denied Glen and Stephen's exception of no cause of action as moot and dismissed without prejudice a motion for constructive contempt of court previously filed by Glen and Stephen.

10.   On March 20, 2024, Glen and Stephen filed a motion to convert Judy's suspensive appeal into a devolutive appeal due to her failure to timely post the security amount set forth by the trial court. This issue was remedied and Judy's suspensive appeal was perfected per an order signed by the trial court on April 17, 2024.

11.   “Corpus” means the property for which a trustee is responsible, i.e., the trust principal. Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

12.   LeDoux Enterprises’ properties at issue in this appeal are located in East Feliciana Parish.

THERIOT, J.