STATE v. WILLIAMS (2025)

The State charged the defendant, Derrick Lee John Williams, Jr., by an amended bill of information with attempted second-degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) and La. R.S. 14:27(A) & (D)(1)(a) (count one), and second-degree kidnapping, a violation of La. R.S. 14:44.1(A)(2) (count two). The defendant initially pled not guilty but later withdrew his original pleas and pled guilty as charged on each count. The trial court sentenced the defendant to forty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count one, and to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count two, applying the firearm enhancement provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the constitutionality of the sentences. After review, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

As the defendant entered guilty pleas in this case, the facts were not fully developed. At the Boykin ¹ hearing, the State entered the following factual basis for the guilty pleas:

[O]n or about November 21, 2021[,] the defendant was driven by Camen Bush from Lafayette to the Bayou Vista area, which is in St. Mary Parish, to the apartment of one Asia Starling, an individual who had an eighteen month old child at the time with the defendant. The defendant entered Ms. Starling[’]s apartment, put Ms. Starling on her knees, fired an AR15 rifle at the back of her skull, [and] took the eighteen month old child with him. At that time he was under an order from the 16th [Judicial District Court] that Ms. Starling had sole custody of their daughter, and the defendant was ordered to visit his child at the Kid's Center for supervised visits only. He then fled the jurisdiction with the eighteen month old child[,] headed back to Lafayette[,] and then went to parts unknown until he was finally captured ․ in December.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the sentences are unconstitutionally excessive. He specifically argues the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, including his lack of a prior felony adult record, his youthful age of twenty at the time of the offenses, the unlikelihood that the acts will recur, and his status as the father of minor children. In assignment of error number two, the defendant notes the crimes arose out of a single course of conduct and argues the trial court should not have ordered the sentences to run consecutively.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Louisiana Constitution Article I, § 20, prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be unconstitutionally excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is considered unconstitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one's sense of justice. See State v. Anderson, 2022-0587 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/22), 357 So.3d 845, 852, writ denied, 2023-00352 (La. 9/6/23), 369 So.3d 1267.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors the trial court is to consider when imposing a sentence. While the trial court need not recite the entire checklist of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, the record must show the trial court adequately considered the criteria. The sentencing judge should review the defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. The goal of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 is the articulation of the factual basis for a sentence, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. Id.

It is the legislature's prerogative to determine the length of the sentence imposed for crimes classified as felonies. State v. Briso, 2004-3039 (La. 7/6/06), 933 So.2d 754, 762, citing State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1278 (La. 1993).² Moreover, courts are charged with applying these punishments unless they are found to be unconstitutional. Id. Mandatory sentences have repeatedly been upheld as constitutional and consistent with the federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting cruel, unusual, or excessive punishment. State v. Dickerson, 2016-1336 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 633, 642, writ denied, 2017-1147 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 1062. To rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional, which means that, because of unusual circumstances, this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Id., citing State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676.

Regarding consecutive and concurrent sentences, La. C.Cr.P. art. 883 pertinently provides:

If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on the same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively. Other sentences of imprisonment shall be served consecutively unless the court expressly directs that some or all of them be served concurrently.

Even if convictions arise from a single course of conduct, consecutive sentences are not necessarily excessive, as it is within a trial court's discretion to order the sentences to run consecutively rather than concurrently. State v. Kitchen, 2022-1274 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 363 So.3d 1254, 1259, writ denied, 2023-00589 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So.3d 716. If convictions arise from a single course of conduct and consecutive sentences are imposed, the trial court shall state the factors considered and its reasons for the consecutive terms. Id. at 1259. Among the factors to be considered are: (1) the defendant's criminal history, (2) the gravity or dangerousness of the offense, (3) the viciousness of the crimes, (4) the harm done to the victims, (5) whether the defendant constitutes an unusual risk of danger to the public, (6) the potential for the defendant's rehabilitation, (7) the multiplicity of acts, and (8) the defendant's lack of remorse. See Id. at 1259-60. However, if the record provides an adequate factual basis to support consecutive sentences, the trial court's failure to articulate specific reasons for consecutive sentences does not require remand. Id. at 1260.

On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. Id. at 1258. The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and this Court will not set aside such a sentence as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 1257.

Herein, on the offense charged on count one, attempted second degree murder, the defendant faced a sentencing range of not less than ten nor more than fifty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) and La. R.S. 14:27(D)(l)(a). On count two, second degree kidnapping, the defendant faced a sentencing range of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than forty years, with at least two years of the sentence imposed without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:44.1(C). Prior to the Boykin hearing, the State filed a motion to invoke the firearm sentencing enhancing provision of La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3, increasing the minimum sentence on count one to fifteen years and on count two to twenty years.³ Thus, on count one, the sentence of forty years is well within the sentencing range of fifteen to fifty years, and on count two, the sentence of twenty years is the mandatory minimum sentence.

The sentencing hearing took place on February 5, 2024. Prior to imposing the sentences, the trial court heard testimony from seven witnesses, including the defendant. Sergeant Blake Giroir with the St. Mary Parish Sheriff's Office testified he responded to the scene after the shooting and kidnapping on November 21, 2021. He noted he had been a paramedic since 2012, but Ms. Starling was the only person he had ever seen with such a gunshot wound to the head who had survived. He noted he did not have the proper equipment to provide care for her life-threatening injuries. Sergeant Giroir testified Ms. Starling had different sized pupils, which he noted was indicative of a traumatic brain injury. He also testified Ms. Starling was found lying in front of a child's bed and appeared to have been shot in that room.

Brett Hernandez, a supervisor of rehabilitation services at Ochsner St. Mary, testified Ms. Starling received physical and occupational therapy services. While Ms. Starling was fully functional before the incident, her injuries caused difficulties with walking and fine motor skills. He further testified Ms. Starling uses a walker and needs assistance to perform daily activities. Mr. Hernandez noted Ms. Starling is unable to live independently without assistance.

Ms. Starling's grandmother,⁴ with whom Ms. Starling and K.W.⁵ (Ms. Starling's daughter and the victim on count two) were living at the time of the sentencing, also testified. She stated that, before the shooting, her granddaughter was an honor student at Nicholls State University, worked at a Subway restaurant, and had tested to become a dispatcher at the Morgan City Police Department. She testified that due to the severity of Ms. Starling's head injury, emergency caregivers could not promise she would live, further noting a portion of her skull had to be removed due to swelling of her brain. As Ms. Starling's grandmother also noted, after the surgery, Ms. Starling was in a coma and bullet fragments remain in her brain. She also testified regarding the impact of the offenses on K.W., noting that hearing certain sounds would cause her to jump and that her mother was no longer able to care for her, as she did before the incident. Finally, Ms. Starling's grandmother testified Ms. Starling was dedicated to getting better every day but suffered from anxiety and had a lot of difficulties understanding and performing day-to-day activities.

Ms. Starling was twenty years old at the time of the defendant's sentencing and eighteen years old at the time of the offenses. Ms. Starling testified the defendant was “mad” on the day of the offenses because she had recently started dating someone else. Ms. Starling detailed the facts of the shooting, stating that after the defendant arrived at her apartment, close to midnight, she could only recall him walking in, putting a gun to her head, forcing her to get on her knees, and forcing her to call the person she was dating. K.W., whose bed was located in the corner of the living room, was in bed at the time. Ms. Starling testified she had to “start over completely” as a result of the shooting. She stated she had to learn how to operate her wheelchair, had to relearn how to feed herself, how to change K.W.’s diapers, how to cook and clean, and had to relearn her skills as a hairdresser. She stated that now she has double vision and will never drive again. Ms. Starling stated she could not get back all of the precious time taken away from her with her grandmother and her daughter.

Finally, the defendant testified he was twenty years old and living with his mother at the time of the offenses. He testified he was laid off at the time but would work from time to time for his father's lawn care service. The defendant apologized to Ms. Starling and her family, his mother, and the trial court, and asked for a second chance to be a better father. The defendant testified he has three children, all under five years of age, and he wanted to “be there as much as possible as a father.” When asked to describe his remorse, the defendant stated he felt bad as a person and that the results of his actions were “not something I wished on her.”

In imposing the sentences in this case, the trial court found a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's crimes. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(A)(2) and (3). The trial court further noted the defendant's conduct manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim, the offense resulted in a significant permanent injury to the victim, the defendant used a dangerous weapon, and the offenses involved multiple victims. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(B)(1), (9)-(11). The trial court further considered the victims individually and how they were affected. In mitigation, the trial court noted the defendant had no history of a prior delinquency or criminal activity before the commission of the instant offenses. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(B)(28).

We note the forty-year sentence on count one is ten years less than the maximum term of imprisonment, and the twenty-year sentence on count two, the minimum sentence that could be imposed under the firearm enhancement provision, is only one-half of the maximum term of imprisonment of forty years. We further note, as to count two, the defendant knew prior to pleading guilty that the minimum sentence would be twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence and agreed after consulting with his attorney. As to count two, the defendant has failed to present evidence that he is exceptional such that the minimum sentence was not meaningfully tailored to his culpability as the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, a downward departure from the presumptively constitutional mandatory minimum sentence is not warranted in this case. See Anderson, 357 So.3d at 853.

Further, the attempted second-degree murder and second-degree kidnapping offenses herein were exceptionally cruel. Specifically, the defendant appeared at Ms. Starling's apartment armed with a gun, forced Ms. Starling to kneel before shooting her at point blank range in K.W.’s presence, took K.W. from the apartment, and left Ms. Starling locked in the apartment after inflicting the gunshot wound to her head. Ms. Starling was young, only eighteen years old at the time of the offenses, and is now permanently disabled. As a result of the defendant's actions, Ms. Starling will never be able to recover the time and quality of life lost with K.W., the victim of the second-degree kidnapping, who was in the bed nearby at the time of the shooting. K.W., who was traumatized as a result of being present when her mother was shot, likewise, will never be able to recover the time and quality of life lost with her mother. Considering the impact of the offenses on the victims, the heinous nature of the offenses, and the trial court's reasons for sentencing, we find the record before us establishes an adequate factual basis for the sentences imposed and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Thus, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentences. The assignments of error are meritless.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

2.   In Dorthey, 623 So.2d at 1280-81, the Louisiana Supreme Court opined that if a trial court were to find that the punishment mandated by La. R.S. 15:529.1 makes no “measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment” or that the sentence amounted to nothing more than “the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering” and is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime[,]” the trial court has the option, indeed the duty, to reduce such sentence to one that would not be unconstitutionally excessive. The sentencing review principles espoused in Dorthey are not restricted in application to the mandatory minimum penalties provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1. State v. Lavy, 2013-1025 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/11/14), 142 So.3d 1000, 1010, n.1, writ denied, 2014-0644 (La. 10/31/14), 152 So.3d 150.

3.   As to count one, if the finder of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was actually used or discharged by the defendant during the commission of the felony for which he was convicted, and thereby caused bodily injury, the court shall impose a term of imprisonment of not less than fifteen years nor more than the maximum term of imprisonment provided for the underlying offense. La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(D). The mandatory minimum sentence must be served without the benefit of parole. La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(G). As to count two, if the firearm is discharged during the commission of such a violent felony, the court shall impose a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years nor more than the maximum term of imprisonment provided for the underlying offense. La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(E)(1)(a) (emphasis added). Second degree kidnapping is one of the enumerated violent felonies for purposes of Subsection E. La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(E)(1)(b). The entire sentence must be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(E)(2). If the trial court finds that a sentence imposed under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3 would be excessive, the court shall state for the record the reasons for such finding and shall impose the most severe sentence which is not excessive. La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(H).

4.   As they have the same last name, Asia Starling's grandmother, Susan Starling, is referenced herein as “Ms. Starling's grandmother.”

5.   K.W. was approximately eighteen months old at the time of the offenses. Herein, initials will be used to protect the identity of the child victim. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

GREENE, J.