ANDERSON v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS (2025)

Relator-Defendant, Pan-American Life Insurance, Co. (“Pan-Am”), seeks review of the trial court's December 18, 2024 judgment, which granted the motion for directed verdict filed by the Respondents-Plaintiffs, Thomas Anderson, Pamela Davenport, Evelle Thomas, June Harvey, Joseph Wong (“Plaintiffs”). For the following reasons, we grant the writ application, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCDURAL HISTORY

In 2000 Plaintiffs filed a petition for damages, alleging they suffered injuries as a result of their exposure to hazardous chemicals located at their workplace, 2400 Canal St., a building owned by the City of New Orleans (“City”). Plaintiffs later amended the petition and added Pan-Am as a defendant, alleging Pan-Am owned the building until August of 1982 and placed the chemicals in the building. Plaintiffs then filed a fourth amended petition alleging Pam-Am sold the building to Poydras Square Properties, L.L.C., and the corporate predecessor of NID, in 1982. Plaintiffs further alleged NID rented the building to the City, but did not remove the hazard.

Trial commenced on April 16, 2024, and after Pan-Am rested its case-in-chief., Plaintiffs orally moved for a directed verdict. Plaintiff later filed a written memorandum in support, contending that NID never occupied 2400 Canal St., but merely purchased and immediately leased the property to the City. Plaintiffs averred NID did not acquire the hazardous chemicals. Thus, Plaintiffs concluded NID could not be found liable for the presence of the hazardous materials. As such, Plaintiffs maintained they were entitled to a directed verdict on Pan-Am's affirmative defense asserting the comparative fault of NID.

Pan-Am filed an opposition to the motion for directed verdict averring the motion was procedurally improper and premature. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict on December 18, 2024. Pan-Am thereafter sought writs with this Court.

APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

Directed Verdict

This Court stated a trial court “is vested with ‘much discretion’ ” in granting or denying a directed verdict motion. Moulds v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 2021-0503, p. 26 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/22), 336 So.3d 920, 937 (quoting Price v. Law Firm of Alex O. Lewis, III & Assocs., 2004-0806, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 608, 610). This Court further averred, “[a]ppellate courts review a ruling on a directed verdict by determining ‘whether reasonable persons could not reach a contrary verdict under the evidence.’ ” Id., 2021-0503, pp. 26-27, 336 So.2d at 937. This Court explained:

What this means is that the discretion of the trial court is really a discretion to deny the motion, not a discretion to grant the motion. In other words, it would not be error for a trial court to deny a directed verdict where reasonable men might disagree with the trial court decision to deny the motion for directed verdict, but it would be error to grant the motion where reasonable men might disagree with the decision to grant it.

Moulds, 2021-0503, pp. 27, 336 So.3d at 937 (quoting Wichser v. Trosclair, 99-1929, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/28/01), 789 So.2d 24, 27).

The statute allowing a party to move for a directed verdict is found in Title V, Chapter 7. Jury Trials within the Code of Civil Procedure. Specifically, that applicable provision provides:

A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict that is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.

La. C.C.P. art. 1810. In examining La. C.C.P. art. 1810, this Court determined that “[t]he motion for directed verdict is a procedural device available in a jury trial to promote judicial economy.” Johnson v. Transit Mgmt. of Se. Louisiana, Inc., 2017-0793, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/28/18), 239 So.3d 973, 978 (citing Seither v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 2002-2091, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 853 So.2d 37, 39). Considering La. C.C.P. art. 1810’s placement in the Title addressing procedures for jury trials and use of the word, “jury” in the Article, coupled with Johnson, the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed verdict during a bench trial. Plaintiffs sought a remedy that was procedurally unavailable.

Involuntary Dismissal

During a bench trial, a party may move for an involuntary dismissal. The First Circuit indicated a “misdesignation” or misnaming of a motion for involuntary dismissal as a motion for directed verdict is “an error of form over substance; we consider them both the same motion.” Andersen v. Succession of Bergeron, 2016-0922, p.7 n.8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 217 So.3d 1248, 1254 (citing Gillmer v. Parish Sterling Stuckey, 2009-0901, p. 3 n.2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/09), 30 So.3d 782, 785). Accordingly, we address Plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict as a motion for involuntary dismissal.

In reviewing a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1672, this Court determined a reversal is not warranted absent manifest error. Brown v. Sargent, 2017-0838, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/21/18), 241 So.3d 1115, 1117.

La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B) provides:

In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of the action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.

La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B) thus allows a party, after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, to move for a dismissal as to him when the facts and law reveal that plaintiff did not prove the right to relief.

One rule of statutory construction provides that, “when a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written.” La. C.C.P. art. 9. In this instance, La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B) permits a party to seek dismissal of a claim asserted against that party. See also Filson v. Windsor Court Hotel, 2004-2893, p. 9 (La. 6/29/05), 907 So.2d 723, 729-30 (wherein the Supreme Court stated a motion for involuntary dismissal is the procedural device for a party to seek dismissal of the claims against it). Application of La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B) as written, allowing a party to only seek dismissal of a claim asserted against that party, will not lead to absurd results.

Here, Plaintiffs are not seeking to dismiss any claim asserted against them. Instead, Plaintiffs are seeking to prohibit the trial court from allocating fault to NID, a different party/entity. La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B) limits Plaintiffs to seeking dismissal of a claim asserted against them, not a claim asserted against NID. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not afforded this procedural remedy.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, we find that the trial court erred in granting the Plaintiffs’ “motion for directed verdict” and reverse the trial court's December 18, 2024 judgment. Additionally, we remand the matter for further proceedings.

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED

The majority's decision to grant the writ application, reverse the district court's judgment, and remand this matter for further proceedings is legally and practically flawed. While the opinion is couched in procedural technicalities and formalistic interpretations, it fails to acknowledge the broader context of trial management and the discretion of the district court to streamline proceedings where the facts support such a move.

At the heart of the majority's reasoning is the notion that the Plaintiffs’ use of a “directed verdict” during a bench trial was procedurally improper, citing the distinction between La. C.C.P. art. 1810 (directed verdicts in jury trials) and La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B) (involuntary dismissals in bench trials). The majority correctly recognizes, and yet simultaneously dismisses, the prevailing jurisprudence that courts are not bound by labels but rather by the substance of a motion. See Andersen v. Succession of Bergeron, 16-0922, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 217 So.3d 1248, 1253 n. 8. By treating the Plaintiffs’ motion as a misdesignated motion for involuntary dismissal, the district court followed not only common sense but sound legal precedent.

To reverse the judgment on this ground is to elevate form over substance and to ignore the settled principle that trial courts may treat improperly labeled motions according to their content. Doing otherwise allows litigation to become ensnared in semantic traps rather than decided on merit.

Moreover, the district court exercised appropriate discretion in granting the motion whether labeled as a directed verdict or, more properly, an involuntary dismissal. Pan-Am's claim of comparative fault against NID was wholly unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. The Plaintiffs showed that NID never occupied the premises at 2400 Canal Street, did not place the hazardous chemicals at issue, and functioned solely as a landlord leasing the property to the City.

The court, as trier of fact in a bench trial, is permitted under La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B) to weigh the evidence and render judgment where the facts and law do not support the relief sought. In the case sub judice, no manifest error has been shown. To reverse this exercise of discretion and judgment simply because of the procedural label used is to undercut the efficiency and fairness of bench trials.

Additionally, it is important to note that this matter has already proceeded through trial. If the final judgment ultimately incorporates or is affected by the challenged interlocutory ruling, Pan-Am will have an adequate remedy on appeal. Appellate review of the final judgment can address any residual error at that time. Moreover, the district court retains authority to reconsider and reverse its own interlocutory ruling prior to final judgment. These built-in safeguards caution against the unnecessary intervention by supervisory writ at this juncture, especially in the absence of irreparable harm.

The majority interprets La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B) rigidly, suggesting it is only available to defendants seeking to dismiss claims against them, not plaintiffs seeking to exclude legally unfounded comparative fault defenses. This interpretation is unduly narrow and unreasonably formalistic. Louisiana law has long permitted a court to dismiss defenses as well as claims when they are unsupported by evidence or law. The motion at issue, functionally, was one to remove a legally and factually baseless affirmative defense from the court's consideration. The district court acted properly in doing so.

Because the district court did not err in granting Plaintiffs’ motion and because the majority's ruling prioritizes procedural technicality over equitable substance, I respectfully dissent and would deny the writ.

Judge Karen K. Herman