STATE v. KESTLE (2025)

Defendant, Brandon M. Kestle, was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced to life imprisonment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 1, 2020, a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant, Brandon M. Kestle, with the second-degree murder of Linda Paquette in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count two).¹ Defendant was arraigned on October 6, 2020, and pled not guilty. Later in the proceedings, defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.²

On December 12, 2023, the case proceeded to a jury trial, and on December 14, 2023, the jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged on both counts. On December 20, 2023, the trial court denied defendant's Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal, Arrest of Judgment, and Alternatively Motion for New Trial. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count one and to twenty years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count two. On January 5, 2024, the trial court granted defendant's motion for appeal. This appeal followed.

FACTS

Kelli Paquette, daughter of the victim Linda Paquette, testified at trial that she and defendant began dating in 2017. In May, 2020, she and defendant moved into a three-bedroom house on Howard Avenue along with their infant daughter. Kelli testified that at that time, her mother, Linda, was living with another daughter, Paige, but plans were made for Linda to move into an extra bedroom in her Howard Avenue residence.

In her testimony, Kelli recounted the events that occurred on May 24, 2024, the day before the shooting. She recalled bringing her infant daughter to her sister, Paige, that morning to babysit during the day. That night, realizing her infant's teething rings were left at Paige's house, Kelli called Paige to ask if she could return the rings to her home. Paige, Linda, and Paige's daughter, B.G.,³ then drove to Kelli's residence to deliver the teething rings.

When Paige, Linda, and B.G. arrived in the early morning hours of May 25, 2020, Kelli was in the kitchen. Kelli recalled that B.G. wanted to show her grandmother, Linda, that some of her belongings had been placed in her new bedroom. She also recalled defendant being in the bathroom at this time. Shortly after B.G. and Linda went into the bedroom, Kelli heard two gunshots. Afterwards, B.G. ran from the bedroom towards her in the kitchen, “Gun. Gun. He shot Nana.” Defendant then came down the hall toward them, yelling something to everyone, and walked out the front door of the residence. B.G. locked the front door behind him. Kelli and Paige went to the bedroom and found Linda against a wall bleeding from the ears. Kelli recalled that while Paige called 9-1-1, she attended to her mother and tried to perform CPR. At some point afterwards, she ran out of the house after defendant. Kelli testified that as she approached defendant outside, he told her to back away and that he already called the police.

Paige Paquette testified that in early 2020, she was living on East William David Parkway with her mother, Linda, her sister, Kelli, and other family members, including her daughter, B.G., and Kelli's infant daughter. In May 2020, Kelli, defendant, and their infant daughter moved from her house into a house on Howard Avenue.

In her testimony, Paige recalled that she arrived at Kelli's house around 1:15 a.m. on May 25, 2020 to return the teething rings. She was accompanied by her mother, Linda, and her daughter, B.G. When they arrived, Kelli was in the kitchen doing the dishes. She testified that she did not initially see defendant; Kelli reported to her that he was in the bathroom. Linda, accompanied by B.G., went into the bedroom that she would occupy in the home. She recalled later seeing defendant come out of the bathroom, walk into the living room, and then down the hallway towards the rooms situated in the back of the house, including the bedroom where Linda and B.G. were located. Soon thereafter, she heard gunshots and plates breaking. She recounted B.G. running down the hallway from the bedroom, screaming “gun!” Immediately afterwards, defendant followed, twirling the gun and saying, “I'm calling 9-1-1.” She ran to the bedroom and found her mother bleeding from the ears. While holding her mother, she tried to call 9-1-1.⁴

B.G., who was thirteen years old at the time of trial, recalled arriving at her Aunt Kelli's new house around 1:00 a.m. on May 25, 2020. Her Aunt Kelli was in the process of moving into the house where one room was to be the bedroom for her grandmother, Linda. After arriving at Aunt Kelli's, B.G. led her grandmother to the bedroom to show her that some of her belongings, including her china plates, were already in her bedroom closet. B.G. recalled seeing defendant come out of the bathroom and then go into a room across the hallway. It appeared that he was grabbing something, but she was not sure what he was doing. The next thing she remembered was defendant walking towards her and her grandmother. As he neared, defendant pointed a gun at her grandmother and shot her twice. B.G. testified that she ran from the room toward the kitchen, screaming that defendant shot her grandmother. B.G. would later speak to police and be interviewed at the Children's Advocacy Center.⁵

Officer Michael Naccari, formerly with the JPSO, was dispatched to the scene. He testified that defendant was handcuffed, advised of his rights, and placed in the back of his patrol vehicle. While in the patrol vehicle, Officer Naccari testified that defendant stated that the victim had been trying to kill him and sabotage his life since he was a child. He further reported that defendant said, “he did not know how she was trying to kill him but she had been doing so because she—excuse me, because he had not [sic] known her since she—since he was a child.” He described defendant as a “little excited”, but not scared, when he made the statement.

Detective Harold Wischan, an employee of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Department, was a homicide investigator assigned to the case. When he arrived on the scene around 2:00 or 2:30 a.m. on May 25, 2020, defendant was in the back of a patrol car, and the victim was already determined to be deceased. At trial, he identified photographs taken of the crime scene, describing depictions of the victim's location in the bedroom to the left of the hallway, a spent and a live .22 caliber cartridge on the floor at the scene, a hole in the sheetrock, blood spatter, and blood smeared walls. He explained that cartridge casings, a cell phone, and a firearm were seized during the search of the residence. He stated that defendant handed over the firearm to the deputies when he surrendered, which was outside of the residence when the officers arrived.

Detective Wischan testified that defendant was transported to the detective bureau where he provided a video and an audio recorded statement. Defendant stated that he first met the victim when he was five years old. He claimed that he told his parents that he had witnessed the victim cheating on her husband, which led to the victim and her husband ending their marriage. Defendant stated that the victim had been out to get him since that time and that she was trying to poison him for years.

As to the shooting, defendant stated that he decided, “I'm going to shoot this b**ch” while he was using the bathroom and smoking a blunt. He then left the bathroom, walked into his room, retrieved his gun from under his bed, and walked into the victim's bedroom. Before B.G. could leave the room, he shot the victim twice because he “wanted to make sure she's dead.” After the interview, an arrest warrant was obtained for defendant's arrest for second-degree murder and felon in possession of a firearm.

Dr. Dana Troxclair, Chief Pathologist at the Jefferson Parish Coroner's office and an expert in the field of forensic pathology, testified at trial. The pathologist who performed the autopsy of the victim, Dr. Conner, was no longer employed by the Jefferson Parish Coroner's Office. Dr. Troxclair reviewed the reports produced by Dr. Conner before trial. In her trial testimony, Dr. Troxclair viewed photographs contained in Dr. Conner's autopsy report, and confirmed the individual in the autopsy photographs was Linda Paquette. In the photographs, she identified two gunshot entry wounds and two projectiles recovered from the decedent's head. She opined that survival from such an injury was highly unlikely. She further testified that she classified the injuries as distant gunshot wounds, typically fired from two to three feet away, depending on the weapon and ammunition.

Emily Terrebonne, formerly a firearms examiner with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office Crime Laboratory, was accepted as an expert in the field of firearms and tool-mark identification. She testified that she analyzed a Walther Model P22, .22 LR caliber semiautomatic pistol, cartridge cases, and projectiles in connection with this case and determined that two of the specimens, .22 caliber cartridge cases, were fired in the Walther pistol. She also concluded that two projectiles possessed similar rifle and characteristics to the Walther pistol.

Dona Quintanilla, the latent print supervisor for the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office Crime Laboratory, testified and was accepted as an expert in the field of latent print analysis and identification. She identified a fingerprint card she took of defendant's fingerprints the previous day and stated that those fingerprints matched those on a certified conviction packet from St. Bernard Parish. That conviction packet from the 34th Judicial District Court showed that defendant had a prior conviction in 2015 for possession of a schedule III drug.⁶

Dr. Sarah DeLand, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist with Tulane University, was accepted as an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry and testified on behalf of the defense. She interviewed defendant three times to perform a general psychiatric evaluation and a mental status examination. During the interview process, defendant denied having a past history of psychiatric treatment, psychiatric hospitalization, or a prescription for psychiatric medication, but admitted to drug and alcohol use for many years. She found his mental status examination was unremarkable until he described having delusions. During the mental status examination, defendant expressed doubts about his children's paternity and suspicions of a conspiracy surrounding his mother's death, despite his family members describing her death as expected due to illness. Defendant reported a belief that the victim had been poisoning him for years, and believed that his infant daughter had been “substituted” at times. He also believed that his daughter from a previous relationship had a twin sibling, who was secreted away at birth and trafficked.

Dr. DeLand diagnosed defendant with delusional disorder of the persecutory paranoid type. She explained that delusional misidentification involves the belief that a known person or family member had been replaced by someone else. She stated that defendant held this belief about his daughter with Kelli as well as his other daughter. She further cited defendant's belief that the victim had orchestrated his systematic poisoning for as long as twenty-five years. She also noted that the first thing defendant told police was that he was being poisoned, a claim he had consistently maintained since the night of the incident. Dr. DeLand opined that defendant was experiencing symptoms of delusional disorder of the paranoid and persecutory type at the time of the incident and was not capable of distinguishing right from wrong. She further stated that while she could not definitively opine on defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, she believed, in her medical opinion, that he met the criteria to be considered insane at that time.

Following Dr. DeLand's testimony, the State called Dr. Gina Manguno-Mire, as a rebuttal witness. Dr. Manguno-Mire was accepted as an expert in forensic psychology. The State engaged her to evaluate defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. She described her evaluation as including three interviews with defendant, together with reviewing the police report, the district attorney's office file, defendant's recorded jail calls with Kelli, and defendant's medical records from the past three years. She administered four psychological tests and the results indicated that defendant was not feigning memory deficits or exaggerating cognitive impairment. In her initial interviews with defendant, Dr. Manguno-Mire recalled that he focused on the belief that his children had been swapped and he did not mention being poisoned. In a subsequent interview, Dr. Manguno-Mire specifically asked defendant about being poisoned. In response, defendant identified an ex-girlfriend as the person who had been poisoning him; he did not mention the victim.

Dr. Manguno-Mire opined that defendant did not have a mental disorder that rendered him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the offense. She stated that his behavior at the time was volitional, meaning intentional, and clarified that having a mental disorder does not necessarily preclude knowing right from wrong. She testified that defendant's behavior after the incident, including calling 9-1-1 and surrendering, demonstrated an awareness of his actions and their consequences. Dr. Manguno-Mire suggested that defendant's delusions arose after the incident to avoid responsibility. It was her conclusion that defendant feigned symptoms of a delusional disorder for secondary gain, despite appearing forthcoming during the evaluation and passing a general malingering test. In her expert opinion, defendant was capable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time shot the victim.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant raises two assignments of error. First, defendant avers permitting Dr. Dana Troxclair to testify in lieu of the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy was a violation of his Confrontation Clause rights. Defendant's second assignment of error argues the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions because he proved he was not guilty by reason of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Considering defendant raises sufficiency of evidence and one or more trial errors, we begin by addressing the issue of sufficiency of evidence. See State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

Sufficiency of the evidence

In this assignment, defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of second-degree murder, and as such, the trial court erred in denying his motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, arrest of judgment, and alternatively motion for new trial. Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that he was insane at the time of the offense. In support of this argument, he points to the expert testimony of Dr. DeLand, as well as the testimonial evidence from other witnesses which described his statements and actions during and after the crime.

The State responds that it presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the jury correctly determined that defendant was sane at the time of the offense. Supporting its argument, the State points to Dr. Manguno-Mire's expert testimony as evidence on which the jury justifiably concluded that defendant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was legally insane at the time of the offense. Additionally, the State avers the entire record supports the jury's determination.

The question of sufficiency of the evidence is properly raised in the trial court by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 821. State v. Mouton, 16-673 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/26/17), 219 So.3d 1244, 1254, writ denied, 17-1149 (La. 5/18/18), 242 So.3d 572. A post-verdict judgment of acquittal shall be granted only if the court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, does not reasonably permit a finding of guilty. State v. Trice, 14-636 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14), 167 So.3d 89, 92. An appellate review of the denial of the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal is controlled by the standards set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Id.

In Louisiana, the law presumes a criminal defendant is sane. State v. Abbott, 11-1162 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/12), 97 So.3d 1066, 1068 (citing La. R.S. 15:432). To rebut this presumption of sanity and avoid criminal responsibility, the defendant has the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 652). This burden is not borne by proving the mere existence of a mental disease or defect. Rather, to be exempt from criminal responsibility, the defendant must show he suffered a mental disease or defect which prevented him from distinguishing between right and wrong at the time he committed the conduct in question. Id. (citing La. R.S. 14:14).

The determination of sanity is a factual matter. In considering an accused's plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, the trier of fact must first determine whether the State has proven the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1068-69. The trier of fact may then proceed to the determination of whether the defendant was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the offense. Id. at 1069.

All evidence, including both expert and lay testimony, along with other evidence of a defendant's conduct and actions before and after the crime, may be considered in determining whether the defendant has met his burden of proof. Id. A determination of the weight of the evidence is a question of fact that rests solely with the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Where rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the interpretation of the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. State v. Williams, 07-1407 (La. 10/20/09), 22 So.3d 867, 875-76.

On review of the sufficiency of evidence supporting an insanity defense, the appellate court, applying the standard outlined in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, must determine whether any rational fact-finder, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant failed to prove that he was insane at the time of offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Williams, 22 So.3d at 876.

In this assignment of error, defendant challenges only his conviction for second-degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, which defines the crime as the killing of a human being when the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Defendant does not argue on appeal that the State failed to prove the elements of the offense. Rather, defendant contends that he met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know right from wrong at the time of the offense and therefore should be exempt from criminal responsibility.

In support of his insanity defense at trial, defendant presented the testimony of Dr. DeLand, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist from Tulane University, who was accepted as an expert in forensic psychiatry. Dr. DeLand testified that she evaluated defendant three times and diagnosed him with delusional disorder of the paranoid and persecutory type. As previously discussed herein, Dr. DeLand testified that defendant's statements were consistent and lacked symptoms typically associated with malingering. Based on defendant's history, substance abuse, and behavior at the time of the incident, Dr. DeLand opined that he met the criteria for delusional disorder and was unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense.

Conversely, the State called Dr. Gina Manguno-Mire, an expert in forensic psychology, as a rebuttal witness. Dr. Manguno-Mire testified that she evaluated defendant on three occasions and reviewed police reports, medical records, and jail calls. She noted that defendant's lack of prior mental health treatment, normal jail behavior, and substance use history undermined the credibility of his claims. Dr. Manguno-Mire concluded that defendant did not have a legitimate delusional disorder and instead exhibited behaviors consistent with feigning symptoms for secondary gain. In her opinion, defendant's actions were volitional and intentional, and any alleged delusions emerged post-incident as a means to avoid responsibility.

As touched upon by Dr. Manguno-Mire, other testimonial evidence describing defendant's actions prior to, at the time of, and after the shooting lend further credence to the jury's determination that defendant was not insane. Testimony at trial established that defendant armed himself with his gun, entered the victim's bedroom, and shot her twice in the head. He also admitted that he told B.G. to leave the bedroom before shooting the victim. Afterwards, he walked out of the bedroom and informed her family that he was calling 9-1-1. Next, defendant proceeded to walk outside where he called 9-1-1 and waited for the police to arrive at the residence. Such actions aid in lending to the conclusion that defendant knew there were legal consequences stemming from his actions.

The expert witnesses who testified at trial disagreed as to defendant's sanity. On the question of which witness is to be believed where conflicting testimony is presented, the decision belongs to the jury and should not be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be shown. State v. Francois, 17-471 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/18), 242 So.3d 806, 816, writ denied, 18-530 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.3d 898. When the conflicting evidence is on the issue of insanity, the reviewing court should accord great weight to the jury's resolution of the conflicting evidence, provided the jury was properly instructed and no evidence was prejudicially admitted or excluded. State v. Pettaway, 450 So.2d 1345, 1355 (La. 1984), writ denied, 456 So.2d 171 (La. 1984); Francois, 242 So.3d at 818. The jury's decision should not be overturned unless no rational juror could have found the defendant failed to prove his insanity at the time of the offense. State v. Sharp, 418 So.2d 1344, 1348 (La. 1982).

Here, the jury, faced with conflicting psychiatric evidence, rejected the opinion of Dr. DeLand and accepted the opinion of Dr. Manguno-Mire that defendant was capable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the offense. We find the record supports the determination made by the jury. Applying the standard outlined in Jackson, viewing the foregoing evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was unable to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the offense. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's “Motion in Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal, Arrest of Judgment, and Alternatively Motion for New Trial” based on sufficiency. This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Right to Confrontation

In this assignment, defendant argues his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when he was denied the opportunity to confront Dr. Conner, who performed the autopsy on the victim and authored the autopsy report.⁷ Defendant asserts that Dr. Conner was available to testify at trial but was not called, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to confront her or challenge her findings. Specifically, he contends the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Troxclair's testimony as to Dr. Connor's report and that Dr. Troxclair improperly testified beyond the scope of death and cause of death by identifying autopsy photographs which she did not take, and interpreting them based on Dr. Connor's report.

The State counters that the autopsy report was nontestimonial in nature and therefore, not subject to the Confrontation Clause requirements. Thus, the State avers that the report was properly admitted, and there was no error in allowing Dr. Troxclair to testify as to Dr. Conner's report. The State asserts that Dr. Troxclair, as the Chief Forensic Pathologist for the Jefferson Parish Coroner's Office, was qualified to testify about the autopsy and that there was no dispute the victim was shot twice in the head by defendant or depicted in the autopsy photographs. The State contends that the issue was defendant's sanity, not the cause or manner of death, and argues that Dr. Troxclair's testimony was within her qualifications. Even if her testimony was admitted in error, the State asserts the guilty verdict was unaffected, and no relief is warranted.

At trial, the State called Dr. Troxclair, a forensic pathologist, to testify. As previously discussed, the victim's autopsy was performed by Dr. Conner, who was no longer an employee of the Jefferson Parish Coroner at the time of trial. While Dr. Troxclair was on the witness stand, the State offered the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Conner into evidence. In response, defendant objected on grounds that the State failed to establish that Dr. Conner was unavailable and there was no valid reason why she could not testify concerning her autopsy report. The State reported to the trial court that the autopsy report was being offered for record purposes only. After acknowledging defendant's objection, and instructing the State that Dr. Troxclair's testimony would encompass her review of the autopsy report and photographs in forming her own expert opinion, the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the autopsy report as State's Exhibit 8 for record purposes only.

Dr. Troxclair was shown a photograph which she indicated was taken during the autopsy. The defense again objected, arguing that Dr. Troxclair did not take the photograph and was not present for the autopsy examination. Noting the defendant's objection, the trial court admitted the photograph into evidence as State's Exhibit 9. Dr. Troxclair confirmed that she reviewed additional, autopsy photographs in preparation of her testimony. In the photograph admitted into evidence, she described the victim as having two entry gunshot wounds. Citing her experience in performing autopsies as a forensic pathologist, she testified that it would be highly unlikely for someone to survive the type of injury depicted in the photograph. When asked about the distance from which the gunshot was made, Dr. Troxclair pointed out the lack of seared edges of the wound in the photographs and opined the shots were fired “anywhere from a few inches up to two to three feet away.” Nothing contained in Dr. Conner's written autopsy report was referenced during Dr. Troxclair's direct examination or cross-examination testimony.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of the accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The confrontation clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1365, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Recently, in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 144 S.Ct. 1785, 219 L.Ed.2d 420 (2024), the United States Supreme Court held, “If an expert for the prosecution conveys an out-of-court statement in support of his opinion, and the statement supports that opinion only if true, then the statement has been offered for the truth of what it asserts.” Id., 602 U.S. at 795, 144 S.Ct. 1785. In Smith, a substitute expert witness testified to the contents of a chemical test report prepared by another analyst. Id., 602 U.S. at 790-91, 144 S.Ct. 1785. The Supreme Court held that the testifying analyst testified to the truth of the other analyst's report, and remanded for the state court to determine if the report was testimonial. Id., 602 U.S. at 796-97, 144 S.Ct. 1785.

In this case, Dr. Troxclair did not offer testimony regarding the findings or conclusions of Dr. Conner's autopsy report. Neither did she offer an opinion on the truth of Dr. Conner's findings or conclusions. Rather, as a qualified expert in forensic pathology, Dr. Troxclair described and offered opinions of what was depicted in the photograph she was presented. More succinctly stated, Dr. Troxclair did not testify to the out-of-court statements contained in Dr. Conner's autopsy report.

Defendant does not contest the cause of death, but instead challenges his sanity at the time of the offense—a fact to which the autopsy report and Dr. Troxclair's testimony were silent. Dr. Troxclair's testimony reflected her own professional analysis, and defendant had the opportunity to, and in fact did, confront and cross-examine Dr. Troxclair as to her opinion of what the photograph depicted. Consequently, we do not find a Confrontation Clause violation in the admission of Dr. Troxclair's testimony. The assignment is without merit.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

The record was reviewed for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). We found no errors requiring corrective action.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   As to count two, the bill of indictment alleged that defendant was previously convicted of possession of a schedule III-controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:968(C), in case number 15-3788 in the 34th Judicial District Court.

2.   Procedural history pertaining to defendant's mental status at the time of the offense is as follows: On February 1, 2022, defendant filed a motion to enter a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. On April 26, 2022, defendant filed a Motion to Appoint Sanity Commission for it to determine his mental status at the time of the offense. The trial court granted the motion on May 5, 2022. On October 17, 2022, defendant filed “Withdraw Motion for Sanity Commission at the Time of the Offense and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity.” The court granted the motion on October 20, 2022. On January 5, 2023, defendant filed a Motion to Enter Dual-Plea of Not Guilty and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. On February 6, 2023, defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.

3.   Because the testifying witness was a minor, her initials are used to protect her identity. See State v. Hayman, 20-323 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/28/21), 347 So.3d 1030, 1034. (“Initials are used to protect the identity of juveniles at the time of trial who testified as witnesses for the State in this case.”)

4.   Kami Plaisance, with the 9-1-1 communications district of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (JPSO), identified State's Exhibit 5 as a certified copy of CAD (“computer-aided dispatch”) documentation. She indicated that the document showed the dispatch location on Howard Avenue at 1:30 a.m. and included the statement, “[H]e just killed his mother-in-law.” The document stated the victim was shot in the head twice. It also recorded that the complainant claimed he shot the victim because she had tried to poison him. Ms. Plaisance identified the two 9-1-1 calls in this case as State's Exhibit 15, which were played for the jury.In a 9-1-1 call made by defendant, he stated that he just killed his mother-in-law because she had been trying to poison him. He said, “I just shot her in the head twice” and confirmed he still had the gun in his possession. He insisted he was “not crazy,” said he would put the gun down, and assured the operator he was not trying to fight. He repeated that he had killed her, she was dead, and he was “not playing games anymore.” He concluded by saying he was done. In another call, Paige reported that her mother, Linda, had been shot. She told the operator that she did not know what happened. Paige also mentioned that she hit her head, resulting in head trauma and bleeding from her ears. (State's Exhibit 15).

5.   Aubrey Ziegler, who worked with the Gretna Police Department as a Forensic Interviewer for the Jefferson Children's Advocacy Center, conducted an interview of B.G. The CAC recorded interview was published to the jury. (State's Exhibit 42). B.G. told Ms. Ziegler that her aunt, her aunt's boyfriend (defendant), and her aunt's daughter were moving into a new house, but her grandmother chose to live with B.G. and her mother instead. Around 1:27 a.m., B.G. and her grandmother went to the residence to bring teething rings. While there, B.G. saw defendant enter the bedroom with a pink and black gun but did not think much of it. She and her grandmother were talking in another room when she heard the incident. B.G. said the shooting happened quickly. Defendant entered the room and shot her grandmother twice. B.G. was scared by the loud noise and what occurred. Afterwards, defendant told her aunt to call the police. Her mother grabbed a towel and tried to stop the bleeding while her aunt attempted to help her grandmother. B.G. said she locked the door after defendant went outside to prevent him from returning. She explained that the police arrived shortly after, and they went outside to speak with them. B.G. indicated that before the shooting, she and her grandmother had been looking at her China plates. (State's Exhibit 42).

6.   State's Exhibit 14, the certified conviction packet, reflects that defendant pled guilty to possession of Suboxone and was sentenced to “2 years suspended, with 1 year of active probation,” as documented in the “Waiver of Constitutional Rights Plea of Guilty” form. It further reflects that defendant pled guilty on June 7, 2016, and was sentenced to two years at the Department of Corrections, suspended, and placed on one year of active probation.

7.   Procedural history pertaining to this assignment of error is as follows: On January 4, 2023, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Call Expert Witness, stating its intent to call Dr. Conner as an expert in forensic pathology. On November 13, 2023, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Call Expert Witness, stating its intent to call Dr. Troxclair as an expert in forensic pathology. The State explained that Dr. Troxclair would testify in place of Dr. Conner, who was unavailable.On November 30, 2023, defense counsel filed a “Motion in Limine-Hearsay.” Counsel argued that Dr. Conner performed the autopsy on May 26, 2020, and the State had filed notices to call her as an expert witness. Counsel contended the State filed a notice to call Dr. Troxclair, explaining only that Dr. Conner was unavailable. Counsel maintained that Dr. Troxclair neither performed nor assisted in the autopsy, did not authorize the report, and was not present at the examination, asserting that allowing Dr. Troxclair, who was uninvolved in the autopsy, to testify about its veracity would violate his confrontation rights and that the State failed to provide timely notice of its intent to call her as a witness. On December 11, 2023, the trial court ruled that allowing the doctor to testify did not constitute a violation and denied the defense's motion on this issue, while acknowledging the defense's objection. The trial court explained that the doctor would review autopsy photographs and the report and provide testimony based on her expert opinion. The trial court emphasized that the defense would have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness and highlight to the jury that she did not conduct the autopsy.

MARCEL, J.