STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RAMEY ARCENEAUX (2025)

Defendant, Ramey Arceneaux, appeals his jury convictions for (1) molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen, and (2) molestation of a juvenile when the incidents of molestation recur during a period of more than one year, both in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying cause challenges related to two prospective jurors who disclosed personal and family histories of sexual abuse. He asserts that this error constitutes grounds for a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

Facts

Defendant's assignments of error do not involve the facts that led to his convictions. Accordingly, we provide only a brief summary of the facts related to his convictions.

On September 29, 2019, the victim, J.H., who was 22 years old at the time, disclosed to her stepmother, her father, her grandmother and grandfather that she had been sexually abused as a child by defendant, her stepfather.¹ J.H. subsequently contacted the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office.

On December 12, 2019, the St. Charles Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information against defendant charging him with one count of molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen (DOB 9/24/1997), and one count of molestation of a juvenile when the incidents of molestation recur during a period of more than one year (DOB 9/24/1997), both in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2. The State amended the bill of information on August 23, 2022, changing the date range for count one from “08/01/2010 to 09/23/10” to “09/24/2003 to 09/23/2010,” and for count two from “08/01/2010 to 08/15/2012” to “09/24/2003 to 08/15/2012.” Defendant pleaded not guilty.

The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial that began on September 13, 2022. The State called several witnesses, including members of J.H.’s and defendant's extended family. Detective Steven Fontenot, the lead juvenile detective on the case, testified that during his interview of J.H. on October 4, 2019, she reported that defendant started abusing her when she was only twelve years old. Detective Fontenot testified he also interviewed members of J.H.’s family, as well as defendant on October 23, 2019. Defendant's statement was played before the jury. Defendant testified and called several witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty on both charges.

On December 2, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to 35 years at hard labor to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension on the charge of molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen. On the charge of molestation of a juvenile for more than one year, the trial court sentenced him to 25 years at hard labor to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension to run concurrently with his first sentence.

Law and Analysis

As his sole assignment of error, defendant asserts that the district court erred in denying his challenges for cause as to prospective jurors J.T. and C.L. after the State failed to adequately rehabilitate them once uncertainty as to their ability to be impartial was revealed.² Defendant contends that J.T. and C.L. disclosed extensive personal and family histories of sexual abuse. J.T. shared multiple experiences of sexual abuse involving herself, her daughter, and her cousin, while C.L. disclosed that she and several family members had been victims of sexual assault. Defendant asserts that these disclosures created a presumption of bias, given the similarity to the charges against defendant, and that the court's minimal rehabilitative questioning was insufficient to address this bias. Defendant argues that the denial of his challenges required defendant to exhaust his peremptory strikes, which ultimately violated his right to an impartial jury. He asserts this error constitutes grounds for a new trial.

The State responds that the trial court properly denied defendant's challenges for cause as to J.T. and C.L. The State contends that both jurors were thoroughly questioned during voir dire and demonstrated their ability to remain fair and impartial despite disclosing prior experiences with sexual abuse. The State argues that defendant failed to exhaust his peremptory challenges and that both jurors affirmed their willingness to follow the law and consider the evidence impartially. The State argues that based on precedent, a juror's prior experiences with similar crimes do not disqualify the juror if impartiality can be demonstrated, and the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the challenges.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused the right to trial by an impartial jury. State v. Griffin, 14-450 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/14), 167 So.3d 31, 41, writ denied, 15-148 (La. 11/20/15), 180 So.3d 315; State v. Munson, 12-327 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 6, 12, writ denied, 13-1083 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 476. La. Const. Art. I, § 17 guarantees the accused the right to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and the right to challenge those jurors peremptorily. Id.

When a defendant uses all twelve of his peremptory challenges, an erroneous ruling of a trial court on a challenge for cause that results in depriving him of one of his peremptory challenges constitutes a substantial violation of his constitutional and statutory rights, requiring reversal of the conviction and sentence. State v. Juniors, 03-2425(La. 6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, 304–05; State v. Breaux, 18-771 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/13/19), 269 So.3d 1046, 1049. Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is erroneously denied by a trial court and a defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. Id. Therefore, to establish reversible error warranting reversal of a conviction and sentence, defendant need only demonstrate: (1) the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2) the use of all his peremptory challenges. Id.

1. Defendant's Strikes Challenging Jurors C.L. and J.T.

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his challenges for cause as to C.L. and J.T. At trial, defendant did, in fact, exhaust all of his peremptory challenges. And defendant did timely object to the trial court's ruling denying his challenges for cause as to C.L. and J.T. But defendant only used a peremptory challenge on one of the two jurors (J.T.), who defendant now complains should have been stricken for cause.

During the second panel of jurors, the trial judge informed defense counsel that he had five peremptory challenges remaining. After hearing challenges for cause, the trial court informed the parties that they were beginning peremptory exceptions. The trial court stated: “As to Panelist 3 [C.L.], she is acceptable to the State and acceptable to the defendant. She will be Juror Number 5.” Afterward, the defense used an eighth peremptory strike on a different juror. Defense counsel did not ever use a peremptory challenge to strike C.L., who subsequently served on the jury.

To preserve the issue for appellate review, a defendant must use one of his remaining peremptory challenges curatively to remove the juror or waive the complaint on appeal, even in a case in which he ultimately exhausts his peremptory challenges. State v. Campbell, 06-286 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 810, 856, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1040, 129 S.Ct. 607, 172 L.Ed.2d 471 (2008); Breaux, 269 So.3d at 1049; State v. Brown, 99-172 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/28/99), 742 So.2d 1051, 1055, writ denied, 99-3148 (La. 4/20/00), 760 So.2d 340.

Defendant did not use a peremptory challenge on C.L. Thus, defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal as to C.L. Defendant did use a peremptory challenge on J.T. though, thus preserving his appeal on the question of whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's challenge for cause on J.T.

2. Challenge for Cause as to Juror J.T.

The grounds for a challenge for cause are set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 797, which provides in pertinent part:

The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that:

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(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence[.]

A prospective juror's seemingly prejudicial response is not grounds for an automatic challenge for cause, and a trial judge's refusal to excuse him on the grounds of impartiality is not an abuse of discretion, if, after further questioning, the potential juror demonstrates a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. State v. Kang, 02-2812 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So.2d 649, 653. However, a challenge for cause should be granted if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render a judgment according to law may be reasonably implied, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial. Kang, supra; Munson, 115 So.3d. at 12.

The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause; the judge's ruling will be reversed only when a review of the entire voir dire reveals that the judge's exercise of discretion was arbitrary and unreasonable with resultant prejudice to the accused. State v. Magee, 13-1018 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/24/14), 150 So.3d 446, 453, writ denied, 14-2209 (La. 10/2/15), 178 So.3d 581; Munson, supra. This is necessarily so because the trial court has the benefit of seeing the facial expressions and hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as they respond to questioning by the parties’ attorneys. Munson, supra; State v. Butler, 08-662 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/09), 15 So.3d 1091, 1096, writ denied, 09-1513 (La. 3/5/10), 28 So.3d 1004. Such expressions and intonations are not readily apparent at the appellate level where a review is based on a cold record. Id.

During voir dire, J.T. stated that she was a business owner, independent inspector, and independent adjuster. When the trial court asked the prospective jurors whether they, or a close friend or relative, had been the victim of a crime, J.T. stated that she had been a victim on different occasions and with different offenders. She said that her youngest daughter and her ex-husband's daughter, with whom she was close, had been victims as well. J.T. advised that she had been molested for a few years and was raped when she was twelve years old. She then stated, “And then I was also with a guy that I was potentially dating as an adult[.]” J.T. indicated that her youngest daughter was abused by someone in the family. She stated that the individual was also young, but a lot older than her daughter. She said, “[t]hings went on, and he went on to be convicted for several of the family members.” J.T. explained that a cousin was raped in the cousin's home by her child's father, pushed onto the Interstate, and left for dead. She stated that she believed this case went to court. The trial court then asked, “With respect to all of those experiences, do you believe that you could still be fair and impartial in this case and only listen to the facts as to this case and this defendant?” She responded, “Yes, ma'am.”

When the court asked the panel how they would vote given that the defendant is presumed innocent and the State had not yet presented any evidence, all of the prospective jurors on this panel answered, “Not Guilty.” J.T. also agreed that she could follow the law as instructed.

Additionally, it is clear from J.T.’s responses to other questions throughout voir dire that she had not made up her mind and that she was capable of keeping an open mind. When asked by the State about when survivors of sexual abuse typically disclose the abuse, J.T. responded that disclosure depends on the person and their situation and that some “take things to the grave ․ it could be anything.” J.T. also nodded in agreement when asked if elements outside of a person's life could impact a person's disclosure and agreed with the other potential jurors that “very few” children falsely report sexual abuse. And when asked about what to look for as to how the victim acts around the perpetrator, J.T. suggested it could vary. For example, a child might avoid the person, or get close to the person because they treat the child in a special way that the child appreciates. And sometimes “you don't know what to look for.”

Defense counsel challenged J.T. for cause, arguing “She was molested. Her mother was molested, her daughter was molested, the whole family was molested.” The State replied that J.T. clearly indicated that she could be fair and impartial in the case, and that nothing she had said suggested she would be unable to follow the law. The trial court clarified that it was J.T., her daughter, and her cousin who had been molested, and that the court had specifically asked J.T. whether she could look at the facts as to this case only, and she responded without hesitation that she could. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's challenge for cause.

Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly upheld the denial of challenges for cause of prospective jurors who have been the victims of crimes similar to the one of which the defendant stands charged, when the juror states that he or she would be fair, impartial, and not prejudiced against the defendants. State v. Burse, 14-564 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 169 So.3d 649, 656, writ denied, 15-804 (La. 3/4/16), 188 So.3d 1056; State v. Mazique, 09-845 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/27/10), 40 So.3d 224, 239, writ denied, 10-1198 (La. 12/17/10), 51 So.3d 19. In Burse, we upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's challenges for cause as to jurors who had been victims of sexual crimes similar to that charged against defendant in this case. Burse found that the jurors’ testimony “as a whole clearly show[ed] their willingness and ability to be fair and impartial jurors and to decide the case according to the law and evidence.” 169 So.3d. at 657.

In the instant case, J.T. stated that she, her daughter, and a cousin had been sexually abused in the past. Nevertheless, J.T. demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the facts of this case, and her responses as a whole did not reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render a judgment according to law could reasonably be implied. And after having had the opportunity to observe J.T. during the questions posed to her throughout the voir dire process, the trial court determined that she could be a fair and impartial juror. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's challenge for cause as to J.T.

Errors Patent Review

We reviewed the record for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990).

The sentencing minute entry reflects that “[d]efendant given notice under La. C.Cr.P. article 930.8 of 2-year prescriptive period for post-conviction relief.” However, the transcript, which controls, does not show an advisal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La 1983).

Accordingly, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, defendant is hereby advised that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. See State v. Harris, 23-233 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 152, 161, writ denied, 24-118 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 607.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

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FOOTNOTES

1.   The victim in this case will be identified by her initials, J.H., in the interest of protecting minor crime victims and victims of sexual offenses, as set forth in La. R.S. 46:1844(W)(3). See State v. R.W.B., 12-453 (La. 12/4/12), 105 So.3d 54; see also Uniform Rules of Court - Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2.

2.   Because the jurors discussed allegations of sexual abuse, we will use their initials. See supra, n. 1.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL JUDGE