STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LAURENCE MCKEE (2026)

The defendant, Laurence A. McKee (“Defendant”), appeals his conviction and sentence for second degree murder. After consideration of the record before this Court and applicable law, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In the late evening hours of August 26, 2016, and continuing into the early morning of August 27, 2016, Defendant and Justin Scott (“Mr. Scott”) spent the evening together in New Orleans, Louisiana. Defendant and Mr. Scott were childhood friends. Earlier that day, beginning at approximately 4:24 P.M., they exchanged text messages about meeting to “hang out.” Later, they met at Defendant's residence, located at 1730 North Broad Street in New Orleans, Louisiana, and rode bicycles to the French Quarter, where they patronized several bars and dined together.

During the evening, Defendant and Mr. Scott encountered Nathaniel Johnson (“Nate”), another friend of Defendant. Nate testified that, when he introduced himself to Mr. Scott, Mr. Scott suddenly and without apparent provocation became aggressive and placed him in a headlock. According to Nate, the encounter lasted approximately five minutes and escalated to the point that police were called to the scene. Officers separated Nate and Mr. Scott, placed Nate in handcuffs, and later released him with instructions to go home. No police report was generated from the incident, and Nate sustained no injuries.

Defendant and Mr. Scott later returned to Defendant's residence on North Broad Street. According to Defendant, he said good night to Mr. Scott and attempted to go inside his residence, but Mr. Scott followed him. Defendant stated that Mr. Scott shoved him into the front door and began choking him. Defendant further claimed that he broke free, ran to his bedroom, retrieved a firearm from a gun box near his nightstand, and returned to the hallway. Defendant stated that he told Mr. Scott to “Get the fuck out,” after which Mr. Scott allegedly lunged toward him. Defendant then fired one shot.

Mr. Scott was pronounced dead at the scene. He was found lying flat on his back on the front stoop of Defendant's residence, with his left foot just inside the front doorway, and the remainder of his body outside the residence. Law enforcement determined, and the coroner's autopsy later confirmed, that Mr. Scott sustained a single gunshot wound to the back, with an exit wound through the chest. Defendant, however, told law enforcement that he shot Mr. Scott in the chest. Based on the location and trajectory of the wound, law enforcement concluded that Mr. Scott was facing away from Defendant, and potentially leaving the residence, when Defendant fired the weapon. This conclusion was further supported by a strike mark on the exterior side of the front door, which indicated to law enforcement that the bullet was fired toward the door as it was swinging open.

Although Defendant told law enforcement that he and Mr. Scott had engaged in a physical altercation before Defendant retrieved the firearm, there was little physical evidence corroborating that account. Mr. Scott was unarmed, and the absence of a blood trail indicated that he was shot while standing in the location where his body was discovered. Mr. Scott did, however, appear to have two black eyes, which he did not have earlier in the evening when he and Defendant were photographed together while still out drinking. Additionally, although Defendant claimed that he rendered medical aid to Mr. Scott after the shooting, officers observed no visible blood on Defendant's hands when they arrived. Defendant also did not appear to have visible injuries and made no complaints of injury.

Inside the residence, the television in the living room area was found face-down on the floor. The television remained plugged into the wall outlets, its screen was intact and undamaged, and its stand had not been toppled over. No other visible signs of a struggle were observed; the remainder of the residence appeared neat and orderly.

Thereafter, Defendant was arrested for the murder of Mr. Scott.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 8, 2016, Defendant was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant appeared for arraignment on January 5, 2017, and entered a plea of not guilty. Over the next two years, Defendant remained subject to regular mandatory drug testing and was largely compliant with those requirements.

Defendant proceeded to a jury trial on January 22, 2019. On January 24, 2019, the jury found Defendant guilty as charged by a non-unanimous verdict. On March 11, 2019, Defendant appeared for sentencing. After denying Defendant's motion for new trial and receiving victim impact testimony, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

On March 20, 2019, Defendant filed a motion for appeal and designation of the record, which the trial court granted. In his first appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence on the ground that the non-unanimous jury verdict violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On August 19, 2020, this Court vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), and remanded the matter to the trial court. State v. McKee, 2019-0949 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/20), 365 So.3d 19.

Following remand, the matter returned to its pretrial posture. On November 15, 2021, the trial court denied five defense motions, and the defense noticed its intent to seek supervisory review. Thereafter, Defendant filed five writ applications with this Court, all of which were denied. The Louisiana Supreme Court likewise denied review.

On August 7, 2025, after the trial court denied the defense motion to recuse the trial judge, the defense again noticed its intent to seek supervisory review. This Court denied the writ application, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.

Defendant proceeded to a second jury trial on August 18, 2025. During trial, on August 21, 2025, the trial court denied the defense motion to present testimony concerning the victim's alleged reputation, which the defense represented had been filed that morning. The defense noticed its intent to seek emergency supervisory review, and the trial court denied the defense request for a stay. This Court denied the writ application, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.

At the conclusion of trial on August 21, 2025, the jury unanimously found Defendant guilty as charged of second degree murder. On September 16, 2025, Defendant filed a joint motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal or motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Additionally, Defendant filed a notice of intent to take appeal. The following day, September 17, 2025, Defendant appeared for sentencing. After receiving victim impact testimony, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defense counsel orally moved to reconsider sentence, and the trial court denied the motion. This timely appeal follows.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. A review of the record reveals no errors patent.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendant assigns six errors for this Court's review: (1) the trial court erred by excluding critical defense witnesses who would have testified to the victim's reputation for violence, thereby impairing Defendant's constitutional right to present a complete defense; (2) the trial court erred and fundamentally misled the jury on the applicable law of self-defense by instructing them on the aggressor doctrine over defense objection, while simultaneously denying a requested “Stand your Ground” instruction; (3) the trial court erred in denying the defense's motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to negate self-defense and support a conviction for second degree murder; (4) the trial court erred in excluding contemporaneous body worn footage under hearsay and authentication rules, thereby withholding crucial, legally admissible corroborating evidence of Defendant's physical injuries immediately following the altercation; (5) the trial court erred in denying the defense's requested special jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication, depriving the jury of the applicable law regarding specific intent; and (6) the trial court erred in summarily denying the defense's motion to reconsider sentence and failing to consider a downward departure from the mandatory life sentence, as the unique facts and circumstances of this case render the statutorily mandated sentence unconstitutionally excessive. We discuss Defendant's assignments of error out of order due to the sufficiency of evidence arguments being asserted.

Assignment of Error No. 3: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Negate Self-Defense

As his third assignment of error, Defendant challenges the denial of his motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and to negate his theory of self-defense. We first determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction of second degree murder. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 (La. 1992) (“When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The reason for reviewing sufficiency first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal․”).

Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), this Court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So. 2d 649, 657 (citations omitted). The statutory test of La. R.S. 15:438 “works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency test to evaluate whether all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury.” Id. (citing State v. Rosiere, 488 So. 2d 965, 968 (La. 1986)).

This Court has previously set forth the applicable standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence:

In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 588 So.2d 757 (La. App. 4 Cir.1991). However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305 (La. 1988). The reviewing court must consider the record as a whole since that is what a rational trier of fact would do. If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. The fact finder's discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Mussall; Green; supra. “[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1992) at 1324.

State v. Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So. 2d 1093, 1111.

The State charged Defendant with the second degree murder of Mr. Scott. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as the “killing of a human being․when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La. R.S. 14:10(1) defines specific criminal intent as “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or his failure to act.” “Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.” State v. Bishop, 2001-2548, p. 4 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So. 2d 434, 437; La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Butler, 322 So. 2d 189 (La.1975); State v. Martin, 92-0811 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/94), 638 So. 2d 411. Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence for his convictions of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder because the State failed to prove that the shooting was not the result of self-defense. Defendant argues that he acted in self-defense when he shot Mr.Scott; thus, his actions were legally justified.

A homicide is justifiable “[w]hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.” La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1). “In a homicide case in which the defendant asserts he acted in self-defense, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” State v. Kirk, 2011-1218, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/8/12), 98 So. 3d 934, 939-40 (citing State v. Taylor, 2003-1834, p. 7 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 58, 63). A defendant who is the aggressor or who brings on the difficulty cannot claim self-defense unless he withdraws in good faith and in a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict. La. R.S. 14:21.

Viewing the trial record in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could readily have found that the State negated self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The forensic proof is the crux of the matter. The autopsy established a single gunshot wound that entered Mr. Scott's back and exited his chest. The position of Mr. Scott's body – nearly entirely outside the front door – the strike mark on the exterior face of the door, and the projectile trajectory all support the conclusion that Mr. Scott was either departing or had been forced into a retreat at the moment Defendant fired. The only evidence supporting the proposition that Mr. Scott was advancing on Defendant was Defendant's own uncorroborated and self-serving custodial statement.

The absence of any visible injury to Defendant, the absence of blood on his hands despite his claimed rendering of aid, the curiously undamaged television (face down but still plugged into the wall), and the lack of any independent witness corroborating the alleged chokehold provided ample additional support for the jury's rejection of justification. On appeal, we will not disturb a credibility determination where the trier of fact could reasonably have inferred from the totality of the evidence that the killing was neither necessary nor the product of a reasonable belief in imminent danger. Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 1: Exclusion of Defense Witnesses on the Victim's Reputation for Violence

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trial court violated his right to present a complete defense by excluding defense witnesses who would have testified to Mr. Scott's reputation for violence and to specific prior violent acts. He further argues that the State opened the door to such evidence when its first witness, Mr. Scott's father, described his son as a peaceful musician.

“A trial court's ruling as to the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Cyrus, 2011-1175, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/5/12), 97 So.3d 554, 565. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(A)(2)(a) provides that, “․in the absence of evidence of a hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the offense charged, evidence of [the] dangerous character [of the victim] is not admissible.” An “overt act” means “any act of the victim which manifests to the mind of a reasonable person a present intention on his part to kill or do great bodily harm.” State v. Edwards, 420 So.2d 663, 669 (La. 1982). The threshold showing must rest on “appreciable evidence” – something beyond the defendant's own uncorroborated, self-serving statements. State v. Jackson, 55,312, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So.3d 354, 362.

We begin with the contention that the State opened the door. The State elicited from Mr. Scott's father brief biographical and identification testimony that his son was a musician with a peaceful disposition. This kind of contextual reference does not transform the victim's character into a “central issue” of the State's case-in-chief, nor does it open the door under La. C.E. art. 404(A)(2) to wholesale impeachment of the decedent's character. The defense lodged no contemporaneous objection to the father's brief testimony and requested no limiting instruction at the time. On this record, the trial court was within its discretion to decline to treat the father's testimony as a waiver of the threshold showing.

Turning to the overt-act showing, Defendant's proffer consisted exclusively of his own custodial statement: the assertion that Mr. Scott shoved him into the door, placed him in a chokehold, and continued to advance even after Defendant had retreated to his bedroom and retrieved a firearm. No independent witness corroborated any of these particulars. The forensic evidence – the location of the body, the back-to-front trajectory, the strike mark on the exterior face of the door, and the absence of any visible injury to Defendant – affirmatively undermined the claim that Mr. Scott was advancing aggressively at the moment of the shooting. Under Jackson, the Defendant's uncorroborated, self-serving account is not sufficient appreciable evidence to unlock the door to Mr. Scott's character evidence. Jackson, 55,312 at p. 11, 374 So.3d at 362. The trial court conducted a careful weighing of the submitted evidence against the requirements of La. C.E. art. 404(A)(2), and we cannot say that its ruling was an abuse of discretion.

The right to present a defense is not absolute and “must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In this case, the application of La. C.E. art. 404(A)(2) did not deprive Defendant of a meaningful opportunity to advance self-defense. He placed his entire account before the jury through his recorded statement and through vigorous cross-examination of every State witness. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 4: Exclusion of the Body-Worn Camera Footage

Next, as his fourth assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in excluding body-worn camera footage from responding officer, which he sought to introduce both as substantive evidence of his physical condition (that his neck hurt) immediately after the shooting and as the unsworn statements of an officer subpoenaed but not produced. Defendant argues that his statement would have corroborated his claim that Mr. Scott choked him. He also argues the footage should have come in over the State's hearsay and authentication objections, either as the Defendant's own statement, as a present-sense impression or excited utterance under La. C.E. art. 803(1)-(2), or as a remedy for the State's asserted failure to facilitate the witness's appearance.

Recently, this Court explained the guidelines for authenticating evidence:

A prerequisite to admitting evidence is for it to be authenticated. E.g. State v. Pollard, 2014-0445, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/15), 165 So. 3d 289, 301 (citing La. C.E. art. 901); see also Groves, 2020-0450, p. 29, 323 So. 3d at 975. That is, the court must find that the evidence in question is what its proponent claims it to be. La. C.E. art. 901(A). The district court is afforded great discretion in determining whether a sufficient foundation has been laid to authenticate evidence. Pollard, 2014-0455, p. 17, 165 So. 3d at 301 (citation omitted). On review, the appellate court must determine whether the proponent established sufficient facts from which a reasonable juror could find the evidence to be authentic. Groves, 2020-0450, p. 29, 323 So. 3d at 976 (citation omitted).

One way evidence can be authenticated is through “the testimony of a witness with knowledge that the matter is what it claims to be.” Groves, 2020-0450, p. 29, 323 So. 3d at 975 (citing La. C.E. art. 901(B)(1)). The jurisprudence on this issue holds that the person who authenticates video footage does not have to be the same as the one who recorded the video so long as that person has knowledge that the video is what he claims it to be and can provide information about its contents. State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/26/23), 372 So. 3d 864, 879, writ denied 2023-01421 (La. 4/3/24), 382 So. 3d 106.

․

Evidence that is authenticated can be admitted as non-hearsay, substantive evidence. Pollard, 2014-0445, p. 17, 165 So. 3d at 301 (citing La. C.E. art. 801(D)(1)). Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” La. C.E. art. 801(C). An officer testifying at trial regarding the sequence of events that led him to the arrest of a perpetrator, for the purpose of explaining the course of his investigation and actions, is not hearsay. State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 32, 372 So. 3d at 885 (citation omitted).

State v. Brisco, 2025-0230, pp. 13-14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/20/26), ___ So.3d ___, 2026 WL 145531 at *6-7.

In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the body-worn camera footage. The defense did not produce the officer with personal knowledge of the footage depicting Defendant's statement as he was not properly subpoenaed. As a result, Defendant failed to produce the only potential witness with the knowledge necessary to authenticate the video.

Furthermore, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that the statement regarding Defendant's physical condition after the incident contained on the body-camera footage was classic hearsay being offered for their truth, and that none of the hearsay exceptions applied. Defendant was not deprived of the substance of his account. His recorded interview with Detective Theophilus Kent was admitted, and ultimately, Defendant's complaint of neck pain reached the jury through his prior trial testimony. The exclusion of the body-camera footage, even if it were error, would not have contributed to the verdict on this record. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 921. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2: The Aggressor Instruction and the Refusal of a Stand Your Ground Instruction

In his assignment of error number two, Defendant maintains that the trial court fundamentally misled the jury on the law of self-defense by delivering an aggressor charge under La. R.S. 14:21 over defense objection while simultaneously refusing his requested “Stand Your Ground” charge under La. R.S. 14:20(A)(4) and (B). He relies principally on State v. Coutee, 2023-01549 (La. 6/27/25)), 413 So.3d 408, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed where the aggressor instruction was given on a record containing no evidence that the defendant had brought on the difficulty.

Regarding jury instructions, a trial court must charge the jury “as to the law applicable to the case.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 802. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 807 provides:

A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent. It need not be given if it is included in the general charge or in another special charge to be given.

Moreover, a special jury charge must be supported by the evidence. State v. Craig, 1995-2499, p. 7 (La. 5/20/97), 699 So.2d 865, 869. “[F]ailure to give a requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error only when there is a miscarriage of justice, prejudice to substantial rights of the accused, or a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.” State v. Perkins, 2013-1917, p. 2 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.3d 206, 208.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:20(A)(4) and (B), the “Stand Your Ground” provisions, require, as a threshold matter, that the homicide be committed against a person who was attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling or who had made an unlawful entry, with the homicide-committing party lawfully inside at the moment the conflict began. The trial court reviewed the trial evidence and concluded that the threshold showing for the presumption ¹ was not made. The forensic evidence established that Mr. Scott was outside the residence and exiting at the moment of the shooting. His body came to rest almost entirely on the concrete outside the doorway, with only the small portion of his left foot inside the threshold. There was no proof of a forcible or unlawful entry sufficient to engage La. R.S. 14:20(B)’s presumption. Where the predicate facts for a requested instruction are not supported by the evidence, the trial court does not err in declining to deliver it. The refusal of the “Stand Your Ground” charge was not error.

Coutee does not require reversal as to the aggressor instruction. In Coutee, the record contained no evidence that the defendant had provoked the conflict; she was, by every account in the record, a passive participant until the moment force was used. Here, by contrast, even taking Defendant's own account at face value, he retreated from an unarmed companion, walked to a separate room, retrieved a loaded handgun, returned to the living area, and fired three rounds. The forensic evidence, viewed alongside that sequence, would permit a rational jury to find that Defendant – not Mr. Scott – escalated the encounter from, at most, a shoving match to a lethal confrontation, and that he did so when retreat was practical and available. Based on the record, it is not apparent that Defendant was entitled to the presumption provided in La. R.S. 14:20(B). Moreover, the State presented substantial circumstantial evidence that Defendant was the aggressor. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and this assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 5: The Voluntary-Intoxication Instruction

In his fifth assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing his requested special charge on voluntary intoxication. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:15(2), provides:

The fact of an intoxicated or drugged condition of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime is immaterial, except as follows:

․

(2) Where the circumstances indicate that an intoxicated or drugged condition has precluded the presence of a specific criminal intent or of special knowledge required in a particular crime, this fact constitutes a defense to a prosecution for that crime.

Two threshold deficiencies preclude relief on this assignment. First, the record reflects that Defendant did not provide the State with pretrial notice of an intoxication defense pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 726 ² , and at trial, conceded that he was not pursuing intoxication as an affirmative defense. Second, the trial evidence – the deliberate sequence of retreating to a separate room, retrieving a loaded firearm, returning to the front of the residence, and discharging a gun – was not consistent with an intoxicated condition that precluded the formation of specific intent. Notably, neither party introduced evidence of Defendant's blood alcohol level the night of the shooting or of the amount of alcohol he consumed. To the extent the jury heard evidence of the parties’ drinking that evening, this evidence was relevant to the surrounding circumstances and to credibility, not to a free-standing intoxication defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the requested charge. Consequently, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 6: Denial of the Motion to Reconsider Sentence and Refusal to Depart Downward

As his final assignment of error, Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion to reconsider sentence and in refusing a downward departure from the mandatory term required by La. R.S. 14:30.1(B)³ . He argues that the unique facts and circumstances of this case render the mandatory sentence unconstitutionally excessive under the principles of State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993)⁴ and State v. Johnson, 1997-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672 ⁵ .

Preliminarily, under La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E), the failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence “shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.” In the instant matter, the Defendant orally moved for the trial court to reconsider the life mandatory sentence, without providing any grounds or further argument. See State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059, 1059-60 (La. 1993) (“If the defendant does not allege any specific ground for excessiveness or present any argument or evidence not previously considered by the court at original sentencing, then the defendant does not lose the right to appeal the sentence; the defendant is simply relegated to having the appellate court consider the bare claim of excessiveness.”). Consequently, this Court need only review the sentence for excessiveness.

Both the Eighth Amendment and La. Const. art. I, § 20 prohibit excessive punishment. State v. Curley, 2023-0498, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/18/24), 401 So.3d 23, 36. “A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering, and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Id. at p. 17, 401 So.3d at 37. “A sentence is grossly disproportionate only if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice.” Id.

“The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” State v. Mathieu, 2018-964, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/19), 283 So.3d 1041, 1045. Moreover, La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D) provides that “an appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed.”

In this case, Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence rested principally on the same arguments he advanced at trial: the closeness of the proof, the relative ages of the parties, and his expression of remorse. The trial court heard victim-impact testimony from Mr. Scott's father, mother, and sister; received Defendant's allocution; and considered counsel's argument before denying the motion and imposing the mandatory term.

Nothing in this record approaches the rare showing required to displace a mandatory sentence for second degree murder. Notwithstanding Defendant's claim that he acted in self-defense, the evidence did not support that theory. Defendant offered little explanation regarding the argument that preceded the shooting, testifying only that Mr. Scott was “ranting and fussing” before allegedly forcing his way into Defendant's residence and attacking him. However, investigating officers testified that they observed no evidence of either a struggle or a forced entry. Additionally, the coroner's autopsy, which confirmed that Mr. Scott sustained a single gunshot wound to the back, suggested that he was in the process of exiting through the front door when Defendant shot him in the back.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider, and the sentence imposed is not unconstitutionally excessive on this record. Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree murder are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:20 (B) explains:B. For the purposes of this Section, there shall be a presumption that a person lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle when the conflict began, if both of the following occur:(1) The person against whom deadly force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.(2) The person who used deadly force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.

2.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 726 provides:A. If a defendant intends to introduce testimony relating to a mental disease, defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged, he shall not later than ten days prior to trial or such reasonable time as the court may permit, notify the district attorney in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. The court may for cause shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other orders as may be appropriate.B. If there is a failure to give notice as required by Subsection A of this Article, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness offered by the defendant on the issue of mental condition.

3.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1(B) states, “Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”

4.   In State v. Dorthey, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge has a duty to reduce a statutorily mandated minimum sentence when he or she finds that the punishment “makes no ‘measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment’ or that the sentence amounted to nothing more than ‘the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering’ and is ‘grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime[.]’ ” 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993).

5.   In State v. Johnson, the Louisiana Supreme Court held, “[a] court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality.” 1997-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676.

Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott