INTEREST OF v. << (2026)

On March 11, 2024, the State of Louisiana, through the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office (“the State”), filed a delinquency petition charging C.G.¹ with illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.8. Following an adjudication hearing on July 12, 2024, the juvenile court found C.G. delinquent as charged. On March 18, 2025, the juvenile court entered a disposition committing C.G. to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice for six months. C.G. now appeals his adjudication and disposition.

As his sole assignment of error, C.G. contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed a handgun on his person.

At the adjudication hearing, the State presented the following testimony from New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) Officers Tyler Strahan and Nicholas Hairston:

On March 7, 2024, Officers Strahan and Hairston were conducting surveillance from an abandoned house across the street from the residence under surveillance as part of an investigation involving suspected narcotics activity. During the surveillance, the officers observed C.G. walking in the area with other individuals. Both officers noticed a bulge protruding from the front waistband area of C.G.’s pants, which Officer Hairston described as “L-shaped.” Officer Strahan described the bulge as having the shape of “a hand grip on ․ a pistol.” Officer Strahan testified that, based upon his training and experience, he believed the bulge was consistent with a concealed firearm in a waistband.² Officer Hairston similarly testified that the shape and size of the object, together with C.G.’s manner of clutching it, was consistent with an individual carrying a firearm in the front of his waistband.³

The officers maintained visual surveillance of C.G. and testified that they observed him remove the object from his waistband before entering the residence under surveillance.⁴ Officer Strahan testified that the object appeared to be a black firearm.⁵ Officer Hairston testified that C.G. removed a black firearm from his waistband and waved it in the air before entering the residence.⁶

Based upon their observations, officers obtained a search warrant for the residence. During execution of the warrant, officers recovered several firearms from inside the residence, including a black Smith & Wesson handgun, a black-and-tan Glock handgun, and an AK-47 style rifle. Officers also recovered a black BB gun from underneath the residence.

It is well-settled that “[w]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in juvenile cases, the standard of review is whether, viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the juvenile court committed manifest error in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed a delinquent act.” State in Interest of C.R., 19-0917, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20), 290 So.3d 220, 223 (citing State v. C.N., 11-0074, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/29/11), 69 So.3d 711, 714); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Review requires the appellate court to “determine that the evidence was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” C.R., 19-0917, p. 6, 290 So.3d at 223 (citing State v. Neal, 00-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657).

Analyzing whether the State has met its burden of proof, an appellate court grants great deference to the juvenile court's factual findings, credibility determinations, and assessment of witness testimony. State in Interest of K.D., 13-1274, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/14), 140 So.3d 182, 186; State ex rel. W.B., 08-1458, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/22/09), 11 So.3d 60, 61. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116, p. 2 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442, 443. “Credibility determinations, as well as the weight attributed to the evidence, are soundly within the province of the fact finder.” State v. D.D., 18-0891, p. 28 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/19), 288 So.3d 808, 833 (quoting State v. Scott, 12-1603, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/13), 131 So.3d 501, 508). “Moreover, conflicting testimony as to factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency.” State ex rel. T.C., 09-1669, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/11), 60 So.3d 1260, 1263 (citations omitted). Such a determination rests solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Id. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Hickerson, 19-1077, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/30/20), 312 So.3d 1124, 1138 (citing State v. Legrand, 02-1462, p. 5 (La. 12/3/03), 864 So.2d 89, 94).

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:95.8(A) provides in pertinent part: “It is unlawful for any person who has not attained the age of eighteen years knowingly to possess any handgun on his person.” This Court has recognized that the statute requires proof of actual possession of a handgun on the juvenile's person. State in Interest of T.M., 11-1238, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/28/12), 88 So.3d 1228, 1234-35, rev'd in part on other grounds, 12-0964 (La. 12/14/12), 104 So.3d 418. Constructive possession alone is insufficient to support an adjudication under La. R.S. 14:95.8. Id.; see also State in Interest of J.H., 22-0324, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/9/22), 369 So.3d 827, 834-35.

C.G. argues that the officers’ testimony was speculative and insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the object observed in his possession was a handgun. He emphasizes portions of the testimony in which the officers described the object as something they “believed” was a firearm, something that “looked like” a firearm, or something “consistent with” a firearm.⁷ This argument lacks merit.

C.G. cites federal jurisprudence holding that “[a] conviction must be overturned if it is based on speculation alone” because “ ‘[a] verdict may not rest on mere suspicion, speculation, or conjecture, or on an overly attenuated piling of inference on inference.’ ” United States v. Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d 320, 333-34 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1521 (5th Cir. 1996)). C.G. argues that the delinquency adjudication must be set aside because “the State's case hinged entirely on testimony that fail[ed] to establish with any reasonable degree of certainty that [C.G.] was in actual possession of a handgun and instead relie[d] on inference layered upon speculation.”

We do not agree that the juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency was based on speculation, or conjecture, or on an overly attenuated piling of inference on inference.

At the outset, we note that C.G.’s arguments conflate the following two separate evidentiary questions: (1) whether the officers sufficiently identified the object observed on C.G.’s person as a handgun, and (2) whether the State proved that a handgun later recovered from the residence was the same handgun observed during surveillance. The first question concerns whether the State proved an essential element of the charged offense; whereas, the second concerns only the weight to be afforded corroborative evidence recovered during the execution of the search warrant.

The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that C.G., a juvenile, knowingly possessed a handgun on his person. La. R.S. 14:95.8(A). The State was not required to prove that a particular firearm later seized from the residence was the identical firearm observed during surveillance. Accordingly, any uncertainty regarding whether the Smith & Wesson handgun recovered from the residence was the same handgun observed outside affects only the weight of that corroborative evidence. It does not determine whether the State proved actual possession. The evidence supporting actual possession was direct eyewitness testimony. Accordingly, this is not a case in which the State asked the factfinder to infer possession solely from proximity to a weapon or from circumstantial evidence discovered after the fact.

Both officers testified that they observed an object consistent with the shape of a handgun protruding from C.G.’s waistband. Both officers testified that, based upon their training and experience, the object's shape, location, and manner in which C.G. carried it were consistent with a handgun concealed in a waistband. Officer Hairston additionally observed C.G. clutching the object in a manner consistent with securing a firearm.

Most significantly, both officers testified that they observed C.G. remove the object from his waistband before entering the residence. Officer Strahan testified that the object appeared to be a black firearm. Officer Hairston testified that the object was a black handgun which C.G. waved in the air before entering the residence.

This case is therefore distinguishable from T.M., cited by C.G., wherein this Court rejected an attempt to establish actual possession through an inference arising from a handgun found near a juvenile. 11-1238, pp. 9-10, 88 So.3d at 1235. In the case sub judice, the State did not rely upon constructive possession or proximity to a weapon. Rather, the State presented direct testimony that officers personally observed C.G. possessing and displaying a handgun on his person.

Although portions of the officers’ testimony utilized phrases such as “believed” or “looked like,” those descriptions do not render the evidence legally insufficient. Viewed in context, the officers were explaining their observations and conclusions based upon their training and experience. The juvenile court heard that testimony, observed the witnesses, and found their testimony credible. The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual finding. State v. Marshall, 04-3139, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 362, 369 (citation omitted). In the case sub judice, the juvenile court heard consistent testimony from two officers.

Ultimately, C.G.’s argument asks this Court to reassess the credibility of the officers and reweigh the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing. That is not the role of an appellate court. Smith, 94-3116, p. 2, 661 So.2d at 443); D.D., 18-0891, p. 28, 288 So.3d at 832-33.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and giving appropriate deference to the juvenile court's credibility determinations, we find that a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that C.G., a juvenile, knowingly possessed a handgun on his person in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.8. Therefore, we find no manifest error in the juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency and disposition against C.G.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the adjudication of delinquency and disposition against C.G.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to the requirements of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings as set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 412, as well as in Rules 5-1 and 5-2 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, this Opinion will refer to the juvenile as C.G.

2.   Officer Strahan testified:Q [B]ased on your training and experience, you stated you'd been with NOPD for a while, what did you believe [the bulge in front of C.G.’s waistband] to be?A A firearm.Q Okay. And based on your training and experience, where do persons typically conceal a firearm?A I'm typically -- I know that people carry the firearms in their waistbands.See Trial transcript, pp. 15-16.

3.   Officer Hairston testified:While observing the defendant, [I] noticed that there was a solid “L” shaped Number 7 object in the front of his waistband that he appeared to be clutching. From that time, it pretty much raised my suspicion that he was in possession of a firearm just because of the bulge's size, how he kind of secured it with his right hand and form. It's pretty consistent with how most people try and secure a firearm so it doesn't fall down the waistband that they don't really have a holster for.Id., p. 48.

4.   Officer Strahan testified: “[Another male] went into the house first, [C.G.] followed, which once he got to the doorway, he pulled something from his waistband and closed the door.” Id., p. 16.Officer Hairston testified: “So, while we were conducting surveillance, [we] observed [C.G.] walking with a bulge. We believed it was a firearm. At one point he's walking from the opposite direction from Claiborne. He removes the firearm. It was a black in color firearm, it was a handgun. Kind of waves it around, then walks back into the house ․” Id., p. 49.

5.   Officer Strahan testified:Q And did you see what he pulled [from his waistband]?A It looked like, a black firearm.․Q [W]hat did you believe [the object C.G. pulled from his front waistband] to be?A A firearm.Id., pp. 16, 18.

6.   See n. 4, supra.

7.   Officer Strahan testified that the object C.G. pulled from his waistband “looked like” a black firearm and that he “believe[d]” the object was a firearm. Id., pp. 16, 18. Officer Strahan stated that the black Smith & Wesson handgun recovered in the search was the firearm “believed [C.G.] had possessed” outside the residence. Id., p. 30. Although, he later identified without qualification the Smith & Wesson as the gun he saw in C.G.’s possession. Id., pp. 36-37. Officer Hairston testified that the Smith and Wesson was “consistent with” the gun he observed in C.G.’s possession. Id., p. 50. In his brief, C.G. also cites instances where the officers used terms such as “believed” and “suspected,” when describing the bulge observed in C.G.’s waistband. Id., pp. 15, 53. However, these references related to observations before C.G. removed the object from his waistband and displayed the object.

Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano