ELIZABETH CAROL CRABTREE APPELLANT v. CHARLES WENDELL CRABTREE APPELLEE (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINIONAFFIRMING

Elizabeth Crabtree appeals from a decree of dissolution and order denying her any marital property, maintenance, and attorney fees.   She argues that Charles Crabtree made certain gifts to her during the marriage and that she is entitled to those pieces of property.   She also argues that she should have been awarded maintenance and attorney fees.   Mr. Crabtree argues that the trial court was correct in finding no gifts had been made and that she had sufficient income and property to support herself and pay her own attorney fees.   We affirm.

The parties to this action were married on September 5, 2007.   They signed a prenuptial agreement stating that they each owned their own home and wished to keep them separate, wanted to keep their finances separate, and wanted no jointly owned marital property.   The marriage fell apart and the parties separated less than one year later.   Mr. Crabtree filed a petition for divorce on August 27, 2008.   Mr. Crabtree had previously been married for 49 years to Margie Crabtree.   She died in 1999.   There were two children from Mr. Crabtree's first marriage.

A hearing was had in this case on May 11, 2009.   At this hearing, both parties testified, along with a representative of BB & T Bank, where Mr. Crabtree had two certificates of deposit.   Ms. Crabtree was seeking certain property of Mr. Crabtree, maintenance in the amount of $400 a month, and attorney fees.   She testified that Mr. Crabtree had given her two certificates of deposit and an independent IRA account.   She equated this to a postnuptial agreement.   She claimed that she left Mr. Crabtree for a short amount of time during the marriage and in exchange for her coming back, Mr. Crabtree promised to give her these financial instruments.   Mr. Crabtree testified that they had separated only once and denied giving her anything and stated that even though he made her the payable-on-death beneficiary on these financial instruments, they were not gifts.^Double He testified that he had named her as the beneficiary only because she was his wife.

The trial court entered an order on August 28, 2009.   In the order, the court found that Ms. Crabtree had adequate income and property and was adequately educated and trained so that she could meet her financial needs without assistance from Mr. Crabtree.   The court also found that Mr. Crabtree owned two certificates of deposit and various IRA accounts prior to the marriage and were therefore nonmarital property.   The court upheld the prenuptial agreement and each party kept his or her own property.   The court also denied Ms. Crabtree attorney fees and denied her request to be awarded the certificates of deposit and the IRA account.

Ms. Crabtree later moved for more specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.   The court entered a new order on April 19, 2010, which contained the requested findings of fact and conclusions of law.   The order set forth the same findings and holdings as the previous order.   This appeal followed.

Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 states that “[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”   This is our standard of review.  Vanover–May v. Marsh, 793 S.W.2d 852 (Ky.App.1990).

Ms. Crabtree's first argument is that there was a valid postnuptial agreement.   She claims that during the marriage, she and Mr. Crabtree separated for a few days.   She says that in exchange for her returning to him, Mr. Crabtree promised he would give her two certificates of deposit, would pay off her house, and would give her an IRA. It is undisputed that Mr. Crabtree put her name on the certificates of deposit and IRA. She argues this was a contract, a promise of gifts in exchange for her return, and therefore a postnuptial agreement.

The trial court found no such promise and we agree.   The trial court stated that her motion to be awarded the certificates of deposit and IRA account was “outlandish and unreasonable based on the evidence․”  After reviewing the hearing, the only evidence presented on this issue was he said/she said testimony.   Ms. Crabtree claimed they were gifts made during the marriage while Mr. Crabtree stated that they were testamentary in nature and could be changed at any time.   Mr. Crabtree admitted he made Ms. Crabtree the beneficiary on the accounts after the marriage, but the court was not persuaded that this amounted to a gift or postnuptial agreement.   We cannot say that the court's findings on this issue were clearly erroneous.   We therefore affirm.

Ms. Crabtree's next argument is that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable because Mr. Crabtree did not inform her of all his assets when they executed the agreement.   Specifically, she claims he never told her about his certificates of deposit, worth $10,000 each.   We find this argument irrelevant to the case.   Even if we find the prenuptial agreement to be unenforceable, there was no evidence presented to the trial court of any marital property.   Each party maintained his or her own house, the certificates of deposit and IRA accounts were in existence prior to the marriage, and Ms. Crabtree did not contribute to any of the financial accounts.  KRS 403.190(2) states that marital property is “property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage.”   Here, there was no property acquired subsequent to the marriage and therefore Ms. Crabtree was not entitled to any of Mr. Crabtree's property.

Ms. Crabtree's next argument is that the trial court erred in not awarding her maintenance.  KRS 403.200(1) states:

In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation ․ the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:

(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs;  and

(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment․

The trial court found that Ms. Crabtree had sufficient property and training to meet her financial needs.   We agree.

[T]he maintenance provisions of the dissolution statute are designed to provide income to a spouse commensurate with his or her needs at a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.   It must first, of course, be established that such spouse lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs and is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment.   Finally, the court certainly must also consider the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his or her own needs while at the same time meeting the needs of the spouse seeking maintenance.

Dotson v. Dotson, 864 S.W.2d 900, 902 –903 (Ky.1993).

In the case at hand, Ms. Crabtree was employed and made approximately $968 per month.   Mr. Crabtree received $1,626 per month in social security benefits.   Ms. Crabtree has had the same job since 2001, graduated high school, and has some college credit.   Ms. Crabtree also owned her own house.   While Mr. Crabtree did have two certificates of deposit and an IRA account, he also had medical and insurance bills that Ms. Crabtree did not.^Double Additionally, the marriage lasted less than a year, so it is unlikely that Ms. Crabtree became accustomed to an extravagant standard of living.   The trial court found that Ms. Crabtree could financially support herself.   These findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and the judge did not abuse his discretion in not awarding maintenance.

Finally, Ms. Crabtree argues that the court erred in not awarding her attorney fees.  “The court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorney's fees․”  KRS 403.220.   The issue of attorney fees is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.  Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823 (Ky.App.1977).   Here, the trial court found that Ms. Crabtree had sufficient property and income to pay her own attorney fees.   We agree with the trial court.   Ms. Crabtree was employed and had her own house.   Both parties also have a similar monthly income.   Mr. Crabtree does have two certificates of deposit and an IRA, but he also has more monthly expenses than Ms. Crabtree due to his poor health.

Based on the above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

ALL CONCUR.

STUMBO, JUDGE: