EVERETT GOODRICH APPELLANT v. PASQUALINA GOODRICH APPELLEE (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINIONAFFIRMING

Everett Goodrich appeals the Hardin Family Court's Order finding him in contempt of the domestic violence order (DVO) entered on July 28, 2009.   After a careful review of the record, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2009, the Hardin Family Court entered a DVO on behalf of Pasqualina Goodrich, providing in pertinent part that Everett “shall remain at all times and places at least 500 feet away from [Pasqualina] and members of [Pasqualina's] family or household;  except as follows:  No unlawful contact between parties.”   The order also prohibited Everett from having “any contact” with Pasqualina and from “disposing of, or damaging, any property of the parties.”

On April 9, 2010, Pasqualina filed an affidavit alleging that Everett had entered her residence ^Double and removed items from the home while she was not present.^Double Everett testified that he had entered the home and removed property from the home.   Everett argued that he did not violate the order because Pasqualina, or any other member of her household, was not in the home when he entered.

The court relied upon Lynch v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Ky.2002) (Keller, J., concurring in party and dissenting in part), and interpreted the word “household” contained in the DVO to include Pasqualina's residence, regardless of whether she or a member of her household was present.   In Lynch, Justice Keller observed in the dissenting opinion that “the word household encompasses its meaning as both a place of occupancy and the persons living therein as a family.”  Id. The family court also reasoned that Everett was aware that he was prohibited from entering Pasqualina's residence because he had previously sought leave from the court to enter Pasqualina's residence.^Double The court held that Everett willfully violated the DVO, found him to be in contempt, and sentenced him to ten days' incarceration in the Hardin County Detention Center with ten days probated.

Everett now appeals, arguing that the court erred by holding him in contempt for willfully violating the DVO when he entered Pasqualina's home while she was not present.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court has nearly unlimited discretion when exercising its contempt powers.   Smith v. City of Loyall, 702 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Ky.App.1986).   We review a court's exercise of its contempt powers for an abuse of discretion.  Meyers v. Petrie, 233 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Ky.App.2007).

III. ANALYSIS

Everett argues that the court incorrectly interpreted the order to prohibit him from entering the marital home while no one was in the home.   He further asserts that the court did not award Pasqualina exclusive use of the marital residence, and he therefore was entitled to enter the residence.   As such, Everett requests that this Court vacate the trial court's finding that he willfully violated the DVO and was therefore in contempt.

It is well established that Kentucky courts have the inherent power to punish individuals for contempt.  Newsome v. Commonwealth, 35 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Ky.App.2001).  “Both this Court and the Kentucky Supreme Court have defined contempt as ‘the willful disobedience of-or open disrespect for-the rules and orders of a court’ ” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Bailey, 970 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky.App.1998)).   As previously mentioned, a court has nearly unlimited discretion when finding a party in contempt.  Smith, 702 S.W.2d at 839.   Furthermore, the purpose of a DVO is to ensure that the life of a victim of domestic violence will be as “secure and uninterrupted as possible.”  KRS  Double 403.715.

In the case at bar, the court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting its own order and holding Everett in contempt for willfully violating the DVO. The DVO itself specifically prohibited Everett from having “any contact” with Pasqualina.   It is evident that Everett understood that broad statement to mean that the DVO prohibited him from entering Pasqualina's home because on at least one prior occasion Everett requested permission from the court to do so.   Everett nevertheless chose to enter the home without leave of the court and by doing so willfully disobeyed the court's order.

Also, the court's interpretation of the order is consistent with the interpretive guidelines and legislative purposes set forth in KRS 403.715.   Allowing Everett entry into the victim's home, even when she was not present, may be construed as intimidation and potentially disrupted Pasqualina's life and sense of security, which is contrary to the purpose of the entry of a DVO. Given the broad discretion of a trial court to exercise its contempt power, we conclude that the court did not abuse its power in this case.   Accordingly, we affirm.

STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS.

CAPERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

MOORE, JUDGE: