PADGETT v. MEADE COUNTY (2026)

OPINION

David and Theresa Padgett (Appellants) appeal from an order of the Meade Circuit Court dismissing their complaint against Meade County, Kentucky (Appellee). The complaint sought a declaratory judgment barring Appellee from requiring Appellants to obtain a permit to operate their recreational vehicle park (RV park). Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in rejecting their argument that Kentucky's Right to Farm Act ¹ and Agricultural Supremacy Clause ² protect their RV park from local regulation. They also contend that the circuit court improperly relied on case law from other jurisdictions. After careful review of the record, the arguments of counsel and the law, we find no error and affirm the order on appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants own and operate Southern Grace Bed and Breakfast (B&B) in Brandenburg, Kentucky. Alongside the B&B, Appellants have grown hay and raised animals including cattle, goats, alpacas, and chickens as part of a recreational farming operation.³ The tract of land, which Appellants have owned for about 26 years, is taxed at an agricultural rate.

In 2016, Appellants bought a parcel of property across the road from their B&B and recreational farming operation. This parcel was taxed at the commercial rate and has a separate tax identification number.

In 2020, Appellants were granted a conditional use permit on the latter parcel to operate a temporary RV park. The RV park was created primarily to serve construction workers building a Nucor steel mill in Brandenburg, Kentucky. According to the record, the RV park could also be used to accommodate visitors to the B&B. The conditional use permit was set to expire on January 1, 2022, but was extended for an additional two years.

On December 29, 2023, Appellants filed the instant action in Meade Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment barring Appellee from requiring Appellants to obtain further conditional use permits or extensions. In support of the complaint, Appellants argued that the Agricultural Supremacy Clause and the Right to Farm Act protect their RV park from local regulation and bar Appellee from requiring a permit for continued operation.

Appellee denied Appellants an extension of the conditional use permit on May 2, 2024. Three months later, the circuit court granted Appellants’ motion for a temporary injunction enjoining Appellee from closing the RV park.

Finally, on March 3, 2025, the Meade Circuit Court entered an order lifting the temporary injunction and denying Appellants’ request for a permanent injunction barring Appellee from requiring further conditional use permits. The court found that the RV park serves no agricultural purpose other than to temporarily house visitors who may or may not engage in some recreational agricultural activity. It also determined that the RV park was not a “residential building development for sale or lease to the public” entitled to protection per KRS 100.111(2). This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In a declaratory action, findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Big Sandy Company, L.P. v. EQT Gathering, LLC, 545 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted).

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

Appellants argue that the Meade Circuit Court's findings are unsupported by the evidence, and that it misapplied the law in failing to conclude that the RV park is an agritourism operation protected by the Agricultural Supremacy Clause. They argue that the RV park is an integral part of their agritourism operation; therefore, it is protected by the Agricultural Supremacy Clause and exempt from local zoning regulations imposed by Appellee. Based on the exemption, Appellants contend that they require no permit to operate the RV park in conjunction with their agritourism operation.⁴

Appellants first argue that their property is a “farm” for purposes of the Agricultural Supremacy Clause, as it is more than five contiguous acres, which they have used for agricultural purposes including growing hay and maintaining livestock such as cattle, goats, alpacas, and chickens at various times. They contend that these activities align with Kentucky's statutory definition of agricultural use, which encompasses the production of crops and the maintenance of livestock on tracts of at least five contiguous acres. They argue that there is no statutory requirement that the operation be profitable, and that the statutory and administrative framework emphasizes the use of land for agricultural purposes, regardless of the intensity or financial outcomes of such use.

Appellants further argue that under Kentucky law and policy, agritourism is an accepted farm practice entitling them to benefit from the Agricultural Supremacy Clause. They direct our attention to the testimony of Keith Rodgers, former Chief of Staff for the Kentucky Department of Agriculture, who stated that an RV park can be considered part of agritourism because it constitutes a farm stay. Appellants also point to the testimony of Heather Siesel, a former guest at the RV park, who they argue stated that she chose the location for its farm-based activities, which provided enrichment and experiential opportunities for her and her daughter. They maintain that during their stay, they observed hay baling, interacted with a baby calf during a campfire, watched alpacas, and fed apples to cows. Appellants argue that these activities are quintessential examples of agritourism, as they connect visitors to farm life and agricultural practices. Appellants also contend that the circuit court erred in relying on extra-jurisdictional case law in reaching its decision.

Appellants argue that the resolution of this issue has significant implications not only for Appellants, but also for the broader agricultural community in Kentucky as it addresses the balance between local regulatory authority and the Legislature's commitment to preserving and promoting agricultural use. They request an opinion reversing the order on appeal, and a holding that Appellee is barred from regulating Appellant's RV park.

KRS 100.203 gives local governments the authority to establish zoning regulations. KRS 100.203(4), however, sets out limited exceptions to this local authority. Referred to in the record as the Agricultural Supremacy Clause, though not expressly named that in the statute, KRS 100.203(4) states that,

[City and county zoning] provisions to the effect that land which is used for agricultural purposes shall have no regulations except that:

(a) Setback lines may be required for the protection of existing and proposed streets and highways;

(b) All buildings or structures in a designated floodway or flood plain or which tend to increase flood heights or obstruct the flow of flood waters may be fully regulated;

(c) Mobile homes and other dwellings may be permitted but shall have regulations imposed which are applicable, such as zoning, building, and certificates of occupancy; and

(d) The uses set out in KRS 100.111(2)(c) may be subject to regulation as a conditional use[.]

Thus, the so-called Agricultural Supremacy Clause provides that cities and counties may not regulate “land which is used for agricultural purposes” subject to limited exceptions for setback lines, flood plain regulation, and mobile homes or dwellings. KRS 100.203(4). The primary question for our consideration, then, is whether the land upon which the RV park is situated is “land which is used for agricultural purposes.”

KRS 100.111(2) states:

“Agricultural use” means the use of:

(a) A tract of at least five (5) contiguous acres for the production of agricultural or horticultural crops, including but not limited to livestock, livestock products, poultry, poultry products, grain, hay, pastures, soybeans, tobacco, timber, orchard fruits, vegetables, flowers, or ornamental plants, including provision for dwellings for persons and their families who are engaged in the agricultural use on the tract, but not including residential building development for sale or lease to the public. For purposes of this subsection, “livestock” means cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, alpacas, llamas, buffaloes, and any other animals of the bovine, ovine, porcine, caprine, equine, or camelid species[.]

In examining this issue, the Meade Circuit Court determined that the RV park is not a “tract of at least five (5) contiguous acres for the production of agricultural or horticultural crops” per KRS 100.111(2). The record supports this conclusion as no agricultural or horticultural crops are produced on the RV park property. The RV park is not “land which is used for agricultural purposes[.]” KRS 100.203(4).

Appellants seek to expand the definition of “agricultural use” in KRS 100.111(2) by application of the Agricultural Supremacy Clause. They argue that since Kentucky public policy favors a robust agritourism industry, it follows that agritourism is “agricultural use” for purposes of KRS 100.111(2) (which defines agricultural use) and KRS 100.203(4) (which prevents local governments from regulating agricultural zoning).

KRS 247.801 states:

(1) “Agritourism” means the act of visiting:

(a) A farm or ranch; or

(b) Any agricultural, horticultural, or agribusiness operation; for the purpose of enjoyment, education, or active involvement in the activities of the farm, ranch, or operation;

(2) “Agritourism activity” means any activity that:

(a) Is carried out on a farm, ranch, agricultural operation, horticultural operation, or agribusiness operation; and

(b) Allows or invites participants to view or participate in activities for recreational, entertainment, or educational purposes. Qualifying activities may include farming, ranching, historic, cultural, civic, or ceremonial activities, including but not limited to weddings and ancillary events; harvest-your-own operations; farmers’ markets; or natural resource-based activities. The activities may qualify as agritourism activities whether or not a participant pays to view or to participate in the activity;

(3) “Agritourism building” means any building or structure or any portion thereof that is used for one (1) or more agritourism activities;

(4) “Agritourism professional” means any person, including employees or authorized agents acting on behalf of the agritourism professional, who is engaged in the business of providing one (1) or more agritourism activities;

(5) “Inherent risks of agritourism activity” means those dangers or conditions that are an integral part of an agritourism activity, including certain hazards, such as surface or subsurface conditions; natural conditions of land, vegetation, or water; the behavior of wild or domestic animals; and the ordinary dangers of structures or equipment used in farming and ranching operations; and

(6) “Participant” means any person, other than the agritourism professional, who engages in an agritourism activity.

After careful review, we find no basis for expanding the statutory definition of agricultural use (KRS 100.111(2)) to include agritourism. When engaging in statutory interpretation,

our main goal is “to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.” The clearest indicator of that intent is the “language the General Assembly chose, either as defined by the General Assembly or as generally understood in the context of the matter under consideration.” And “[w]here the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as written.”

Bell v. Bell, 423 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Ky. 2014) (footnotes and citations omitted).

Here, the words used in KRS 100.111(2) are clear, unambiguous, and express the legislative intent; therefore, there is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as written. Id. The General Assembly granted to local governments the authority to enact zoning regulations. KRS 100.203. It then carved out limited exceptions to that authority, including land of more than five acres used for agricultural purposes. That agricultural use is expressly constrained in KRS 100.111(2) to include only “the production of agricultural or horticultural crops[.]” The General Assembly could have expanded that definition to include agritourism and RV parking for agritourism, but it did not. There is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as written. Bell, 423 S.W.3d at 223.

Appellants also briefly argue that the Right to Farm Act, set out in KRS 413.072, bolsters their claim that the RV park should not be subject to local regulation. This argument is not persuasive, as the Act's stated purpose is to “reduce the loss to the state of its agricultural ․ resources by clarifying the circumstances under which agricultural ․ operations may be deemed a nuisance[.]” KRS 413.072(1). The Act is not applicable to the facts before us.

Lastly, Appellants argue that the Meade Circuit Court improperly relied upon or otherwise misinterpreted extra-jurisdictional case law in concluding that the RV park was not agricultural land exempt from local regulation. We have closely examined this argument and find no error. Even without reference to case law from other states, the statutory language employed by the Kentucky General Assembly clearly reveals that 1) local governments may regulate zoning; 2) exempt from this authority are certain agricultural lands in excess of five acres; and, 3) an RV park is not agricultural land subject to the exemption. We find no error in the Meade Circuit Court's reference to case law from other states.⁵

CONCLUSION

The Agricultural Supremacy Clause does not bring agritourism or related operations like an RV park within the agricultural exemption to local regulation. The Meade Circuit Court properly so found. For the foregoing reasons, we find no error and affirm the order of the Meade Circuit Court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.072.

2.   KRS 100.203(4).

3.   At the time of this proceeding, Appellants raised only a small herd of goats on the parcel.

4.   It appears online that Southern Grace Bed and Breakfast may have permanently closed. None of the parties, however, has moved to dismiss this appeal.

5.   The extra-jurisdictional case law considered by the Meade Circuit Court does not bolster Appellants’ claim. In Forster v. Town of Henniker, 167 N.H. 745, 118 A.3d 1016 (2015), for example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that a wedding venue on a Christmas tree farm was not protected from zoning regulation despite the plaintiff's argument that it was a form of agritourism. The court expressly found that statutory definition of “agriculture” did not include “agritourism.” Id. at 1022.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE:

ALL CONCUR.