JHPDE FINANCE LLC LLC v. Shawn Huffman, Real Party in Interest (2025)

ORDER

Petitioners JHPDE Finance I, LLC and Javitch Block, LLC filed an original action in this Court for a writ of prohibition in two cases originating in Jefferson Circuit Court. Real Party in Interest, Shawn Huffman, filed a response. For the reasons stated herein, it is ORDERED that the petition for writ of prohibition is GRANTED as to JHPDE Finance I, LLC v. Shawn Huffman, Jefferson Circuit Ct. Action No. 22-CI-004116 (Susan Schultz Gibson, Judge) and DENIED as to Shawn Huffman v. JHPDE Finance I, LLC, Jefferson Circuit Court Action No. 25-CI-002878 (Tracy E. Davis, Judge).

I. BACKGROUND

On August 19, 2022, JHPDE filed Action No. 22-CI-004116 against Huffman to collect a delinquent credit card debt. Huffman filed a handwritten, pro se answer. On April 14, 2023, JHPDE filed a motion for summary judgment. Huffman filed no response. The circuit court entered summary judgment in the amount of $15,150.65 on May 19, 2023. On that date, the judgment was final and appealable because it “adjudicate[ed] all the rights of all the parties in [that] action ․” CR ¹ 54.01.

Huffman made no post-judgment motion pursuant to CR 52.02 or CR 59 that would have suspended the running of time to take an appeal from the summary judgment. RAP ² 3(E)(3). Therefore, “[t]he circuit court lost jurisdiction of the case ten days from the date the order was signed and entered ․” Yocum v. Oney, 532 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. 1975). For the next twenty days, until June 19, 2023, the judgment remained final and appealable. Thereafter, the judgment was non-appealable. RAP (3)(A)(1). That is, it became “final and conclusive” as to the parties. Wood v. Sharp's Adm'r, 159 Ky. 46, 166 S.W. 787, 788 (1914) (“judgment of the circuit court ․ from which no appeal was prosecuted ․ being final and conclusive of [the party's] rights, the matter of [the party's] claim is res judicata”).

JHPDE was only required to wait ten (10) days after entry of the judgment to begin collection efforts. KRS ³ 426.030 (“No execution shall issue on any judgment, unless ordered by the court, until after the expiration of ten days from the rendition thereof.”). That is because “[t]he statute [KRS 426.030] contemplates a final judgment.” City of Louisville v. Verst, 308 Ky. 46, 213 S.W.2d 517, 521 (1948). JHPDE waited eighty-seven days before availing itself of the laws governing a judgment creditor's collection of adjudicated debts.

Title XXXIX of the Kentucky Revised Statutes is our legislative scheme for enforcing judgments. KRS 425.001-KRS 427.990. It creates the judgment creditor's right to collect by execution and other means against the judgment debtor's property. See KRS 426.010 (“If a final judgment in personam is rendered in any court of record in this state for an ascertained sum of money, with interest and cost, or for either, an execution against property may issue thereon.”). JHPDE followed a typical course to collect the judgment.

On August 14, 2023, JHPDE initiated wage garnishment proceedings against Huffman's employer, C & I Engineering, in accordance with KRS 425.501 et seq., KRS 426.130, and KRS 427.005(1). Title XXXIX provides judgment debtors such as Huffman opportunities to challenge such garnishments. See, e.g., KRS 425.501(4); CR 69.01; CR 69.02(2). See also Gibson v. Auxier, 264 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ky. 1953) (“garnishee sought to have the summons quashed”). However, the limited record before this Court does not indicate he took advantage of any such opportunities. Instead, on September 27, 2023, Huffman, again acting pro se, moved to set aside the summary judgment.

Huffman cited no rule authorizing his collateral attack upon the judgment. Neither does the circuit court's order denying the motion entered on December 4, 2023, cite any rule. It indicates that after Huffman filed his motion, he hired attorney Nick Thompson to represent him, but Thompson cited no rule either. The circuit court's order simply says in its entirety:

Denied. Original motion states no grounds for the motion. Counsel was permitted time to file a supplement, but none has been filed. Therefore, there have been no arguments of counsel and the Court cannot find good cause.

In that same interval between Huffman's filing of the motion and its being heard, JHPDE served a non-wage garnishment on the garnishee, Fifth Third Bank, following the same authorized collection procedures of Title XXXIX. That was November 14, 2023. On January 4, 2024, a month after the circuit court denied Huffman's motion to set aside the judgment, JHPDE tendered a notice of Satisfaction of Judgment. The circuit court entered the Satisfaction of Judgment and the clerk of court served it on the parties on February 9, 2024.

Three months later, on May 15, 2024, Huffman's attorney, Mr. Thompson, served discovery requests to JHPDE's counsel. JHPDE acknowledges receiving the discovery requests eight days later and not responding, explaining “the judgment in the 4116 case was satisfied, Javitch's file closed and the 4116 case was over.” Petition, p. 1.

On October 17, 2024, Huffman filed a motion to compel JHPDE's response to discovery. But he did not serve either of Javitch Block's Ohio offices of record.⁴ Instead, he served a law firm in Hebron, Kentucky unassociated with the case.⁵ No one appeared for JHPDE at the October 28, 2024, hearing on the motion and the circuit court entered an order compelling discovery that same day.

Because Mr. Thompson prepared the order compelling discovery (which he also mistakenly captioned “Motion to Compel Discovery”), the only address shown on the order for service to JHPDE's counsel was the law firm in Hebron, Kentucky, that did not represent JHPDE. At some point, a Javitch Block attorney who had represented JHPDE, Edna Coulter, learned of Mr. Thompson's recent filings. On November 8, 2024, she emailed Mr. Thompson, stating:

I am reaching out to you about your motion to compel, I am a bit confused as to why such a motion was filed, since this case has been settled and file closed for some months. Was this perhaps filed in the wrong case?

Mr. Thompson did not respond to the email. JHPDE responded to neither Huffman's discovery requests nor the circuit court's order which the record fails to indicate Javitch Block ever received.

On December 12, 2024, Huffman's counsel filed a motion for sanctions to be heard on December 16, 2024. Not only did he again serve the wrong law firm, but he also sought “an order granting sanctions against ․ [that firm,] Zwicker, and Associates.” JHPDE made no appearance at the hearing, in person or by counsel.

The video of the hearing is not in our limited record. However, on December 19, 2024, the circuit court entered an order supporting the representation of Huffman's new counsel, James H. Lawson, that Mr. Thompson made an oral motion at the hearing to set aside the final judgment. That order is captioned “Order for Sanctions” and says, in pertinent part:

Defendant [Huffman] has now motioned the Court to set aside the Summary Judgment of May 19, 2024 [sic] to return funds garnished from Defendant's bank account since that date, and to award attorney fees in the amount of $200. Counsel for Plaintiff [JHPDE] did not appear at the motion hour at which this matter was called, and has filed no response to the motion.

․

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Summary Judgment entered on May 18, 2024 [sic] is hereby set aside. Funds garnished since that date shall be returned to Defendant.

On April 14, 2025, Huffman filed Action No. 25-CI-002878, against JHPDE and Javitch Block in a different division of Jefferson Circuit Court, alleging JHPDE: (1) violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by failing to abide by the order entered in No. 22-CI-004116 requiring JHPDE to return the garnished funds to Huffman; and (2) converted the garnished funds by refusing to comply with the order. JHPDE removed that case to federal court and petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition.

II. ANALYSIS

Of the two classes of writ, JHPDE seeks a writ of the first class and so that is our focus. It is well-settled law that a writ of prohibition of the first class “may be granted upon a showing that ․ the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court ․” Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004) (emphasis original).

We first take particular note that the Court in Hoskins did not place an adjective or adjectival phrase before the word “jurisdiction.” Presuming a petitioner satisfies the requirement that there is no remedy by appeal or otherwise, a writ of prohibition, necessarily and logically, must be available whether the circuit court is acting without subject matter jurisdiction, or without personal jurisdiction, or without particular case jurisdiction.

It has been said that “the term jurisdiction is often more easily used than understood.” Davis v. Wingate, 437 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But, of the three kinds just mentioned, surely particular case jurisdiction must be the most easily understood because of its relation to the finality rule. “Our finality rule deprives trial courts of jurisdiction to make new findings after ten days.” Brett v. Isaac, No. 2008-SC-000712-MR, 2009 WL 2707092, at *2 (Ky. Aug. 27, 2009) (citing Yocum, 532 S.W.2d at 16).

In Pavkovich v. Shenouda, we said the circuit court “lost jurisdiction of the subject matter of [that particular case] ․ ten days after it entered the order dismissing the Pavkoviches’ claims with prejudice.” 280 S.W.3d 584, 587 (Ky. App. 2009). Was the jurisdiction we said was lost subject matter jurisdiction or particular case jurisdiction? The subtle interstitial play between subject matter jurisdiction and particular case jurisdiction should not confuse us. We used to say, “An order of dismissal is final and after the term at which it is entered [now after ten days], the court loses jurisdiction of the cause.” See Van Arsdale v. Caswell, 311 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Ky. 1958), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Kelly v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Ky. 2018) (brackets in original) (emphasis added) (citing Combs v. Deaton, 199 Ky. 477, 251 S.W. 638, 641 (1923)).

Although “subject-matter jurisdiction is separate and distinct from particular-case jurisdiction[,]” Kelly, 554 S.W.3d at 860, a party can have his particular case adjudicated only in a court with subject matter jurisdiction to do so. To be clear, the legislature does not grant subject matter jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. Subject matter jurisdiction is legislatively granted in the abstract and is theoretical. For example, circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over claims by all credit card companies against any of their customers for non-payment, but it exists in the abstract and theoretically. KRS 23A.010(1). Only when JHPDE brought its particular case against Huffman did that subject matter jurisdiction become concrete and practical.

Just as in Pavkovich, in this case the circuit court “lost jurisdiction of the subject matter” of JHPDE's particular cause of action against Huffman “ten days after it entered” summary judgment. 280 S.W.3d at 587. However, in Pavkovich we went on to say, “Once lost, jurisdiction must be invoked anew, independently of the previous action that has achieved finality.” Id. at 588. And what does that mean?

Subject matter jurisdiction of a particular case can be “invoked anew” if the law says it can. But Huffman did not invoke subject matter jurisdiction anew in this case. It is true, as part of our “more-easily-used-than-understood” fog, we have not always spoken of lost jurisdiction invoked anew, but the concept is always the same. For example, when we referred to “residual jurisdiction,” we said whatever “residual jurisdiction remain[s] in the trial court under these circumstances is limited in scope to consideration of only specifically authorized matters.” Young v. Richardson, 267 S.W.3d 690, 696 (Ky. App. 2008). That separate specific authorization is the subject matter jurisdiction invoked anew.

For instance, CR 60.01 allows courts to correct clerical mistakes anytime, but “the rule is limited to mistakes that are clerical in nature.” Hutson v. Commonwealth, 215 S.W.3d 708, 717 (Ky. App. 2006). The rule itself provides the limits of the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction when CR 60.01 is invoked. Regardless, Huffman never sought relief pursuant to CR 60.01.

CR 60.02 allows mistake, newly discovered evidence, etc., to be considered within a year of a final judgment, and fraud, “or any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief” can be considered within a reasonable time. That is the limited scope of the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction when CR 60.02 invokes it anew in a particular case. Again, Huffman never pursued a collateral attack on the finality of the summary judgment by invoking the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to CR 60.02.

Similarly, “there are statutes in Kentucky that specifically grant a trial court continuing jurisdiction[⁶ ] over a particular case after a final judgment has been entered, such as in child custody, child support, and certain probationary matters.” Buster v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 294, 304 (Ky. 2012). Of course, Huffman never invoked the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction—i.e., never made manifest that court's subject matter jurisdiction—by bringing a particular case pursuant to such authority.

“KRS 342.125(1) gives some relief from the principles of the finality of judgments by permitting the reopening and reconsideration” of workers’ compensation claims under proper circumstances. Slone v. R & S Mining, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 259, 262 (Ky. 2002). That is, this statute authorizes invoking anew the court's subject matter jurisdiction limited as it is by the scope of the statute itself. But Huffman's claim is not a workers’ compensation claim.

We already discussed the legislative scheme that “invoked anew” the circuit court's jurisdiction in this case—Title XXXIX. But that jurisdiction was invoked by JHPDE, not Huffman. Title XXXIX provides, in the abstract, a circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction to oversee the collection efforts of all judgment creditors pursuing collection of their final judgments against their judgment debtors. JHPDE made that abstract subject matter jurisdiction concrete when it sent Huffman's employer a wage garnishment in August 2023.

However, the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the express authority granted in the legislative scheme of Title XXXIX. The authority given the circuit court while vested with that subject matter jurisdiction is almost exclusively to aid the judgment creditor in collecting what the judgment debtor owes. See, e.g., KRS 425.106(2) (court may compel judgment debtor's attendance to be questioned regarding whereabouts of his property and “punish a disobedience of its orders in this respect as in cases of contempt”); KRS 425.521 (court may order a garnishee to deliver property of judgment debtor); KRS 425.526 (court may adjudicate claims by judgment creditor against garnishee); KRS 426.030 (court may authorize waiver of the ten-day waiting period before a judgment creditor may execute on property of judgment debtor); KRS 426.384 (“court shall enforce the surrender of the money or securities therefor, or of any other property of the [judgment debtor] defendant in the execution, which may be discovered in the action; and the court may use its contempt power in enforcing surrender of the property”).

What is clearest, however, is that none of the dozens of statutes in that legislative scheme grants the circuit court subject matter jurisdiction to set aside a final and conclusive summary judgment. Nothing therein authorizes a circuit court to order a party, whose claim the court adjudicated in its favor, who engaged in lawful debt collection with the same court's assistance, and whose judgment the same court declared satisfied, to then disgorge that lawful recovery. That is, nothing in Title XXXIX grants the court subject matter jurisdiction to do so.

We may not have identified every way to invoke jurisdiction anew, but Huffman identified none that grants the circuit court subject matter jurisdiction to set aside the summary judgment. Absent such statutory empowerment, a trial court is wholly stripped of its subject matter jurisdiction relative to the particular case and cause. This circuit court lost jurisdiction of the case and cause JHPDE brought against Huffman ten days from entry of summary judgment when he undertook no authorized post-judgment collateral attack of the judgment. See Prater v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 898, 906 (Ky. 2002). Allowing the resurrection of long final cases where no authority for doing so exists “would create endless possibilities for frivolous claims that would wreak havoc upon the finality of judgments[,]” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 2, 11 (Ky. 2004), rendering the finality principle all but meaningless.

Because Jefferson Circuit Court Action No. 22-CI-004116 reached finality on May 19, 2023, and by his inaction Huffman waived his right to appeal on June 19, 2023, the judgment was final and conclusive, and the circuit court already lost subject matter jurisdiction over this particular case. A particularized exercise of subject matter jurisdiction authorized the circuit court to adjudicate JHPDE's claim against Huffman. The circuit court exercised that jurisdiction fully to its final and conclusive resolution, and the court was done with that particular case. The circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction then again became abstract and theoretical, remaining so until another party invokes it in a particular case, making subject matter jurisdiction concrete and practical once again.

The October 28, 2024, order compelling discovery and the December 19, 2024, order sanctioning JHPDE, setting aside the May 19, 2023 summary judgment, and compelling JHPDE's disgorgement of what it collected pursuant to Title XXXIX were entered while the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, making those orders void ab initio. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 892 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. App. 1995) (a court's orders entered while lacking subject matter jurisdiction are void ab initio). That satisfies one of the elements required to establish entitlement to a writ of prohibition of the first class—the circuit court proceeded outside its jurisdiction.

The only other necessary element is the unavailability of a remedy by appeal or otherwise. Huffman argues the case of Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Moberly, 241 S.W.3d 329 (Ky. 2007), controls here. We agree, but not for the reason Huffman argues.

In Asset Acceptance, a creditor obtained a default judgment against its debtor customer, Moberly. A month later, Asset Acceptance filed a judgment lien. The summons, various notices, the judgment, and the lien, which Moberly did not deny receiving failed to get her attention. Nearly two years after the judgment, however, Asset Acceptance “garnisheed Moberly's bank account and collected $11,032.92 from the garnishee bank.” Id. at 331. Moberly then took note.

Citing CR 55.02 which says, “For good cause shown the court may set aside a judgment by default in accordance with Rule 60.02[,]” Moberly's attorney filed a CR 60.02 motion. Moberly, 241 S.W.3d at 332. She claimed her “ ‘unawareness’ ․ was ‘a reason of an extraordinary nature’ entitling her to relief from Asset's two-year-old judgment under CR 60.02(f).” Id. at 331. The circuit court granted the motion.

“[T]he general rule in Kentucky is, and for some time has been, that an order setting aside a judgment and reopening the case for trial is not final or appealable.” Id. at 332 (citing Asher v. Asher, 339 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1960)). When Asset Acceptance appealed the order setting aside the default judgment, Moberly cited this general rule and successfully moved this Court to dismiss the appeal.

Asset Acceptance took its case to the Supreme Court, urging that Court to adopt an exception federal courts recognized “permitting an immediate appeal from orders setting aside a judgment when the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant that relief.” Id. at 333. The Supreme Court acquiesced, saying:

We are persuaded ․ and therefore join the federal courts to the extent of recognizing a narrow exception to the rule that orders setting aside a judgment may not be appealed. Where a final judgment has been ordered reopened, where the disrupted judgment is more than a year old, and where the reason offered for setting it aside is allegedly an “extraordinary circumstance” under CR 60.02(f), permitting an immediate appeal helps to maintain the important balance between, on the one hand, the equitable insistence on justice at all costs and, on the other, the equally vital insistence that litigation must at some point conclude and reasonable expectations founded upon long-established final judgments must not lightly be overturned. This is the balance that the limitations provisions of CR 60.02 attempt to strike, and we agree with Asset that when that balance is threatened by the trial court's alleged disregard of those provisions, an immediate appeal is appropriate.

Id. at 334 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court vacated this Court's order dismissing the appeal and remanded because of “the narrow circumstances presented by this case ․ to ensure that CR 60.02(f) has not been invoked to, in effect, evade the one-year limitations period CR 60.02 imposes on claims appropriately regarded as falling under CR 60.02(a), (b), or (c).” Id. at 334-35. On remand, we reversed the circuit court's order setting aside the default judgment, stating, “Moberly's claim that her temporary battle with alcoholism prior to being served with process justifies the extraordinary relief afforded by CR 60.02 is woefully inadequate. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court had no authority to set aside the judgment entered two years earlier.” Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Moberly, No. 2006-CA-000863-MR, 2009 WL 1347164, at *4 (Ky. App. May 15, 2009).

The case now before this Court does not fall within this narrow exception because “the narrow circumstances presented” there are not present here.

First, the Supreme Court in Asset Acceptance took special note that “default judgments are disfavored and the trial court is vested with broad discretion to set them aside.” 241 S.W.3d at 332. Huffman was not defaulted out in this case. He received notice and an opportunity to be heard and was heard. He defended the claim against him, albeit pro se, a choice he was free to make.

Second, Asset Acceptance did not avail itself of CR 79.02 by having the court enter a Satisfaction of Judgment and may still have been pursuing collection when Moberly moved to set aside the default judgment. Though of no particular legal effect, Javitch Block's filing of a Satisfaction of Judgment indicates it had little or no reason to fully monitor anything further in Action No. 22-CI-004116, whether those actions were by Huffman or the circuit court.

Third, Huffman's attorney initiated the series of events that led to the petition for a writ by promulgating unauthorized post-finality discovery. JHPDE's attorneys were entitled to such discovery under Title XXXIX in aid of execution, but Huffman was not.

Fourth, Huffman's attorney's failure to respond to an email inquiry seeking an explanation for the unusual and unauthorized post-finality discovery and subsequent motions, and his misdirection of notices of motions and orders to a random law firm in Hebron, Kentucky, raise eyebrows and call into question whether JHPDE received the process it was due.

Fifth, and most significantly, the narrow Asset Acceptance exception applies only when the motion to set aside the judgment is based on CR 60.02(f). Huffman cannot satisfy that element of the exception. He acknowledges that “we do not know the basis for the motion to vacate the summary judgment or Judge Gibson's reasons for granting the motion” and says he is “[a]ssuming arguendo that Judge Gibson relied on CR 60.02 ․” Response to Petition, p. 6. That is not enough. The basis must be CR 60.02(f), specifically. If the order setting aside the judgment has any other basis, the exception does not apply.

So, yes, Asset Acceptance governs and supports our conclusion that JHPDE had no remedy by appeal or otherwise. We are not inclined to broaden what the Supreme Court expressly ruled is a “narrow exception,” limited to the “narrow circumstances” of Asset Acceptance. The circumstances of this case do not compare favorably to those narrow circumstances. Nothing supports a belief the order setting aside the summary judgment was based on CR 60.02(f). Therefore, the general rule prevails “that an order setting aside a judgment and reopening the case for trial is not ․ appealable.” Black Forest Coal, LLC v. GRC Development, LLC, 483 S.W.3d 378, 380 (Ky. App. 2015) (quoting Asset Acceptance, 241 S.W.3d at 332, and declining to extend the exception beyond motions based on CR 60.02(f)).

JHPDE's petition satisfies the second element that must exist for a writ of the first class to issue—the unavailability of a remedy by appeal. As to Jefferson Circuit Court Action No. 22-CI-004116, the petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby GRANTED. The circuit court's October 28, 2024, order compelling discovery and the December 19, 2024, order sanctioning JHPDE, setting aside the May 19, 2023 summary judgment, and compelling JHPDE's disgorgement of garnisheed monies were entered when the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and under circumstances denying JHPDE the right to appeal. Those orders are therefore void ab initio. Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. J.T.G., 301 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Ky. App. 2009) (“[A]ny order issued by a court that did not have proper jurisdiction is ‘void ab initio ․ is not entitled to any respect or deference by the courts.’ ”).

We note, however, if Huffman believes he is entitled to relief pursuant to CR 60.02(d), (e), or (f), nothing prohibits him from presenting such motion to the circuit court for its consideration.

As for Jefferson Circuit Court Action No. 25-CI-002878, the petition for a writ of prohibition is not well taken. “Original proceedings in an appellate court may be prosecuted only against a judge or agency whose decisions may be reviewed as a matter of right by that appellate court. All other actions must be prosecuted in accordance with applicable law.” RAP 60(A) (emphasis added). Because this case was removed to federal court prior to the circuit court's entry of any order or decision, and because removal ceased all proceedings in that court, a petition for a writ of prohibition in this Court is not ripe and is therefore DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of prohibition in JHPDE Finance I, LLC v. Shawn Huffman, Jefferson Circuit Court Action No. 22-CI-004116 is GRANTED.

The petition for a writ of prohibition in Shawn Huffman v. JHPDE Finance I, LLC, Jefferson Circuit Court Action No. 25-CI-002878 is DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

2.   Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.

3.   Kentucky Revised Statutes.

4.   Two Javitch Block attorneys represented JHPDE: (1) Edna Jenelle Coulter, Javitch Block LLC, 1100 Superior Avenue, 19th Floor, Cleveland, OH 44114; and (2) Robert Kevin Hogan, Javitch Block LLC, 700 Walnut Street, Suite 302, Cincinnati, OH 45202.

5.   Zwicker and Associates P.C., 2300 Litton Lane, Suite 200, Hebron, KY 41048. The individual lawyer served, Robert Hogan “was employed with Javitch (not Zwicker and Associates) until he retired on or about May 6, 2024[,]” before Huffman served discovery. Petition, p. 2.

6.   Again, whether we call this jurisdiction “residual” as in Young v. Richardson, supra, or “continuing” as in Buster v. Commonwealth, supra, or define it as jurisdiction invoked “anew,” as in Pavkovitch, supra, the concept remains that we are not talking about the same subject matter jurisdiction the circuit court exercised to finality in the original case.

ACREE, JUDGE:

ALL CONCUR.