HARPER v. PREMIER INK SYSTEMS INC (2025)

OPINION

Christopher Harper seeks review of an August 16, 2024, order of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) in which the Board declined to review a subrogation agreement between Harper's former employer, Premier Ink Systems, Inc. (Premier), its insurance carrier, Chubb Insurance Group (Chubb), and third-party alleged tortfeasors, AmScan, Inc. (AmScan) and AmScan employee Michael Hughes, citing a lack of jurisdiction. After careful review, we affirm.

In April of 2019, while Harper was employed at Premier, he visited AmScan as part of his job duties. While on location, Harper was injured when he was struck by a forklift driven by Hughes. Harper filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits from Premier. Eventually, Premier and Harper entered into a settlement agreement and Premier agreed to pay Harper $100,000 as a lump sum benefit. The agreement was approved by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the case was closed in September of 2020.

Harper filed a separate tort action against AmScan and Hughes in the Jefferson Circuit Court in March of 2020. In July of 2020, Premier filed an intervening complaint seeking subrogation for workers’ compensation benefits paid to Harper. Unbeknownst to Harper and prior to any sort of resolution of his tort claims, Premier, through Chubb, entered into a subrogation agreement with AmScan and Hughes in which AmScan and/or Hughes agreed to pay Chubb $65,000. Shortly thereafter, Premier, Chubb, AmScan, and Hughes filed a stipulation and sought dismissal of all claims between one another. Harper objected, arguing that Premier's claims were only derivative of his own and that he had not been included in the negotiations for the settlement agreement. Specifically, he contended that he was entitled to a pro rata share of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.700.

Upon further motion by Harper, the circuit court by order entered July 20, 2023, remanded the settlement agreement between Premier/Chubb and AmScan/Hughes to the ALJ for approval. Upon remand, in a perfunctory order, rendered February 27, 2024, the ALJ ruled that Harper's:

‘motion for ruling’ to address a subrogation issue in a companion civil case is taken as a motion to reopen, and, since the cited reason is not grounds for reopening under KRS 342.125(1), the motion is denied. The extent of an employer's subrogation interest, if any, is for a circuit court to decide since the workers’ compensation claim was previously resolved by a settlement approved on September 24, 2020.

Harper immediately appealed to the Board, which affirmed the ALJ by its order entered August 16, 2024. Harper then petitioned this Court for review on September 9, 2024.

The only issue we need decide on appeal is whether the Board was correct in its determination that it lacked jurisdiction to review the settlement/subrogation agreement between Premier/Chubb and AmScan/Hughes. “[J]urisdiction is generally only a question of law.” Davis v. Wingate, 437 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Ky. 2014) (footnote omitted). “[R]egarding questions of law, this Court is bound neither by the decisions of an ALJ or the Board regarding proper interpretation of the law or its application to the facts. In either case, the standard of review is de novo.” Miller v. Go Hire Emp. Dev., Inc., 473 S.W.3d 621, 629 (Ky. App. 2015) (citation omitted).

In order to analyze the Board's ruling, we must take a step back to the circuit court proceedings, with the caveat that we are not addressing an order appealed from the circuit court. Upon motion of Harper, the circuit court ordered on July 20, 2023, that “all issues related to the Settlement Agreement of the subrogation claim are remanded to [the Board] for review and resolution.” “Remand” is a verb which means, in relevant part, “[t]o send (a case or claim) back to the court or tribunal from which it came for some further action[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 1547 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). There was no case or claim before the circuit court that originated from the Board. Harper filed an independent, original tort action in circuit court against AmScan and Hughes, and Premier intervened. Not only was the Board never a party before the circuit court, but Harper's claims were not an appeal of a decision of the Board, which would necessarily require this Court to exercise jurisdiction, not the circuit court. See KRS 342.290. Accordingly, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case to the Board and, for that reason alone, the Board was correct that it did not have jurisdiction to review the subrogation agreement.

Notwithstanding, we also agree with the Board's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to review the settlement agreement between Premier/Chubb and AmScan/Hughes under any statute contained within KRS Chapter 342. Harper argues that KRS 342.325 provides jurisdiction. We disagree. The statute provides that, “[a]ll questions arising under this chapter, if not settled by agreement of the parties interested therein, with the approval of the administrative law judge, shall be determined by the administrative law judge except as otherwise provided in this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) Harper also contends KRS 342.265 provides jurisdiction. We again disagree. The statute provides, in relevant part,

(1) If the employee and employer and special fund or any of them reach an agreement conforming to the provisions of this chapter in regard to compensation, a memorandum of the agreement signed by the parties or their representatives shall be filed with the commissioner, and, if approved by an administrative law judge, shall be enforceable pursuant to KRS 342.305. Where all parties have not joined in the settlement agreement, it shall not be approved unless it is certified that the party not participating in the settlement has been served with a copy of the agreement not less than ten (10) days prior to submission of the agreement for approval.

(Emphasis added.)

Under KRS 342.325, there are simply no facts or law to support the contention that AmScan and Hughes are “parties interested” under Harper's workers’ compensation claim. Similarly, neither AmScan nor Hughes are any of the entities contemplated in KRS 342.265. Stated differently, Harper has failed to persuade this Court that any provision of KRS Chapter 342 confers jurisdiction of the ALJ and the Board over AmScan or Hughes under the facts of this case.

We also agree with the Board that Custard Insurance Adjusters, Inc. v. Aldridge, 57 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. 2001) provides guidance. In that case, an employee of an Indiana corporation was injured while on the job in Kentucky. The employer had separate insurance carriers for Kentucky and Indiana. The employee filed a workers’ compensation claim in Kentucky and the Indiana carrier began paying benefits to the employee. However, the Kentucky carrier later became involved and began paying benefits. The Indiana carrier sought reimbursement for benefits it had mistakenly paid to the employee prior to the Kentucky carrier. The Kentucky carrier argued the ALJ and the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the reimbursement issue and that it should be resolved in circuit court. The ALJ ultimately decided it had jurisdiction and ordered the Kentucky carrier to reimburse the Indiana carrier. The Board agreed with the ALJ. This Court reversed the Board and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. In explaining its reasoning our highest court stated:

The Board's analysis overlooks the fact that the question of reimbursement was purely a dispute between two insurance carriers over benefits that had already been paid, and resolution of the matter did not involve a provision of Chapter 342. Under those circumstances, we are persuaded that the dispute did not concern a question that arose under Chapter 342 and, therefore, that the ALJ and the Board did not have jurisdiction to resolve it.

Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc., 57 S.W.3d at 288-89.

The dispute between Premier/Chubb and AmScan/Hughes concerns reimbursement for benefits already paid to Harper and does not arise under a statutory provision of KRS Chapter 342. Accordingly, the Board did not have jurisdiction to resolve the issue, including review of the settlement agreement.

We decline to address any party's argument pertaining to the merits of the settlement agreement, as those arguments must be raised in and decided by the circuit court. “An appellate court is without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.” Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Board is affirmed.

TAYLOR, JUDGE:

ALL CONCUR.