B.M., Appellant, v. K.J., Appellee. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

B.M. challenges the district court's award of $2,500 in attorney fees to K.J. after B.M. failed to appear for trial without warning. After reviewing the record, we find the court acted within its discretion and therefore affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Following an apparently tumultuous relationship, B.M. petitioned for a protection from abuse (PFA) order against K.J. The district court issued an ex parte temporary PFA order and set the matter for an initial hearing roughly two weeks later. The court held two status hearings, at which K.J. appeared with counsel and B.M. appeared pro se. At the second status hearing, the court scheduled the matter for trial after confirming the proposed trial date worked for the parties.

B.M. failed to appear at trial or tell the court that she could not attend. As a result, K.J. asked for the case to be dismissed and that attorney fees of $2,500 be awarded in his favor. The district court granted both requests.

B.M. then retained counsel, who moved for relief from judgment or, in the alternative, to amend judgment. She contended the attorney fee award was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the court failed to consider any of the factors set forth in Rule 1.5(a) of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 332) before awarding fees. She also argued that K.J. made no showing that B.M.’s request for a PFA order was frivolous, so the award of attorney fees was inappropriate. B.M. claimed she did not appear for trial “because she was intimidated by the process, was not represented by legal counsel, and was concerned that confronting [K.J.] in person would result in him eventually seeking revenge on [her].”

The district court heard arguments from both parties’ attorneys at a hearing on B.M.’s motion, after which it declined to alter or amend its order. In explaining its decision, the court clarified that fees were not awarded because it found B.M. had filed a frivolous claim. But, rather, because B.M. did not appear for trial:

“[B.M.] set in motion a process by which the defendant engaged counsel at not an insignificant cost to him. Counsel was present from the beginning at the hearings. So [B.M.] had full knowledge that counsel was involved, had phone calls with counsel, and given the fact that she is in the legal field, and even if she wasn't, should expect that there is probably costs associated with the defendant having an attorney, and then decided to not show up for the trial.”

The district court also clarified:

“[T]he only thing that the Court considered at the time of the fee award was the fact that she had agreed and committed to a trial date and utterly failed to notify the Court or counsel that she was going to not attend. She didn't email the Court or counsel a minute before, two minutes before, three minutes before, four minutes before, five minutes before. And I'm not going to keep going.

“She had countless opportunities to say, you know what, I don't think I'm going to move forward. And she chose not to do that, and so the only thing the Court considered was [defense counsel]’s request for fees and granted them because the Court found that he was entitled to the fees pursuant to the statute because they are something I can assess. Additionally, they were reasonable, that analysis was made when I made the award, and I didn't have to set forth findings of fact.

“And, lastly, given the fact that she failed to appear, the Court cannot go through an analysis of whether the case was frivolous or not, because she chose not to prosecute it. And the fact that the defendant was prepared for trial, and she, for whatever reason, decided not to come, that has no relevance to me whatsoever.”

As for the amount of the fee award, the district court stated that the amount requested was “completely consistent with fee awards [in] these types of case[s] that I get asked for day in and [day] out. What [K.J.] asked for was not too high. It wasn't too low. It was reasonable.” Last, based on “[a]ll of her actions, both with me and in writing,” the court found B.M.’s stated reason that she did not appear because she was intimidated by the process was not credible.

Review of B.M.’S Appellate Challenges

Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework

The issue of the district court's authority to award attorney fees is a question of law over which appellate review is unlimited. In re Estate of Oroke, 310 Kan. 305, 317, 445 P.3d 742 (2019). And, if an award of fees is authorized by statute or contract, the decision to award attorney fees lies within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Schmidt v. Trademark, Inc., 315 Kan. 196, 208, 506 P.3d 267 (2022); Fletcher v. Anderson, 29 Kan. App. 2d 784, 786, 31 P.3d 313 (2001). If any reasonable person would agree with the district court's decision, appellate courts will not disturb the district court's decision. This is an extraordinarily high standard. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 786. The party asserting the district court abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse. In re A.S., 319 Kan. 396, 400, 555 P.3d 732 (2024).

B.M. has not shown the district court abused its discretion.

B.M. spends most of her brief recounting her allegations of abuse and arguing that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees because her allegations of abuse were not frivolous. She then cites Lisk-Boydston v. Boydston, No. 90,058, 2003 WL 22990200 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion), in which we stated:

“A trial court should be careful when awarding attorney fees against plaintiffs seeking protection from abuse orders. The statutory scheme of the Protection from Abuse Act ‘is designed to promote protection of the victims and make access to the court easy and prompt.’ Furthermore, K.S.A. 60-3101(b) states: ‘[t]his act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection of victims of domestic violence from bodily injury or threats of bodily injury and to facilitate access to judicial protection for the victims, whether represented by counsel or proceeding pro se.’ Awarding attorney fees against plaintiffs could result in legitimate victims of abuse not seeking the protection the Act provides. [Citation omitted.]” 2003 WL 22990200, at *4.

We take no issue with the caution advised in Lisk-Boydston. But the situation here is not analogous because the district court awarded fees in Lisk-Boydston after finding the plaintiff's allegations were frivolous (a decision which was affirmed on appeal). 2003 WL 22990200, at *4. Here the district court awarded fees because she failed to appear for trial without warning. So B.M.’s arguments about the basis for her allegations do not show any abuse of discretion by the court in awarding fees.

B.M. next argues that the district court abused its discretion when awarding fees because she claims the court's decision “was based on two fanciful misstatements of fact made by the court.” First, she says the court “repeated an incorrect allegation throughout the case that [B.M.] held herself out as an attorney in perhaps an ‘intentional’ effort to confuse the court.” Next, she claims the court “repeatedly and incorrectly stated throughout the case that [B.M.] requested a trial.” But, again, she misconstrues the remarks she cites.

As for what she describes as the district court's “strange fixation” that [B.M.] represented or insinuated she was an attorney, B.M. takes the court's remarks on this issue out of context. Apparently, when appearing for one of the virtual hearings before trial, B.M. used computer equipment from the law firm where she worked, and the display name was an attorney who worked at that firm. The court mentioned it was caught off guard by this and thought perhaps B.M. was represented by counsel or “intentionally or perhaps unintentionally” held herself out as an attorney. But both times the court mentioned the issue (at trial, when discussing whether to award fees, and at the hearing on B.M.’s motion to alter or amend), it explained how B.M. worked in the legal field and therefore understood the consequences of failing to appear for trial. And the court did not say B.M.’s action in appearing under an attorney's name at a virtual hearing in the case was a reason it awarded fees. Instead, the court explicitly stated it awarded fees because B.M. failed to appear for trial without warning, explaining that B.M.’s knowledge of the legal field through her employment should have made her aware of the possible consequences of her actions. We do not find these comments by the court—even if errant—establish an abuse of discretion.

Next, B.M. claims that the district court “repeatedly and incorrectly stated throughout the case that [B.M.] requested a trial.” She claims K.J. was the one who asked for a trial. While this is technically correct, a plaintiff in a PFA case cannot continually extend the temporary PFA order without giving the defendant a chance to defend themselves. As such, the court was not wrong in finding that B.M. did in essence ask for the case to be set for trial because she wanted the PFA order extended, which could not be done without a trial at some point. The court's reasoning in awarding fees was that B.M.’s petition necessitated a trial, she knew when the trial would be held, and she failed to appear for that trial without warning. We do not find the court abused its discretion in relying on this basis to award fees.

B.M. additionally argues the district court's abuse of discretion was “also informed by its statements to and demeanor toward [B.M.] throughout the course of the case.” She points out that the court asked if she wanted to dismiss her case at the status conferences. And, during a discussion about difficulties the parties were having over K.J. wanting to retrieve personal items from B.M.’s home, the court asked her if she wanted it to vacate the temporary PFA order. Last, she claims the district court's statements at the hearing on her motion to alter or amend “suggest it may routinely award attorney fees against abused persons.” But, again, B.M. offers only conclusory statements and fails to explain how these instances impacted the court's decision to award fees or demonstrate an abuse of its discretion in that decision.

First, although the district court did ask whether B.M. wanted to dismiss her case at the status conferences, the question seemed aimed at whether the case would need to continue and whether a trial would be necessary. While it may not have been the most tactful way to phrase the question, we do not find that it showed an abuse of discretion in the fee decision.

Likewise, the record appears to show the district court mentioned vacating the temporary order to encourage the parties to resolve their dispute over the retrieval of K.J.’s belongings. And it appears the court was frustrated with the allegations about B.M.’s refusal to return K.J.’s property and her comment that K.J. should just buy new instead. Again, this was likely not the best way to address that situation. But the district court did not vacate the order and B.M. does not explain how this occurrence impacted the court's fee decision.

Finally, B.M. suggests the district court demonstrated bias when it stated that the award of attorney fees was “completely consistent with fee awards [in] these types of case[s] that I get asked for day in and [day] out.” She reads this to mean that the district court routinely awards attorney fees against abused persons, but she does not provide any further support for this assertion. In context, the statement is discussing the amount of fees appropriate in a similar case, based on the court's experience. The court did not say whether it awarded fees to plaintiffs or defendants in these types of cases—just that the amount requested was consistent with other fee awards. B.M. has not explained how this statement evidences bias, much less an abuse of discretion.

The district court's fee award was not illegal.

B.M. also argues that because K.J. did not present evidence of the amount of attorney fees under KRPC 1.5(a), the district court made a legal error in granting the $2,500 award.

Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework

“ ‘The district court is vested with wide discretion to determine the amount and the recipient of an allowance of attorney fees. When reviewing an award of attorney fees, the appellate court does not reweigh the testimony or evidence presented or reassess the credibility of witnesses. An attorney fee award will not be set aside on appeal when supported by substantial competent evidence. [Citations omitted.]’ ” In re Marriage of Strieby, 45 Kan. App. 2d 953, 973, 255 P.3d 34 (2011).

The district court is an expert in the area of attorney fees and can draw on and apply its own knowledge and expertise in determining the value of services rendered. An appellate court is also an expert on the reasonableness of attorney fees, but an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the district court on the amount of the attorney fees awarded unless, in the interest of justice, the appellate court disagrees with the district court. Johnson v. Westhoff Sand Co., 281 Kan. 930, 940, 135 P.3d 1127 (2006). When the district court has authority to grant attorney fees, the amount awarded is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Schmidt, 315 Kan. at 208.

In deciding the reasonableness of attorney fees, the eight factors set forth in KRPC Rule 1.5(a) should be considered. In re Estate of Oroke, 310 Kan. at 319. The KRPC 1.5(a) factors to be considered are: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. See Johnson, 281 Kan. at 940-41.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the $2,500 award.

B.M. relies on Case v. Unified School Dist. No. 233, Johnson County, 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998), and Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. HV Properties of Kansas, LLC, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1316 (D. Kan. 2011), to assert that parties moving for attorney fees must submit “meticulous, contemporaneous time records that reveal, for each lawyer for whom fees are sought, all hours for which compensation is requested and how those hours were allotted to specific tasks.” Notably, these cases were requesting fees in the amount of $481,330.83 and $1,505,683.89, respectively. Case, 157 F.3d at 1246; Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.

A more comparable case to this matter is State ex rel. SRS v. Cleland, 42 Kan. App. 2d 482, 494-95, 213 P.3d 1091 (2009). In Cleland, the district court awarded $1,000 in attorney fees in a divorce proceeding after the moving party submitted only an attorney fee statement and without going through the factors set out in KRPC 1.5(a). The district judge who awarded the fees presided over all the relevant hearings for which fees were requested, giving him an insight into the amount of work imputed to this case.

When determining whether attorney fees were appropriate the district court stated:

“ ‘Mr. Cleland incurred substantial child support arrears during the child's minority. There were repeated efforts by Petitioner, and the trustees of two (2) counties, to collect child support from Respondent. Years have now passed, the child support has never been fully paid.’

‘At the hearing in aid of execution held by this Court on February 27, 2008, Respondent failed to appear despite being under Court order to do so; nevertheless, Petitioner and her counsel appeared at significant expense to Petitioner. A second hearing was necessary, at more cost to Petitioner.’ ” 42 Kan. App. 2d at 497.

This court noted the district court did not take the attorney's statement at face value but rather “used its experience and expertise in determining the $1,000 attorney fees amount,” thus it did not abuse its discretion in awarding the fees. 42 Kan. App. 2d at 496. Like Cleland, there were no detailed hourly statements submitted by K.J.; however, his attorney stated that the fees expended throughout the case amounted to $2,500.

The district court here did not explain why it found the amount of fees requested were reasonable at the time of the award. But at the hearing on the motion for relief from judgment or to amend judgment, the district court stated that it did “not have to engage in an on-the-record analysis” or “set forth findings of fact” to award attorney fees. This is not entirely correct. While the court may not have needed to go through the factors of KRPC 1.5(a), there needed to be some basis for determining whether the fees awarded were reasonable. That said, the district court did explain its basis when it stated that the request received was “consistent with fee awards [in] these types of case[s] that I get asked for day in and [day] out. What [K.J.] asked for was not too high. It wasn't too low. It was reasonable․ It's his burden, so I had said, [to defense counsel], I think that's too high, then it would have been his burden to establish why he was entitled to it.” As in Cleland, the district judge here presided over this entire case and thus used his experience and expertise in determining the appropriate fee amount. Therefore, we also find no abuse of discretion on this basis.

Affirmed.

Cline, J.: