State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Lavonda Cherell Grant, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After pleading guilty to three felony counts of driving under the influence (DUI), the district court sentenced Lavonda Cherell Grant to 12 months of imprisonment for each count and 12 months of postimprisonment supervision. The court found Grant had already served the mandatory 90-day imprisonment and ordered her postimprisonment supervision to start immediately. Grant later violated her supervision, and the district court ordered a quick dip jail sanction and reinstated Grant's term of supervision, but the court referred to Grant's postimprisonment supervision as “probation.” Grant then violated her supervision a second time, and the court revoked her supervision and ordered her to serve the remainder of her underlying sentence of imprisonment.

On appeal, Grant argues the district court lacked authority to impose “probation” or, alternatively, that the court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered her to serve her underlying term of imprisonment. While the district court referred to Grant's nonprison supervision as “probation” rather than postimprisonment supervision at the first violation hearing, the district court did not impose a new sentence or create an illegal sentence by using this common terminology. The district court clearly intended to and did extend Grant's postimprisonment supervision. Further, the court had authority under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3) to impose Grant's underlying prison sentence upon a finding that she violated her postimprisonment supervision—which it did. For these reasons, the district court is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 1, 2023, Grant entered guilty pleas to felony DUI 3rd, 4th, and 5th in three separate cases. The plea agreements contained sentencing recommendations, which included: “90 days custody total (to satisfy the mand[atory] min[imum] for all 3 cases)” with credit for time served; 12 months of underlying imprisonment for each case to run consecutive to make a 36-month controlling sentence; and 12 months of postimprisonment supervision, which the district court also refers to as PIS, among other penalties. At the bottom of each plea agreement there were three boxes that could be checked that said “Probation,” “No agreed disposition,” and “Prison/Jail.” On each plea agreement, the box next to probation was checked.

At sentencing, the defense attorney and prosecutor both asked the district court to adopt and follow the plea agreements. The defense attorney noted that Grant “did serve 93 consecutive days to satisfy the mandatory minimum in-custody time. We are asking for the Court to grant a 36-month controlling sentence and place her on 12 months of PIS.” The State agreed to follow the plea agreements, saying that Grant “has already served all of that time upfront as well, which I think is very commendable.”

The district court said it would follow the terms of the plea agreements, “[a]nd order 90 days in custody, which is—she has credit for time served on those 90 days.” The court then said, “Each of the three cases will be a 12-month underlying sentence. All of those to run consecutively with one another for a 36-month controlling sentence. The Court will order 12-month post-imprisonment supervision with Community Corrections.”

The journal entry of sentencing reflects what the district court said during the sentencing hearing. It includes the judge's handwritten text “(12 mo. PIS—Com Cor)” in the section entitled “Probation Term,” but it has no boxes checked in that section. Handwritten “(12 mo. PIS)” is also found in a section entitled “Probation Term Imposed,” but, again, no boxes are checked in that section. In the section entitled “Felony DUI” the “Community Corrections” box is checked where it says “Post-Imprisonment Supervision (PIS).” In the section entitled “DUI Post-Imprisonment Supervision” the “Community Corrections” boxed is checked.

The district court also issued an “Order of Post Imprisonment Supervision” for Grant. The order lists Grant's three cases and provides for postimprisonment supervision for 12 months:

“Post Imprisonment Supervision (P.I.S.) is granted for a term of 12 months upon the following conditions. The 12 month P.I.S. term will begin after release from custody, house arrest, work release or any combination thereof.

“1. Defendant shall serve ____ hours/days at the Johnson County Adult Detention Center followed by ___ hours/days of ____House Arrest or ____Work Release.”

The word “done” is handwritten in the first blank after “serve” in the second paragraph above. No other blanks are filled in.

In January 2024, Grant's intensive supervision officer (ISO) filed an affidavit alleging Grant violated several conditions of her “Probation.” At a hearing on February 2, 2024, the district court initiated the hearing by saying, “We are set for go [on a] probation revocation this morning.” The parties and court continued to use the word “probation” during the violation hearing. The defense attorney said, “Grant is prepared to stipulate that she has violated probation” and asked the court for “reinstatement and a new extension of 12 months ․ for her to comply with probation ․” The State requested a jail sanction: “Two days in each case, with credit for time served and reinstating her on all of these cases to one more shot of a 12-month probation.” The district court ordered a “two-day dip in all three cases” with time served and said it was going to “reinstate the— to an ISP probation and extend for a period of 12 months.”

On June 17, 2024, Grant's ISO filed an affidavit alleging again Grant violated several conditions of her “Probation,” and at the related hearing the district court stated it was a proceeding for a probation revocation. Grant agreed to stipulate that she “violated the PIS in these three cases.” In response, the district court asked Grant, “And if you stipulate ․ you understand that the Court would revoke the probation and then I would listen to the attorneys and probation for further disposition?” Grant responded affirmatively. The defense attorney requested the court to give Grant “another opportunity on her post-imprisonment supervision.” Counsel also spoke to Grant's remaining underlying sentence: “I have had a chance to calculate her underlying sentence, and I will tell the Court I do believe she has approximately 29-and-a-half months left that she will have to serve in the county jail if the Court remands her on these.” The State asked for the district court to impose Grant's underlying sentence.

The district court ordered Grant to “serve her time” in the three cases. When asked how much time Grant would be serving, the district court said, “I have no idea. The attorney said ․ 29 months.” The journal entry of the violation hearing entered September 12, 2024, indicates Grant would serve her original sentence and that she had 201 days of jail credit.

Grant appeals.

Discussion

On appeal, Grant argues the district court lacked jurisdiction or authority to impose a reinstated term of supervision at the first revocation hearing. Grant alternatively argues the district court lacked authority to impose the underlying sentence at the second revocation hearing because Grant had already completed the entire term of imprisonment.

I. The District Court Extended Grant’s Postimprisonment Supervision

Grant first argues that the district court lacked authority to impose her underlying term of imprisonment after the second supervision violation hearing because of an infirmity from the first supervision violation hearing. Grant contends that in response to finding she violated the terms of her supervision at the first hearing in February 2024, the district court imposed or reinstated a term of probation, which Grant contends is different from postimprisonment supervision. Essentially, Grant argues that during the February 2024 hearing the district court did not extend her postimprisonment supervision—instead it erroneously imposed or perhaps reinstated a term of probation. Therefore, Grant concludes that because the district court did not order Grant to serve probation as part of her sentence, the district court lacked authority to impose probation at the February 2024 hearing. Thus, according to Grant, her term of postimprisonment supervision expired in March 2024.

Grant's support for this argument appears to rest on the district court's use of the term “probation” when referring to Grant's supervision and the district court's imposition of a quick dip sanction that is typical in probation violation proceedings. See K.S.A. 22-3716(b) and (c). Therefore, this court must determine first whether the district court's use of the term “probation” carried the legal weight of somehow converting Grant's postimprisonment supervision sentence into a probation sentence or if it meant the court imposed a new term of probation. If this court determines that the district court's actions at the February 2024 hearing did not amount to an imposition of a probation sentence, then the second task is determining whether the court erred in the sanctions imposed for Grant's violations of postimprisonment supervision.

While Grant does not cite to or argue her sentence is illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504, that statute contemplates a scenario in which a district court imposes a sentence without jurisdiction, which is what Grant contends occurred here. “ ‘Illegal sentence’ means a sentence[ ] [i]mposed by a court without jurisdiction; that does not conform to the applicable statutory provision, either in character or punishment; or that is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served at the time it is pronounced.” K.S.A. 22-3504(c)(1).

Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which appellate courts exercise unlimited review. State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024). This court also has unlimited review in interpreting statutes and determining whether jurisdiction exists. State v. Hillard, 315 Kan. 732, 775, 511 P.3d 883 (2022). In construing unambiguous statutes, this court does not speculate about the legislative intent beyond the clear language of the statute, nor does this court read something into the statute not readily found in the language. State v. McCray, 321 Kan. 316, 322, 579 P.3d 126 (2025).

Kansas law sets forth the penalties for DUI convictions in a statute, which is referred to herein as “the DUI statute.” See K.S.A. 8-1567. The Kansas Supreme Court has described the DUI statute as “self-contained” because it addresses “all essential components of the crime, including the elements, severity levels, and applicable sentences.” State v. Reese, 300 Kan. 650, 654, 333 P.3d 149 (2014). The DUI statute imposes progressive, enhanced sentences for repeat offenders and is thus considered a “habitual criminal or recidivist statute.” 300 Kan. at 654.

In alleging the district court lacked authority to impose the sanctions and penalties at issue here, Grant interchangeably uses the terms “jurisdiction” and “authority.” If Grant is referring to subject matter jurisdiction, that is the district court's power “ ‘to hear and decide a particular type of action.’ ” State v. Barnes, 320 Kan. 147, 156-57, 563 P.3d 1255 (2025). “Once subject-matter jurisdiction has properly attached, courts may exceed their authority or otherwise err without loss of jurisdiction.” Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1999). Kansas district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to impose sanctions and remedies, including revocation and imposition of an underlying prison sentence, when a defendant violates the terms and conditions of probation or other types of nonprison supervision such as the postimprisonment supervision contemplated within DUI convictions. See K.S.A. 22-3716 (probation revocation procedures); K.S.A. 8-1567 (procedures for postimprisonment supervision violations); see also State v. Hall, 287 Kan. 139, 143, 195 P.3d 220 (2008).

Under the DUI statute applicable to Grant's convictions here, the district court was required to impose 12 months of “supervision” for Grant's third or fourth DUI conviction. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3). For any such conviction, “[a]fter the term of imprisonment imposed by the court, the person shall be placed on supervision to community correctional services or court services, as determined by the court, for a mandatory one-year period of supervision, which such period of supervision shall not be reduced.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3).

The parties agree that the district court placed Grant on postimprisonment supervision pursuant to K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3) after determining she had completed her 90-day mandatory jail term. Grant also admits that the district court had authority at the February 2024 supervision violation hearing to extend the period of postimprisonment supervision if it found a violation. However, Grant contends that the district court's use of the word “probation” at the February 2024 hearing and its imposition of quick dip sanctions found under K.S.A. 22-3716—the statute governing probation sanctions—means the court did not extend her term of postimprisonment supervision but rather “reinstated a ‘term of probation.’ ”

The district court did not impose or reinstate probation at the February 2024 hearing.

Grant does not argue that the court lacked authority to extend her postimprisonment supervision at the February 2024 hearing, but merely that it did not do so because it imposed probation. Grant is correct that the district court's reference to “probation” at the February 2024 supervision violation hearing was inaccurate. The district court sentenced Grant to 12 months of underlying imprisonment on each charge, to run consecutive, and 12 months of postimprisonment supervision—which is not probation. The court also ordered Grant to be in custody for 90 days, suspending the remainder of her sentence. Sentences are effective upon being announced from the bench. State v. Howard, 287 Kan. 686, 692, 198 P.3d 146 (2008). Therefore, the district court had not ordered Grant to serve a term of probation as part of her sentence.

Grant argues that the district court's use of the term “probation” and imposition of a quick dip sanction, which is a common sanction for a probation violation, somehow demonstrated the district court's intent to impose a probation sentence. Neither of these actions leads this court to conclude that the district court imposed a term of probation at the February 2024 hearing. The district court's phrasing and reference to probation, although technically incorrect, was merely a colloquial reference to nonprison supervision. The district court's use of the term probation does not demonstrate an intent to create an order for probation.

When the district court's sentencing intent can be discerned from the context, a misspoken word or phrase does not create a legal error. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 313 Kan. 1010, Syl. ¶ 4, 492 P.3d 1190 (2021) (“The meaning of a sentence may be derived from the context of the entirety of the sentencing hearing.”); see also State v. Juiliano, 315 Kan. 76, 81, 504 P.3d 399 (2022) (noting that the sentence was clear from the context of the sentencing proceeding even though it could have been worded more clearly); State v. Prafke, No. 127,208, 2024 WL 4647687, at *4 (Kan. App. 2024) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 320 Kan. 867 (2025) (while the court failed to “sum up the entire sentence in a single, neat statement, the context shows the court's intent” regarding extending the defendant's probation). But see State v. Lozano, No. 122,459, 2021 WL 642306, at *5 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion) (finding court's vague and uncertain statements made its intent unclear and remanded for resentencing).

Perhaps adding to the terminology confusion is that the DUI statute uses the terms “probation” and “supervision,” but it does not include the term “postimprisonment supervision.” See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567. Another panel of this court has considered the interplay of PIS, postrelease supervision, and probation in the DUI context and noted that PIS was not defined in the statute. State v. Castillo, 54 Kan. App. 2d 217, 221, 397 P.3d 1248 (2017). However, the court noted that the term postimprisonment supervision or PIS was used to refer to a defendant's postrelease supervision term in DUI cases. Relevant here, the court concluded that PIS for DUI is “akin to probation.” 54 Kan. App. 2d at 227.

Here, the transcript from the February 2024 hearing shows that the district court merely misspoke when it referred to Grant's postimprisonment supervision as probation and it was not intending or attempting to impose a term of probation. During that hearing, the parties also used the term “probation,” but no party expressed confusion at the penalties imposed by the court. Further, the documents in this case also use terms somewhat interchangeably: The plea sentencing recommendation requested 12 months of PIS, but the plea agreements—and probation revocation affidavits—use the word “probation.” However, importantly, the district court clearly imposed Grant's sentence and probation was not ordered. Thus, the court's extension of “probation” at the revocation hearing referred to postimprisonment supervision because that was the only nonprison supervision the court had ordered.

The district court had authority to impose a quick dip jail sanction at the February 2024 hearing.

While Grant concedes that the district court had authority at the February 2024 hearing to extend her term of postimprisonment supervision, she argues that the court did not take that action. Instead, Grant contends that the district court “imposed sanctions contemplated in K.S.A. 22-3716, which did not apply to post-imprisonment supervision as set forth in the self-contained DUI statute.” It is unclear if Grant contends that the court's use of this type of sanction, often referred to as a “quick dip,” is evidence the district court intended to reinstate probation rather than postimprisonment supervision, or that the district court lacked authority to impose a quick dip jail sanction. However, Grant fails to show an error under either theory.

The DUI statute authorizes the district court to impose sanctions after finding a defendant has violated their postimprisonment supervision. Those sanctions include, but are not limited to, revocation of the postimprisonment supervision and imposition of the defendant's underlying term of imprisonment:

“Any violation of the conditions of such supervision may subject such person to revocation of supervision and imprisonment in jail for the remainder of the period of imprisonment, the remainder of the supervision period, or any combination or portion thereof. The term of supervision may be extended at the court's discretion beyond one year, and any violation of the conditions of such extended term of supervision may subject such person to the revocation of supervision and imprisonment in jail of up to the remainder of the original sentence, not the term of the extended supervision.” K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3).

The applicable DUI statute permitted the district court to sanction the violating defendant to prison “for the remainder of the period of imprisonment, the remainder of the supervision period, or any combination or portion thereof.” K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3). Pursuant to that same statute, the district court could also extend the term of the defendant's postimprisonment supervision. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3).

The district court ordered a “two-day dip in all three cases” with time served and said it was going to “reinstate the—to an ISP probation and extend for a period of 12 months.” While the State said “one more shot” of probation—Grant had not been on probation but had been sentenced to postimprisonment supervision. Therefore, the second shot could only relate to postimprisonment supervision. Moreover, the district court had authority to impose a prison sanction for “any combination or portion” of the remainder of imprisonment sentenced or the supervision period—which it did when it ordered the two-day prison sanction for each case. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3). The statute does not prohibit this type of short jail sanction. The district court also had authority to extend the postimprisonment supervision, which it did. Contrary to Grant's assertion, the district court did not impose or reinstate a term of probation at the February 2024 hearing, but extended the term of postimprisonment supervision. This court finds no error in the district court's imposition of a short jail sanction or extension of Grant's postimprisonment supervision at the February 2024 hearing.

II. The District Court Had Authority to Impose Grant’s Underlying Sentence

Grant alternatively argues that at the second hearing in September 2024 the district court lacked authority to revoke her supervision and impose her underlying sentence, and thus the district court sentenced her to an illegal sentence. This court exercises unlimited review of illegal sentences under K.S.A. 22-3504. Daniels, 319 Kan. at 342. If the review of this issue requires the interpretation of statutes, this court also exercises unlimited review. Nicholson v. Mercer, 319 Kan. 712, 714, 559 P.3d 350 (2024).

Grant contends that because the district court immediately placed her on postimprisonment supervision at sentencing, that meant that she had no further imprisonment to complete because this type of supervision is ordered after a term of imprisonment. Therefore, according to Grant, there was no remaining term of imprisonment to impose at the revocation hearing on September 12, 2024. However, this is not an accurate reflection of her sentence because it ignores the ordered underlying prison sentence. At sentencing, the district court said it would follow the terms of the plea agreements, “[a]nd order 90 days in custody ․” The court then said, “Each of the three cases will be a 12-month underlying sentence. All of those to run consecutively with one another for a 36-month controlling sentence. The Court will order 12-month postimprisonment supervision with Community Corrections.”

While the district court awarded Grant time served for the required 90 days of imprisonment, that does not mean the 90 days constituted Grant's entire prison sentence. The DUI statute applicable to Grant's conviction included both a required term of imprisonment that must be served, meaning it cannot be suspended, and range for a term of a prison sentence that could either be ordered served or suspended. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(D). For a “third conviction” of felony DUI—which is the conviction at issue here—the defendant “shall not be eligible for release on probation, suspension or reduction of sentence or parole until the person has served at least 90 days’ imprisonment.” K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(D), (E). Additionally, the DUI statute also required a term of supervision:

“(3) In addition, for any conviction pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D) or (b)(1)(E), ․ [t]he court shall determine whether the offender, upon release from imprisonment, shall be supervised by community correctional services or court services based upon the risk and needs of the offender ․ After the term of imprisonment imposed by the court, the person shall be placed on supervision to community correctional services or court services, as determined by the court, for a mandatory one-year period of supervision, which such period of supervision shall not be reduced.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3).

Grant relies on the emphasized language “[a]fter the term of imprisonment imposed by the court, the person shall be placed on supervision” to argue she could not have been on postimprisonment supervision unless she had completed her entire term of imprisonment. However, her interpretation of the statute relies on isolated language without reading the statute together as a whole. When interpreting statutes to determine legislative intent, Kansas courts must consider various provisions of an act in pari materia to reconcile and bring the provisions into workable harmony if possible. Roe v. Phillips County Hospital, 317 Kan. 1, 5-6, 522 P.3d 277 (2023); see also State v. Newman-Caddell, 317 Kan. 251, 259, 527 P.3d 911 (2023) (“The doctrine of in pari materia means that statutes relating to the same matter may be read together to discern intent.”). Such a reading ensures that even when considering various provisions of a statute, this court attempts to “reconcile and bring those provisions into workable harmony, if possible.” Bruce v. Kelly, 316 Kan. 218, 224, 514 P.3d 1007 (2022).

Contrary to Grant's interpretation, the DUI statute gave the district court authority to impose a one-year prison sentence even though it mandates only 90 days in custody. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(1)(D) and (E) (mandating the court to sentence a person convicted of a third or subsequent felony DUI to at least 90 days in prison or up to a full year and requiring the person to serve “at least 90 days’ imprisonment”). Grant's argument would make this section of the DUI statute meaningless or impose limitations not included in the statute's plain language. Additionally, Grant's interpretation would undermine the district court's authority to revoke a person's supervision and order their imprisonment “for the remainder of the period of imprisonment.” See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3).

The DUI statute provides for a scenario where the defendant would be on postimprisonment supervision but still have a suspended or underlying prison sentence remaining. This is similar to situations where a defendant is sentenced to an underlying prison sentence but awarded probation and the defendant has served time in custody while awaiting adjudication. See, e.g., State v. Lebeuf, No. 116,224, 2017 WL 2403348, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (remanding for the district court to include a jail credit award to the underlying sentence imposed after probation revocation). Therefore, as the defense attorney explained at the second supervision violation hearing, counsel “had a chance to calculate [Grant's] underlying sentence” to be “approximately 29-and-a-half months” remaining on the underlying sentence which Grant would “have to serve in the county jail if the Court remands her on these.” The defense attorney calculated that remaining jail sentence based on time Grant had already spent in custody.

The district court had authority to revoke Grant's supervision and order Grant to serve the remainder of her underlying sentence in custody upon finding Grant violated the terms of her postimprisonment supervision. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3).

Conclusion

Grant challenges the district court's revocation of her supervision and imposition of her underlying imprisonment sentence based on semantics and a faulty, narrow reading of only a portion of the applicable DUI statute. Grant's arguments are unavailing. The district court's use of the term “probation” to refer to Grant's postimprisonment supervision under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567 was merely a colloquial reference to nonprison supervision and created no error. Moreover, the district court had authority under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1567 to impose jail sanctions, extend and revoke Grant's supervision, and impose Grant's underlying prison sentence after finding she violated the terms and conditions of that supervision.

Grant's sentence is not illegal, and the district court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: