State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jayna Krystal Sayles, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jayna Krystal Sayles appeals her 32-month prison sentence, arguing the district court misunderstood its sentencing authority when it declined to impose an optional nonprison sentence instead of prison. We find no evidence to support that, however. Because we find the district court imposed a presumptive prison sentence under a lawful plea agreement, we dismiss Sayles’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Factual and Procedural Background

While Sayles was on duty as a correctional officer at Lansing Correctional Facility, a fellow officer caught her with several packages of methamphetamine and marijuana. Sayles admittedly brought the drugs into the prison for the purpose of distributing them to inmates.

The State charged Sayles with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Sayles agreed to enter a no contest plea to amended charges of trafficking contraband in a correctional institution and unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. The parties also agreed to recommend consecutive sentences for the offenses. But the parties did not agree about whether Sayles should receive a prison or nonprison sentence.

Sayles entered her plea in January 2025. A presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that Sayles had no prior crimes, giving her a criminal history score of I. This placed Sayles’ possible sentence in a border box on the sentencing grid, which provided for a presumptive prison sentence. Still, the district court had the option to impose a nonprison sentence under K.S.A. 21-6804(f) and (q). One basis for imposing the optional sentence under this statute related to the existence and availability of recidivism-reducing treatment. K.S.A. 21-6804(q)(1).

Sayles moved for the optional nonprison sentence, arguing in part that she was a nonviolent offender and the sole caretaker of three young children. Sayles also asked for a continuance so that she could get a diagnostic evaluation to solidify the treatment plan that she would present at sentencing. The district court granted Sayles’ continuance request but noted that because Sayles had not been convicted of drug use, the value of a substance abuse evaluation was unclear.

Undeterred, Sayles underwent the evaluation and received a treatment plan. The parties generally agree that the report, which is not included in the record, suggested that Sayles exhibited symptoms of depression and anxiety. The accompanying treatment plan recommended therapy and medication.

At sentencing, the district court noted that it had received Sayles’ evaluation and treatment plan and asked the State for its recommendation. As previously agreed, the State recommended the standard prison sentence for each offense and asked for them to be served consecutively. But the State also supported the requested nonprison sentence, explaining that “probation would be the most appropriate outcome” in this case. The State noted that Sayles was not a public safety risk and that her convictions and duty to register would likely be sufficient to prevent any future offenses.

Defense counsel suggested that Sayles met the statutory requirements for imposing an optional nonprison sentence because treatment was available in the community and Sayles was participating in a treatment plan. During allocution, Sayles acknowledged the wrongfulness of her conduct, adding that she had committed the offenses because she had no money to provide for her children. She explained that she had been paid $500 for her involvement and had used that money for her children.

The district court acknowledged that Sayles was “fairly young” and people sometimes exercise bad judgment. But noting Sayles’ position as a public servant, the district court found that Sayles should be held to a higher standard. The district court then admonished Sayles for her actions and discussed the need to deter similar offenses. Defense counsel again advocated for leniency, noting that Sayles had cooperated with law enforcement's investigation of the distribution at Lansing by handing over her phone and answering the officer's questions. According to defense counsel, this information provided law enforcement with evidence of chargeable offenses against others involved.

The district court, however, denied Sayles’ motion and made the following findings:

“This is a border box case which means that this is a presumptive imprisonment case unless the Court makes certain findings on the record concerning the need for treatment and the availability [of] an appropriate treatment program. To that end, your attorney has provided to the Court some information including an evaluation from The Guidance Center.

“The Court has reviewed the evaluation, and it would appear to the Court—at least the Court's interpretation of this evaluation is that most, if not all, of the symptoms or—I guess we will call them symptoms—that you are experiencing are somewhat derived from and flow directly from the fact that you got caught engaging in criminal behavior. The evaluation does not shed any light on or to this Court on how any sort of pre-existing mental health issue that you had played a role in pushing you down this path that you found yourself on.

“There is no link between your mental health symptoms and explanation for why this crime was committed, why you felt it necessary to engage in this criminal behavior, rather, and not surprisingly, it is pretty common when people are facing criminal charges for them to have certain signs and symptoms of that. You know, depression and anxiety, and that is just par for the course. That is common when you are faced with an encounter with the justice system.

“So the Court does not think that there is any particular nexus between what I am reading here in the mental health evaluation and the underlying offense. So what that tells the Court—at least the conclusion this Court has arrived at, is that there may be a treatment program available, but as far as rehabilitating you, ․ since there is no nexus between your mental health and the underlying criminal activity, the Court is less convinced that rehabilitation is where we need to place the emphasis in this case in terms of the Court's sentence.

“Rather—and alluded to before, because I think because you abused your position of authority, your position of trust, that deterrence not only for yourself but for individuals who are employed by the Kansas Department of Corrections, they need to know, they need to understand and they need to see that if they cross that line, then they will be punished. And they're going to be punished to the maximum extent of the law.

“And so finding that retribution and deterrence are the most applicable policy goals here to your situation, I do find and will not make the border box findings. So I am not suspending your sentence. You are going to be ordered to begin serving that prison sentence forthwith.”

The district court then imposed a controlling term of 32 months’ imprisonment, ordering a 32-month term for the trafficking offense and a concurrent 15-month term for the drug offense.

Sayles timely appeals.

Do We Have Jurisdiction to Hear This Appeal?

The State contends that because the district court sentenced Sayles to a presumptive prison sentence under a lawful plea agreement, we lack jurisdiction to review her appellate claim. We address this issue first.

Standard of Review

Whether this court may exercise jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of law, subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Hillard, 315 Kan. 732, 775, 511 P.3d 883 (2022), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Barnes, 320 Kan. 147, Syl. ¶ 3, 563 P.3d 1255 (2025) (venue is not a jurisdictional matter, but a procedural one).

Lack of Appellate Jurisdiction

Sayles’ criminal history score of I and the offense severity levels of her convictions placed her in the border box range for sentencing. Under K.S.A. 21-6804(f), the presumptive punishment is a term of imprisonment, but the court may impose an optional nonprison sentence as otherwise provided by K.S.A. 21-6804(q).

When a district court imposes a sentence that is within the presumptive sentence range for a crime, this court generally lacks jurisdiction to consider the sentence on appeal. K.S.A. 21-6820(c); see State v. Young, 313 Kan. 724, 730-31, 490 P.3d 1183 (2021); see also State v. Rizo, 304 Kan. 974, 984-85, 377 P.3d 419 (2016) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review a denial of a motion to depart from presumptive sentence). And when a defendant's sentence results from a lawful plea agreement, the defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of their statutory right to appeal is generally enforceable. State v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, 226, 195 P.3d 753 (2008). Both conditions are met here—Sayles got a presumptive sentence, and her sentence resulted from a lawful plea agreement. Under this general rule, her appeal is barred.

Limited exceptions to these rules exist, however. Sayles argues an exception under State v. Warren, 297 Kan. 881, 885, 304 P.3d 1288 (2013). In that case, the Kansas Supreme Court found that a criminal defendant may seek appellate review of a presumptive sentence when the district court misinterpreted its statutory authority. This exception thus allows appellate review of claims alleging statutory interpretation issues related to the district court's sentencing authority. 297 Kan. at 885; see State v. Strahm, No. 125,489, 2023 WL 3775026, at *3-5 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) (applying this rule and finding a misinterpretation where the district court believed probation could be granted only if it found a substantial and compelling reason for a departure sentence, but K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6804(h) and (q) provided for an optional nonprison sentence). We thus examine whether the Warren exception applies here and establishes a basis for reversing the district court's sentencing decision.

Failure to Show Exception to Jurisdictional Bar

K.S.A. 21-6804(q)(1) states that “an ‘optional nonprison sentence’ is a sentence which the court may impose, in lieu of the presumptive sentence, upon making the following findings on the record:

“(A) An appropriate treatment program exists which is likely to be more effective than the presumptive prison term in reducing the risk of offender recidivism; and “(B) the recommended treatment program is available and the offender can be admitted to such program within a reasonable period of time; or “(C) the nonprison sanction will serve community safety interests by promoting offender reformation.”

The statute specifies that “[a]ny decision made by the court regarding the imposition of an optional nonprison sentence shall not be considered a departure and shall not be subject to appeal.” K.S.A. 21-6804(q)(2).

Invoking the Warren exception to avoid the statute's bar on appealing a district court's decision about imposing an optional nonprison sentence, Sayles argues that the district court misinterpreted its authority under this statute by adding three requirements to it. First, Sayles asserts that the district court erroneously determined that the sentence could be granted only to defendants found to need treatment and such treatment is available. Sayles bases this argument on the district court's statement: “This is a border box case which means that this is a presumptive imprisonment case unless the Court makes certain findings on the record concerning the need for treatment and the availability [of] an appropriate treatment program.” (Emphasis added).

For her second argument, Sayles points to the district court's discussion finding no “link between [Sayles’] mental health ․ and explanation for” her crimes. Sayles argues that this finding erroneously imposed a requirement that “some nexus” exist between a defendant's mental health and their offense. Finally, Sayles claims that rather than considering the likelihood of her recidivism as required under K.S.A. 21-6804(q)(1)(A), the district court considered the message that a prison sentence would send to other individuals.

We do not agree that the district court's discussion, read in context, shows any misunderstanding about its authority to impose a nonprison sentence. The district court's decision instead shows that it considered Sayles’ request for the optional nonprison sentence under K.S.A. 21-6804(q)(1), as well as the State's general agreement that Sayles was qualified to receive it. Yet the district court understood the law stating that it had the discretion to impose an optional nonprison sentence but intentionally opted for the presumptive prison sentence. Under these circumstances, the Warren exception does not apply and Sayles is bound by the general rule that “[a]ny decision made by the court regarding the imposition of an optional nonprison sentence shall not be considered a departure and shall not be subject to appeal.” K.S.A. 21-6804(q)(2). We thus lack subject matter jurisdiction to review Sayles’ claim.

Appeal dismissed.

Per Curiam: