State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Stephanie Marie Lang, Appellant. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this appeal, Stephanie Marie Lang challenges her convictions for perjury and interference with law enforcement. Lang's perjury conviction stemmed from an incident where Lang was present when her boyfriend struck a bar patron. Lang reported the incident to law enforcement but later changed her account while testifying in a preliminary hearing in her boyfriend's criminal case. Lang's conviction for interference with law enforcement was based on Lang's denial to law enforcement that her boyfriend was present at her residence after the bar incident.

On appeal, Lang first argues that the prosecutor erred by making comments during voir dire, including an analogy, that sought to define reasonable doubt. While we caution the State against making such comments, under this set of facts we do not find error. The prosecutor's statements did not minimize the burden of the jury to find “reasonable doubt” nor impermissibly define that term.

Lang's second challenge on appeal is that her conviction for perjury was not supported by sufficient evidence. Lang argues that the State failed to prove that she committed the crime of perjury in Ellis County as charged. Lang reasons that her perjury conviction was based on her testimony in her boyfriend's preliminary hearing, which occurred in Ellis County. But Lang points out she was physically located in Pratt County during the hearing and testified electronically in the Ellis County proceeding. We find that because the requisite acts for perjury occurred in two separate counties, under K.S.A. 22-2603, Lang could have been prosecuted in either Ellis or Pratt County, and sufficient evidence supported her conviction for perjury.

Finally, Lang challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting her conviction for interference with law enforcement. She argues that as a matter of law, she could not have been convicted under K.S.A. 21-5904(a)(1)(C) because when she was asked by law enforcement if her boyfriend was at her home, she was left with no option that did not force her to incriminate herself. Lang argues that she had to tell law enforcement that her boyfriend was not there or face criminal charges and the removal of her children. But we find the facts in this case do not support Lang's argument. Lang's compliance with the law would not have resulted in any negative legal consequence to her. Accordingly, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Stephanie Marie Lang was found guilty by a jury of perjury and interference with law enforcement. Lang's convictions are based on a set of facts that are largely uncontroverted. Lang was at a bar in Hays, Kansas, in the early morning hours of September 26, 2021, when an altercation involving her boyfriend, Christopher Adams, and another bar patron, Richard Diehl, occurred.

Corporal Dakota Reese of the Hays Police Department was dispatched to the bar around 2:20 a.m. and found Diehl, whose face was bleeding profusely. Reese talked to witnesses who provided mixed information about the events that occurred. Diehl was taken by ambulance to the emergency room but would later testify at Lang's trial that he had no recollection of how he was injured.

While still outside the bar, Reese heard another call over the police radio about a domestic disturbance that had occurred near a cemetery in Hays. Another officer, Master Patrol Officer Derick Nordell, left the crime scene at the bar to cover that call. After completing his investigation at the bar, Reese also responded to the second call. At the second crime scene near the cemetery, Reese spoke with Lang, who was seated in Nordell's patrol car. Reese noted Lang was under the influence but felt like she understood his questions and was able to give accurate information.

Lang told Reese that she had gone to the bar with Christopher Adams and that Adams had punched Diehl in the face. She was upset with Adams about this and left the bar. Lang stated that Adams later caught up to her, grabbed her, and threw her to the ground. Lang had scratches on her elbow consistent with her statement.

Later that night, law enforcement met with Lang at her home. Reese asked Lang to provide a written statement about the night's events. The statement she provided did not include the facts she had shared while in the patrol car.

Nordell was the first officer on the scene at the bar. He checked on the victim and attempted to get information from bystanders. Nordell was called away from the scene to respond to the disturbance near the cemetery. Nordell arrived and saw Lang and another man. Lang stated the other male was not her boyfriend; rather, he was a man who had helped her “get away from her boyfriend and find her phone.” She indicated Adams had punched the man who helped her in addition to the person Adams had punched at the bar.

Lang told Nordell that Adams lived with her and her children. She believed two of her children were at home, and she did not know where Adams was. When Nordell noticed a mark on Lang's elbow, she admitted Adams had grabbed her and thrown her to the ground. Nordell noted that Lang was intoxicated but believed she was able to understand and respond to his questions appropriately. Law enforcement took Lang home, secured the residence, and told Lang and her children it was best for them to stay somewhere else that night.

Sergeant David Vilaysing of the Hays Police Department became involved in the case when he started his shift later in the morning of September 26, 2021. He was informed that the department was searching for Adams, who was suspected of aggravated battery, battery, and domestic battery. Adams was believed to be hiding at Lang's residence. This information was based on a report from Lang's son that Adams was currently present in his mother's home.

Vilaysing approached Lang's front door with another officer. Lang answered the door. When asked if Adams was there, Lang stated, “Chris is not here.” The officers asked if they could come in and look. Lang responded that they were not allowed to enter without a warrant. She shut the door and then refused to answer further questions. After knocking and waiting for approximately 40 seconds, the officers threatened to charge Lang with interference with law enforcement if she did not open the door. She continued to refuse to respond. An officer shouted through the door that they were not leaving. She was told if she did not cooperate, she faced arrest and potential criminal charges as well as potential protective custody of her children if they were in an unsafe situation.

After approximately three minutes, the officers stated that if she did not come to the door, they would get a warrant. The officers stated that if Adams was in Lang's home, she would face criminal charges and the children would be placed into protective custody. The garage door opened and Adams was located and arrested without further incident.

Adams was charged in Ellis County District Court with aggravated battery, domestic battery, and battery related to his actions on September 26, 2021. Lang was called as a witness at Adams’ preliminary hearing, though she testified remotely through electronic means from Pratt, Kansas. Lang's testimony at the preliminary hearing differed from what she had stated to law enforcement on September 26, 2021. Lang testified she did not see Adams punch anyone at the bar on September 26, 2021. Lang stated that she recalled walking home through the cemetery and calling 911. But she claimed not to know what she told law enforcement officers on the night in question and said that she might not have been truthful.

At the conclusion of the jury trial, Lang was convicted of perjury and interference with law enforcement. Lang was sentenced to a 13-month controlling sentence, but her sentence was suspended and she was placed on probation for 24 months.

Lang timely appeals.

Analysis

Did the State Commit Prosecutorial Error During Voir Dire by its Discussion of “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”?

Lang's first challenge to her convictions is based on prosecutorial error. Lang argues that the prosecutor erred by attempting to define “reasonable doubt” during voir dire and minimizing the burden of the jury to find reasonable doubt.

Standard of Review

The appellate court uses a “two-step process to evaluate claims of prosecutorial error: error and prejudice.” State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 737, 559 P.3d 792 (2024).

“To determine whether prosecutorial error has occurred, the appellate court must decide whether the prosecutorial acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. If error is found, the appellate court must next determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial. In evaluating prejudice, we simply adopt the traditional constitutional harmlessness inquiry demanded by Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)]. In other words, prosecutorial error is harmless if the State can demonstrate ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016).” Mendez, 319 Kan. at 737.

Discussion

Prosecutors are given wide latitude to present the State's case but not so wide as to “ ‘offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.’ ” Mendez, 319 Kan. at 737. Lang brings two challenges related to the prosecutor's comments during voir dire. The first challenge is based on the prosecutor's description of reasonable doubt. During voir dire, the prosecutor said:

“But what does beyond a reasonable doubt mean? Good question. I don't know that anyone can give you an exact definition. The judge will instruct you on what that means, but that explanation, that instruction, sometimes can be a little bit difficult as well.

“So I can tell you that beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest legal standard we have in the United States. It is something that is more than ‘I'm probably sure.’ It's more than ‘I'm pretty sure.’ It's something pretty close to ‘I'm certain.’ Okay?

“And so I think it's critical, but it's also not some impossible standard. Right? It's not proof beyond all doubt. It's just proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Lang points out that courts have repeatedly cautioned prosecutors regarding their attempts to define reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court has noted “that prosecutors embellish on the definition of the burden of proof in criminal cases at their peril.” State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan. 906, 914, 235 P.3d 460 (2010).

The State argues that there is no error here, because the prosecutor did not attempt to define reasonable doubt with his comments. We agree. Though the prosecutor's comment, “beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest legal standard we have in the United States” approaches the line of being a proposed definition, the statement still falls within the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors. We find that the prosecutor's statements fairly and accurately commented on the concept of reasonable doubt as being the highest burden of proof—which is true. We note that a panel of our court has approved similar language: “As highlighted by the State, the trial court, in preliminarily addressing the jury at the start of trial, properly informed them that the defendant was presumed innocent and it was the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—‘the highest burden under the law.’ ” State v. Hatfield, No. 102,358, 2011 WL 2534987, at *8 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion). The language used by the prosecutor did not provide a definition, did not offer a personal opinion, and did not seek to reduce the burden of proof. We find no error in these comments.

Lang also challenges the use of an analogy during the prosecutor's discussion of reasonable doubt during voir dire. The prosecutor offered the following analogy:

“Imagine this morning your car was parked in your driveway or out on the street, and you leave your house or apartment or whatever through the front door. You close the door.

“You go out to your car, you get in. You put the key in. You turn the car on. You put it in reverse. You start to back out and then doubt creeps into your mind. ‘Did I lock that front door?’

“The only information that you have available to you as you doubt whether or not you've locked that front door is, ‘Well, I've never forgotten to lock it before ever.’

“So you've got doubt about whether or not that front door is locked. The question is is it reasonable to doubt whether or not that door is locked?

“Well, let's find out. Who of you, raise your hand, would get out of the car and go check the door? I'm seeing all hands go up. Yeah. All hands go up. Yeah.

“So it's reasonable then to doubt whether or not that door is unlocked. The only information you have is ‘I don't remember locking it. I've never forgotten to before, but this time I might have.’ Right? So that doubt is reasonable.

“Contrast that with: You get out of the car, you go up to the door. You check. Oh, thank goodness, you checked, because it is unlocked.

“So you close it. You close it tight. You slide the key into the dead bolt lock. You feel the key go in. You feel the tension that the key gives you as that dead bolt slides into the doorjamb. You hear it. You turn the key back and you take the key out. You push and push, it's not coming open.

“You walk back to your car. You get in the car, put it back into reverse, and that doubt creeps back into your mind. Is that door really locked?

“Well now what information do we have? Well, we were just up there. We just checked the door. We wiggled it and wiggled it. We felt the key go into the key slot. We felt the tension the key gave us as we turned it. We felt the dead bolt slide into the door. I'm doubting whether this door is locked or not, but I have all of this information available to me.

“Is it reasonable to doubt whether that door is locked anymore? Raise your hand if you think it is reasonable to doubt that door is locked anymore. Nobody is raising your hands. Okay.

“I would assert to you that this is a good understanding of what is and what is not a reasonable doubt. Right? When we have enough evidence to us to close out that doubt, to know that the doubts that we have are not reasonable, then we have proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Lang asserts that this analogy trivialized the duty the jury faced, as the consequences of locking or not locking a door do not have the same consequences as a guilty verdict. Lang also argues that the analogy minimized the burden of proof. In response, the State argues that it was only trying to help potential jurors “conceptualize the idea of reasonable doubt.”

In State v. Crawford, 46 Kan. App. 2d 401, 409, 262 P.3d 1070 (2011), Crawford argued the State committed prosecutorial error “by misrepresenting the definition of reasonable doubt and minimizing the standard of proof during voir dire and closing argument.” In Crawford, the prosecutor compared the concept of reasonable doubt to putting together a jigsaw puzzle. The prosecutor commented that even when the puzzle is missing some pieces, it is possible to still know what the puzzle looks like. The prosecutor concluded, “[t]hat's kind of what I'm talking about is reasonable doubt. There's probably always going to be some question something that doesn't get answered. The question is, when you put the pieces together, even if there are some pieces missing, does that mean it didn't happen? No.” 46 Kan. App. 2d at 411-12. The panel found that the prosecutor's comments “implied to the jury that it could find Crawford guilty even if some evidence was missing if it ‘looked like’ he committed the crimes.” 46 Kan. App. 2d at 414. The panel concluded, “the comments were beyond the wide latitude afforded prosecutors and constituted misconduct.” 46 Kan. App. 2d at 414. The panel cautioned the State that “argument designed to define reasonable doubt for jurors with unusual or seemingly clever analogies heads down a path fraught with peril.” 46 Kan. App. 2d at 416.

While our appellate courts have generally discouraged the use of analogies, some analogies have nonetheless passed review under limited circumstances. For example, in State v. Stevenson, 297 Kan. 49, 54, 298 P.3d 303 (2013), the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the State's use of a “ ‘Wheel of Fortune’ ” analogy, where the prosecutor compared reasonable doubt to a puzzle that was solvable even with a missing letter. While the court concluded the analogy did not result in error, it cautioned:

“[O]ur ruling should not be read as an endorsement of the ‘Wheel of Fortune’ analogy. The prosecutor's comments in this case scuffed the line of misconduct without actually crossing it. Nevertheless, only a slight difference in wording would have resulted in error, and use of this analogy seems fraught with possibilities for stepping over the line of error. Especially troubling is the potential for quantifying reasonable doubt by discussing the difference between missing one letter as compared to more. Consequently, we discourage use of the ‘Wheel of Fortune’ analogy.” Stevenson, 297 Kan. at 54-55.

While the use of analogies is generally discouraged, the analogy in this case does not dilute or trivialize the standard as Lang argues. We find here that the analogy sets a very high bar. The prosecutor described only eliminating reasonable doubt after the person in the analogy has checked, double checked, and fully examined the door. The analogy was given after the prosecutor had also described the reasonable doubt standard as being “pretty close to ‘I'm certain’ ” and “the highest legal standard we have in the United States.” We fail to see how the prosecutor's comments diluted the burden of proof. But the language in Stevenson seems fitting here. The court noted that the “prosecutor's comments in this case scuffed the line of misconduct without actually crossing it. Nevertheless, only a slight difference in wording would have resulted in error, and use of this analogy seems fraught with possibilities for stepping over the line of error.” 297 Kan. at 55. We do not find here that the prosecutor's analogy concerning reasonable doubt created error, but we caution the State against using such comments and analogies in the future.

Moreover, we find that even if the comments made by the prosecutor related to reasonable doubt were made in error, that error does not require reversal. In the event of prosecutorial error, we are required to consider the traditional constitutional harmlessness test stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967):

“[P]rosecutorial error is harmless if the State can demonstrate ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016) (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 [2011]).

When assessing the prosecutor's comments, the reviewing court does not look at the statement in the abstract but in the full context it was made. State v. Wash, 320 Kan. 646, 663, 571 P.3d 568 (2025). Here, the two challenged statements were made by the prosecutor only once, and at the beginning of the trial during voir dire. Our Supreme Court has relied upon erroneous statements being limited to voir dire as a basis for finding harmless error:

“The State has met its burden to show that the error was harmless. As the State argues, the prosecutor's improper comments here were limited to voir dire. While the prosecutor referred to voir dire in closing argument, he did not repeat the erroneous ‘do your job’ language. Instead, the prosecutor reminded jurors that they had agreed they ‘could’ find J.L.J. guilty if the State proved all the elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. And voir dire was separated from closing arguments by 2 days of trial at which 9 witnesses testified and 114 exhibits were admitted. Finally, the prosecutor made no other comments during closing argument suggesting the jury was obligated to return a guilty verdict.” State v. J.L.J., 318 Kan. 720, 728, 547 P.3d 501 (2024).

Similarly, the challenged comments in this case occurred only one time—during voir dire. Lang does not challenge any comments from the prosecutor's closing argument. The jury trial lasted two days and there were multiple witnesses. There is no evidence here that the jury instructions failed to inform the jury of the applicable law in the case, including the elements of the crime and the State's burden of proof. We also note the strength of the State's case, which was bolstered by Lang's own admission that she might not have been truthful in her statements to law enforcement shortly after the bar altercation and an audio recording of Lang's denial that Adams was at her residence the next morning. See State v. Crawford, 300 Kan. 740, 756-57, 334 P.3d 311 (2014) (finding prosecutor's erroneous definition of reasonable doubt harmless in light of proper jury instructions and strength of the evidence).

After a careful review of the record, we find that the State has met its burden of proof in showing that even if the prosecutor's comments made during voir dire were erroneous, there was “ ‘no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.’ ” Mendez, 319 Kan. at 737.

Did Sufficient Evidence Support Lang’s Perjury Conviction?

Lang's second argument on appeal is that sufficient evidence did not support her perjury conviction because the State failed to prove she committed the crime in Ellis County, Kansas, as charged.

Standard of Review

“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses. [Citation omitted.]” Mendez, 319 Kan. at 723.

Discussion

Lang appeals her conviction for perjury, arguing the State failed to present sufficient evidence of all elements of the crime. Lang was charged and convicted of perjury in Ellis County, Kansas. But her statements during Adams’ preliminary hearing, which formed the basis of her perjury charge, occurred when she was physically in Pratt County, Kansas, testifying remotely through an electronic medium. Lang argues that because her alleged false testimony did not physically occur in Ellis County, there was insufficient evidence to prove one of the elements charged by the State: that the “ ‘act occurred on or about the 29th day of March, 2022, in Ellis County, Kansas.’ ” To sustain a conviction, the State must prove “every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Star, 27 Kan. App. 2d 930, 934, 10 P.3d 37 (2000). This means we must consider whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's conclusion that Lang committed the crime of perjury in Ellis County, Kansas.

We note Lang's argument that under section 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution, a criminal defendant is entitled to “ ‘a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.’ ” Lang argues that this language supports her argument that she could not have been found guilty of committing perjury in Ellis County, because her physical location was in Pratt County when the alleged crime occurred.

First, we clarify that venue is procedural, not jurisdictional. Venue for a criminal prosecution is set by statute. State v. Barnes, 320 Kan. 147, 158-59, 563 P.3d 1255 (2025). K.S.A. 22-2602 provides, “Except as otherwise provided by law, the prosecution shall be in the county where the crime was committed.” And a companion statute, K.S.A. 22-2603, provides, “Where two or more acts are requisite to the commission of any crime and such acts occur in different counties the prosecution may be in any county in which any of such acts occur.”

Here, the State charged Lang with the crime of perjury as defined in K.S.A. 21-5903(a)(l):

“(a) Perjury is intentionally and falsely:

(1) Swearing, testifying, affirming, declaring or subscribing to any material fact upon any oath or affirmation legally administered in any cause, matter or proceeding before any court, tribunal, public body, notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths.”

In this case, a conviction for the crime of perjury required proof of false testimony that occurred in a court proceeding—here, a preliminary hearing in Adams’ case. At the time of the hearing, Lang was physically located in Pratt County, but she gave her testimony, electronically, in an Ellis County proceeding. Thus, even if we consider Lang's “location” was in Pratt County, Lang completed the crime of perjury by giving her false testimony in the court proceeding that was simultaneously occurring in Ellis County. This is a situation contemplated by K.S.A. 22-2603. “When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about the legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading something into the statute that is not readily found in its words.” State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022). Because both acts were requisite to the crime and arguably occurred in different counties, the prosecution “may be in any county in which any of such acts occur.” K.S.A. 22-2603.

The Kansas Supreme Court analyzed a similar situation in State v. Boorigie, 273 Kan. 18, 41 P.3d 764 (2002). In Boorigie, the defendant was charged with criminal solicitation for soliciting others to confess to committing a murder for which he was on trial. The solicitation charges were brought in Montgomery County where the murder occurred even though some of the solicitations occurred in other counties. The Kansas Supreme Court found a “direct link between the Montgomery County criminal charges and the crimes committed in Elk and Wilson Counties.” Boorigie, 273 Kan. at 24. The court concluded, “it is logical that Montgomery County was a proper venue for the prosecution of the defendant's solicitations for false testimony.” 273 Kan. at 24-25.

The Boorigie court found State v. Jones, 9 Kan. App. 2d 106, 673 P.2d 455 (1983), relevant in its decision. In Jones, a defendant was an inmate at the Allen County jail awaiting trial, but failed to return after being released from a Kansas City, Missouri hospital where he had been transported for medical treatment. Jones challenged the jurisdiction of the court. But the Jones court ruled that because Jones was obligated to return to Allen County to face trial, that was the logical venue and there was jurisdiction to charge and convict Jones in Allen County. 9 Kan. App. 2d at 106-07.

Boorigie and Jones are instructive in interpreting K.S.A. 22-2603. Lang's perjury conviction required her false testimony, which occurred in different counties. She provided the false testimony in Pratt County—where she was physically located during the remote hearing—while she simultaneously presented that false testimony to the court in Ellis County. Thus, Lang's prosecution properly occurred in one of those counties—Ellis County. See K.S.A. 22-2603. Lang does not otherwise contest that the evidence was sufficient to support her perjury conviction. Thus, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find a rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mendez, 319 Kan. at 723.

Did Sufficient Evidence Support Lang’s Conviction for Interference with Law Enforcement?

Lang's final argument on appeal is that sufficient evidence does not support her conviction for interference with law enforcement. Lang argues that she could not be convicted of this crime as a matter of law.

Standard of Review

Lang frames her issue as a sufficiency challenge to her conviction for interference with law enforcement, a crime which is defined in relevant part under K.S.A. 21-5904(a)(1)(C). Lang's conviction was based on her statement to law enforcement that Adams was not in her home when he was hiding in her garage.

A sufficiency challenge requires us to “review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mendez, 319 Kan. at 723. To the extent our review relies upon statutory interpretation, our inquiry presents a “question of law over which we have unlimited review.” State v. Daniels, 319 Kan. 340, 342, 554 P.3d 629 (2024).

Discussion

We begin our analysis of Lang's sufficiency challenge by reviewing the definition of the crime of interference with law enforcement under K.S.A. 21-5904(a)(1)(C):

“(a) Interference with law enforcement is:

(1) Falsely reporting to a law enforcement officer, law enforcement agency or strategy investigative agency:

․

(C) any information, knowing that such information is false and intending to influence, impede or obstruct such officer's or agency's duty.”

Lang acknowledges that falsely reporting information to a law enforcement officer may form the basis of a conviction for interference with law enforcement, citing State v. Miller, No. 113,595, 2016 WL 1079467, at *4 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion). But Lang argues that she legally could not be convicted of the crime because when law enforcement asked her if Adams was present in her home, and threatened her with criminal prosecution and the removal of her children if she did not cooperate, law enforcement created a situation where she could only choose between interfering with law enforcement by denying Adams was present, or incriminating herself by admitting Adams was present. Lang believes she cannot be convicted when faced with either giving a false statement to law enforcement or incriminating herself. In support of her position, Lang cites Shepack v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, No. 117,508, 2018 WL 2373232 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion).

In Shepack, the defendant denied drinking to law enforcement, which was false. 2018 WL 2373232, at *6. The panel recognized that lying to a police officer can serve as grounds for a charge of interference, but it also noted that “the information the trooper requested was partially incriminating.” 2018 WL 2373232, at *6. The panel stated the statute “should not be construed to penalize the avoidance of providing self-incriminating statements.” 2018 WL 2373232, at *6.

The rationale in Shepack does not apply here. Lang was not involved in any criminal activity when officers came to the door. When law enforcement officers arrived at Lang's home, Lang was only a victim and a witness. Providing honest information about Adams’ whereabouts would have had no negative legal consequence for Lang. Law enforcement did not threaten Lang that she would be charged criminally or have her children taken if she provided honest information. The only consequence for Lang occurred when she chose to be dishonest with law enforcement in her answers. When officers went to Lang's door, they asked if Adams was there and Lang told officers he was not—even though at the time he was in Lang's garage. Lang does not contest that she provided false information that impeded law enforcement. Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence for a rational fact-finder to conclude Lang violated K.S.A. 21-5904(a)(1)(C) beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mendez, 319 Kan. at 723.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam: