Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
The People of the State of New York, v. Peter C. Supinski, Defendant.
History of the Case.
The defendant was charged with a violation of VTL § 1141, by a simplified information, pursuant to VTL § 100.25 (1), relative to an accident resulting in a fatality on August 19, 2022 at approximately 8:00 P.M. on Route 250 in the Town of Webster.
The matter was set down for a bench trial on April 14, 2023. The People presented three witnesses at that trial, to wit: David C. Pfluke, a civilian witness, Officer Tesssa Frate of the Webster Police Department and Investigator Eric Davis of the New York State Police Department. The defendant did not present any witnesses nor did he testify at the trial. At the conclusion of the People's case defense counsel moved for a trial order of dismissal, pursuant of CPL § 290 (1).1
Facts of the Case
The first person to testify was David C. Pfluke, who was following the defendant's vehicle, a 2015 Toyota SUV, northbound on Route 250, also known as Webster Road, as it approached Millcreek Run, the entrance to which is on the west side of said road. In so doing he observed the defendant's vehicle stop to made a left turn on to Millcreek Run. At the same time he saw a motor cycle, which was described as a "crotch rocket" heading in a southbound direction on Route 250. The witness indicated that the defendant, before making the left turn appeared to hesitate, then proceeded to make the turn. In viewing both the left turn of the defendant and the approaching motorcycle the defendant testified to remembering that it appeared to him that an accident was forthcoming. As the events progressed that is exactly what happened. Namely, the motorcycle crashed into the passenger side of the defendant's vehicle.
The body of the motorcycle driver having been thrown in front of the witness' vehicle. At that point the witness approached the driver of the motorcycle now laying on the road to see if he could find a pulse, having first directed his wife to call 911. He returned to his own vehicle to speak to the 911 operator. Finally, the witness testified to assisting others in moving the motorcycle out of the road.
The second witness to testify was Officer Tessa Frate of the Webster Police Department, who was the officer that issued the uniform traffic information to the defendant for a violation of VTL § 1141.2 Although not the first officer on the scene, she assisted in securing the scene of the accident in accordance with the protocols of her department in the case of a motor vehicle accident involving a fatality. The defendant did spontaneously advise Officer Frate that he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident.
The third prosecution witness was Investigator Eric Davis of the New York State Police. It was stipulated by defense counsel that Investigator Davis was an expert in traffic accident reconstruction.He testified that the Webster Police Department had made a request to the New York State Police for the assistance of such a person. Investigator Davis arrived at the scene about 10:00 P.M. after being authorized to assist Webster Police. Upon his arrival the investigator took a number of photographs of the scene himself. In addition he employed a drone which was capable of taking pictures that accurately mapped and measured the scene of the accident and surrounding areas. The diagram of the scene of the accident produced by the drone's software, which was entered into evidence, set out the positions of the vehicles involved, various benchmarks and distances between them so as to reconstruct the accident. Investigator Davis testified that the speed limit on Route 250 in that area was 40 miles per hour. That based on the photographs of the scene, which included an initial gouge in the road caused by the motorcycle and the point of impact, the motorcycle was probably traveling minimally at 45 miles per hour prior to attempting to brake in an effort to avoid the defendant's vehicle, which was in the southbound lane and in the process of turning into Millcreek Run. He testified on cross-examination that the motorcycle was traveling between 45 and 50.3 miles per hour. He further testified that the gouge in the road indicated that said point was where the motorcycle driver first made an attempt to avoid colliding with the defendant's vehicle. Said point being approximately 126 feet from the point of impact, which gave the motorcycle driver about 1.75 seconds to avoid the crash. The Investigator further testified that the gouge and the point of impact indicated that the motorcycle driver's attempt to stop and/or avoid the defendant's vehicle was improper and suggested an inexperienced motorcycle driver. His testimony implied that a more experienced motorcycle driver could have avoided the defendant's vehicle. He also indicated that the model and year of the motorcycle, to wit a 2022 Yamaha, would have been equipped with an automatic on headlight, which would indicate that the headlight was on at the time of the accident.
Issue Presented.
Should the court grant the defendant's motion for trial order of dismissal?
Legal Analysis.
Elements of the Offense. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 states as follows: "The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard." CPL § 290.10 (1) (a) states in pertinent part "At the conclusion of the people's case or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may, . . . upon motion of the defendant, issue a 'trial order of dismissal,' dismissing any count of an indictment upon the ground that the trial evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense."3 The Court of Appeals has held that
"A verdict is legally sufficient if there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to conclude that every element of the charged crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see e.g. People v. Smith, 6 NY3d 827, 828, 817 N.Y.S.2d 575, 850 N.E.2d 622 [2006], cert. denied 548 U.S. 905, 126 S.Ct. 2971, 165 L.Ed.2d 953 [2006], quoting People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]; People v. Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 246, 785 N.Y.S.2d 405, 818 N.E.2d 1146 [2004] ). The proof must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and the People are entitled to all reasonable evidentiary inferences (see e.g. People v. Conway, 6 NY3d 869, 872, 816 N.Y.S.2d 731, 849 N.E.2d 954 [2006]; People v. Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 437, 497 N.Y.S.2d 637, 488 N.E.2d 458 [1985] )." (People v. Delamota, 18 NY3d 107,113, 936 N.Y.S. 3d 614,618 (2011)]
In determining whether the trial evidence is legally sufficient to establish the offense charged one must first analyze each of the elements of the alleged offense. First of all it is un-controverted that the defendant was attempting to make a left turn from Webster Road on to Millcreek Run.VTL § 120 (a) defines an intersection as "The area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come in conflict." Based on that definition the area wherein Millcreek Run meets Webster Road constitutes an intersection. A right of way is defined by VTL § 139 as "The right of one vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian approaching under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other." Certainly the defendant's vehicle was approaching from the opposite direction and was within the intersection or so close to to the intersection of Webster Road and Millcreek Run as to cause an immediate hazard. VTL § 117-b defines a hazardous operation of a vehicle as follows: The operation, or parking, of a vehicle on or immediately adjacent to a public highway while such vehicle is actually engaged in an operation which would restrict, impede or interfere with the normal flow of traffic." Again it is uncontested that the defendant's vehicle while making a left turn on to Millcreek Run would have impeded and/or interfered with the normal flow of traffic in the southbound lane, which is evidenced by the collision herein.
Speed of the Motorcycle as Contributing to the Collision. The testimony of the NYS Police Investigator that the driver of the motor cycle was speeding was not contradicted. It is also undeniable that the motorcycle traveling in the southbound lane had the right of way. There is no doubt that had the motorcycle been traveling at or less than 40 miles per hour that it would have been easier to stop and/or avoid the collision with the defendant's vehicle. " Although a driver with a right-of-way also has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid a collision ..., it has been recognized that a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision ...." (internal citations omitted). (Yelder v. Walters, 64 AD3d 763,764, 883 N.Y.S.2d 290,292 [2009]). In fact, the court held "... that the driver with the right-of-way, was entitled to anticipate that the plaintiff would obey traffic laws which required her to yield."4
Proximate Cause of the Collision. Even assuming arguendo that the motorcycle driver had been exceeding the speed limit at the time he observed the defendant's vehicle, it was the presence of the defendant's vehicle in the lane wherein the motorcycle had the right of way that was the primary proximate cause of the collision and the resulting fatality. "However, it is only the unexcused violation of a provision in the Vehicle and Traffic Law that constitutes negligence per se." (Habir v. Wilczak, 191 AD3d 1320, 141 N.Y.S.3d 596,598 [2021]) In other words, unless there is an excuse for the violation in question, such as a failure to yield, a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law that results in an accident is negligence per se. For example in Habir the held "... that plaintiff failed to meet her initial burden on her [summary judgment] motion inasmuch as her submissions raised an issue of fact whether defendant's violation of section 1141 should be excused based on evidence that plaintiff may have been driving her vehicle on the street between 2:00 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. without her headlights illuminated."5 In any event, in this case the speed of the motorcycle above the speed limit could not be considered so excessive as to excuse the actions of the defendant. "The reasonableness of defendant's excuse is for a fact finder to determine (see Baker v. Joyal, 4 AD3d 596, 597, 771 N.Y.S.2d 269 [3d Dept. 2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 706, 781 N.Y.S.2d 287, 814 N.E.2d 459 [2004]; see also Feeley v. St. Lawrence Univ., 13 AD3d 782, 783, 788 N.Y.S.2d 179 [3d Dept. 2004]; Tomaselli v. Goldstein, 104 AD2d 872, 873, 480 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2d Dept. 1984])."6
Conclusion.
In order to grant the motion of the defendant, the court would have to find that the evidence presented by the People was not legally sufficient to establish the charge of failure to yield right of way as set out in VTL § 1141. That is not the case. The evidence presented was legally sufficient to establish a violation of VTL § 1141.
Thus the motion for a trial order of dismissal is hereby denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Dated: April 24, 2023
Webster, New York
Hon. Thomas J. DiSalvo
Webster Town Justice
FOOTNOTES
1. (CPL § 290.10 is primarily directed to the prosecution of indictments in Superior Courts. However, CPL § 350.10 [4] states that "The provisions governing motion practice and general procedure with respect to a jury trial of an indictment are, wherever appropriate, applicable to a non-jury trial of an information.")
2. (The simplified information was not issued until September 30, 2022, which was after the receipt of the accident reconstruction report by the Webster Police..)
3. (" 'Legally sufficient evidence' means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof; except that such evidence is not legally sufficient when corroboration required by law is absent." CPL § 70.10 [1])
4. (Id.)
5. (Id.)
6. (Id.)
Thomas J. DiSalvo, J.
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Docket No: Case No.: 22100022
Decided: April 24, 2023
Court: Justice Court, New York,
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)