The Krejci-Putz Revocable Trust, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Gerald M. Bishop and The Law Offices of Gerald M. Bishop & Associates, Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The Krejci-Putz Revocable Trust (“the Trust”) appeals the trial court's dismissal of a legal malpractice claim that the Trust filed against Gerald M. Bishop (“Gerald”) and The Law Offices of Gerald M. Bishop & Associates (“the Law Office”) (collectively, “Appellees”). The Trust argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Trust lacked standing to bring the malpractice claim. We find the Trust's argument waived for lack of cogency and therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The relevant facts as alleged in the Trust's complaint are as follows.¹ Appellees served as the attorney for William Putz (“William”), who was born in 1946, for decades. In approximately 2008, Gerald and William jointly acquired an income-producing condominium in Florida (“the Condo”). In September 2020, Gerald prepared a power of attorney (“POA”) for William, “which appointed his wife Deborah [“Deborah”] as his attorney-in-fact to transact on his behalf and make health care decisions for William.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 5.

[3] Sometime in June 2022, Deborah received a diagnosis of terminal cancer and was given only six to twelve months to live. In July, with Gerald's assistance, Deborah established the Trust and was named as both the settlor and the trustee. At some point, Deborah transferred the Putz family home to the Trust for the benefit of William and their son, Jordan. In October, Gerald drafted a second POA for William that named Tina Mohamed (“Tina”) as William's attorney-in-fact and authorized her to “transact financially” and “request and consent to any and all medical care and treatment” on his behalf. Ex. Vol. at 66-67.²

[4] In November, Gerald sent William and Deborah a letter in which he offered to purchase William's interest in the Condo for $116,515. In December, William executed a special warranty deed conveying his interest in the Condo to Gerald and his wife, Suzanne (“Suzanne”). Gerald transferred the funds for the Condo to the Trust. In February 2023, Tina had William placed in an assisted living facility in Crown Point, where he still resided as of December 2024. Deborah passed away in March 2023, and Tina succeeded her as trustee. In February 2024, Bryan Beall succeeded Tina as trustee.

[5] In December, the Trust and Jordan filed a multi-count complaint against Appellees, Suzanne, and Tina. The only count relevant to this appeal is a legal malpractice claim based on the following allegations:

142. Deborah employed [Gerald] and the Law Office to serve as legal counsel for Deborah in creating and administering the Trust.

143. Deborah also employed [Gerald] and the Law Office to serve as legal counsel for Deborah during her time as William's attorney-in-fact.

144. An attorney exercising ordinary skill and knowledge in trust and estate work would have advised Deborah to place all of William's assets into the Trust, including the Condo.

145. [Gerald] and the Law Office should have instructed Deborah to place the Condo into the Trust, but failed to do so.

146. If [Gerald] and the Law Office had properly advised and assisted Deborah in placing the Condo in the Trust, the Trust would not have suffered unnecessary losses related to the sale of the Condo.

147. Placing the Condo into the Trust would have effectuated the intentions of the settlor, Deborah, by ensuring that the Condo was properly utilized for William and Jordan's benefit.

148. [Gerald] and the Law Office's failure to advise and assist Deborah in placing the Condo into the Trust resulted in unnecessary losses related to the sale of the Condo.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 25-26.

[6] Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Specifically, Appellees argued that the Trust and Jordan lacked standing to bring the claims asserted in the complaint. The Trust and Jordan responded to the motions filed by Appellees and Suzanne, and those parties filed a reply. In July 2025, after a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting all motions to dismiss, finding that the Trust and Jordan lacked standing to bring their claims. The Trust now appeals the dismissal of the foregoing legal malpractice claim against Appellees.³

Discussion and Decision

[7] “[W]e review de novo a ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Spiegel, 186 N.E.3d 1151, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “When evaluating such a motion, courts must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint, consider them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff.” Hensley v. Lewis Bros. Bakeries, Inc., 263 N.E.3d 199, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “[Courts] need not accept as true conclusory, nonfactual assertions or legal conclusions.” Crystal Valley Sales, Inc. v. Anderson, 22 N.E.3d 646, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “A complaint is not subject to dismissal unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts.” Honeycutt v. Ong, 806 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting McDonald v. Smart Prof'l Photo Copy Corp., 664 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). “We do not assess the sufficiency of facts in support of the complaint, but rather we determine if the complaint states any set of allegations upon which the trial court could have granted relief.” Id. “We will affirm the trial court when it is clear from the face of the complaint that under no circumstances could the trial court have granted relief.” Id.

[8] Motions to dismiss for lack of standing may be brought under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hensley, 263 N.E.3d at 201. “[O]n appeal, we review de novo the legal question of whether a party has standing.” Id. “The threshold issue of standing determines whether a litigant is entitled to have a court decide the substantive issues of a dispute.” Id. (quoting Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner, 212 N.E.3d 1234, 1238 (Ind. 2023)). “The standing requirement ensures that courts avoid engaging in ‘abstract speculation’ and that courts act only in ‘real cases.’ ” Id. at 202 (quoting Hoosier Contractors, LLC, 212 N.E.3d at 1238). “Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury, which is met when the plaintiff shows that he ‘has suffered or is in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct.’ ” Id. (alterations in Hensley) (quoting Hoosier Contractors, LLC, 212 N.E.3d at 1238).

[9] The Trust asserts that it had standing to assert a legal malpractice claim, Appellant's Br. at 16, yet it fails to cite a single pertinent authority regarding what constitutes standing or why the Trust, as opposed to (or in addition to) the trustee or a Trust beneficiary, has standing to bring such a claim.⁴ Because the Trust did not support its argument with cogent reasoning or citations to authority, we find that it has waived its claim for appellate review. Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)-(b)). “It is not sufficient for the argument section that an appellant simply recites facts and makes conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support.” Id. Consequently, we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We agree with Appellees that the Trust's brief contains much “extraneous information” that is “wholly unrelated” to the issue on appeal. Appellees’ Br. at 8 n.7.

2.   The second POA does not mention, let alone purport to revoke, the first POA. Ex. Vol. at 66-67.

3.   The Trust's appeal was consolidated with a guardianship appeal, which was later dismissed.

4.   The Trust cites Indiana Code Section 30-4-3-3(a)(11), which gives a trustee “[t]he power to prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection of: (A) trust property; and (B) the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties.” The Trust fails to explain how this statute applies to the Trust itself as a separate legal entity.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.