Sabra Bough, Appellant-Defendant v. Aloaha Jones, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Sabra Bough appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Aloaha Jones on Jones's claim against her for conversion. Bough argues that the trial court's judgment for conversion and damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees was erroneous. Jones cross-appeals, claiming that because she prevailed on her claim, the trial court erred in not awarding her post-judgment interest and additional attorney's fees.

[2] We affirm and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Jones and Bough are the daughters of Martha Sue Wininger, who died on October 25, 2021. At the time of Wininger's death, a checking account was held at Old National Bank with all three listed as joint owners. The account balance when Wininger died was $70,105.32, and an interest credit on October 26, 2021, brought the balance to $70,105.89.

[4] Shortly after Wininger's death, Bough met with attorney J. David Lett. No attorney-client relationship was formed, and she paid no fee for his services. Bough informed Attorney Lett of the joint account and showed him Wininger's purported will. Attorney Lett expressed concern over the will and advised that it should not be probated. He also told Bough that she could withdraw the joint account funds and place them in a separate account so she could have control over the money and pay Wininger's debts.

[5] Bough withdrew $66,000 from the joint account on November 1, 2021, leaving a balance of $1,934.41. That same day, Bough deposited the $66,000 into a separate checking account that she opened only in her name. After Bough paid Wininger's utility bill, she deposited the remaining balance of $1,843.53 into the separate account on January 24, 2022. She then paid some of Wininger's additional bills from that account and wrote checks to herself and two others.

[6] On June 26, 2022, Jones contacted Bough and demanded one-half of the joint account funds. Bough refused to give any money to Jones, and she told Jones that she should retain an attorney.

[7] On July 25, 2022, Jones filed a complaint against Bough seeking injunctive relief, damages for conversion, unjust enrichment, trespass, and an accounting. Jones sought damages in the amount of $35,052.66 (one-half of joint account's funds), interest, costs and attorney's fees, and “any and all damages allowable under a civil and criminal conversion claim.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 26.

[8] At the conclusion of a bench trial on January 22, 2025, the trial court entered judgment for Jones with the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

12. Attorney Lett informed the Defendant that she could withdraw the money from the joint account and set up another account so that the Defendant could follow the Defendant's stated goals of following the Decedent's wishes.

13. The Defendant subsequently withdrew the funds and placed them in a separate account after paying a utility bill owed by the Decedent.

14. The Defendant paid several bills out of this new account as well as checks to herself, Frank Wininger, and Angela Diamond.

15. On June 26, 2022 the Plaintiff called and sent a text message to the Defendant demanding half of the money from the joint account.

16. The Defendant responded with a text stating that the Plaintiff should get an attorney.

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18. This action was filed on July 25, 2022.

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22. In answering the Plaintiff's request for Admissions, the Defendant denied that the account was a joint account and that both Defendant and Plaintiff were entitled to half of the account's value.

23. To date no payments have been made to the Plaintiff on this claim.

24. The Plaintiff engaged the services of an attorney to proceed with this action and has incurred attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $17,621.79.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. A joint account belongs in equal share to the survivors after the death of a party to the account.

2. A joint account is a non-probate asset.

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4. The Defendant's removal of the funds from the joint account and refusal to pay the Plaintiff her share of that account amounts to an act of conversion.

5. The value of the account was $70,105.89. The Plaintiff's share is $35,052.94.

6. The Defendant [had] the advice of counsel throughout these proceedings. Such advice is not [a] defense to the claim, but does offer some explanations of her actions and mitigates the request for treble damages.

7. The Court ORDERS the Defendant pay to the Plaintiff $35,052.94, prejudgment interest based on the finding of conversion at 6%, which is $175.26 per month from February 2023 through July 2025 which is 29 months. That amount is $5,082.66 and attorney fees and costs in the amount of $17,621.79. The total due is $57,757.39.

Id. at 19-21 (emphases added).

[9] On September 3, 2025, Bough filed a motion to correct error to which Jones filed a response. And on September 15, 2025, Jones filed a motion to amend the trial court's judgment to include post-judgment interest and additional attorney's fees because she was the prevailing party. As the trial court did not rule on the motions, they were deemed denied.

[10] Bough now appeals, and Jones cross-appeals.

Standard Of Review

[11] As the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law at Jones's request pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Infinity Products, Inc. v. Quandt, 810 N.E.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Ind. 2004). The trial court's findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. 11438 Highway 50, LLC v. Luttrell, 81 N.E.3d 261, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. A finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts or reasonable inferences supporting it. TKG Assocs., LLC v. MBG Monmouth, LLC, 259 N.E.3d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). This court does not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Infinity Products, 810 N.E.2d at 1032.

Discussion and Decision

I. Bough's Contentions

[12] Bough argues that the trial court erred in determining that she committed conversion and that awarding attorney's fees to Jones was erroneous. Bough Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CT-2633 | May 29, 2026 Page 6 of 13 contends that the trial court misinterpreted the law regarding attorney's fees, in that the commission of conversion does not permit such an award.

[13] Criminal conversion occurs when a person knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over the property of another. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3.

[14] Here, the trial court found that

Bough knew Jones was a joint owner of the account;

Bough withdrew the funds;

Bough paid herself and others;

Bough refused to pay Jones;

Bough denied Jones's ownership; and

Bough made no payments until after judgment.1

Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 19-21.

[15] Although Bough claims that her reliance on counsel's advice excused her from liability for conversion, the trial court expressly stated in its order that “[s]uch advice is not [a] defense to the claim, but does offer some explanations of her actions and mitigates the request for treble damages.” Id. at 21 (emphasis added).

[16] Here, the evidence established that Bough improperly retained Jones's money in the joint account, and it was reasonable for the trial court to find that her continued possession of the money amounted to conversion. See, e.g., Auto Liquidation Center, Inc. v. Chaca, 47 N.E.3d 650, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that once the defendant realized that the plaintiff was not behind in payments, it was reasonable for the factfinder to conclude that the defendant's continued possession of the property constituted conversion).

[17] We also note that while Bough contends that the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Jones was error, Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1, (the Crime Victim's Relief Act), provides in part that

If a person has an unpaid claim on a liability that is covered by IC 24-4.6-5 or suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation of IC 35-43 ․, the person may bring a civil action against the person who caused the loss for the following:

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(2) The costs of the action.

(3) A reasonable attorney's fee.

(Emphasis added).

[18] Here, because the trial court correctly determined that Bough committed conversion pursuant to I.C. § 35-43-4-3, the award of attorney's fees to Jones was proper.

II. Cross-Appeal

[19] On cross-appeal, Jones maintains that the trial court was obligated to award her post-judgment interest and additional attorney's fees.

[20] Ind. Code § 24-4.6-1-101 (the Money Judgments Statute) states in relevant part that

[I]nterest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of the return of the verdict or finding of the court until satisfaction at:

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(2) an annual rate of eight percent (8%) if there was no contract by the parties.

[21] As this statute provides, post-judgment interest is automatically and mandatorily awarded to a prevailing plaintiff. Denman v. St. Vincent Med. Grp, Inc., 176 N.E.3d 480, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. And because there was no contract between the parties in this instance, Jones is entitled to post-judgment interest at an annual rate of eight percent.

[22] Further, although the Crime Victim's Relief Act does not specifically permit the prevailing party to recover appellate attorney's fees in an action for conversion, this court has construed the statute to allow for such an award. See Heartland Res., Inc. v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to determine Jones's reasonable appellate attorney's fees and include that amount in the judgment.

[23] Finally, Jones claims that she is entitled to attorney's fees that she incurred in responding to Bough's motion to correct error. The Crime Victim's Relief Act makes no provision for the recovery of such fees; nor have we found any authority expressly permitting or disallowing an award of such fees. That said, it is our view that because the prevailing party is permitted to recover reasonable trial and appellate attorney's fees for conversion under the Crime Victim's Relief Act, Jones should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees incurred in responding to Bough's motion to correct error.

[24] In sum, we affirm the trial court's judgment and remand this case with instructions to calculate the amount of post-judgment interest at the annual rate of eight percent to which Jones is entitled. The trial court is further directed to determine the reasonable amount of appellate attorney's fees, the fees that Jones expended in litigating Bough's motion to correct error, and issue an amended judgment to reflect those amounts.

[25] Affirmed and remanded.

[26] I concur in the majority's conclusion that Jones is entitled to post-judgment interest. I respectfully dissent from its conclusions that the trial court correctly determined that Bough committed criminal conversion and that the award of attorney fees to Jones under the Crime Victims Relief Act was proper and would remand for clarification.

[27] Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3 governs criminal conversion and provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person commits criminal conversion, a Class A misdemeanor.” “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “In any criminal conversion action, criminal intent is an essential element that must be proven.” JET Credit Union v. Loudermilk, 879 N.E.2d 594, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “It is this mens rea requirement that differentiates criminal conversion from a more innocent breach of contract or failure to pay a debt, which situations the criminal conversion statute was not intended to cover.” Id. “To establish this element of the crime of conversion, a plaintiff must show the defendant was aware of a high probability his control over the plaintiff's property was unauthorized.” Id.

[28] The Crime Victims Relief Act “provides a punitive remedy if the claimant can prove that the defendant violated a penal statute, and, as a punitive measure, it should be strictly construed and applied only where the challenged conduct is clearly proscribed.” Klinker v. First Merchants Bank, N.A., 964 N.E.2d 190, 195, (Ind. 2012). “An actual criminal conviction is not required for recovery [under the Crime Victims Relief Act]; a claimant merely must prove each element of the underlying crime by a preponderance of the evidence.” Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 606 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 327, 334 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Liability under the Crime Victims Relief Act “is civil, not criminal, and does not require criminal charges or proof beyond reasonable doubt.” Id.

[29] The record reveals that Bough sought legal advice from Attorney Lett, disclosed the joint account and the purported will, and acted in accordance with Attorney Lett's advice. There was no evidence that Bough misrepresented any facts to Attorney Lett. While the trial court observed that Bough had “the advice of counsel throughout these proceedings” and “[s]uch advice is not on [sic] defense to the claim,” the trial court stated that it “does offer some explanations of her actions and mitigates the request for treble damages.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 21. This cuts against criminal intent. The trial court did not specify it was awarding fees under the Criminal Victims Relief Act or any other basis for the award of attorney fees. Under these circumstances, I would remand for the trial court to clarify whether it determined there was civil or criminal conversion and the basis for the fee award.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On August 22, 2025, Bough paid Jones $30,492, thus leaving an unpaid principal balance of $4,560.94.

Altice, Judge.

Judges DeBoer concurs in result without opinion. Judge Brown concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion. DeBoer, J., concurs in result without opinion. Brown, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.