IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of L.K. (Minor Child); (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] D.K. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with her eight-year-old daughter, L.K. (“L.K.”). Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with L.K. is clearly erroneous. Concluding that the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental relationship with L.K. is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] The facts most favorable to the termination reveal that Mother is the parent of L.K., who was born in May 2017. Mother is also the parent of W.K. (“W.K.”) (collectively with L.K, “the children”), who is younger than L.K., but whose date of birth is not included in the record. L.K. and W.K. do not have the same father. This appeal concerns only the termination of Mother's parental relationship with L.K.

[4] In 2023, Mother and the children were living in Oregon. In August 2023, Mother and the children came to Indiana to visit Mother's mother (“maternal grandmother”). In February 2024, while Mother and the children were still in Indiana, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report alleging that the children were victims of neglect because of Mother's methamphetamine and alcohol use.

[5] A DCS family case manager met with Mother to investigate the report, and Mother acknowledged that she had recently used methamphetamine. In addition, Mother's drug tests were positive for methamphetamine.

[6] In March 2024, DCS filed separate petitions alleging that the children were children in need of services (“CHINS”), removed the children from Mother, and placed them in foster care with maternal grandmother. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine several times in March 2024.

[7] In May 2024, following a factfinding hearing, the trial court adjudicated the children to be CHINS. In addition, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine in May 2024.

[8] In June 2024, the trial court issued a dispositional order that required Mother to: (1) abstain from the use of illegal controlled substances and alcohol; (2) submit to random drug screens; (3) complete a substance abuse assessment and complete all treatment recommendations; and (4) abstain from committing acts of domestic violence. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine in June 2024.

[9] Although Mother did not complete the court-ordered substance abuse assessment, she began participating in a virtual substance abuse treatment program offered by Affect (“the Affect program”). However, the Affect program was not a DCS-approved substance abuse program because it was a virtual program that paid Mother for her participation. Further, DCS subsequently learned that Mother had not been consistently attending the therapeutic portion of the Affect program. In addition, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine multiple times in July and August 2024.

[10] In September 2024, while L.K. was at school, Mother went to maternal grandmother's home and grabbed infant W.K. out of maternal grandmother's arms. As a result of this incident, one week later, the State charged Mother with: (1) Level 6 felony domestic battery for touching maternal grandmother in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; (2) Level 6 felony domestic battery for touching W.K. in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; (3) Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass; and (4) Class C misdemeanor interference with custody. Mother was incarcerated during the pendency of this criminal case.

[11] The day after Mother had been arrested, the trial court granted DCS’ motion to cease visitation between Mother and L.K. Specifically, the trial court's order provided that Mother's visits with L.K. would cease until Mother had: (1) maintained sobriety for thirty days, confirmed through DCS drug screens; (2) completed a substance abuse assessment through Cummins Behavioral Health Systems; and (3) begun participating in services recommended through that assessment.

[12] Following a November 2024 periodic case review hearing, the trial court issued an order providing that Mother had not completed a substance abuse assessment and that all of her drug screens had been positive for methamphetamine. The trial court's order further noted that Mother had recently been charged with four offenses and was incarcerated.

[13] In December 2024, Mother pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Mother to 144 days in the county jail, with time served. Following Mother's release from the county jail, she had two negative drug tests. However, shortly thereafter, Mother began testing positive for methamphetamine again.

[14] At some point in early 2025, Mother completed the court-ordered substance abuse assessment. However, she did not participate in the recommended substance abuse treatment because she did not want to stop using methamphetamine. Thereafter, Mother either tested positive for methamphetamine or refused to take drug tests when the DCS family case manager asked her to do so. Because Mother continued to use methamphetamine, her visits with L.K. were never reinstated.

[15] In June 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental relationship with L.K. Then, in July 2025, DCS filed an amended petition to terminate Mother's parental relationship with L.K.

[16] At the October 2025 termination hearing, the trial court heard the facts as set forth above. In addition, Mother acknowledged that she was still using methamphetamine and that she had last used methamphetamine a few days before the hearing. Mother further testified that she did not believe that her methamphetamine use impacted her parenting. Further, according to Mother, her goal was long-term sobriety but she could not promise that she would achieve that goal. In addition, Mother testified that she had recently been baptized and that she had been attending church for five weeks. Mother also testified that DCS had placed her younger daughter, W.K., in Oregon with W.K.’s father. According to Mother, her ultimate plan was to return to Oregon with L.K. and to reunite the two sisters.

[17] In addition, two DCS family case managers who had been assigned to Mother's case at different times during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings testified that the termination of Mother's parental relationship with L.K. was in L.K.’s best interests. In addition, the CASA also testified that the termination of Mother's parental rights was in L.K.’s best interests.

[18] Further, maternal grandmother testified that L.K. had lived in her home for the previous two years and that L.K. was doing “[a]bsolutely fantastic.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 74). The plan for L.K. was adoption by maternal grandmother.

[19] One month later, in November 2025, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental relationship with L.K. In this order, the trial court concluded, in relevant part, that DCS had met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in L.K.’s removal would not be remedied. Specifically, the trial court found that L.K. had been removed from Mother because of Mother's ongoing substance use and that during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother's attempts to address her substance use had been unsuccessful. The trial court further concluded that the termination of Mother's parental rights was in L.K.’s best interests.

[20] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[21] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with L.K. is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

[22] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[23] Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege in its termination petition as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) and (d).² DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013).

[24] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[25] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with L.K. is clearly erroneous. Specifically, her sole contention is that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Mother's parental relationship with L.K. was in L.K.’s best interests.

[26] In determining whether a termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A child's need for permanency is a central consideration in determining the child's best interests. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009), reh'g denied.

[27] In addition, a parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Lang v. Starke County Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Further, a parent's failure to exercise the right to visit her child demonstrates a “lack of commitment to complete the actions necessary to preserve [the] parent-child relationship[.]” In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, this Court has previously held that the recommendations of the service providers, in addition to evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the child's removal would not be remedied, is sufficient to show clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[28] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Mother's methamphetamine use has historically rendered her unable to provide L.K. with a suitable environment and rendered her unable to provide the same at the time of the termination hearing. Specifically, at the termination hearing, Mother acknowledged that she had continued to use methamphetamine during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings and that she had last used methamphetamine two days before the termination hearing. In addition, the trial court suspended Mother's visits with L.K. in September 2024 because of Mother's continued methamphetamine use. The visits were never reinstated, and at the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not visited with L.K. in over a year.

[29] Moreover, two DCS family case managers and the CASA testified that the termination of Mother's parental relationship with L.K. was in L.K.’s best interests. Further, the trial court concluded that DCS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in L.K.’s removal would not be remedied, and Mother does not challenge this conclusion. Lastly, we note that at the time of the termination hearing, eight-year-old L.K. had been living with maternal grandmother for two years, including eighteen months following L.K.’s removal from Mother. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the termination of Mother's parent-child relationship with L.K. was in L.K.’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental relationship with L.K. is not clearly erroneous. Mother's argument is simply a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 628.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated L.K.’s father's (“Father”) parental relationship with L.K. However, Father is not participating in this appeal.

2.   The General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024 (“the 2024 amendment”). During the 2025 legislative session, the General Assembly further amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025 (“the 2025 amendment”). Here, DCS filed the original termination petition in June 2025 and the amended termination petition in July 2025. Because the 2025 amendment did not alter the statutory provisions that are relevant to this case, we reach the same result under both the 2024 amendment and the 2025 amendment.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.