Jerry W. Hunt, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On August 6, 2025, Jerry Hunt was placed on probation after pleading guilty to Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. Within two months, the State petitioned to revoke Hunt's probation, alleging that he had violated the terms of his probation by failing to report to the probation department as instructed. Hunt admitted to the violation, after which the trial court revoked and terminated his probation and ordered him to serve six years and eleven days of his previously-suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). Hunt argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve six years and eleven days in the DOC. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 26, 2023, the State charged Hunt with Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On May 14, 2025, Hunt entered into a plea agreement, by the terms of which he agreed to plead guilty to the lesser charge of Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. In exchange for Hunt's guilty plea, the State agreed to “dismiss all remaining counts” and indicated that it would “not object to probation transferring to Kentucky if approved.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 18. The parties agreed that Hunt would “serve a sentence of Nine (9) years in [the DOC], with Sixty[-]Three (63) Days executed [and the] remainder suspended” to five years of supervised probation. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17.

[3] On August 6, 2025, the trial court accepted the plea, entered judgment of conviction, and sentenced Hunt in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. The sentencing order noted the standard terms and conditions of probation, including that Hunt was ordered to immediately report to the Lawrence County Probation Department (the “LCPD”) and that he was required to report “in person” to the LCPD as directed by his probation officer. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. The sentencing order also noted that “[p]robation may be transferred to [Hunt's] state of residence - Kentucky.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 54 (emphasis omitted). Hunt signed the sentencing order, indicating that he had both read and understood the conditions of his probation.

[4] Hunt began serving his probationary term on August 6, 2025. On September 30, 2025, the State petitioned to revoke Hunt's petition, alleging that he had failed to report to the LCPD on September 29, 2025, as directed and “failed to comply with the requests made by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to transfer his probation[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 55.

[5] On November 5, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the State's petition to revoke Hunt's probation. Lawrence County probation officer Rebecca Remillard testified that Hunt had been trying to have his probation supervision transferred to Kentucky through the Interstate Compact, but that Kentucky had rejected the transfer because Hunt had failed to “report as directed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. Remillard indicated that although Kentucky had “[a]t first” indicated a willingness to approve the transfer, the transfer was rejected after Hunt had failed to report to Kentucky officials as directed and attempts “to get him to report there” were deemed “futile.” Tr. Vol. II p. 28. After his request to transfer his probation to Kentucky had been rejected, Remillard instructed Hunt to report to the LCPD on September 29, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. Hunt did not report to the LCPD on September 29, 2025. Remillard testified that she did not speak to Hunt until October 23rd, which was after she had filed the petition to revoke Hunt's probation, and instructed him to report to the LCPD on October 28, 2025. Hunt reported as instructed on October 28th, at which time the warrant for his arrest was served, and he was arrested.

[6] At the evidentiary hearing, Hunt admitted that he had failed to report to the LCPD as instructed on September 29, 2025. Hunt claimed that he had been unable to appear in either Indiana or Kentucky because he had been ill in September, explaining that he suffered from “congestive heart failure” and end-stage “cirrhosis of the liver[ ]” and has “a pacemaker defibrillator ․ to keep [his] heart beating until a suitable heart transplant and liver transplant can be found.” Tr. Vol. II p. 29. Hunt also claimed that he had been unable “to find any suitable transportation or any way to get to [his] probation officer.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 29–30. Hunt claimed that he had not called to tell Remillard that he would be unable to appear as directed because his phone was “busted” and, by the time he obtained a new phone, he “had forgotten all about it.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 30, 31. Hunt did “not recall” how many times Kentucky probation had tried to contact him, but acknowledged that on August 21, 2025, a failure-to-appear notice had been submitted, and on September 12, 2025, a home visit had been conducted but that he had either not been home or had not opened the door. Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Hunt further acknowledged that he had also failed to report to the Kentucky probation department on September 19, 2025, claiming that he had not known that he “had to be there on [(sic)] that time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32.

[7] The trial court found that Hunt had violated probation by failing to report as directed, noting that “he could have at least called a week later and let people know what was going on[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 32. The trial court then turned its focus to disposition, at which time Hunt requested “either 30 or 60 days to attempt to get [his] probation in compliance[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 33. Remillard indicated that “[t]he only options would be he finds a residence here so he can serve his sentence ․ or the [DOC]” as it was unlikely that Kentucky would accept a probation transfer “again.” Tr. Vol. II p. 33.

[8] After Hunt presented mitigating testimony and the parties presented sentencing arguments, the trial court revoked Hunt's probation, noting that probation had been terminated unsuccessfully. The trial court stated that “Ms. Remillard is correct. If you violate the interstate compact, there are severe ramifications. So you've been given your chance. Generally, at least my experience, Kentucky won't take you again. They won't do it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 38. The trial court noted that “[t]here is some mitigation, although not a lot[,]” and ordered Hunt to serve six years and eleven days of his previously-suspended sentence in the DOC.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants. Accordingly, a trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.

Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

[10] Once the trial court finds that a person has violated the terms of his probation, the trial court

may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). “Violation of a single condition of placement is sufficient to revoke placement.” Porter v. State, 117 N.E.3d 673, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[11] Hunt argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve a portion of his previously-suspended sentence in the DOC because his violation had been technical in nature, he had a minor criminal history, and he was in poor health. In support of his argument that the trial court abused its discretion, Hunt cites Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In 2009, Ripps, who suffered from “terminal prostate cancer, congestive heart failure, and obstructive pulmonary disease,” pled guilty to Class C felony child molesting. Ripps, 968 N.E.2d at 325. In accordance with his plea agreement, Ripps was sentenced to “eight years with six years and three hundred days suspended to probation[,]” a condition of which was that Ripps could not live “within one thousand feet of a youth program center[.]” Id. at 324. In 2011, the State petitioned to revoke Ripps's probation, alleging that he had violated the terms of his probation by moving into an assisted-living facility that was within 1000 feet of a facility that qualified as a youth program center. Id. at 325. The trial court revoked Ripps's probation and ordered him to serve “two years and two-hundred and sixty-six days[ ] in prison.” Id. at 326. On appeal, a panel of this court concluded that

[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with Ripps that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in prison. Ripps was sixty-nine years old and suffering from serious health issues, including terminal cancer; he was attempting to adhere to his probation conditions, as evidenced by his going to the sheriff's office to register his new address; although he was initially in violation of the residency restriction, evidence reveals he was taking steps to correct the violation by finding a new residence; while he did live within 1,000 feet of the public library, this was only so by about twenty feet and some ambiguity exists in how this distance was measured; and, last, Ripps previously served time in prison for a crime that was later vacated as violative of our constitutional ex post facto provision. Given the circumstances, it was unreasonable for the trial court to determine Ripps's violation warranted revoking his probation.

Id. at 328. While we acknowledge the Ripps decision, we find that the only similarity between Ripps and the instant matter is that both Ripps and Hunt claimed to suffer from serious, life-threatening illnesses. Notably, unlike in Ripps, nothing in this case indicates that, prior to appearing at the LCPD on the date of his arrest, Hunt had undertaken any attempt to comply with the terms of his probation.

[12] “Probation is a criminal sanction wherein a convicted defendant specifically agrees to accept conditions upon his behavior in lieu of imprisonment.” Bonner v. State, 776 N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. After pleading guilty to Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Hunt agreed to and accepted the terms of his probation in lieu of incarceration. He then, in short order, failed to abide by said terms, demonstrating a pattern of failing to appear or cooperate.

[13] When the LCPD agreed to allow Hunt to seek transfer of his probation to Kentucky, i.e., at a location that was seemingly more convenient to him, Hunt failed to appear as directed in Kentucky, leading Kentucky to reject the transfer. He then failed to appear as directed at the LCPD. Hunt claimed that he had been ill on the date he was to have appeared and that his telephone had been broken but acknowledged that he had failed to contact the LCPD once he had obtained a working telephone. Hunt's actions, both in Kentucky and in Indiana, demonstrate an inability and/or unwillingness to maintain contact with the probation department as directed.

[14] While Hunt claims that his failure to appear in Kentucky “was not a violation of his probation[,]” Appellant's Br. p. 12, we agree with the State that “[a]lthough this may be true, the trial court was not forbidden from considering his lack of cooperation with Kentucky when imposing a sanction.” Appellee's Br. p. 11. As the State further notes, Hunt's “lack of cooperation meant that he was not reporting to any probation department to be supervised during the period when the Kentucky approval process was happening; a transfer process that was presumably undertaken to make it easier for Hunt[ ]” to comply with the terms of his probation. Appellee's Br. p. 11. We agree with the State that “Hunt's violation, and his failure to cooperate in Kentucky, showed that he was not taking probation seriously.” Appellee's Br. p. 13.

[15] Hunt, who was forty-five years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing, blamed his failure to appear at the LCPD as directed on his health issues. These health issues were self-reported, and Hunt presented no evidence beyond his self-serving testimony to prove the severity of his claimed health issues. Hunt alternatively claimed that he had been unable “to find any suitable transportation or any way to get to [his] probation officer.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 29–30. Hunt did “not recall” how many times probation officers from Kentucky had tried to contact him but acknowledged that he had failed to appear at least twice and had either not been home or had not opened the door when Kentucky officials attempted to complete a home visit. Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Hunt further blamed his failure to contact the LCPD to let them know that he was unwell and would not be able to report as directed on the fact that his cellular telephone had broken. Hunt admitted, however, that once he had obtained a working cellular telephone, he “had forgotten all about it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 31. While Hunt claimed that he would comply with the terms of his probation going forward, the trial court was in the best position to judge Hunt's credibility and was free to discredit Hunt's testimony in this regard. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (“[T]he fact finder is best positioned to judge the credibility of [the] witnesses, is free to credit or discredit testimony, and weigh conflicting evidence.”). The fact of the matter here is that given Hunt's multiple failures to appear in both Kentucky and Indiana during the first two months of his probationary period, the trial court did not believe Hunt's claim that he would reform his behavior moving forward.

[16] “Probation is an opportunity that can be squandered.” Gaddis v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1227, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). In this case, Hunt squandered the opportunity given to him to serve his sentence without commitment to the DOC by failing to comply with the most basic term of his probation, that being to appear at the LCPD as directed. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking and terminating Hunt's probation and ordering him to serve six years and eleven days of his previously-suspended sentence in the DOC.

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.