Charlie Annamae Moore, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Charlie Annamae Moore was convicted of murder, a felony, and obstruction of justice, a Level 6 felony. Moore also pleaded guilty to perjury, a Level 6 felony. The jury found that a firearm was used in the commission of the murder. Moore appeals and claims: (1) the trial court erred by denying her motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C); (2) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a prior shooting in which Moore was involved; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support Moore's conviction for murder under a theory of accomplice liability; and (4) accomplice liability cannot support a firearm enhancement. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Moore presents four issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred by denying Moore's motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C).

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a prior shooting in which Moore was involved.

III. Whether the evidence is insufficient to support Moore's conviction for murder under a theory of accomplice liability.

IV. Whether accomplice liability can support a firearm enhancement.

Facts

[3] On the night of August 31, 2021, Moore and several of her friends were at an apartment in Lafayette. Jeremy Dumas came to the apartment complex and asked Moore if she knew where her brother was. The conversation got “heated,” and at some point during the confrontation, Dumas lifted up his shirt to display a handgun. Tr. Vol. IV p. 127. Moore then asked one of her friends, Adam Cheeseman, for a gun, but Cheeseman tried to de-escalate the situation and said, “[l]et's just calm down.” Id. Still, the confrontation escalated to the point that Moore and Dumas began shoving each other, and Dumas “smacked Moore.” Id. at 19. Moore then went to the bathroom, where she placed a call to her boyfriend, Bruce Alexander. Moore told Alexander about her encounter with Dumas and informed Alexander that Dumas had a gun. Moore told Alexander that Dumas had threatened her and asked Alexander to “come handle the situation.” Id. at 129. Alexander also spoke to Cheeseman and questioned why he was not “taking care of this situation.” Id. at 87. Alexander then told Moore that he was on his way to her location.

[4] Before Alexander arrived, Dumas “racked” his handgun, meaning that he loaded a round of ammunition into the firing chamber, at which point Cheeseman did likewise. Id. at 89. Still, Cheeseman attempted to calm Dumas down and told him: “This isn't something worth dying for [or] going to jail for. It's just a girl arguing with you. This isn't something that you need to be concerned about and go to jail for the rest of your life, or you and me ․ dying.” Id. at 90. Eventually, Dumas put his gun away and left.

[5] In the meantime, Alexander called his friend, Willie James, and asked for a ride to the apartment because “someone was messing with” his girlfriend, Moore. Tr. Vol. II p. 227. James drove Alexander toward the apartment complex. On the way, Alexander received a video call from Moore. Moore told Alexander that Dumas had left the apartment complex on a bicycle and told him which direction Dumas was headed. Alexander told James to keep driving. When they encountered Dumas, Alexander rolled down his window and fired multiple shots from a handgun at Dumas. Afterward, Alexander called Moore and told her, “it was handled.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 130.

[6] Officers from the Lafayette Police Department were soon dispatched to the scene of the shooting, where they found Dumas lying on a sidewalk. Dumas had been shot multiple times and was “barely responsive.” Tr. Vol. III p. 16. Emergency medical personnel arrived and rushed Dumas to the hospital, where he died as a result of the gunshot wounds.

[7] Immediately after the shooting, Alexander went to his home. Moore and her friends went to a Walmart store, where they listened to a police radio scanner. Moore also changed her clothes to “throw off” the police. Tr. Vol. IV p. 132. Moore told her friends that they should not talk about the shooting and stated: “if one of us is going down, we're all going down.” Id. Moore eventually fled Lafayette to stay with her father in nearby Attica, where she told her friend, Karlen Landis, that Alexander shot Dumas.

[8] The day after the shooting, James told Alexander to look at the news regarding the shooting. James appeared to be worried and said, “this is bad,” but Alexander told him, “everything's going to be calm. Cool. Just calm down.” Tr. Vol. II p. 242. Landis saw a news story online about the shooting and mentioned it to Moore in a social-media message. Moore seemed not to care and referred to the lyrics of a song that stated, “F*ck your homie he dead [sic].” Tr. Vol. III p. 192. Moore told Landis not to talk to the police about the shooting or Moore would “take [Landis] down.” Id. at 193.

[9] Law enforcement officers found several spent 9 mm ammunition casings on the street where Dumas was shot. The casings collected from the scene of Dumas’ shooting matched those collected from the scene of a shooting that had occurred on August 20, 2021, eleven days before Dumas was shot. A firearms expert determined that the casings collected at both scenes were the same brand and had been fired from the same weapon. Security camera footage of the August 20 shooting showed two people being shot at by someone in a white Chevrolet Cruze. Moore was known to drive a white Chevrolet Cruze. Alexander later admitted to firing the weapon on August 20 and stated that Moore was driving the Cruze when the shots were fired. A subsequent search of the Cruze revealed an empty box of 9 mm ammunition of the same brand used in both shootings and paperwork with Moore's name.

[10] On September 3, 2021, Moore texted Alexander to tell him that the police were at the door of the home where she was staying and indicated that she was going to flee. When Alexander asked Moore if she could get away, she informed him that she was hiding under the sink. Alexander told her to be quiet until the police left. Moore later texted Alexander that she thought the police were gone but that she was now hiding “under the trailer.” Ex. Vol. VI p. 119. Alexander and Moore both subsequently fled the state. Moore went to Chicago and changed the color of her hair. When Moore later traveled back to Lafayette, she rode in the trunk of her friend's vehicle to avoid being seen.

[11] When Moore learned that Landis had spoken to the police about the shooting, she sent Landis a threatening text message. Moore also tracked Landis to a hotel room in Indianapolis and knocked on the door. When Landis did not respond, Moore yelled through the door that “Lafayette wasn't that big,” and that she would find Landis. Tr. Vol. III p. 195. Alexander and Moore also spray-painted the words “whore” and “snitch” on Landis’ car at the hotel. Id.

[12] On May 19, 2022, Moore was indicted by a grand jury on the following charges: murder, a felony; aggravated battery, a Level 5 felony; battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony; battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor; pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony; criminal recklessness, a Level 6 felony; conspiracy to commit attempted murder, a Level 1 felony; conspiracy to commit aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony; conspiracy to commit battery while armed with a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; conspiracy to commit battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony; conspiracy to commit pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony; conspiracy to commit criminal recklessness, a Level 6 felony; obstruction of justice, a Level 6 felony; and perjury, a Level 6 felony. The State also alleged that a firearm was used during the commission of several of the charges, including the murder.

[13] Moore was arrested on these charges on May 20, 2022.¹ At the initial hearing, the trial court set a jury trial date of September 20, 2022. On August 19, 2022, the trial court continued the trial to February 7, 2023, at the joint request of the parties. On January 12, 2023, the trial court again continued the trial to May 16, 2023, and noted that both parties requested the continuance. On April 19, 2023, the parties jointly requested yet another continuance, and the trial was reset for September 19, 2023. On August 25, 2023, the trial court again continued the trial to February 20, 2024, at the parties’ joint request. On January 7, 2024, Moore filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C), which the trial court denied. Moore then unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order denying the motion to discharge.² Thereafter, on August 29, 2024, the trial court continued the jury trial to October 21, 2024, on grounds of court congestion.

[14] A five-day jury trial commenced on October 21, 2024. Moore pleaded guilty to perjury, and the remaining charges proceeded to trial. At trial, the trial court allowed the State to present evidence regarding the August 20 shooting. This included the testimony of one of the detectives, who stated that Alexander admitted to firing the weapon on August 20 and implicated Moore as the driver of the car when the shots were fired. The jury found Moore guilty as charged and also found that a firearm was used as alleged. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered judgments of conviction only as to the counts of murder, obstruction of justice, and perjury. The trial court subsequently sentenced Moore to an aggregate term of sixty-four years in the Department of Correction. Moore now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Motion for Discharge

A. Criminal Rule 4(C)

[15] Moore first claims that the trial court erred by denying her motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C). This rule provides in part:

No person can be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Delays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period. If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed․

Ind. Crim. R. 4(C) (emphasis added).

[16] This rule protects the constitutional right to a speedy trial by placing an affirmative duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year from the later of two dates: (1) the filing of charges; or (2) the arrest. Brown v. State, 725 N.E.2d 823, 825 (Ind. 2000). Criminal Rule 4(C) is “not intended to be a mechanism for providing defendants a technical means to escape prosecution.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ind. 2013). Criminal Rule 4(C) recognizes that some delays are inevitable and allows the one-year period to be extended in certain circumstances based on the actions of either the State, the defendant, or the trial court. Battering v. State, 150 N.E.3d 597, 598 (Ind. 2020). Accordingly, “criminal defendants extend the one-year period ‘by seeking or acquiescing in delay resulting in a later trial date.’ ” Id. (quoting Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. 2009), abrogated in part on other grounds by Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039 (Ind. 2013)).

[17] A defendant has no obligation to remind the State of its duty, or to remind the trial court of the State's duty, to bring the defendant to trial within the period established by Criminal Rule 4(C). Ferman v. State, 232 N.E.3d 133, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Thus, if the trial court, after the one-year period has expired, sets a trial date, the defendant need only file a motion for discharge. Id. But “[a] defendant waives h[er] right to be brought to trial within the [Criminal Rule 4(C)] period by failing to raise a timely objection if, during the period, the trial court schedules trial beyond the limit.” Pelley, 901 N.E.2d at 498-99.

[18] We generally review a trial court's ruling on a motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C) for an abuse of discretion. Battering, 150 N.E.3d at 600. If, however, the relevant facts are undisputed and the issue is a question of law, we review a Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for discharge de novo. Id.

B. The trial court properly denied Moore's motion for discharge.

[19] Moore was charged on May 19, 2022, and arrested on May 20, 2022. It is from the later of these two dates, May 20, 2022, that the one-year time limit of Criminal Rule 4(C) began to run. See Brown, 725 N.E.2d at 825. The trial court initially set the jury trial to begin on September 20, 2022, well within the one-year timeline. The trial date was then reset four times, all at the request of both parties.

[20] We have held that “[w]hen a defendant seeks a continuance, the time between h[er] motion for a continuance and the new trial date is excluded from the one-year time limit.” Mefford v. State, 51 N.E.3d 327, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Todisco v. State, 965 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). “Similarly, if the defendant acquiesces in a delay, such as not objecting to a continuance requested by the State, the one-year time limit is extended by the length of such delay.” Id. Here, Moore did not simply fail to object to the continuances that delayed her trial—she actively sought them.

[21] When Moore filed her motion for discharge on January 7, 2024, 597 days had elapsed since her arrest. But 474 days of that delay was due to the joint motions to reschedule the trial, and 242 days remained in the one-year period to bring Moore to trial.³ Moore's motion for discharge was premature and, therefore, properly denied.⁴ See Bradley v. State, 113 N.E.3d 742, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“ ‘[W]hen a motion for discharge for a Criminal Rule 4 violation is made prematurely, it is properly denied.’ ”) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 487 n.21 (Ind. 2001)), trans. denied.

[22] Moore nevertheless claims that the joint motions to continue should not be counted against her because she had not yet received the grand jury transcripts she had requested in discovery. Our courts have recognized that, “[w]hen a trial court grants a defendant's motion for continuance because of the State's failure to comply with the defendant's discovery requests, the resulting delay is not chargeable to the defendant.” Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1101 (Ind. 2010) (quoted in Wellman v. State, 210 N.E.3d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)).

[23] This “discovery exception” was applied in Wellman. There, the defendant explained in his motions for continuance that he had still not received certain laboratory results from the State in discovery. We held that these delays could not be attributed to the defendant even though he requested the continuances because the continuances were “based on the State's failure to produce his blood test results.” Wellman, 210 N.E.3d at 817; see also Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing denial of defendants’ motion for discharge where, although defendants sought continuances, the delays caused by these requests were due to the State's inability to secure the attendance of its confidential informant for deposition).

[24] Here, however, Moore never identified the delay in obtaining the grand jury transcripts as the reason for the continuances. Consequently, this case is more like Bik v. State, 211 N.E.3d 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). There, the defendant moved for several continuances, but he only specifically cited the State's outstanding discovery as the basis for two of his nine motions for continuance. Id. at 598. We, therefore, held that the motions that did not cite the outstanding discovery issue as the basis for the request were attributable to the defendant, not the State.⁵ Id.

[25] The same is true here, where Moore never cited discovery issues as the reason for any of her joint motions to continue the trial. We, therefore, find that the “discovery exception” is inapplicable and apply the general rule that a defendant is charged with the delays caused by her own requests for a continuance.

[26] Even assuming that the delays caused by the continuances were chargeable to the State, Moore would not prevail. Moore was arrested on May 20, 2022, and, if all the continuances were chargeable to the State based on its failure to produce the grand jury transcripts, this would place the expiration of the one-year deadline at May 20, 2023. But when the trial court, on April 21, 2023 (before the expiration of the one-year deadline), reset the trial date to September 19, 2023 (a date outside the one-year deadline), Moore made no objection. She, therefore, waived her right to be brought to trial within the one-year period of Criminal Rule 4(C). See Pelley, 901 N.E.2d at 498-99.

[27] In short, Moore jointly moved to continue her trial numerous times, and she cannot now complain that she was not brought to trial within one year. And even if the delays caused by the continuances were charged to the State, Moore failed to object to the untimely trial date. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Moore's motion for discharge.

II. Admission of Evidence

[28] Moore next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence regarding the August 20, 2021 shooting that predated Dumas’ murder.

A. Standard of Review

[29] We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013). “The effect of an error on a party's substantial rights turns on the probable impact of the impermissible evidence upon the jury in light of all the other evidence at trial.” Gonzalez v. State, 929 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2010); see also Ind. Trial Rule 61; Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A).

B. Evidence Rule 404(b)

[30] Moore claims that the evidence regarding the August 20 shooting was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 404(b). This rule provides: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be admitted, however, “for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2).

[31] “Evidence Rule 404(b) is designed to prevent the jury from making the ‘forbidden inference’ that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Hardiman v. State, 222 N.E.3d 1049, 1055-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 681 (Ind. 2013)). Accordingly, evidence is excluded under Rule 404(b) only if it is introduced to prove the “forbidden inference” that the defendant has a propensity to commit the charged crime. Hardiman, 222 N.E.3d at 1056 (citing Laird v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)). When evidence is introduced for purposes other than the “forbidden inference” the trial court:

[f]irst ․ must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act. Second, the court must determine that the proponent has sufficient proof that the person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit the act. And third, the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.

Id. (quoting D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009)).

C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the August 20 shooting.

[32] Moore claims that the evidence of the August 20 shooting created the forbidden inference and should not have been admitted. We disagree. Evidence of the earlier shooting was relevant to establish that Alexander had access to the handgun used in Dumas’ murder and to demonstrate the nature of the relationship between Moore and Alexander.

[33] “Evidence that a defendant had access to a weapon of the type used in a crime is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act.” Pickens v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied; see also Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997) (holding that trial court properly admitted evidence regarding how defendant came to have access to the murder weapon, which had allegedly been stolen from the victim of a prior murder, but that details of the prior murder were not properly admitted); Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 960-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that evidence that defendant was previously seen with a steak knife used to murder a fellow partygoer was relevant to a matter other than defendant's propensity to commit the charged act).

[34] Evidence of a prior bad act can also be admissible to show the nature of the relationship between the defendant and another party. See Burkins v. State, 219 N.E.3d 735, 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that evidence that defendant had recently consumed illicit drugs with shooting victims was admissible to show the nature of the relationship between the defendant and victims), trans. denied; see also United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that evidence of defendant's prior check-fraud scheme was admissible to show that he had a criminal relationship with codefendant that led to the crime of robbery).⁶ Such evidence is especially relevant in accomplice liability cases, where the accomplice's relation to or companionship with the principal, and the accomplice's actions before, during, and after the crime, are important considerations. Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1036 (Ind. 2006).

[35] Here, the evidence of the August 20 shooting was admissible to show that Alexander had access to the very same weapon that was used to kill Dumas. Because the weapon used to kill Dumas was never recovered, the August 20 shooting was the only evidence linking Alexander to that weapon. The casings recovered from that incident matched those recovered at Dumas’ shooting, and because Alexander and Moore were clearly identified at the scene of the August 20 shooting, that match provided critical proof that Alexander had access to the weapon used to shoot Dumas.⁷ It was also probative of the nature of the relationship between Moore and Alexander, especially because Moore was charged and convicted as an accomplice to Alexander's acts.⁸

[36] Moore further argues that, to the extent that the evidence of the August 20 shooting was probative for reasons other than the forbidden inference, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Ind. Evidence Rule 403 (providing that a trial court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice[.]”). Again, we disagree.

[37] Evidence of the August 20 shooting provided the key link between Alexander and Moore and the weapon used to kill Dumas. This evidence was highly probative. As to the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence regarding the August 20 shooting simply presented the jury with evidence from which they could draw inferences regarding what Moore knew and how she and Alexander were connected to the murder weapon. The evidence of the August 20 shooting was not unnecessarily inflammatory. The victims of that shooting were not depicted in the photographs. Instead, the photographs of the scene of that shooting simply showed the spent casings and the damaged vehicle.

[38] Finally, Moore argues that the State could have introduced the ballistics evidence regarding the casings found at the scene of the August 20 shooting without also introducing evidence that she was the driver of the car from which the shots were fired. But the August 20 evidence did not merely establish that Alexander had access to the murder weapon; Moore's presence during the August 20 shooting showed her personal knowledge of Alexander's conduct under circumstances similar to his conduct on the night of Dumas’ murder. This evidence was extremely probative of Moore's accomplice liability.

[39] Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the evidence regarding the August 20 shooting was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Ceaser v. State, 964 N.E.2d 911, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that trial courts are afforded “wide latitude” in weighing the probative value against the risk of prejudice for evidence admitted under Rule 404(b)), trans. denied.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[40] Moore next claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her conviction for murder under a theory of accomplice liability. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

[41] Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

B. Murder and Accomplice Liability

[42] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-1(1), a person who “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being ․ commits murder.” Under the accomplice liability statute, “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4.

[43] In discussing the proof required to demonstrate that a person acted as an accomplice, our Supreme Court has explained:

Generally there is no distinction between the criminal liability of an accomplice and a principal, although evidence that the defendant participated in every element of the underlying offense is not necessary to convict a defendant as an accomplice. There is no bright line rule in determining accomplice liability; the particular facts and circumstances of each case determine whether a person was an accomplice. We consider four factors to determine whether a defendant acted as an accomplice: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of crime. That a defendant was present during the commission of a crime and failed to oppose the crime is not sufficient to convict her. But, presence at and acquiescence to a crime, along with other facts and circumstances may be considered.

Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In seeking to convict a defendant as an accomplice, the State need not show that the defendant “ ‘was a party to a preconceived scheme; it must merely demonstrate concerted action or participation in an illegal act.’ ” Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1003-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Rainey v. State, 572 N.E.2d 517, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).

C. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Moore's conviction for murder as an accomplice.

[44] In support of her argument that there was insufficient evidence to establish her accomplice liability, Moore cites Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1999). In that case, Lloyd, who was having an affair with Garland's mother, told Garland that Garland's father had molested a family member and “should be killed.” Id. at 1239. Garland responded, “if that's what it takes, that's what it takes.” Id. Lloyd later suggested that Garland serve as a distraction so Lloyd could shoot Garland's father, but Garland rejected the plan as “crazy.” Id. Lloyd then threatened Garland, warning that he would be “done in” if he told anyone of the plan. Id. That evening, Lloyd arrived outside the family home and spoke with Garland's mother. When Garland went outside, Lloyd told him to remain outside “if [Garland] don't want no part of this [sic].” Id. Lloyd then entered the home and shot and killed Garland's father. Garland remained on the porch and did not intervene. Afterward, Garland and his mother fled and met with Lloyd, who told them what to tell the police. Garland was ultimately convicted as an accomplice to his father's murder.

[45] On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed Garland's conviction, concluding:

Considering the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime, we recognize that the defendant was aware of Lloyd's expressed desire to kill the defendant's father, that he did not report it to police or warn his father, that he was present near the scene of the murder, that he assisted his mother in leaving the scene and concealing potential evidence, and that he initially lied to police regarding his knowledge of the incident. Our finding of insufficient evidence substantially results from the absence of evidence demonstrating that the defendant took any step to aid, induce, or cause the crime, even though the defendant may have known that Lloyd intended to commit murder, and took no action to prevent it.

Id. at 1242 (emphasis added).

[46] Moore argues that the evidence against Garland was greater than the evidence against Moore because Garland knew about the murder plan for multiple days, was physically present at the scene, and made a statement that could be read to have encouraged Lloyd's actions. We disagree. Unlike Garland, where there was no evidence that the defendant affirmatively aided, induced, or caused the murder, here, as explained below, there was such evidence.

[47] We acknowledge that Moore was not physically present at the scene of the shooting. But she was on a live video call with Alexander at the time of the shooting. As to her companionship, Moore was Alexander's girlfriend; she initially contacted Alexander to complain about Dumas’ behavior; and she asked him to “handle the situation” with Dumas. Tr. Vol. IV p. 129. Moore did more than merely not oppose the commission of the crime, as was the case in Garland. Instead, she actively asked Alexander to take action against Dumas and directed Alexander to Dumas’ location. Given her involvement in the August 20 shooting, the jury could reasonably conclude that this was a request for Alexander to shoot Dumas.

[48] The factor that most heavily favors Moore's conviction is her behavior before, during, and after Dumas’ murder. Before the shooting, Moore attempted to obtain a gun from Cheeseman during her argument with Dumas. When Cheeseman refused, Moore called Alexander, informed him of her altercation with Dumas, told him Dumas was armed, and asked him to come “handle the situation.” Id. During the commission of the crime, Moore remained on the live video call with Alexander and told him that Dumas was on a bicycle heading toward a specific street. After the shooting, Moore changed her clothes, threatened and intimidated witnesses, actively hid when the police attempted to contact her, and fled the state.

[49] From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Moore aided, induced, and/or caused Dumas’ murder. See Watson v. State, 999 N.E.2d 968, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming defendant's conviction for murder as an accomplice where defendant instigated the killing by actively recruiting the shooters and directing them to the victim, even though defendant was not physically present when the shooting occurred). The evidence is, thus, sufficient to sustain Moore's conviction for murder.

IV. Firearm enhancement

[50] Lastly, Moore claims that the firearm enhancement is inapplicable to her because Alexander, not Moore, used a firearm during the commission of the offense. We disagree.

A. Firearm enhancement and Standard of Review

[51] The firearm enhancement statute permits the State to seek an additional fixed term of imprisonment for a defendant convicted of a qualifying offense if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(d). “If the [fact-finder] makes such a finding, then the trial court “may sentence the person to an additional fixed term of imprisonment of between five (5) years and twenty (20) years.” Id. § 11(g). This statute applies to specific qualifying offenses, including murder. Id. § 11(b)(1).

[52] To the extent that Moore claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the firearm enhancement, we apply our highly deferential standard of review to such sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims. See Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review to a claim that evidence did not support the imposition of firearm enhancement), trans. denied. To the extent that Moore bases her claim on the interpretation of the firearm enhancement statute, we review such claims de novo. See Shorter v. State, 144 N.E.3d 829, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (applying a de novo standard to claims regarding the interpretation of the firearm enhancement statute).

B. The firearm enhancement was properly applied to Moore.

[53] Moore claims that the accomplice liability statute applies only to “offenses,” not to sentencing enhancements. Because the firearm enhancement is not itself an “offense,” Moore argues that accomplice liability cannot apply. We agree with Moore that the firearm enhancement is not a separate offense. See, e.g., Cooper, 940 N.E.2d at 1215 (holding that “sentencing enhancements are not offenses for double jeopardy purposes” and that the firearm enhancement “only prescribes an additional penalty for felonies that are committed with the use of a firearm.”) (emphasis in original). But the question here is not whether the firearm enhancement is an “offense” but whether an accomplice to murder is responsible for the manner in which the principal committed the crime. Our case law answers this question in the affirmative.

[54] We have previously held that an accomplice's sentence can be enhanced by the firearm enhancement. See Parker v. State, 754 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“The fact that Parker was not the actual shooter is irrelevant under [the firearm enhancement] statute.”). We further note that an accomplice is responsible for the actions of the principal. See Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (Ind. 1999) (“In Indiana, there is no distinction between the responsibility of a principal and an accomplice.”). Indeed, “[u]nder an accomplice liability theory, ‘the evidence need not show that the accomplice personally participated in the commission of each element of a particular offense.’ ” Kendall v. State, 790 N.E.2d 122, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Cohen v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1168, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied). Instead, “[a]ccomplice liability ‘applies to the contemplated offense and all acts that are a probable and natural consequence of the concerted action.’ ” Id. (quoting Wieland v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (Ind. 2000)).

[55] Thus, when Moore aided, induced, and/or caused Alexander to shoot Dumas, Moore was responsible for both the underlying crime of murder and the manner in which that murder was committed, i.e., with a firearm. Because there is sufficient evidence to support Moore's conviction for murder under a theory of accomplice liability, there is also sufficient evidence to support application of the firearm enhancement to Moore's sentence based on Alexander's use of a firearm during the commission of the murder. See Parker, 754 N.E.2d at 619.⁹

Conclusion

[56] The trial court did not err by denying Moore's motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C), as Moore actively sought the continuances of her trial, and, if the delays caused by the continuances were chargeable to the State, Moore waived her Criminal Rule 4(C) claim by failing to object when the trial court set the trial date outside the one-year deadline. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the August 20 shooting, as this evidence was not admitted to prove the “forbidden inference.” The State presented sufficient evidence to support Moore's conviction for murder under a theory of accomplice liability, and the firearm enhancement was properly applied to Moore's conviction for murder as an accomplice. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment.

[57] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The warrant return indicates that Moore was arrested on May 20, 2022, but the return was not entered into the chronological case summary until May 24, 2022.

2.   The trial court granted Moore's request to certify, for purposes of interlocutory appeal, the order denying the motion for discharge, but we declined to accept interlocutory jurisdiction.

3.   The 123 days that elapsed between Moore's arrest and the initial trial date are chargeable to the State.

4.   Moore notes that the State did not invoke Criminal Rule 4(D), which permits the State to seek a ninety-day extension if a defendant files a motion for discharge. Because Moore's motion for discharge was premature, Criminal Rule 4(D) was never triggered, and the State did not need to avail itself of this rule.

5.   Moore claims that the discovery exception should apply because she was legally prohibited from obtaining the grand jury transcripts herself. See Ind. Code § 35-34-2-10(b) (providing that grand jury transcripts may be produced only for the official use of the prosecuting attorney or upon order of the court). Moore, therefore, contends that, unlike most discovery disputes, she had no mechanism to compel production of the grand jury transcripts and was reliant on the State and the court to do so. But the relevant question under the discovery exception is not whether the discovery was exclusively within the State's control but whether the defendant cited the outstanding discovery as the basis for seeking the continuance. See Bik, 211 N.E.3d at 598. Here, the four joint motions to continue made no mention of the outstanding grand jury transcripts as the reason for requesting the continuance. Because Moore did not tie her continuance requests to the lack of the transcripts, the delays caused by those continuances are attributable to her despite her limited access to the grand jury transcripts.

6.   Although a federal court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is not binding upon us, “federal case law interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence may be of some utility” due to the similarity between the Indiana Rules of Evidence and their federal counterparts. Griffith v. State, 31 N.E.3d 965, 969 (Ind. 2015).

7.   In her reply brief, Moore claims that the question of her access to the firearm, as opposed to Alexander's access, was irrelevant. But Moore was charged as an accomplice, and Alexander's access to the weapon, and Moore's knowledge of Alexander's access to this weapon, was highly relevant.

8.   Moore claims that her relationship with Alexander was undisputed. The evidence of the August 20 shooting may not have been relevant to show the nature of Moore's romantic relationship with Alexander, but it was relevant to show that she knew what Alexander was likely to do when she asked him to “handle the situation” with Dumas. Tr. Vol. IV p. 129.

9.   We acknowledge that, in Parker, the defendant provided the firearm to the principal. But Parker nevertheless held that “[t]he fact that Parker was not the actual shooter is irrelevant under this statute.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Pack v. State, 486 N.E.2d 994, 995 (Ind. 1985) (affirming defendant's conviction for armed robbery even though defendant did not hold the firearm because the acts of one accomplice are imputed to the other accomplices and it was, therefore, “inconsequential” that defendant did not actually hold the weapon).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.