Teddian Jackson, et al. Appellants-Plaintiffs v. Cintas Corporation No. 2 and Brian Treasure, Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Lake Superior Court granted Cintas Corporation No. 2's and Brian Treasure's (collectively, “Cintas”) Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Teddian Jackson's pro se complaint alleging trespass, assault, libel, and slander. Jackson appeals and argues that he pleaded sufficient facts to support his claims against Cintas, and, therefore, the trial court erred when it granted the motion to dismiss.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Jackson owns and operates Montego Bay Restaurant Group LLC, which is in Hobart and housed in a building also owned by Jackson. The corporation leases its restaurant space from Jackson. Jackson contracted with Cintas for uniform and equipment rental and cleaning supplies for Montego Bay Grille, which is operated by Montego Bay Restaurant Group LLC. Montego Bay Grille was open Tuesdays through Saturdays and its operating hours ranged from 3:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, p. 14.

[4] On May 8, Jackson and Montego Bay Restaurant Group, LLC, d/b/a Montego Bay Grille, filed a complaint against Cintas. In the complaint, Jackson alleged that Montego Bay Grille allowed a Cintas service technician to access its premises every other Wednesday between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. “Cintas ha[d] specific and narrow restrictions for entry and service, and the license to access the property has always been understood as such over the eight-year period and has always been adhered to.” Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 15-16. Jackson further alleged that he never authorized Cintas to access the premises on Thursdays because he desired to limit the disturbances to Montego Bay Grille's business operations. Id. at 16. Although the service technician originally collected payment for Cintas's services from Jackson, Cintas began to require online payment in 2023. Id. at 17.

[5] On some unspecified date prior to April 24, 2025, Jackson became delinquent on the Cintas account. Jackson communicated with Cintas's representatives about the delinquency and the possible renewal of Montego Bay Grille's service contract with Cintas. Jackson paid a significant sum toward the delinquency, and he informed the Cintas service technician that the remaining balance would be paid before the service due in May. Jackson also informed Cintas that he was looking at other vendors in lieu of renewing the contract with Cintas. Id. at 20.

[6] Jackson believed that the amount owed to Cintas on April 24 was $358.33. At approximately 3:20 p.m. that Thursday, two men in Cintas uniforms entered Jackson's office at Montego Bay Grille and demanded that Jackson pay an invoice totaling more than $700 or Cintas would not continue to service Montego Bay Grille's account. Id. at 22. Jackson told the Cintas employees to leave and that they did not need to service the account. According to Jackson, one of the Cintas employees insisted that Jackson pay the invoice, and, in response, Jackson again insisted that they leave the restaurant. Id. Jackson also stated that there was no additional service scheduled until May and that he had made payment arrangements with his regular service technician. Id. at 22-23. Jackson described one of the Cintas employees as “stern” and “irate.” Id.

[7] The Cintas employees left Jackson's office, and Jackson believed that they had left the restaurant premises. However, a restaurant employee entered Jackson's office minutes later and told him that the Cintas employees “were taking all the stuff saying you need to pay your bill.” Id. at 23. Jackson left his office and found the Cintas employees collecting Cintas equipment and products. Jackson retrieved mops and a bag of cleaning items from one of the Cintas employees. The other Cintas employee and Jackson began arguing over the items. The three men were standing near the back door of the restaurant when Jackson opened the back door and told the Cintas employees to leave. Id. at 24. One Cintas employee exited the premises, but the other insisted on retrieving Cintas's property. Id. Once again, Jackson told the Cintas employee to leave. The employee exited the building but continued to state that he would return to collect Cintas's property. Id. He also stated to Jackson, “you need to pay your bill.” Id. The next day, Jackson received an email from Cintas Service manager Brian Treasure. The email terminated Cintas's contract with Montego Bay Grille. Id. at 26.

[8] Relevant to this appeal, Jackson's original complaint argued that Cintas, through its employees, had committed trespass, assault, libel, and slander against Montego Bay Grille and Jackson. Jackson filed the complaint pro se, and Montego Bay Restaurant Group, LLC did not appear by an attorney, which is required by Indiana Code section 34-9-1-1.¹ For this reason, Cintas filed a motion to strike the complaint.

[9] On July 15, Jackson filed an amended complaint. That complaint named only Jackson as the plaintiff. The factual assertions of the original and amended complaints are nearly identical and likewise claimed that Cintas's employees committed trespass, assault, libel, and slander. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 17-37. In response, Cintas filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

[10] After holding a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued an order granting Cintas's motion to dismiss. In its order, issued on September 30, the court concluded that the facts pleaded in Jackson's amended complaint did not support a claim of civil trespass as to Jackson as an employee of Montego Bay Grille, which company was the real party in interest to Jackson's claims, that the facts as pleaded did not support the libel and slander claims because no “false statement was uttered or published[,]” and facts pleaded were “devoid of any factual allegations” to support a claim of assault. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 13-14. Therefore, the trial court granted Cintas's motion to dismiss Jackson's trespass, libel, slander, and assault claims. The court's order also stated that “[t]his Order constitutes a final appealable Order and no cause for delay exists.” Id. at 15.

[11] Jackson now appeals pro se.

Standard of Review

[12] The trial court dismissed Jackson's amended complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6). We apply a de novo standard when we review a trial court's order granting a Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. See Crystal Valley Sales, Inc. v. Anderson, 22 N.E.3d 646, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief. See Kitco, Inc. v. Corp. for Gen. Trade, 706 N.E.2d 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, while we do not test the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regards to their adequacy to provide recovery, we do test their sufficiency with regards to whether or not they have stated some factual scenario in which a legally actionable injury has occurred.

A court should “accept[ ] as true the facts alleged in the complaint,” Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), and should not only “consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but also “draw every reasonable inference in favor of [the non-moving] party.” Newman v. Deiter, 702 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). However, a court need not accept as true “allegations that are contradicted by other allegations or exhibits attached to or incorporated in the pleading.” Morgan Asset Holding Corp. v. CoBank, ACB, 736 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted).

Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 134-35 (Ind. 2006). Finally, “a complaint does not fail to state a claim merely because a meritorious defense may be available. But a plaintiff may plead itself out of court if its complaint alleges, and thus admits, the essential elements of a defense.” Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. 2017).

The facts, as pleaded in Jackson's complaint, do not establish that Cintas trespassed on Jackson's property.

[13] To survive a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss on his trespass claim, Jackson had to plead facts to establish that he possessed the land when the alleged trespass occurred and that the trespassing defendant entered the land without a legal right to do so. Samples v. Wilson, 12 N.E.3d 946, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[14] In his amended complaint, Jackson alleged that Montego Bay Restaurant Group LLC “is engaged in the hospitality services, by way of restaurant operations; dba, Montego Bay Grille. The entity is wholly owned by” Jackson. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 43. Jackson also alleged that he was a paid employee of Montego Bay Grille and the legal owner of the property “leased to Montego Bay Grille to operate their business activities as a restaurant.” Id. at 44. Although the contract was not attached to his complaint, Jackson alleged that Montego Bay Grille contracted with Cintas to provide products and services on a bi-weekly basis. Id. at 45. Jackson further alleged that Montego Bay Grille “extended a limited license to Cintas (through a service technician)” that allowed the service technician to access the premises on Wednesdays between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. Id.

[15] Cintas argues, and the trial court agreed, that the alleged trespass occurred on a property controlled and operated by Montego Bay Grille, and the Cintas employees were on the premises to collect a debt owed to it by Montego Bay Grille; therefore, Montego Bay Grille is the real party in interest for the trespass claim, not Jackson. Indiana Trial Rule 17(a) requires that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” The rule further provides in pertinent part:

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time after objection has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify the action, or to be joined or substituted in the action. Such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced initially in the name of the real party in interest.

T.R. 17(b). “[W]hen the real party in interest does not ratify, substitute or join the action, the remedy for an action brought by a party other than the real party in interest is dismissal.” E & L Rental Equip., Inc. v. Gifford, 744 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

[16] Jackson named Montego Bay Grille as a party in his initial complaint. After the trial court informed him that Indiana law requires corporations to be represented by an attorney,² Jackson filed his amended complaint, which named only Jackson as the plaintiff. We agree that Montego Bay Grille is the real party in interest on the trespass claim, as the business controlled and operated the premises when the alleged trespass occurred, and, therefore, the trespass claim must be dismissed.

[17] In the alternative, Cintas argued that, if Jackson is a proper party as the owner and landlord of the underlying premises,³ the trespass claim could be dismissed because Montego Bay Grille was open to the public, and, therefore, the Cintas employees had permission or a legal right to enter the premises.⁴ Moreover, Jackson's complaint established that Cintas had a contractual relationship with Montego Bay Grille, and that the restaurant breached that contract when it failed to pay Cintas the full amount owed for their services. These facts, which were pleaded by Jackson, establish that the Cintas employees had a legal right to enter the premises to attempt to collect payment and/or retrieve Cintas's property.

Jackson cannot establish a claim of libel or slander where the facts, as pleaded, establish that the Cintas employees’ statements were true.

[18] “False defamatory words, if written and published, constitute a libel; if spoken, a slander.” Hall v. Shaw, 147 N.E.3d 394, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Branaman v. Hinkle, 137 Ind. 496, 502, 37 N.E. 546, 548 (1894) (citation omitted)), trans. denied. “In an action for libel or slander, it is sufficient to state generally that the defamatory matter published or spoken was about the plaintiff. If the defendant denies the allegation, the plaintiff must prove at trial the facts showing that the defamatory matter was published or spoken about the plaintiff.” See Ind. Code § 34-15-1-1. Moreover, truth is a complete defense to defamation. E.g., Melton v. Ousley, 925 N.E.2d 430, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); see also Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 457 (Ind. 1999).

[19] In his amended complaint, Jackson claimed that, on April 24, the Cintas employees told Jackson within earshot of other employees that he needed to pay his bill. Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 53-54. He also alleged that he received an email from Cintas employee Brian Treasure concerning the balance owed to Cintas.⁵ Jackson pleaded facts in his complaint establishing that he owed Cintas over $350 on April 24 and that he had been delinquent in payments on the Montego Bay Grille service contract with Cintas. Because the statements are true, Jackson did not plead sufficient facts in his complaint that would establish that he would be entitled to relief for his libel and/or slander claims.

Jackson did not plead sufficient facts to establish a claim of assault.

[20] A civil claim for assault “is effectuated when one acts intending to cause an imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with another person.” Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ind. 2008) (citing Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. 1991)).

It is the right to be free from the apprehension of a battery which is protected by the tort action which we call an assault. As this Court held approximately 90 years ago in Kline v. Kline (1901), 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9, an assault constitutes “a touching of the mind, if not of the body.” Because it is a touching of the mind, as opposed to the body, the damages which are recoverable for an assault are damages for mental trauma and distress. “Any act of such a nature as to excite an apprehension of a battery may constitute an assault. It is an assault to shake a fist under another's nose, to aim or strike at him with a weapon, or to hold it in a threatening position, to rise or advance to strike another, to surround him with a display of force ․” W. Prosser & J. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts § 10 (5th ed. 1984). Additionally, the apprehension must be one which would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person. Id. Finally, the tort is complete with the invasion of the plaintiff's mental peace.

Cullison, 570 N.E.2d at 30.

[21] Jackson pleaded the following facts: 1) that, during his interaction with the Cintas employees, one of the two employees had a “stern facial expression”; 2) that Jackson asked the employees to leave but they remained on the premises attempting to collect Cintas property and payment; 3) when Jackson refused to pay the invoice, the employee with the stern facial expression “was still in an irate manner” due to Jackson's noncompliance; 4) while standing inside “the narrow passageway” leading to the back door of the restaurant, Jackson and the Cintas employee argued whether the employee would be removing Cintas property from the premises; 5) after Jackson opened the back door, one Cintas employee exited the building but the stern Cintas employee insisted on taking the Cintas property with him; and 6) after Jackson repeated his demand that the employee leave the premises, the employee did so, but said he would return to get the property and reminded Jackson that he needed to pay his bill. Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 51-54.

[22] Jackson's complaint describes interactions with the Cintas employees that were unpleasant and that one of the two employees was angry with Jackson. However, none of the facts, as pleaded, rises to the level of assault. Jackson has not alleged any facts to establish that the Cintas employees verbally or physically threatened him. The Cintas employee's stated intention to remove Cintas property in Jackson's possession or the floor mat Jackson was standing on was not a threat to batter Jackson. Cf. Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 794 (concluding that the plaintiff proved that the defendant committed assault because the defendant, who was angry over a workplace dispute, “aggressively and rapidly advanced on the plaintiff with clenched fists, piercing eyes, beet-red face, popping veins, and screaming and swearing at him” causing the plaintiff to believe that the defendant intended to hit him, and as the defendant stormed past the plaintiff he stated “you're finished, you're history”). For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it dismissed Jackson's assault claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Conclusion

[23] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it granted Cintas's Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jackson also failed to initially serve a summons on Cintas. After the court issued an order noting Jackson's failure to comply with the Trial Rules, a summons was served on Cintas on May 29.

2.   “A corporation and any organization required to make application to the secretary of state under IC 25-11-1-3 must appear by attorney in all cases.” See Ind. Code § 34-9-1-1.

3.   “Landlords do have a sufficient possessory interest in the common areas of their properties to maintain an action for trespass to those areas.” Aberdeen Apartments v. Cary Campbell Realty Alliance, Inc., 820 N.E.2d 158, 167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

4.   As we noted in the fact section, in his complaint, Jackson stated that the alleged trespass occurred on a Thursday at approximately 3:20 p.m., which was during Montego Bay Grille's operating hours.

5.   Cintas and Jackson disagreed whether the balance owed was $358.33 or $716.66, but that does not change our analysis. Jackson admitted that he owed money to Cintas and he has not pleaded any facts that would establish that Cintas's claim that he owed over $700, if false, was made with actual malice. A plaintiff is also required to plead actual malice to succeed on a defamation claim, and the alleged defamatory statements must be specifically stated in the complaint. Ali v. Alliance Home Health Care, 53 N.E.3d 420, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); Haegert v. McMullan, 953 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Moreover, in his amended complaint, Jackson only speculates that the statements in the email were published to others. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 61 (alleging that “Jackson has strong reasons to believe that said communications were distributed to others ․”); see also Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v. Bandido's, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 456 (Ind. 1999) (explaining that “[a]ctual malice exists when the defendant publishes a defamatory statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”) (emphasis added and quotation omitted).

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.