V.P., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Marion Superior Court adjudicated V.P. a delinquent child for dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. V.P. appeals the adjudication and argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it admitted a handgun into evidence. Specifically, V.P. argues that, although the trial court properly suppressed his statement to law enforcement officers taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, his statement led to the discovery of the handgun.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 6, 2025, law enforcement officers were dispatched to a residence on Catherwood Avenue in Indianapolis after receiving a report that there was a domestic disturbance involving a weapon. When Officer Mitchell Hubner arrived at the address, he saw “a male with a ski mask on standing in the doorway behind a storm door with a firearm in his right hand.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 70. He then saw the male shut the front door. While Officer Hubner was waiting for assisting law enforcement officers to arrive, the male remained in the home. A woman, later identified as V.P.’s mother, walked up to the home and entered the residence after ignoring the officers’ requests that she remain outside. Shortly thereafter, the male exited the residence with the ski mask, and he was identified as fifteen-year-old V.P. Id. at 71-72. Assisting law enforcement officers secured V.P. after he had exited the home. Id. at 30. When V.P. was taken into custody and searched, an officer found a holster on his person.

[4] The owner of the residence, V.P.’s great grandmother, allowed law enforcement officers to enter the home.¹ She told the officers that, when the law enforcement officers arrived at her home, V.P. ran into his bedroom. Id. at 45-46. V.P.’s great grandmother gave the officers permission to search V.P.’s bedroom. Id. at 32, 45-46. Officer David Carney, V.P.’s uncle, V.P.’s great grandmother, and a second officer began looking for the handgun in V.P.’s bedroom. Shortly after they entered V.P.’s bedroom, the assisting officer radioed to an officer who was outside the home with V.P. to ask V.P. where the handgun was located. V.P. stated that the handgun was “in the closet, on a shelf.” Id. at 39. Officer Carney searched the closet but did not find a handgun. Thereafter, V.P.’s uncle found the gun on top of a tall dresser with a shelf unit in V.P.’s bedroom. Id. at 41-42, 87. He then gave the gun to the officers.

[5] The next day, the State filed a petition alleging that V.P. was a delinquent child for committing intimidation, a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult, and dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. The juvenile court held the delinquency fact-finding hearing on May 14, 2025. The court first addressed V.P.’s motion to suppress the firearm found in his bedroom. The State conceded that V.P.’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated, and the juvenile court suppressed V.P.’s statements to the police about the location of the handgun. V.P. argued that the handgun was discovered because of his statements to the officers, and, therefore, the handgun should be suppressed as well under the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree. He also argued that the gun should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment because he did not consent to the search of his bedroom. The juvenile court denied his motion to suppress the handgun and later admitted it into evidence over V.P.’s objection.

[6] After the close of evidence, the State moved to dismiss the intimidation allegation. The juvenile court granted that motion. The court then entered a true finding as to the dangerous possession of a firearm allegation and adjudicated V.P. a delinquent child. The court placed V.P. on probation and ordered him to complete a gun violence prevention program and a home-based case work program.

[7] V.P. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] V.P. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it admitted the handgun into evidence. The juvenile court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission of evidence. J.B. v. State, 205 N.E.3d 244, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Generally, we review the juvenile court's ruling for an abuse of discretion, and we reverse only where it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). However, when a challenge to the admission of evidence is predicated on constitutional law, we review the claim de novo. C.J. v. State, 141 N.E.3d 830, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[9] V.P. argues that his suppressed statement led law enforcement officers to the handgun's location in his bedroom, and, therefore, the handgun should have been excluded from evidence during the factfinding hearing. The State does not directly respond to V.P.’s argument. Instead, the State asserts the law enforcement officers had knowledge that the handgun was reasonably likely to be found in V.P.’s bedroom before officers asked V.P. where the gun was located in the bedroom, and the officers properly executed the search of V.P.’s bedroom because the homeowner consented to the search; therefore, the handgun was properly admitted during the fact-finding hearing. We agree with the State.²

[10] In this case, when Officer Hubner arrived at the residence, he saw “a male with a ski mask standing in the doorway behind a storm door with a firearm in his right hand.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 70. The officer saw the male wearing the ski mask, who was later identified as V.P., shut the front door of the residence. Id. A few minutes later, V.P. complied with the officers’ demands to exit the house.³ Id. at 76. While other officers remained outside the home and took V.P. into custody, Officer David Carney entered the home and spoke to the homeowner, V.P.’s great grandmother. Id. at 30. She told Officer Carney that if there was a gun in the house, she wanted the officers to find it. Id. at 45. She also told the officer that V.P. ran to his bedroom after the officers saw him shut the front door. Id. at 45-46.

[11] The law enforcement officers then conducted a warrantless search of V.P.’s bedroom but with the great grandmother's consent to the search. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ․” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable “subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (citations omitted).

[12] A voluntary and knowing consent to search is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973); Stallings v. State, 508 N.E.2d 550, 552 (Ind. 1987)). “Authority to consent to a search can be either apparent or actual.” Id. (quoting Gado v. State, 882 N.E.2d 827, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied). “Actual authority requires a sufficient relationship to or mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access to or control of the property for most purposes.” Id. at 999-1000 (citing Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 677 (Ind. 2005)).

[13] Here, the officers obtained V.P.’s great grandmother's consent to search V.P.’s bedroom. She had control over the home and there is nothing in the record to suggest that she did not have access to his bedroom. “The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)). Moreover, in R.B. v. State, 43 N.E.3d 648, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), our court acknowledged that “parents have unilateral authority over and access to the home” and the juvenile's mother's consent supported the warrantless search of the juvenile's bedroom. Id. V.P.’s great grandmother enjoyed the same rights to her home as the mother in R.B.

[14] After V.P.’s great grandmother consented to the search, Officer Carney, an assisting officer, the great grandmother, and V.P.’s uncle proceeded to the bedroom and began to search for the gun. At that point, one of the officers radioed to the officer standing outside with V.P. and requested that V.P. provide the location of the gun. But the gun, which was found by V.P.’s uncle, was not found in the location provided by V.P.⁴

[15] Under these facts and circumstances, the law enforcement officers reasonably believed that the gun they saw in V.P.’s possession would be found in his bedroom prior to asking V.P. for the gun's specific location. And V.P.’s statement, which was properly suppressed, did not lead to the discovery of the handgun. We therefore agree with the State that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the handgun into evidence.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   V.P. lived with his great grandmother at her home on Catherwood Avenue. V.P.’s mother lived in the home until some date in February 2025. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 46-47, 56-57.

2.   In his brief, V.P. argues that his statement concerning the handgun's location in response to the officer's question was not a voluntary statement, and therefore, the United States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) is inapplicable in this case. In Patane, the Court held that while a Miranda violation requires suppression of statements obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, such a violation does not require suppression of physical evidence obtained from a defendant's voluntary statements to law enforcement officers. Id. at 636-67. Our court has relied on Patane to hold that physical evidence obtained as the result of voluntary statements given to law enforcement officers without adequate Miranda warnings may be admitted at trial. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 191 N.E.3d 878, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.V.P. addresses the Patane and Jones holdings in his brief but argues that there is no evidence in the record establishing that his statement to the officer concerning the handgun's location was voluntary. In the alternative, he argues that his statement was not voluntary because juveniles are entitled to greater protections before they are subject to custodial interrogations. See J.Q.R. v. State, 252 N.E.3d 919, 925 (Ind. 2025); Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1. We appreciate V.P.’s thought-provoking argument as it is certainly not without merit. But because V.P.’s suppressed statement did not lead to the handgun's location and seizure, it is an issue that must be left for another day.

3.   After V.P. complied with the officers’ demands to exit the home, he was taken into custody, and during the custodial search, officers discovered an empty holster on his person. On the record before us, it is not known whether the officers in the house who searched the bedroom knew that the custodial search revealed that V.P. had a holster on his person. Under the collective knowledge doctrine, “an officer's personal knowledge of facts that establish the necessary suspicion may be imputed to another officer.” Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 876 (Ind. 2022). But the knowledge must be conveyed to the investigating officer before the search, and the “collective knowledge cannot be relied upon after the fact.” See State v. M.J.M, 837 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

4.   V.P. argues that the tall dresser with a shelf unit, where the gun was found, could be considered a closet, which is where he said the gun would be found. The dresser or armoire was described as a piece of furniture but a closet is commonly understood as a recessed area of a room with a concealed opening.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.