Kenneth Schrank, Appellant-Petitioner v. Megan Anderson, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kenneth Schrank (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order establishing his custody, parenting time, and child support over his minor child, K.S. (“Child”). Father raises five issues for our review, which we restate as the following eight issues:

1. Whether Father's arguments on appeal are foreclosed from our review based on his motion to correct error in the trial court.

2. Whether the trial court's award of primary physical custody over Child to Megan Anderson (“Mother”) is clearly erroneous.

3. Whether Mother unnecessarily delayed the paternity proceedings.

4. Whether purportedly improper findings by the trial court require reversal.

5. Whether the trial court's determination of legal custody over Child is clearly erroneous.

6. Whether the trial court's award of the annual tax exemption for a dependent to Mother is clearly erroneous.

7. Whether the trial court's determination of child support is clearly erroneous.

8. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay a portion of Mother's reasonable attorney's fees.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In October 2019, Mother gave birth to Child, and Father established his paternity over Child thereafter. Child was born with a rare genetic disorder that requires her to attend weekly behavioral and occupational therapy appointments and also requires specialized medical treatment. Child also has “significant difficulty with change.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 24.

[4] In a preliminary order, the trial court initially awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody over Child to Mother. Later, the parties agreed that they would “provisionally share joint legal custody” over Child, but, “in the event of disagreement” between them, Mother would be “the final decision maker.” Id. at 96. The parties also agreed for Child to attend a certain school system in Indianapolis. In the summer of 2025 before the commencement of the school year, Mother and Father agreed that Child would spend one week with each parent on a rotating basis.

[5] The court held a final hearing in August to determine custody, parenting time, and support for Child. At that hearing, Mother testified that she is heavily involved in Child's education at Child's elementary school as well as Child's therapy and medical appointments. She testified that Child “has developed friendships with children from daycare and preschool, and those friends” will be attending Child's elementary school with her. Id. at 26. Mother further testified that, given Child's difficulty with change, teachers from her pre-K program have assisted Child with transitioning to her elementary school. Id.

[6] Father and his live-in girlfriend, Heather Elliot, confirmed that Father was rarely involved in Child's education, therapy, and medical appointments, and Heather had in fact “assumed the majority of Father's responsibilities as a parent” over Child. Id. at 28. Further, while Father testified that he wished for Child to attend a different elementary school, he presented no evidence as to how Child would handle such a change or why such a change would be in Child's best interests. Father's main reason for wanting the change was for his own convenience. See id. at 27.

[7] The parties also testified regarding other dependents who live with them. Mother testified that, in addition to Child, she has two other children who live with her, one of whom has “severe autism,” as well as her seventy-four-year-old mother. Id. at 25. Because of the demands from Mother's severely autistic child, Mother is “unable to work a traditional job.” Id. Similarly, Father and Heather live together with Heather's sixty-one-year-old mother, who is legally blind. Father and Heather also have four children who live with them. At Mother's home, Child has her own room; at Father's, Child shares a bed with another child.

[8] Father sought to continue the summer 2025 week-on, week-off custody arrangement into Child's academic year. The court found that Father's request was “not in the best interests of the Child” and instead ordered the parties’ provisional custody arrangement—where Mother had physical custody over Child subject to Father's “reasonable parenting time”—to be in Child's best interests. Id. at 29. The court then made clear that Father's parenting time would be “overnights every other weekend ․ with an additional overnight every Wednesday” unless the parties agreed otherwise. Id. The court further ordered the parties to have joint legal custody over Child, but, in the event they are unable to reach an agreement on Child's best interests, “Mother shall make the final decision.” Id.

[9] With respect to support, the court found that Father had failed to present evidence showing any amounts actually spent on prior-born children who live with him, but the court did consider costs expended by each parent on after-born children. After considering each party's weekly income, the court ordered Father to pay Mother $84 per week in child support. The court further found that “Mother shall be entitled to claim the [C]hild for income tax purposes every year” and that “[t]here is no evidence to support a finding that Father should be entitled to claim the [C]hild as a dependent for income tax purposes.” Id. at 30. Finally, the court found that Mother was “the prevailing party in this matter” and ordered Father to pay $4,000 to Mother for her reasonable attorney's fees. Id. at 31. The court also found that “Father's testimony lacks credibility ․” Id. at 28.

[10] After the trial court denied Father's ensuing motion to correct error, this appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[11] Father appeals the trial court's order on custody, parenting time, and child support. The trial court's order is supported by findings of fact and conclusions thereon. We will not set aside such a judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. 2012). Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment, and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Id. at 953-54. Due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and we will not reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

1. Father's arguments were not foreclosed by his motion to correct error.

[12] Before proceeding to the merits of Father's arguments on appeal, we first address Mother's contention that Father waived all of his arguments for appellate review because he filed a motion to correct error in the trial court but did not identify his appellate issues in that motion. Indiana Trial Rule 59(A) provides:

A Motion to Correct Error is not a prerequisite for appeal, except when a party seeks to address:

(1) Newly discovered material evidence, including alleged jury misconduct, capable of production within thirty (30) days of final judgment which, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered and produced at trial; or

(2) A claim that a jury verdict is excessive or inadequate.

All other issues and grounds for appeal appropriately preserved during trial may be initially addressed in the appellate brief.

(Emphasis added.)

[13] That language is clear. Aside from the Rule's two enumerated exceptions, a party may initially raise in his or her appellate brief any issues that were appropriately preserved during trial. And Father's issues on appeal do not involve newly discovered evidence or a claim of an excessive or inadequate jury verdict. Thus, his arguments on appeal are not foreclosed by his motion to correct error.

2. The trial court's order on physical custody is not clearly erroneous.

[14] We thus turn to Father's first argument on appeal, namely, whether the trial court's order to award primary physical custody over Child to Mother is clearly erroneous. Father, relying exclusively on his testimony and Heather's testimony, argues that the summer 2025 arrangement—where Child spent one week with one parent and the next week with the other—should continue into Child's academic year. But Father's argument is merely a request for our Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Mother's testimony, which Father does not mention in his brief, let alone dispute, made clear that Child does not handle change well, and awarding Mother primary physical custody over Child accommodates Child's need for consistency. The trial court's decision was therefore not clearly erroneous.

3. Father's argument that Mother delayed the proceedings fails.

[15] Father next asserts that Mother unnecessarily delayed the proceedings before the trial court, which adversely impacted his parental rights. We conclude that Father's argument is not supported by cogent reasoning. He does not direct us to a portion of the record that demonstrates where he preserved his argument that Mother should be charged with some unreasonable delay in the proceedings. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Moreover, he had a provisional custody and parenting time arrangement in place, and he does not explain to us how the implementation of a provisional arrangement failed to protect his rights during the pendency of the proceedings. See id. And, insofar as his argument here is that Mother excluded him from parenting opportunities or hid certain information from him, the trial court found Father to not be credible, and his argument on appeal is simply a request for our Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Father's argument on this issue therefore fails.

4. Father does not demonstrate that purportedly improper findings are reversible error.

[16] Father next takes issue with several of the trial court's identified “findings” as “not proper findings” because they are premised around what someone testified to or what certain evidence showed. Appellant's Br. at 20; see also Maddux v. Maddux, 40 N.E.3d 971, 974 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“Findings that indicate that the testimony or evidence was this or that are not findings of fact.”). But Father does not demonstrate why any of the purportedly improper findings require us to reverse the trial court's judgment. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a); see also Pitcavage v. Pitcavage, 11 N.E.3d 547, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (affirming the trial court's judgment “notwithstanding the trial court's faulty language” in its findings as the basis for the court's judgment was nonetheless clear). We therefore decline to do so.

5. The trial court's determination of legal custody is not clearly erroneous.

[17] Father next argues that the trial court's award of joint legal custody with the “caveat” that Mother gets final decision-making authority denies him true joint legal custody. Appellant's Br. at 21, 24. But Father cites no authority for the proposition that such an arrangement is not within the trial court's discretion. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Further, given Mother's historical consistency in attending to Child's education, therapeutic, and medical needs, and Father's historical absence from the same, we cannot say that the trial court's order on legal custody is clearly erroneous.

6. The trial court's award of the annual tax exemption to Mother is not clearly erroneous.

[18] Father also challenges the trial court's decision to award Mother with the annual tax-dependent exemption for Child. Father's essential argument here is that he has the higher income between the parents and, thus, should receive the exemption. But the trial court considered the parties’ respective incomes and living situations already. Further, the court ordered Mother to have primary physical custody over Child. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court's order that Mother is the one who may claim the annual tax exemption is clearly erroneous.

7. The trial court's child-support order is not clearly erroneous.

[19] We next address Father's argument that the trial court erred in its calculation of Father's weekly child support. In particular, Father argues that the court failed to include prior-born children who live with him in its calculation.¹ But Father acknowledges that he did not tender a Child Support Obligation Worksheet to the trial court. Appellant's Br. at 32. Further, while the parties testified to prior-born children who live with them, the court expressly found that Father presented no evidence regarding what support costs he might have for those children, and Father does not demonstrate that that finding is in error. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court's order on child support is clearly erroneous.

8. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Father to pay a portion of Mother's reasonable attorney's fees.

[20] Last, we address Father's argument that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay a portion of Mother's reasonable attorney's fees. Indiana Code section 31-14-18-2(a)(2) (2025) expressly authorizes a family law court to order one party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney's fees to the other party. “We review a trial court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion.” River Ridge Dev. Auth. v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before it, or the court “misinterprets the law.” Id.

[21] As we have long recognized:

In making such an award, “the trial court must consider the resources of the parties, their economic condition, the ability of the parties to engage in gainful employment and to earn adequate income, and such factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award.” A.G.R. ex rel. Conflenti v. Huff, 815 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider any misconduct by one party that causes the other party to directly incur additional fees. Id. “When one party is in a superior position to pay fees over the other party, an award of attorney fees is proper.” Id. at 127-28․

In re M.R.A., 41 N.E.3d 287, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[22] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Father to pay $4,000 toward Mother's reasonable attorney's fees. As Father elsewhere acknowledged, his income “is 73.68% of the joint income of the parties.” Appellant's Br. at 27. Further, the trial court found, and Father does not dispute, that Mother is unable to work a traditional job due to another of her dependents having severe autism. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Father to pay a portion of Mother's reasonable attorney's fees.

Conclusion

[23] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father also argues that the court erred when it did not include prior-born children who live with Mother. Father does not demonstrate to our Court that he has standing to make that argument, and we therefore do not consider it.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.